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AVANT-PROPOS
Volume 14 of the Journal of Civil Law Studies is published one
year behind schedule, proving the fragility and the resilience of the
operation. Fragility, as it was hit by a series of events, such as the
COVID pandemic that paralyzed many human ventures all over the
world. Fragility, because human causes impacted the personal life
of its major actors, such as the Editor-in-Chief’s unexpected longtime leave and the Managing-Editors moving to other places. Resilience, because editing continued thanks to devoted LL.M. graduates
who answered the call and joined the Center of Civil Law Studies as
Research Associates. Resilience, because the team did not give up
and the venture is too successful to fail. Volume 14 of 2021 comes
out as Volume 14 of 2021-2022. After Volume 15 of 2022-2023, the
Journal will try to come back to two annual issues matching the calendar year.
The Journal mourns the loss of the two Honorary Members of its
Advisory Board. Jacques Vanderlinden passed away on January 22,
2021. He started his academic career with a major study of codification, to then clarify the concepts of custom and sources of the law.
He was a great support, contributing four articles1 and a book review2 to the Journal. His scholarship and teaching embraced several
continents, namely, Africa, Europe, and America, connecting legal
history, comparative law, and legal anthropology. Rodolfo Sacco
died on March 21, 2022. A long-time professor at the University of
Turin, he authored major civil law and comparative law treatises,
renewed the theory of sources of the law, and changed Italy into a
powerful comparative law incubator. No comparative law professor
had as many followers, including the author of this note.

1. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Analyzing Property in Different Societies, 1 J.
CIV. L. STUD. 61 (2008); Jacques Vanderlinden, Aux origines de la culture juridique française en Amérique du Nord, 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2009); Jacques Vanderlinden, Is the Pre-20th Century American Legal System a Common Law System?
An Exercise in Legal Taxonomy, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2011); Jacques Vanderlinden, French Jurisdictional Complexity on the Fringe— Acadia 1667-1710, 12 J.
CIV. L. STUD. 33 (2019).
2. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355 (2015).
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Sacco and Vanderlinden–who were friends, within and beyond
academic life–will remain a fertile source of inspiration. Their last
day and year on this earth is a salute to the Journal, each combining
21 and 22. Each of them visited Louisiana State University. They
were mentors and friends of the Editor-in-Chief who used to have
them speak as a duet in Lyon each April, before migrating to Louisiana. While my assistant used to code the event “Sacco and Vanzetti,” I named it the printemps des comparatistes and participants
remember these sessions as an invigorating Rite of Spring. Sacco
and Vanderlinden both spoke in Baton Rouge in spring 2008, when
the Journées Capitant celebrated the Bicentennial of the Louisiana
Digest of 1808.3 This bouquet final must receive an echo when the
Center of Civil Law Studies and Journal of Civil Law Studies will
celebrate the Bicentennial of the Civil Code of Louisiana in 2025.
Two more Members of the Advisory Board passed away during
this period. Attila Harmathy, a longtime professor at the Eötvös University of Budapest who also served as a Justice of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court (1998-2007), was one of the finest civil law
and comparative law professors in Europe. His name comes first
when listing great jurists from Eastern Europe. He was the kindest
of men, a friend and mentor to many. He visited and taught at LSU
in the spring of 2007, and visited again in November 2018 to deliver
the 41st Tucker Lecture.4
Harvard Law School graduate Paul R. Baier embraced the civil
law tradition when he started his long teaching career at LSU. A
scholar and a playwright,5 he brought the dramatis personae to life
in the classroom, bringing objects, sound and image. A constitutional law scholar, he was a great supporter of the LSU civil law
program. His reflection on the constitution as code reversing the

3. Olivier Moréteau and Agustín Parise, The Bicentennial of the Louisiana
Civil Code (1808-2008), 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195 (2009).
4. Attila Harmathy, Changes in the Legal System: A Comparative Essay
Based on the Hungarian Experience, 12 J. CIV. L. STUD. 217 (2019).
5. Paul R. Baier, "Father Chief Justice": E. D. White and the Constitution,
A Play, 58 LA. L. REV. 423 (1998), PAUL R. BAIER, "FATHER CHIEF JUSTICE": E.
D. WHITE AND THE CONSTITUTION (La. Bar Found. 2011).
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more traditional perspective of code as constitution6 was saluted by
Justice Nicholas Kasirer, an invitation to pursue the combination of
both ideas in the years to come.7
In the meantime, may this volume honor the memory of these
great scholars, with a plurality of voices and a wealth of material.
By its content and authorship, Volume 14 embraces over twelve jurisdictions including Argentina, Azerbaijan, Canada, Chile, France,
Germany, Italy, Jersey, Louisiana, New Zealand, North Korea, Poland, Québec, and South Africa. Articles visit contract law and penalty rules, supreme court dissents in a civil law jurisdiction, civil
liability of corporate officers, and legal education in micro jurisdictions. While the full translation into Spanish of Book 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code is published in bilingual format, the Civil Law
Translations series opens to a rarely visited jurisdiction, publishing
the Civil Code of North Korea in bilingual format, with an introduction by the translator. Civil Law in the World visits Azerbaijan,
Chile, and South Africa. Professor Palmer’s research on the Lost
Translators of the Digest of 1808 is reviewed, as well as a linguistic
analysis of the doctrine of consideration, often compared to cause.
A rediscovered Letter by Colonel Tucker reviews the sources of the
early civil codes of Louisiana. Three student-written case notes conclude the volume, discussing recent decisions by Louisiana courts.
Patience has its rewards and readers, authors, contributors, and
editors deserve our thanks. Everyone should consider the present
Volume as a token of gratitude and appreciation for the hard work
and for the interest the Journal of Civil Law Studies has sparkled
since its foundation fifteen years ago, in Louisiana and beyond.
Olivier Moréteau

6. Paul R. Baier, The Constitution as Code: Teaching Justinian’s Corpus,Scalia’s Constitution, and François Gény, Louisiana and Beyond—Par la
constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2016). See also
Paul R. Baier and Georgia D. Chadwick, Judicial Review in Louisiana: A Bicentennial Exegesis, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 7 (2012).
7. Nicholas Kasirer, Postscript to The Constitution as Code by Paul R.
Baier, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 23 (2016).
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ABSTRACT
Few would deny that contract law is filled with default rules, but
there has been a great deal of scholarly debate about their purposes
and functions. Some American scholars have argued that there are
default rules that do not align with most parties’ expectations; indeed, they impose a burden on one or both parties if they are not
departed from. Departing from these default rules typically requires
one or both parties to share information that they might have otherwise kept to themselves. These have been called “penalty default
rules.” While there is a significant amount of scholarship on penalty
default rules in the United States, mostly by law and economics
scholars, civilian scholars have not paid much attention to this concept. In this paper, I bring the concept of penalty default rules out
* B.A. (York University), B.C.L., J.D. (McGill University). I am grateful
to Fabien Gélinas, Olivier Moréteau, and the anonymous peer reviewer for their
helpful comments.
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of the United States, the common law tradition and the law and economics scholarship. I demonstrate that there are many penalty default rules in Quebec contract law. I continue by arguing that these
penalty default rules serve two valuable functions. First, they enhance the parties’ freedom of contract by equipping them with information. I focus on how this enables them to reach a fair allocation of risks. Second, they complement the duty of good faith by supplementing the limited duty of disclosure and by altering what sort
of conduct is reasonable and therefore not abusive.
Keywords: penalty default rules, obligations, contracts, information
sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
It would be hard to imagine a world in which people enjoy the
freedom to form contracts without a legal system that has at least
some default rules in place. What would happen if parties render
their contract nonsensical or inoperative by overlooking a key detail? Default rules plug these gaps without inhibiting freedom of
contract since the parties remain free to depart from them. Thus, by
many accounts, default rules ought to resemble what parties hypothetically would have agreed to.1
But some have argued that default rules often do more than
simply fill gaps. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner coined the term “penalty default rule” to describe default rules that do not align with the
parties’ expectations, or at least create an undesirable outcome if
they are not departed from. This gives the parties an incentive to
depart from them.2 Ayres and Gertner also argued that penalty default rules are desirable because they, among other things,
1. See e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 CAL. L REV. 261 (1985).
2. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591
(1999).
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“encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third
parties (especially the courts)” since information sharing is necessary to depart from them.3 However, in response, Eric Posner argued
that there are no penalty default rules in American contract law,4 and
Eric Maskin argued that there ought not to be penalty default rules.5
Ayres responded with a blunt “ya-huh” and argued again that there
are and ought to be penalty default rules in contract law.6
In this paper, I contribute a new perspective to this debate, one
that comes from both a different country and a different legal tradition. I argue that there are penalty default rules in Quebec contract
law and that they serve valuable functions. I do so by analyzing four
aspects of contract law—contract formation, the content and interpretation of contracts, changed circumstances and remedies for
breach—to reveal an assortment of penalty default rules. Then, I argue that penalty default rules enhance parties’ freedom of contract
by facilitating the sharing of information between them. This enables parties to make informed decisions and to better protect their
own interests. I focus on how this facilitates the pursuit of a fair allocation of risks. Moreover, penalty default rules complement the
duty of good faith in two ways. One way is by encouraging information sharing in a wider range of circumstances than what is required by the duty of disclosure that is part of the duty of good faith.
Another is by informing what sort of conduct is reasonable and
therefore not abusive. Overall, I show that the concept of penalty
default rules that Ayres and Gertner outlined need not be confined

3. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91; See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal
Information, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1615 (1999); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991).
4. See Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law,
33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 563 (2006).
5. See Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 557 (2006).
6. See Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 557 (2006).
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to the United States7 or to the common law tradition, or even to law
and economics scholarship. Rather, it offers a useful lens through
which we can learn more about the nature and functions of contract
law in a wide range of legal systems, including in Quebec’s civilian
system.
The term “default rule” might, at first blush, seem to be confined
to the common law tradition. After all, most civilians would prefer
to use the term “suppletive rules” to describe rules that the parties
can depart from if they choose to. Suppletive rules, if understood
narrowly, are only those rules that clearly invite the parties to depart
from them. However, some of the penalty default rules that I identify
are not suppletive rules in this narrow sense; as I will note, they are
mandatory or imperative rules that can behave like default or suppletive rules in some situations. I consider these rules to be default
rules. Much like Ayres, “if something quacks like a duck and walks
like a duck,”8 I consider it to be duck. With this in mind, I suggest
that the concept of “penalty default rules” is best understood as a
“meta concept” that does not call any legal tradition home.9 Instead,
it can be used to describe concepts from different legal traditions,
including some default rules in the common law tradition, suppletive
rules in the civil law tradition and other rules that might not readily
seem like default or suppletive rules at all. Any rule that parties can
depart from, directly or indirectly, that imposes a burden on one or
both parties if they fail to depart from it could be called a penalty
default rule.

7. There is a limited amount of Canadian scholarship that engages with the
concept of penalty default rules. For an example of an article that engages with
the concept in the context of corporate law, see Mohamed F. Khimji & Jon Viner,
Oppression-Reducing Canadian Corporate Law to a Muddy Default, 47 OTTAWA
L. REV. 123 (2016). In the context of family law, see Robert Leckey, Cohabitants,
Choice, and the Public Interest, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHILDREN’S
AND FAMILY LAW 115 (Elizabeth Brake & Lucinda Ferguson eds., Oxford U.
Press 2018).
8. Ayres, supra note 6, at 593.
9. See generally Olivier Moréteau, The Words of Comparative Law, 6 J.
INT’L & COMP. L 183 (2019).
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I should emphasize that this paper stretches the concept of penalty default rules into a domain that Ayres and Gertner might not
have anticipated, not only because I bring it to a different jurisdiction that operates within a different legal tradition. This paper does
not offer an economic analysis. I do not focus, at least not directly,
on how penalty default rules may or may not enhance efficiency.
Rather, I borrow a concept that, while initially born out of scholarship from the law and economics movement, provides a useful lens
to analyse the notions of freedom of contract and good faith in Quebec. That said, for the sake of completeness and for the convenience
of readers who are not familiar with the existing scholarship on penalty default rules, I begin by briefly outlining the debate on penalty
default rules and their ability (or lack thereof) to enhance economic
efficiency.
II. SHORT (AND PARTIAL) SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN DEBATE
In their first article on this subject, Ayres and Gertner described
penalty default rules as default rules that are unappealing to at least
one party if they are not departed from. This gives the parties an
incentive to depart from them, and in so doing it forces them to reveal information to the other party.10 Ayres and Gertner went on to
argue that penalty default rules enhance efficiency.11
This idea eventually came under attack from two fronts at a symposium that led to papers in the Florida State University Law Review: one empirical and one normative. Posner analyzed the examples of penalty default rules that Ayres and Gertner offered, including the rule that is sometimes seen to have emerged in Hadley v.
Baxendale.12 In Hadley, an English court held that victims of
10. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91.
11. Id. at 93–95.
12. See Posner, supra note 4; see also Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng.
Rep. 145 (Eng.). However, it should be noted that this rule has deep civilian roots,
and that it emerged in common law jurisdictions prior to Hadley. See e.g. ROBERT
JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS, SELON LES REGLES TANT DU FOR DE
LA CONSCIENCE, QUE DU FOR EXTERIEUR 177 (Paris: Debure l’aîné 1764); Blanchard v Ely, 21 Wend 342 (NY Sup Ct, 1839); Joseph M Perillo, “Robert J. Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of Contract” (2005) 11:2 TEX. WESLEYAN
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breaches cannot recover damages for injury that was not reasonably
foreseeable or foreseen. Of course, injury could become foreseeable
if the party that might suffer the injury communicates this possibility
to the other party prior to the formation of the contract. But the default rule is that such loss will not be compensable if the adverse
party is not told that it might occur, unless the parties allocate the
risks of unforeseeable harm.13 According to Ayres and Gertner, this
rule is unappealing to a party that might suffer injury that is not reasonably foreseeable or foreseen by the other party, which is understandable because it would leave them without full compensation.
Therefore, it gives them an incentive to make the other party aware
of this possibility, which means that the rule serves as a “purposeful
inducement” that facilitates the sharing of information.14 Without
summarizing Posner’s entire argument, it suffices to say that he
challenged the idea that Hadley is a penalty default rule by arguing
that it often aligns with the parties’ expectations. Posner wrote that
“the usual reason for thinking that the Hadley rule is not a majoritarian rule is that it is counter to the notion of efficient breach.” Since
“the efficient breach theory says that contract damages should equal
actual loss” but “the Hadley rule excludes the unforeseeable portion
of any loss, [therefore] it is not majoritarian.” However, Posner argued that “this view…oversimplifies the analysis of optimal damages rules.” Expectation damages – the typical remedy for breach of
contract in the common law tradition – “force the breacher to provide insurance to the victim against whatever event causes the
breach.”15 The breaching party, who would have to pay expectation
damages to compensate for all injury caused by the breach, is not
always “the cheaper insurer” against any and all potential risks.
L. REV. 267; Robert M Lloyd & Nicholas J Chase, “Recovery of Damages for
Lost Profits: The Historical Development” (2016) 18:2 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 315;
Wayne Barnes, “Hadley v. Baxendale and Other Common Law Borrowings from
the Civil Law” (2005) 11:2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 627.
13. Id.
14. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 101.
15. Posner, supra note 4, at 574.
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Posner argued that “if this is right, then most parties would want
liability limited to foreseeable loss,”16 which means that the Hadley
rule aligns with most parties’ expectations.17
In reply, Ayres wrote that “[i]f we go far enough back behind the
veil of ignorance, all information-forcing rules are majoritarian.”18
With this apparent reference to John Rawls’ work,19 Ayres suggested that the Hadley default could align with a majority of parties’
expectations when it leads to “fully compensatory damages” or
when “a majority of contracting parties would prefer the rule that
deters the strategic withholding of information by an unrepresentative minority.”20 But for Ayres, Hadley is nevertheless a penalty default rule because “its efficiency stems from its inducing some contractors to contract around the default, rather than from enabling parties to save on the costs of contracting around it.”21 While Ayres
conceded that “the Hadley example is not the cleanest example of a
penalty default” since it does not “[induce] a majority of contractors
to contract around” it, it is nerveless an illustration of how penalty
default rules work because it shows “the informational impact of
contracting around was an important consideration in choosing
among competing defaults.”22
Maskin argued that Ayres and Gertner’s claim with respect to the
efficiency of penalty default rules is “logically in error.”23 In short,
Maskin argued that parties could reach a more efficient contract by
adhering to the Hadley default rather than contracting around it.24
Ayres replied that Maskin’s “counterexample merely displaces one
type of contracting cost with another,” therefore “it is hardly a serious challenge to the possibility that penalty defaults can be

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 575.
Id. at 574–575.
Ayres, supra note 6, at 612.
See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard U. Press 1971).
Ayres, supra note 6, at 612.
Id.
Id. at 613.
Maskin, supra note 5, at 557.
Id. at 561–562.
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efficient.”25 But regardless of whether it was Maskin or Ayres that
arrived at the most economically efficient calculation, both arguments overlook other potential benefits that flow from information
sharing that penalty default rules encourage. Therefore, I push beyond this debate to identify some of these other benefits in Quebec
contract law.
III. PENALTY DEFAULT RULES IN QUEBEC CONTRACT LAW
A. Contract Formation
The Civil Code of Quebec contains two penalty default rules that
apply to how contracts are formed, and more specifically to the
power of an offeror to revoke an offer. Parties, particularly sophisticated parties, probably expect that offers can be revoked by offerors at any time prior to acceptance, as is the case in every other
Canadian province26 and in the United States.27 Commercial expectations are often drawn from how the law is generally seen to operate. For example, this is why the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin
v. Hrynew28 recognized good faith as an organizing principle of contract law in common law provinces, explaining that part of its reason
for doing so was to align Canadian common law with commercial
expectations that are influenced by American and Quebec law.
Thus, the fact that Quebec is physically surrounded by, and has deep
commercial ties with, jurisdictions that allow offers to be revoked at
any time prior to acceptance suggests that parties, particularly those
that do some or even most of their business outside of Quebec,
would expect that this would hold true in Quebec as well. It could
also be argued that this expectation is intuitive or even commonsensical; if I offer to sell you something, we did not yet form an
25. Ayres, supra note 6, at 617.
26. See e.g., JOHN MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 83–90 (2d ed., Irwin
Law 2012).
27. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §42
(1981).
28. Bhasin v. Hrynew, [2014] S.C.R 71 (Can.).
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agreement, and in fact I probably did not even promise to sell it to
you. But the Civil Code of Quebec contains two default rules that
are inconsistent with this expectation.
First, unlike in other Canadian provinces and in the United States,
offers that are made with “terms,” which are best understood as
timelines for acceptance, cannot be revoked unilaterally by the offeror.29 These offers are almost like options contracts that are used
in common law systems; in both cases, the offeror is required to keep
the offer open. When one reads the articles in the Civil Code of Quebec that set out this rule, it appears to be a mandatory rather than a
default rule. Seemingly mandatory language, like “[w]here a term is
attached, the offer may not be revoked before the term expires,”30
leads to this perception. But this rule behaves like a default rule because an offeror can avoid it by simply not attaching a term to their
offer, or they could probably avoid it by indicating that the timeline
that they propose is not a binding term but instead a suggested timeline. Moreover, this rule behaves like a penalty default rule because
it imposes a burden on the offeror—presumably the party with more
information available to them at the time that the offer is made—by
holding them to the timelines that they propose unless they take deliberate action, which must involve communicating with the offeree,
to depart from it.31
Second, when an offer does not include a term, the offeror is nevertheless bound to keep it open for a reasonable amount of time if
the offeree indicates that they are interested in considering the offer.32 Again, this has the effect of creating what is almost an options
contract because it causes the offeror to lose their power of revocation. And again, while the Civil Code of Quebec establishes this rule
using what seems like mandatory language, it behaves like a default
29. C.C.Q. art. 1390 ¶2.
30. Id.
31. Even if a proposed timeline is more advantageous to the offeror than
what might otherwise be reasonable (i.e., what they might be held to if their offer
becomes the subject of a promise to contract, discussed below), requiring the offeror to keep the offer open for the duration of that timeline is still a burden on
them if they want the flexibility to revoke their offer whenever wish.
32. C.C.Q. art. 1396.
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rule because the offeror could exempt themselves from it by altering
their communication to change its status from an offer to what could
be called an ‘invitation to treat.’ For example, instead of saying “I
will sell you my diamond ring for $10,000,” which would likely be
an offer, one could say “I might be interested in selling you my diamond ring for $10,000; contact me if you want to discuss this further.” In the second scenario, the formal offer would likely only
come from the apparent offeree, and probably only after the parties
have communicated further to establish mutual interest in the transaction. Thus, by using carefully chosen language to depart from
what is effectively a default rule, the offeror can avoid being bound
to keep their offer open simply because the other party expressed
noncommittal interest. This is a penalty default rule because it subjects the offeror to a burden—that of having to keep their offer open
for a reasonable amount of time, which might not be desirable for
them—if they fail to depart from it.
Taken together, these two penalty default rules force the offeror
to either disclose the extent to which they are serious about the offer
being accepted or risk experiencing a burden that extends protections to the offeree. If someone makes an offer knowing that the offeree is not in a position to accept it yet—something that happens
frequently in large transactions where the offeree might, for example, need to secure financing before being in a position to seriously
consider whether they should accept the offer—they have an incentive to say so and to take steps to depart from these penalty default
rules.
B. Content and Interpretation of Contracts
Parties generally expect that clauses in their contracts will be
given legal effect, which is the general rule in Quebec. But in consumer contracts33 and contracts of adhesion,34 the Civil Code of
33.
34.

C.C.Q art. 1384.
C.C.Q art. 1379.
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Quebec sets out two exceptions that are penalty default rules. First,
art. 1435(2) provides that external clauses in consumer and adhesion
contracts are null unless the party that prepared the contract brought
them to the attention of the consumer or adhering party prior to the
formation of the contract or if they can prove that the consumer or
adhering party knew of them when the contract was formed.35 Second, art. 1436 provides that illegible or incomprehensible clauses
are null if they cause injury to a consumer or adhering party unless
the party that prepared the contract explained “the nature and scope
of the clause . . . to the consumer or adhering party.”36 Both of these
rules function as penalty default rules because they put a burden on
the party that prepared the contract (i.e., rendering these clauses
null) if they fail to take steps to communicate information about
these clauses to the consumer or adhering party in advance.
Arts. 1435 and 1436 are perhaps more effective than other penalty default rules that exist in other jurisdictions. J. H. Verkerke argued that, while many American penalty default rules do encourage
information sharing between the parties, they do not often lead sophisticated parties to clearly or effectively communicate information to less sophisticated parties because this information sharing
often takes the form of “boilerplate language in largely unread contract documents.”37 By contrast, arts. 1435 and 1436 ensure that
boilerplate language is unhidden, legible, and comprehensible.
Thus, there is at least a minimum amount of comprehensible communication between the parties in consumer and adhesion contracts,
even if it is true that most consumers and adhering parties will not
bother to make themselves aware of what has been communicated
to them. In these situations, the consumer or adhering party has at
least been provided with an opportunity to be fully informed of the
content of the contract. This perhaps does not go nearly as far as
“requiring an oral recitation of all or part of the contract, quizzing
35. C.C.Q. art. 1435.
36. C.C.Q. art. 1436.
37. J. H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 906 (2015).
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parties about their understanding of key contract terms, or perhaps
mandating the participation of an attorney in certain transactions,”38
but it at least gives most consumers and adhering parties a chance to
be properly informed. In reality, many consumers and adhering parties will not take advantage of this opportunity—whether we admit
it or not, most of us have not taken the time to read all clauses in
every consumer or adhesion contract that we have ever entered into
with care—but if parties have a fair opportunity to read and understand those clauses, there is a possibility that this penalty default rule
will have an impact on the parties’ behavior.
One might argue that arts. 1435 and 1436 are aligned with rather
than opposed to parties’ expectations and therefore they cannot be
seen as penalty default rules. By this view, parties would expect that
their consent only extends so far as to cover clauses that they were
aware of or could have reasonably been aware of, and that they
would therefore not expect their consent to cover unknown external
clauses or unexplained illegible or incompressible clauses. But it is
common for people to be presented with lengthy consumer and adhesion contracts that they might not bother to read from top to bottom.39 This often happens online when people sign up for digital
accounts or purchase goods. Usually, a lengthy set of clauses will
appear, and the adhering party will have the opportunity to accept
them within seconds through a click of their mouse or a tap of their
finger. Thus, it would be difficult for one to argue that parties have
a reasonable expectation that all clauses in contracts will be brought
explicitly to their attention since they regularly scroll past and click
to accept contracts the content of which they do not fully know. One
day, this might change. Indeed, there is (at least arguably) some indication that consumer and adhesion contracts in Canadian common

38. Id. at 907.
39. Indeed, in a recent paper, Aditi Bagchi went so far as to argue that boilerplate or adhesion contracts should be regarded as the norm. See Aditi Bagchi,
Risk-Averse Contract Interpretation, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2019).
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law provinces will need to be made shorter and more legible,40
which might cause parties’ expectations to shift. But at the moment
it is likely that parties do not expect that there are default rules like
arts. 1435 and 1436 that penalize the party that prepared a contract
if they fail to protect the consumer or adhering party by sharing certain information.
Another penalty default rule—one that has been identified in the
American literature41—is contra proferentem interpretation of contracts. According to this canon of interpretation, ambiguous contracts are interpreted in a manner that disfavors their drafters. Courts
rarely turn to contra proferentem interpretation because, so long as
“the words of the contract are clear, the court’s role is limited to
applying them to the facts before it.”42 If the words are ambiguous,
courts must look contextually for the common intention of the parties consistent with a holistic reading of the contract.43 However, art.
1432 provides that if this exercise still leaves courts with doubts,
they must resolve these doubts in a manner that favors the debtor in
a contract that was open to negotiation, or “[i]n all cases . . . in favor
of the adhering party or the consumer.”44 This means that contra
proferentem interpretation is available for at least some ambiguous
consumer and adhesion contracts. While this might look like a mandatory rule because it does not openly invite parties to depart from
it, it is best understood as a default rule because it can be ignored if
the contents of contracts are made clear, particularly through clear
drafting.45 Further, it is best understood as a penalty default rule
40. See Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.R. 16, 71 (Can.) (in
which the majority wrote that an inequality of bargaining power, which is one part
of the test used to determine whether contracts can be set aside for unconscionability, can arise because one party could not understand the content of an adhesion
contract due to, for example, “dense or difficult to understand terms”).
41. See e.g., Ayres, supra note 6, at 596.
42. Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc., [2017] SCC 43, para. 36
43. See C.C.Q. arts. 1425–1431.
44. C.C.Q. art. 1432. See also Didier Lluelles, Les règles de lecture forcée «
contra proferentem » et « contra stipulatorem » : du rêve à la réalité, 37 R. J. T.
235 (2003).
45. Ayres, in defending the position that contra proferentem can be seen as
a default rule, argued that “resolving the ambiguity [in the contract] through an
act of interpretation is analogous to filling the obligational gap with a default.
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because it gives parties that prepare contracts, especially consumer
and adhesion contracts, a strong incentive to draft clearly. If they
fail to do so, they could find themselves in a burdensome situation
in which their ambiguous clauses are at best not given full legal effect or at worst given an effect that will harm them.46 Thus, it is
difficult for these parties to hide their true intentions behind ambiguous terms in contracts; art. 1432 forces them to share enough information through clear drafting so that the court can discern a common
intention of the parties in order to avoid contra proferentem interpretation.
C. Changed Circumstances
Parties generally expect that contractual obligations will be performed, or at least that damages will be paid. However, many endeavors that contracts facilitate run the risk of being upended by
changed circumstances. The Civil Code of Quebec contains some
recognition of this reality. Although parties have a broad duty to fulfil their contractual obligations,47 arts. 1470 and 1693 provide that
they can be excused from liability for non-performance if the injury
caused by their failure to perform results from a “superior force.”48
A superior force must be both “unforeseeable” and “irresistible;”
this means that it could not have been foreseen by a reasonable person in the position of the parties when the contract was formed and
that there is nothing that could have been done to stop it.49 Although

Where that act of interpretation is carried out according to a predictable rule, parties will contract around it just as they would a pure statutory default.” See Ayres,
supra note 6, at 596.
46. As Ayres put it, “[t]he contra in contra proferentem rightly suggests a
penalty; the interpretative presumption is not chosen because we think that the
most negative interpretation is what the drafter or even the draftee normally wants,
but rather because the rule of construction is a stick to force drafters to educate
nondrafters.” See Ayres, supra note 6, at 596.
47. C.C.Q. art. 1590.
48. C.C.Q. art. 1470.
49. See SEBASTIEN GRAMMOND, ANNE-FRANÇOISE DEBRUCHE & YAN CAMPAGNOLO, QUEBEC CONTRACT LAW ¶363–644 (2d ed., Wilson Lafleur 2016);
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there are some inconsistencies in the jurisprudence,50 few risks are
considered to be truly unforeseeable.51 Even fewer risks are considered to be truly irresistible. As Vincent Karim notes, “any resistance
by the debtor to the event must be ineffective, useless and futile…such that it is absolutely and permanently impossible for them
to perform the obligation.”52 Thus, arts. 1470 and 1693 are of little
help to parties that fail to allocate the risks associated with many, if
not most, unforeseen circumstances.
If they are far enough behind the veil of ignorance—that is, if
they do not yet know whether they might benefit from or suffer because of a change in circumstances—parties will likely expect that
the law will require that, at minimum, contractual obligations be revised or renegotiated in the event that they are harmed. But there is
no provision in the Civil Code of Quebec that grants relief to parties
in circumstances that do not meet the high bar of superior force.
Thus, in order to give legal effect to their expectations, parties need
to reach an agreement on how the risks of circumstances changing
will be allocated. If they fail to do so, they run the risk of being left
without recourse if a major change in circumstances that is not quite
a superior force comes along in the future and harms them.
While it is common for parties to be far behind the veil of ignorance in the sense that neither expects that a major change in
VINCENT KARIM, 2 LES OBLIGATIONS, paras 3774, 3779 (5th ed., Wilson Lafleur
2020).
50. See e.g., Gestion Initiative Développement GID Ltée v. Québec New
York 2001, 2004 CanLII 647 ¶11 (Can. Qc. S.C.). In this case, the parties agreed
that “les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001, à deux pas du site de l’exposition, constituaient une force majeure” [the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, close to the exhibition site, was a superior force]. Faced with different facts,
the Superior Court held that “les tragiques incidents survenus le 11 septembre
2001 ne constituent pas un événement de force majeure pour Bombardier
puisqu’ils n’en ont pas le caractère suffisant au terme du contrat intervenu entre
les parties et qu'ils ne rencontrent pas plus les critères définis par la loi” [the
tragic incidents that occurred on September 11, 2001 do not constitute a superior
force for Bombardier because they do not have the required carachter based on
the contract between the parties and they do not meet the criteria established by
law]. See Caisse Desjardins de St-Paulin v. Bombardier Inc., [2008] QCCS 3725
(Can.)
51. See PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN AND NATHALIE VÉZINA, LES OBLIGATIONS
844–849 (7th ed., Yvon Blais 2013).
52. KARIM, supra note 49, para. 3779 [translation by author].
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circumstances will occur, it is not difficult to imagine situations in
which one of the parties knows more about how circumstances
might change than the other. But even in these situations, the party
with more information might still find themselves behind the veil of
ignorance to the extent that they do not know whether or not they
will benefit from a change in circumstances. For example, a manufacturer of hand sanitizer could conceivably benefit from a pandemic due to increased demand or they might be harmed because
they will be stuck selling their product for a fixed price when they
could have sold it to other customers that are suddenly willing to
pay more. Thus, even parties that know more information will probably want to allocate the risks associated with at least some changes
in circumstances. If they fail to discuss these risks with the other
party and reach an agreement, they are penalized by being left without recourse unless there is a superior force. Arts. 1470 and 1693,
taken together, can therefore be seen as a penalty default rule. It is a
default rule because it can be departed from, and it penalizes the
parties if they fail to initiate a discussion on the topic by depriving
them of protections that they might want while they are still behind
the veil of ignorance. Even if one party does not know more information than the other, arts. 1470 and 1693 still operate as a penalty
default rule by denying both parties the opportunity to make themselves feel more comfortable with the amount of risk that they are
taking on in the contract unless they have a discussion and agree on
who will bear the risks of circumstances changing.
D. Remedies for Breach
Without rehashing the debate, which was briefly discussed earlier, about whether Hadley is a penalty default rule, I should note
that the Hadley rule has deep civilian roots.53 It is thus unsurprising
53. See e.g., ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, supra note 12, at 177. See also
Blanchard v Ely, 21 Wend 342 (NY Sup Ct, 1839) at 348–350; Joseph M Perillo,
Robert J. Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11:2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267 (2005); Robert M Lloyd & Nicholas J Chase, Recovery of
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that the Civil Code of Quebec contains a provision that is similar to
the Hadley rule. Art. 1613 provides that “the debtor is liable only for
damages that were foreseen or foreseeable at the time the obligation
was contracted” if the breach is not the result of “intentional or gross
fault” on the part of the breacher.54 One easy way to render injury
that might otherwise be too remote foreseen is for the party with
knowledge of the potential for such injury to alert the other party. If
they fail to do so, art. 1613 penalizes them in the event of a breach
by denying them recovery for such injury.
IV. VALUE OF PENALTY DEFAULT RULES IN QUEBEC
So far, I have revealed that there are a number of penalty default
rules in the Civil Code of Quebec that facilitate the sharing of information. The party that knows less stands to benefit from the existence of penalty default rules either because they favor them if they
are not departed from or because the other party will act on their
incentive to share information. While the benefits that these rules
provide to parties with less information if they are not departed
from, such as protections against the revocation of an offer, might
seem obvious, the benefits that these rules provide when they are
departed from might be less apparent. Therefore, in what follows, I
discuss two major benefits of information sharing that is facilitated
by penalty default rules. First, it enhances the parties’ freedom of
contract. Second, it complements the duty of good faith.
A. Enhancing Freedom of Contract
Information sharing that is facilitated by penalty default rules enhances parties’ freedom of contract by equipping them with information that can help them reach fair agreements. Although freedom
of contract has been defined as the freedom for “autonomous and
Damages for Lost Profits: The Historical Development, 18:2 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 315
(2016); Wayne Barnes, Hadley v. Baxendale and Other Common Law Borrowings
from the Civil Law, 11:2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 627 (2005).
54. C.C.Q. art. 1613.
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self-interested parties” to form any contract,55 meaning “that
the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not
the law,”56 the Supreme Court of Canada has recently recognized
that “[a]t the heart of this theory is the belief that contracting parties
are best-placed to judge and protect their interests in the bargaining
process.”57 This relies on the assumption that there is at least a degree of equality between the parties.58 Of course, there is room for
“economically rational actor[s] engaged in commercial negotiation[s] . . . to achieve the most advantageous financial bargain . . . at
the expense of the other negotiating party,”59 which might be seen
as part of the broad concept of freedom of contract. But this freedom
is not absolute. As Justice Binnie wrote, “[f]reedom of contract, like
any freedom, may be abused.”60 Although I have thus far referred to
common law cases and materials, the idea that freedom of contract,
like other rights,61 is not absolute is well entrenched in Quebec civil
law.62 Therefore, it could be said that a proper understanding of freedom of contract in Quebec would include the assumption that, while
parties have the freedom to agree to whatever they wish that is
within the bounds of public order, both parties should have a shared
understanding of at least some information so that they can interact
on a somewhat level playing field.63 When penalty default rules facilitate the sharing of information, the party that would have had less
information is better equipped to negotiate clauses that reflect the
realities revealed by that information and to decide whether they
want to enter into the contract at all. Penalty default rules therefore
55. MCCAMUS, supra note 26, at 24.
56. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59 (Oxford U. Press 2004).
57. Heller, supra note 40, at ¶56.
58. Id.
59. Martel Building Ltd. v. Canada, [2000] SCC 60 ¶62 (Can.).
60. Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), [2010] SCC 4 ¶118 (Can.).
61. See e.g., C.C.Q. art. 7.
62. See generally 6362222 Canada inc. v. Prelco inc., 2021 SCC 39, § 39.
63. Indeed, Pierre-Gabriel Jobin and Nathalie Vézina note that, while freedom of contract is an important tenet of contract law in Quebec, it has never been
endorsed in its most extreme form. See JOBIN & VÉZINA, supra note 51, at ¶84.
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serve to enhance the parties’ freedom of contract by equipping the
party with less information with the information that they need to
negotiate.
When parties engage in pre-contractual negotiations, the penalty
default rules that I identified which apply at this stage enhance the
parties’ freedom of contract by shaping how the parties negotiate.
As previously discussed, if an offeror makes an offer without disclosing how serious they are about the offer being accepted, the law
will effectively presume that they are serious and it will therefore
build in protections for the offeree against sudden revocation of that
offer. These protections impose a burden on the offeror. For example, if A offers to sell B gold at the present day’s spot price but the
spot price fluctuates upward a few days later, A stands to miss out
on the opportunity to sell the gold for more money if B accepts the
offer. A would probably want to revoke the offer before B could
accept it, but unless they told B in advance that they might do so,
this would probably not be allowed. B therefore enjoys either protection or disclosure in advance of the potential for sudden revocation. The benefits for B are obvious if the default rules are not departed from. Yet, if the default rules are departed from, both B and
A stand to benefit from the information sharing that would be required to depart from them. If, for example, A tells B that the offer
is only open for a short period of time, such as 24 hours, B cannot
reasonably rely on the offer being open for longer than that. A would
not need to worry about opportunistic acceptance of the offer beyond that set period of time. Alternatively, if A tells B that the offer
could be revoked at any time, B will either be wary of devoting too
much energy to pondering whether to accept the offer or at least do
so having been forewarned that this endeavor could leave them
empty-handed.
Ultimately, by A sharing information with B about the seriousness of the offer—otherwise put, whether there is a risk of sudden
revocation—both A and B are better positioned to protect their own
interests in the negotiation process. B could, for example, reject an
offer that is not sufficiently serious on the spot, perhaps because it
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will not leave them with enough time to consider it, which would
enable both B and A to move on to other endeavors. Alternatively,
B might tell A that, given only a small amount of time to consider
the offer, they would only be in a position to consider it if the price
is lower, which would prompt negotiations between A and B. A
might agree to lower the price (thus putting a new offer on the table),
or B might walk away. In the first scenario, the risk of revocation
would be built into the final offer, and more likely into the price to
be paid or some other clause that is important to the parties. Regardless, by A giving B an assessment ahead of time of the risk of revocation of the offer, A and B are both better positioned to allocate the
risks of sudden revocation during their pre-contractual negotiations,
or if they cannot manage to do so, to move on to other endeavours.
This enhances their freedom of contract because it allows both of
them to negotiate on more realistic terms and to ultimately end up
with an offer that both are satisfied with or to part ways sooner than
they otherwise would have if they cannot find an agreeable solution.
Likewise, the penalty default rules that apply to the content and
interpretation of contracts facilitate information sharing that enhances the parties’ freedom of contract. Take, for example, arts.
1435 and 1436 which require that certain clauses in consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion be brought to the attention of the
consumer or adhering party when the contract is formed. Of course,
the consumer or adhering party will often stand to benefit from these
penalty default rules when they apply by protecting them from disadvantageous clauses. But if the party that prepared the contract decides to depart from them, the consumer or adhering party is often
better empowered to protect their own interests. If they, for example,
are made aware of a clause that is seriously disadvantageous to
them, they might decide not to enter into the contract at all or insist
that the problematic clauses be modified. If, for example, the party
that prepared the contract would have allocated a great deal of risk
to the consumer or adhering party, the consumer or adhering party
might refuse to enter into the contract unless the price is lowered.
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Of course, in such a situation, the contract would no longer be an
adhesion contract because the clauses of the contract would have
been negotiated, but by that point arts. 1435 and 1436 would have
already done their information-forcing work.64 Contra proferentem
interpretation of contracts that is sometimes required by art. 1432
serves a similar function by ensuring that clauses, including those
that might be disadvantageous for the drafting party, are either clear
or interpreted in a manner that favors the non-drafting party. Additionally, if enough consumers and adhering parties choose “exit”
over “voice,”65 this could cause systemic change by encouraging
parties that prepare consumer or adhesion contracts to more fairly
allocate risks between the parties so that fewer people refuse to enter
into those contracts. In any event, consumers and adhering parties
will enjoy enhanced freedom of contract because they will be empowered to take some steps to protect their own interests, or at least
to be forewarned about potentially disadvantageous clauses even if
they do not take any steps to protect their interests.
The penalty default rule that applies to changed circumstances
also serves to equip parties to more fairly allocate risks. If one party
knows that there is a risk of circumstances changing in a way that
will harm them, they have a strong incentive to share this information with the other party in order to avoid being left without recourse if that risk materializes. If that party stands to benefit from
those changed circumstances, perhaps they will not have the same
incentive to share that information with the other party, but it could
be argued that they would be required to do so as part of the duty of
good faith. Parties must disclose information that they knew or
ought to have known which is of decisive importance that the other
party could not have discovered themselves, or if the other party
reasonably relies on the other party to disclose it.66 If one party
64. Ultimately, stronger parties will sometimes have a direct incentive to stay
away from consumer or adhesion contracts.
65. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (Harvard U. Press 1972).
66. See Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 SCR 554 (Can.), at 586–
587.
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withholds information about a serious risk that circumstances might
change that will benefit them, particularly at the expense of the other
party, it might not be difficult to argue that this test could be met. In
either case, the party with less information is likely going to be informed, which could spark negotiations about the allocation of risks.
For example, if circumstances are somewhat likely to change in a
manner that will harm the buyer, they might ask for a lower price in
order to make it economically rational for them to move forward
with the transaction. There is also the possibility, which is perhaps
more common, that both parties will be equally far behind the veil
of ignorance as to the risk of circumstances changing. In these situations, while there is no foreseeable risk that one party is incentivised to tell the other party about, the parties will nevertheless be incentivized to engage in negotiations as to who is best placed to bear
the risk of changed circumstances because they will want to avoid
the possibility that they find themselves in a seriously disadvantaged
position and without recourse if circumstances change. The party
that bears more risk than the other might ask to be compensated in
some way, such as through a more favorable price. In both cases, the
penalty default rules that apply to changed circumstances give the
parties incentives to negotiate a fairer allocation of risks. This enhances their freedom of contract because it equips both of them with
the tools to better protect their own interests by presumably either
taking on less risk or being compensated for taking on more risk
than the other party.
Finally, the penalty default rule that excludes unforeseeable or
unforeseen injury from compensation is another tool that facilitates
the fair allocation of risks. If one party knows that they will suffer
injury that would not be reasonably foreseeable in the event of a
breach, they have a strong incentive to tell the other party about it
during pre-contractual negotiations so that they are not left without
recourse for that injury. When this happens, the other party is essentially told that they are taking on additional risk, and this could
prompt them to either ask for a more favorable price, to seek other
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modifications or to not enter into the contract at all. This enhances
their freedom of contract because it equips them to protect their own
interests in the face of varying levels of risk. Likewise, it enhances
the other party’s freedom of contract because it makes it feasible for
them to enter into contracts that might otherwise be undesirable for
them. If they know that they might suffer some sort of injury that is
not reasonably foreseeable if the contract is breached but they also
know that they cannot possibly have recourse for that injury if it
occurs, they might not enter into the contract at all. Ultimately, by
sharing information and thus departing from this penalty default
rule, both parties have the opportunity to negotiate a fairer allocation
of risks. While this is easiest to visualize when one party knows of
the potential for unforeseeable injury to flow from a potential
breach, it is also true when both parties are equally far behind the
veil of ignorance as to whether unforeseeable injury might occur. In
such circumstances, the harshness of the penalty default rule—that
no unforeseeable injury is compensable—might give the parties incentive to allocate some or all the risks of unforeseeable injury in
order to make the contract more desirable for them. One party might
feel more comfortable or be better equipped to take on that risk, and
in exchange they might ask for a more favorable price. It is also
possible, considering Posner’s analysis,67 that the parties will accept
this default rule as a desirable allocation of risks. But even if this
happens, the parties may have discussed the nature of this rule (or at
least recognized it themselves) and therefore they would have come
to an agreement on how the risk of unforeseeable injury should be
allocated. Overall, regardless of whether this penalty default rule is
departed from, the parties will be equipped to negotiate a fair allocation of risks and to decide not to enter into the contract at all.

67.

See Posner, supra note 4.
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B. Complementing the Duty of Good Faith
Penalty default rules serve a second valuable function in Quebec
by complementing the duty of good faith. Parties owe each other a
duty of good faith at all times,68 which can manifest itself in many
forms, such as a duty to disclose information69 or to not exercise
rights abusively.70 In this section, I demonstrate that penalty default
rules build on top of the duty of good faith. First, they often give
parties with additional information incentives to disclose more information than what the duty of good faith requires. Second, they
can alter what it means to act reasonably and therefore to not exercise rights abusively.
1. Disclosure of Information
As part of the duty of good faith, parties are sometimes required
to disclose information to each other. The Supreme Court of Canada
outlined a test to gauge whether disclosure is necessary in Bank of
Montreal v. Bail Ltée.71 One has a duty to disclose information if
they have “actual or presumed” knowledge of it, if that information
is “of decisive importance” and if it was either impossible for the
other party to find that information out themselves or if they legitimately relied on the first party to disclose it.72 Penalty default rules
might therefore seem, at first blush, to have a redundant function
since information sharing is sometimes required (not merely incentivized). But this duty of disclosure is limited. In some situations,
penalty default rules incentivize the sharing of information that does
not need to be disclosed in order to comply with the duty of good
faith.
Take, for example, the penalty default rules that give parties an
incentive to share information about the seriousness of their offers.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See C.C.Q. art. 1375.
See e.g., Bail, supra note 66.
See e.g., Houle v. Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122 (Can.).
Bail, supra note 66.
Id. at 586–587.
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While it might not be hard to argue that an offeror has actual
knowledge of the seriousness of their own offer and that the other
party would often have no way to discover that information themselves, it is not always the case that this information is of decisive
importance to the offeree. In some cases, an offeree might only be
prepared to consider accepting an offer that was made very seriously. But it is not hard to imagine situations in which an offeree is
prepared to rely on an offer regardless of whether it was made very
seriously. A start-up might, enamored by the prospect of taking their
business to the next level, make internal arrangements to eventually
form a lucrative contract with a multinational corporation if that corporation makes them an offer. Of course, this reliance might be
based on an assumption that the offer was made seriously, but it
would not be hard to argue in at least some cases that the start-up
would rely just as heavily on an offer made less seriously. A prospective contract can sometimes be so alluring that it is rational to
make arrangements to enter into it even if it is not certain or even
likely that it will be eventually formed. Think of distributors who
invest considerable efforts to get their products into big box stores,
or start-ups that create products with the sole intention of trying to
convince large companies to acquire them. In these situations, it
would therefore be challenging to demonstrate that the offeror
would be required to disclose the seriousness of their offer to the
offeree under the duty of good faith. But penalty default rules incentivize the sharing of this information. In this example, the offeror
would need to disclose the seriousness (or lack thereof) of their offer
in order to depart from the default rules that would extend protections to the offeree. Once equipped with this information, the offeree
becomes better placed to decide whether it is worthwhile for them
to rely on the offer being open for acceptance.
The same could be said about the penalty default rules that incentivize the sharing of information about the content and interpretation
of contracts. In consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion, the
presence of certain clauses might not be of decisive importance to
the consumer or adhering party. It is common for consumers and
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adhering parties to sign pre-prepared written agreements without the
presence or absence of certain clauses being of decisive importance
for them. David Heller, the representative plaintiff in Uber Technologies v. Heller,73 relied on his contract with Uber to earn a living,
and it is therefore not a stretch to say that he would have entered into
the contract even if the arbitration clause that was later impugned
had been written in plain language and printed in bold red ink. He
might not have liked the clause—in fact, we know that at least in
retrospect he did not like it—but it would be hard to claim that the
presence or absence of the clause was of decisive importance for Mr.
Heller because his livelihood depended on that contract. But even
though this information might not rise to the level of decisive importance—and is therefore not subject to a duty to disclose required
by the duty of good faith—the penalty default rules on the content
and interpretation of contracts would give the party that prepared the
contract a strong incentive to disclose it or at least make it available
in legible and easily accessible text.
It is also not hard to imagine situations in which the risk of circumstances changing would not be of decisive importance. While I
noted earlier that there could be situations in which the duty of good
faith would require the disclosure of such information, this is not
always the case. Take, for example a publicly held corporation that,
after a few quarters of poor performance, is eager to boost its stock
price. If it can enter into a contract that will boost its stock price
quickly, it might want to do so even if there is a possibility that circumstances will change to its detriment. This might seem improbable because corporate directors and officers owe the corporation a
duty of care and a fiduciary duty,74 which includes a duty to protect
its long-term interests,75 but so long as the directors and officers can
show that their decision was reasonable, courts will defer to their
73. Heller, supra note 40.
74. See e.g. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, §122(1).
75. See BCE Inc v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] S.C.R. 69 ¶38 (Can.);
Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] S.C.R. 68 (Can.). See
also In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

2021-2022]

QUEBEC PENALTY DEFAULT RULES

31

business judgement.76 It could be seen as sound, or at least reasonable, business judgement to enter into a contract that would temporarily boost a corporation’s stock price with the hope that this will
inspire confidence in the corporation that will lead to more growth
in the future. In these circumstances, a duty to disclose would not
arise because the information about the potential that circumstances
will change would not be of decisive importance. But the penalty
default rule that applies to changed circumstances would give the
parties an incentive to disclose information that they know about the
potential for circumstances to change, at least when they either stand
to be harmed by those changed circumstances or when they are sufficiently far behind the veil of ignorance that they cannot know
whether they will be harmed or will benefit. Of course, the penalty
default rule does not do a perfect job of incentivizing the sharing of
information in all cases. If the party that knows about the potential
for changed circumstances stands to benefit from those changes and
no duty to disclose is triggered, they will probably opt not to share
that information with the other party. That said, the penalty default
rule and the duty of disclosure work together to force or incentivize
the sharing of information about the potential for changed circumstances in many, if not most, situations.
Likewise, the risk of unforeseeable injury in the event of a breach
might not be of decisive importance for parties that rely heavily on
contracts, such as for their livelihoods, particularly if they do not
expect that there will be a breach. But parties might still be incentivized to disclose information about unforeseeable injury by art.
1613 if they either know that they could suffer this injury upon
breach or if they are sufficiently far behind the veil of ignorance that
it is rational for them to act as if they might be harmed. Unlike with
changed circumstances where it is conceivable that one could benefit from unforeseen events, it is hard to imagine that anyone would
benefit from injury to themselves. Therefore, this penalty default

76.

BCE, S.C.R 69 at 75; Peoples, S.C.R 68 at 75.
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rule encourages even more information sharing than the penalty default rule that applies to changed circumstances.
2. Reasonable Conduct and Abuse of Right
By incentivizing information sharing, penalty default rules complement the duty of good faith in another way: by changing what it
means to act reasonably (including in the exercise of legal rights) in
some circumstances. One concept that fits under the broad umbrella
of good faith is “the civil law framework of abuse of rights.” Under
this framework, “it is no answer to say that, because a right is unfettered on its face, it is insulated from review as to the manner in
which it was exercised.”77 Rather, parties must act reasonably in the
exercise of their rights, meaning that they must not intentionally
harm others or act in an objectively unreasonable manner.78 Put another way, they must not act “imprudently or negligently, in an intemperate manner or with an intention to harm.”79 Courts can objectively assess whether conduct is reasonable “by reference to the conduct of a prudent and diligent individual.”80 While this standard is
objective, it takes context into account; courts consider how a reasonable person would have acted in the circumstances.81 If a party
knows additional information due to the circumstances, so will the
reasonable person.82 Therefore, if the circumstances surrounding the
contractual dealings between parties—including penalty default
rules—result in more information being shared, this could alter what
would count as reasonable conduct in the circumstances.

77. C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45, para. 68.
78. See C.C.Q. art. 7; see also Houle, supra note 70.
79. Wastech Services Ltd. v. Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage
District, 2021 SCC 7, para. 109
80. Houle, supra note 70, at 164. See also Méthot c. Banque de développement du Canada, 2006 QCCA 649.
81. See St Lawrence Cement Inc v. Barrette, [2008] S.C.R. 64 ¶71 (Can.).
See also JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN, PATRICE DESLAURIERS & BENOIT MOORE, LA
RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 161 (8th ed., Yvon Blais 2014).
82. See e.g., Labelle v. Gatineau (Ville), [1960] BR 201 (Can.).
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For example, what is reasonable and therefore not abusive can be
influenced by the parties’ shared understanding that circumstances
might change. This can come about because of the penalty default
rule that applies to changed circumstances, which incentivizes the
parties to disclose known risks and to allocate unknown risks. Consider, for example, the facts in Houle v. Canadian National Bank.83
Canadian National Bank suddenly recalled a corporation’s loan and
gave only three hours for it to be repaid while negotiations were underway for its shares to be sold. This led to the shares being sold for
significantly less than they would have otherwise been sold for. Under the contract, Canadian National Bank had the right to recall the
loan whenever it wanted to.84 But the Supreme Court of Canada held
that Canadian National Bank abused this right by acting unreasonably.85 While it was considered to be unreasonable to suddenly recall
the loan in these circumstances, this might have been different if the
parties had shared information about or allocated the risks of potential changes in circumstances when the contract was formed. Imagine that the Canadian National Bank told the debtor corporation’s
directors that, if there is a serious risk that the shares will be sold to
third parties, they could feel less comfortable with the loan, perhaps
because they prefer to lend money to corporations whose directors
they know and trust. New majority shareholders in a closely held
corporation will probably mean new directors, and the bank would
therefore no longer trust the corporation. If that had happened, it
would be more difficult to argue that recalling the loan would be
abusive because the debtors were forewarned that this might happen.
Even the three-hour delay might not have been abusive if, for example, the bank only found out about the pending sale on short notice.
Ultimately, the same action—suddenly demanding payment—
which is abusive in some situations might not be abusive in other
situations, which could be influenced by how much information the
parties share with each other when the contract is formed.
83.
84.
85.

Houle, supra note 70.
Id. at 130–133.
Id. at 167–176.
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V. CONCLUSION
As I have shown, there are many penalty default rules in Quebec
contract law that serve valuable functions. Although the concept
emerged in the American law and economics literature, it is a useful
tool to understand default rules in other jurisdictions and even other
legal traditions. Penalty default or suppletive rules should not be
seen as simply gap-fillers; rather, as I have shown, they can play a
much greater role by enhancing the parties’ freedom of contract and
by complementing the duty of good faith. With this in mind, my
hope is that this paper will serve as an invitation to think more about
the role of default rules—particularly penalty default rules—in Quebec and in other civilian jurisdictions.
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common law have traditionally treated dissents, introduces the
basic elements of British philosopher J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, applies Austin’s concept of performatives to dissents, shows examples from the supreme courts of both Argentina and the United
States, and finally makes the plain-language case as another compelling argument for clarity in dissents to propose the abandonment
of a practice that is not truthful to reality and seriously limits the
understanding of the Argentine Supreme Court decisions. The whole
discussion is presented as a jurilinguistic exercise, combining law
and language analysis.
Keywords: dissents, performatives, speech-act theory, judicial discourse, law and language, jurilinguistics, plain language, genre analysis, Supreme Court, Argentina
I. INTRODUCTION
Argentina is a civil-law country, but it has imported a considerable part of its constitutional design and some of its constitutional
doctrines from the United States.1 This influence has been so significant that Argentina has been described as a “civil law nation with a
common law touch.”2 One aspect in which Argentina sets itself apart
from its civil-law counterparts is Supreme Court opinions. While
decisions issued by the highest courts in other civil-law countries
usually do not state the names and the specific opinions of each justice,3 Argentina has chosen to follow the American common-law
1. See, e.g., MANUEL JOSÉ GARCÍA MANSILLA & RICARDO RAMÍREZ
CALVO, LAS FUENTES DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL. LOS PRINCIPIOS FUNDAMENTALES DEL DERECHO ARGENTINO (LexisNexis 2006); and MANUEL JOSÉ GARCÍA MANSILLA & RICARDO RAMÍREZ CALVO, LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL Y LA
OBSESIÓN ANTINORTEAMERICANA (Virtudes 2009).
2. See Santiago Legarre & Christopher R. Handy, A Civil Law State in a
Common Law Nation, a Civil Law Nation with a Common Law Touch: Judicial
Review and Precedent in Louisiana and Argentina, 95 TUL. L. REV. 445 (2021),
and Alberto F. Garay, A Doctrine of Precedent in the Making: The Case of the
Argentine Supreme Court’s Case Law, 25 SW. J. INT’L L. 258, 269 (2019).
3. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 37
(2d ed., Stan. U. Press 1984):
[T]he tendency is for the decisions of higher courts in civil law jurisdictions to be strongly collegial in nature. They are announced as the
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model, in which the names and opinions of individual justices are
known. The judgments issued by the Argentine Supreme Court indicate the name of the justices and their individual opinions, if any.
Justices may join the majority or plurality, may concur, or may dissent. One of the consequences of this system is that justices may
express their disagreement from the majority by writing a dissent,
which in Argentina takes the form of an alternative disposition of
the case. Dissents are unheard of in many other civil-law countries,
such as France4 or Italy,5 though dissent writing is a widespread
practice in other civilian jurisdictions, such as Spain, Colombia,
Brazil, or Chile.
While Argentina has imported from the American common law
the tradition of publishing dissents, if any, together with majority
opinions (or plurality opinions, for that matter) in cases decided by
the Supreme Court, it has copied the tradition with a defect. Dissents
issued by Argentine Supreme Court justices use performative language as if they were actually deciding a case, and that is simply not
true. As such, Argentine Supreme Court dissenting justices are liars,6 in linguistic terms. In the end, a dissent is nothing but an alternative view of how a case should have been decided. Conversely, in
the United States dissenting judges express their opposition to the
main opinion with the language of suggestion, using modal verbs
such as “would” or “should.”
This remark may seem trivial at first sight, but considering that
citizens at large are usually interested in the Supreme Court decisions given the transcendental role of the highest judicial body in the
decision of the court, without enumeration of votes pro and con among
the judges. In most jurisdictions separate concurring opinions and dissenting opinions are not written or published, nor are dissenting votes
noted. The tendency is to look at the court as a faceless unit.
4. See DAVID POLLARD, SOURCEBOOK ON FRENCH LAW XXVII (CAVENDISH
PUBL’G 1998).
5. See JEFFREY S. LENA & UGO MATTEI, INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW
111 (KLUWER 2002).
6. Martin Shapiro, Judges As Liars, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 155
(1994) (the epithet is actually used here for the reluctance of judges to recognize
that they actually create the law and not that they merely apply it).
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nation, justices should do away with this tradition and be clearer in
how they express themselves. Also, being clearer in dissenting also
favors experts who read Supreme Court opinions on a daily basis as
part of their work. Writing dissents using performative language as
if they were actually the law only infuses confusion in the reader.
This article will analyze the concept of dissents and their place in
the civil law and the common law, will explain what performatives
are in the theory of British philosopher J. L. Austin and how this
linguistic concept is relevant to the notion of dissents, will include
examples of parts of American and Argentine dissents for comparative linguistic analysis, and will finally make a proposal for change
that is in line with the linguistic theory underlying performatives and
modern plain-language approaches.
II. DISSENTS IN COMMON-LAW AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS
As dissents are typically described as a distinctive feature of
common-law opinion writing, we need to bring the common law
into the conversation and compare its approach with that of the civil
law. The focus, however, will be mainly on the American common
law. One of the many differences of the approach to the law between
the common law and the civil law is the treatment of published dissents. To put it simply, published dissents are commonplace in the
common law, but a rarity in the civil law, at least theoretically. This
sharp distinction is not so clear-cut in every single case, as some
higher courts in civil-law systems regularly publish dissents, such as
the case of the Argentine Supreme Court being analyzed here.7
Michael Kirby provides a good account of the features of dissents in the common law or, in other words, the reasons why dissents

7. For another example of a civilian jurisdiction whose highest court publishes dissents, see Stanisław Goźdź-Roszkowski, Communicating Dissent in Judicial Opinions: A Comparative, Genre-Based Analysis, 33 INT. J. SEMIOT. LAW
381 (2020) (discussing the differences and similarities in how dissents are expressed in the United States Supreme Court and the Poland Constitutional Tribunal).
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are commonplace in common-law court decisions.8 The first of these
reasons is the oral tradition.9 Common-law judges usually heard
cases in the courtroom and decided on the spot. Such exposure to
public criticism led judges to express their views before their audience, and that view could be the majority view or a dissenting opinion. The second reason is the judges’ background.10 In the common
law, judges are appointed (and, in the United States, sometimes
elected) after having been distinguished practitioners for several
years. Thus, a judge tends to consider the judiciary as a continuation
of his or her legal career. And that career consists in exercising independent judgment to solve legal conflicts. The idea is that judges
come to the bench with, and because of, their intellectual individuality. Common-law judges rarely see themselves as part of the government bureaucracy tasked with solving conflicts. The third reason
is the notion of what the role of courts is.11 Due to their training as
lawyers, common-law judges have a knack for providing sound arguments; at times they might even improve the arguments of the
parties. As their opinions are authoritative beyond the case at hand,
they strive to make the best arguments possible so that their reasoning may endure. Also, stating their arguments in the most persuasive
way is what they did when they practiced the profession.
Another feature that factors in is the model of courts in terms of
judicial review. In the United States, as the courts are entitled to
quash laws on grounds of their inconsistency with the constitution,
judges are expected to be prudent in their exercise of such a broad
power. The provision of convincing reasons, based on the law, has
proven to be essential to exercise this power. These courts require
the exposition of all views, even when they might differ and occasionally clash. Yet another feature for Kirby is that common-law
judges are expected to render dissenting opinions, when they deem
8. Michael Kirby, Judicial Dissent — Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 123 L. Q. REV. 379 (2007).
9. Id. at 384.
10. Id. at 387.
11. Id. at 388.

40

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

it appropriate, as one further step in the process of governmental
transparency.12 When it started hearing and deciding cases and for
the first decade of its existence, the United States Supreme Court
announced its decisions following the practice of the King’s Bench,
i.e., through seriatim opinions of its members.13 Afterward, Justice
Marshall, who was concerned about the Court speaking with one
voice to strengthen the constitutional structure of the nation, adopted
the practice of announcing the decision of the Court in a single opinion to which the majority assented.14 The United States Supreme
Court was established in 1789 and published its first dissent in
1806.15 After this date, the publication of dissents became standard
practice in the United States Supreme Court.
Common-law judges, according to Kirby,16 are also prone to dissenting when they deem it appropriate because they expect that dissents may cast light on a certain issue which will be decided properly
in the future. It is not uncommon that the view reflected in a dissent
is ultimately reflected in a statute or in a subsequent majority opinion. Courts also have an important pedagogical function in the common law: law professors teach based on cases. Judges are aware of
this reality and many dissents result from the feeling of a judge who
believed that law students (and the academic community at large)
should pay attention to a given issue from a different perspective.17
12. Id. at 392 (drawing a comparison with the civil law: “The assertive, seemingly dogmatic, style of judicial reasoning in the traditional civil law countries is
rather unsatisfying, even dismaying, to those brought up in the more transparent
and discursive approach of the reasoning of common law courts.”).
13. Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of
Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1958-1959) (containing a detailed
analysis of the evolution of the practice of opinion writing in the United States
Supreme Court). Seriatim opinions are individual opinions by the judges deciding
the same matter, instead of a single opinion for the whole court.
14. Id. at 193.
15. See Simms & Wise v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 2 L.Ed. 446 (1806). See
also ZoBell, supra note 13, at 195.
16. Kirby, supra note 8.
17. Justice Antonin Scalia, a renowned dissenter, was famous for saying that
he wrote his dissents for law students. See ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS:
REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 271 (Christopher J. Scalia
& Edward Whelan eds., Crown Forum 2017).
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Other authors have said that dissents have an important and
long-lasting influence after the case has been decided, “in shaping
and sometimes in altering the course of the law,”18 that they are “an
appeal to the intellect of tomorrow,”19 and that they show “that the
case was well considered.”20 As a matter of fact, dissents may subsequently become binding after an overruling.21 In the common law,
dissents serve the very important function of subjecting established
rules to the process of evolution.22 As common law is, in essence,
judge-made law, how a judge dissents in a case may be a good basis
for a majority decision in the future and a draft dissent may even be
useful in reaching consensus in a court.23 Multi-judge courts with an
odd number of members are a sign that judges are expected to disagree.24 While some negative views have been expressed,25 dissents
are a reality in legal practice.
18. Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM.
JUD. SOC. 78 (1942).
19. Robert G. Simmons, The Use and Abuse of Dissenting Opinions, 16 LA.
L. REV. 497 (1956).
20. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315, 333 (1936).
21. Pintip Hompluem Dunn, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and
the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 523–524 (2003):
The act of overruling can transform the statements written in a dissenting
opinion into an authoritative source. . . . By quoting from the dissent, the
Court incorporates the dissent’s language into the majority opinion. The
very act of writing these words, in the proper context with the proper
authority, transforms such words into an authoritative source on which
future judges can rely.
22. Simmons, supra note 19, at 498.
23. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (2010) (discussing the practice of Justice Brandeis, who used to write dissents and bury them “if the majority made ameliorating alterations or, even when
he gained no accommodations, if he thought the Court’s opinion was of limited
application and unlikely to cause real harm in future cases.”). A book was even
published with all the dissents Justice Brandeis decided not to publish; see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK (Harvard U. Press 1957).
24. Joe W. Sanders, The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana, 23 LA. L.
REV. 673 (1963).
25. See William A. Bowen, quoted in Sanders, supra note 24 (“the Dissenting
Opinion is of all judicial mistakes the most injurious”). See also article 19, Canons
of Judicial Ethics, American Bar Association (“Except in case of conscientious
difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.”). Speech given by Judge Learned Hand at Harvard Law School on Feb. 6, 1958, quoted in Michael A. Musmanno, The Value of
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Europe shows a surprising approach toward dissents. While the
European Court of Justice does not permit dissents,26 the European
Court of Human Rights allows for that possibility. Judges appointed
to the European Court of Human Rights have a tendency to show
their independence and integrity, and oftentimes their opinions are
contrary to their countries of nationality.27 At the same time, in the
different individual countries that are part of the European Union,
two models of opinion-writing coexist: France28 and Italy29 follow
the traditional civil-law model, and do not publish any dissents,
while countries such as Germany and Spain have built on the American model and do publish individual votes and dissents. These different approaches to opinion-writing are also reflected on other features of the opinions: French and Italian decisions are relatively
short and declare the law, while German and Spanish decisions are
longer, more wide-ranging, and even have a literary taste.30
Dissents have been traditionally considered a rarity in the civil
law, especially in light of French judicial practices, which were in
force before the codification movement.31 In many civil-law
Dissenting Opinions 29 PA. BAR ASSOC. Q. 268 (1958) (a dissent “cancels the
monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.”).
26. See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJC 115,
9.5.2008, p. 210–229, tit. III, art. 35 (“The deliberations of the Court shall be and
shall remain secret.”) and art. 36 (“Judgments shall state the reasons on which
they are based. They shall contain the names of the Judges who took part in the
deliberations.”).
27. Kirby, supra note 8, at 33.
28. POLLARD, supra note 4 (“In France, the decision is that of the court, rather
than a collective decision of individual judges. The court is a collegiate body and
there is no place for dissenting judgments.”).
29. LENA & MATTEI, supra note 5 (“[C]ontrary to the practice in common
law countries, separate opinions — whether dissenting or concurring — are not
announced. In other words, appellate decisions appear as unanimous and anonymous decisions of the Court.”).
30. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 145 (Oxford U. Press 2000).
31. ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 59 (Butterworths
1998):
Despite the fact that in all higher courts there is a plurality of judges,
there is only one judgment, and no dissenting opinions are expressed.
This results from the theory of unity; on the basis that the written law is
one (la loi est une) a judgment made in application of the law can only
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jurisdictions, the decisions of higher courts are published without
specifying how each individual judge voted. There is a deeper sense,
it is alleged, of collegiality, and the aim is trying to send the message
that what is important is the final decision of the court as a whole,
regardless of the particularities of individual judges. As Merryman
put it, “the tendency is to think of the court as a faceless unit.”32
Some have even said that dissents are incompatible with the continental European legal tradition, that they are tantamount to adopting
foreign law, and that they may result in an academic exercise without any legal consequences.33
Anyway, whether one is for or against dissents, the reality is that
the Argentine Supreme Court has departed from the general civillaw convention34 and it is not unusual at all that decisions on important matters where one or more judges disagree contain something else than a collegial, majority decision. The Argentine Supreme Court issues (a) unanimous opinions; (b) majority opinions;
(c) plurality opinions; (d) concurring opinions; and (e) dissenting
opinions.35 This article only discusses and criticizes the way dissents
are written at the highest court in Argentina.
III. DOING THINGS WITH WORDS: PERFORMATIVE USE OF
LANGUAGE
The whole point of this article is based on a simple idea: Argentine Supreme Court dissents should not be written with performative
be expressed in the form of a single majority decision. The practice originated in the Ancien Régime, in which the written law was one, as being
the expression of the king as sole legislator; the judgments of the Parlements were therefore expressed in the same form.
32. MERRYMAN, supra note 3, at 38.
33. Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, 8 JURIDICA INT’L 163 (2003).
34. The Argentine Supreme Court started hearing cases in 1863 and the first
published dissent in the Argentine Supreme Court dates back to 1877, written by
Justice Saturnino M. Laspiur in the case XL “D. Lino de la Torre sobre recurso
de habeas corpus,” Fallos 10:231 (1877).
35. For an explanation of how cases are distributed for decision among justices in the Argentine Supreme Court, see Genaro R. Carrió, Don Quijote en el
Palacio de Justicia (La Corte Suprema y sus problemas), LA LEY 1131 (1989).
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language. To get there, we first need to revisit the concept of “performative utterances” or “performatives.” British philosopher
J. L. Austin is to be given credit for coining these terms and describing what lies underneath them.36 He was convinced that the phenomenon described was widespread and obvious, and yet not much attention had been paid to it. This theoretical framework to understand
how language is used came to be known as “speech-act theory.”37
Philosophers had assumed that statements could only describe a
state of affairs or state some fact, and any such statement could be
true or false. But, Austin said, there are utterances which are not
verifiable and are, instead, part of doing an action.38 For example,
saying “I name this ship Queen Elizabeth,” while smashing a bottle
against the hull of a ship, or saying “I bet you 10 dollars the LSU
Tigers will win the game.” None of these utterances is true or false,
nor do they describe anything; these utterances do what they predicate. As they perform an action, Austin proposed the term “performatives.”39
But uttering words that spark a change in the reality is not an act
of magic. It is always necessary that the circumstances surrounding
the words uttered be appropriate. It is necessary that the speaker or
somebody else also perform other actions or even utter other words.
In the example given above, the person naming the ship must have
adequate authority to do so. If, let us suppose, the board of directors
of the company owning the ship had decided that the person who
would throw the bottle at the ship to name her will be the president
of the company, it is not possible for the chief financial officer to
36. JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 1 (2d ed., James O.
Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., Harvard U. Press 1975).
37. For an explanation of the theory as applied to judicial opinions, overrulings in particular, see Dunn, supra note 21.
38. AUSTIN, supra note 36, at 6.
39. Id. at 7. Austin justified the choice of this term as being the most overarching term for all utterances that qualify as performatives. He even mentioned
that H. L. A. Hart told him that lawyers use the term “operative” for the clauses
of an instrument that serve to effect the transaction; that is the main object of the
instrument, while the rest “recites” the context in which the transaction takes
place.
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conduct such task.40 As we will see below, this consideration is of
the utmost importance in the law. As for the substance of this study,
while a dissenting judge has the authority to issue a dissent and express his or her judicial opinion on how the case should be resolved,
the single opinion of that judge will have no performative value unless he or she has the support of the required number of fellow
judges (and in that case, it follows, we would not be talking about a
dissent anymore).
In Austin’s terms, a dissent using performative language would
be an example of an unhappy performative utterance. Let us see
why. Austin has described the requirements for a performative utterance to function smoothly or happily. In other words, what is required for a purposed performative to be an actual performative?
The answer to this question in the context of judicial dissents, as we
shall see, is the crux of this article.
Austin establishes six rules that must be met for a performative
utterance to be such:
- A(1) There must be an accepted conventional procedure
having a certain effect, which should include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances; and
- A(2) the particular persons and circumstances must be
the appropriate ones to invoke the relevant procedure.
- B(1) The procedure must be executed by all participants
both correctly and
- B(2) completely.
- C(1) If the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or to cause a certain
conduct by any participant, then the person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have
those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend to so conduct themselves, and also
- C(2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.41
40. Unless, of course, there is an authorization from the president to delegate
his or her powers to the chief financial officer but let us assume that such is not
the case in this example.
41. Id. at 14–15.
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Failure to satisfy any of the six rules renders the utterance unhappy.42 In A and B, if the requirements are not met, there is no performative utterance at all. In the ship-naming example, if the one
crashing the bottle on the ship hull is not the president of the company but a sailor without any authorization, his or her act, even after
having pronounced the correct words, produces no effect. Austin
calls this infelicity effect a misfire.43 In the cases of C, the effects of
not complying with requirements 1 and 2 do not result in the voidance of the performative utterance. Instead, the act is achieved, but
in insincere circumstances which render the act an abuse of the procedure. A good example of C is a false promise. For instance, Peter
promises to convey a tract of land to Laura in exchange for $50,000,
but Peter knows he will sell it for $75,000 to Covey. Peter has no
intention to stand by his promise; he made a promise, but it is a false
promise. This type of infelicity is an abuse, in Austin’s terms.44 The
consequence of a misfire is that the act produced is void and of no
effect; the consequence of an abuse is that the act is “hollow” or not
consummated. This article does not discuss abuse; instead, we will
focus on misfiring.
In both A.1 and A.2, Austin identifies the infelicity of misinvocation of a procedure, because (a) there is no proceeding or (b) the
proceeding cannot be made to apply in the way attempted.45 When
the procedure exists, but cannot be applied as purported, Austin uses
the term misapplication.46
The claim in this article is that a judge writing a dissent using
performative utterances falls within the infelicity described by Austin as a misinvocation. The performative utterances in a dissent are
of no operative value—they do not produce any changes in the reality. This does not mean that the dissent does nothing; it surely has

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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argumentative or pedagogical value, but it does not produce the act
of adjudicating a case.
An example adapted to the ship-naming situation will help clarify this concept. If a person is walking by the harbor and sees the
ship that the president is supposed to christen, but instead of waiting
for the president takes the task upon himself and smashes the bottle
against the hull of the ship pronouncing the words “I hereby name
this ship the Mr. Oliver Cromwell,”47 we can all agree that the ship
has not been named via that act. How so? Well, even if that person
pronounced the words that are typically expected to be used when
naming a ship, he had no authority to utter the performative which
would change the reality in that very specific context and circumstances, i.e., giving a name to the ship.
This is very similar to what happens when a dissenting opinion
uses performative language. A judge writing a dissent with performative language acts like the person walking by the harbor who
took it upon himself to christen the ship in the example above. To
go deeper into this consideration, we first need to explore the nature
of the work of courts and judges in general.
Judges have jurisdiction, i.e., the power or authority to say or
declare the law (from the Latin juris dictio).48 When a judge pronounces a sentence against a defendant, whether in writing or orally,
the pronunciation or the writing on paper of the sentencing words is
the act of sentencing.49 These words do not describe a previous act
that took place earlier; instead, they modify the reality creating a
new state of things. A free man sentenced to imprisonment changes
his status right after the sentence is pronounced. Jurisdiction, however, is not without limits. A court cannot hear any case; typically,

47. Example adapted from id. at 23.
48. Jurisdiction, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Clarendon Press
1989).
49. Saying or writing “I pronounce the defendant guilty” is a type of performative termed “verdictive statement” by Austin. See AUSTIN, supra note 36, at
42–43; see also Dunn, supra note 21, at 502.
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a court will be constrained by jurisdiction over the persons and over
the subject matter, and venue, among other considerations.
In collegiate courts, the draft opinion that gets the greatest number of votes is the one that decides the case. If a case has been decided by an absolute majority, the resulting opinion is a majority
opinion. For example, if a case pending before the Supreme Court
of the United States results in a division of justices on two sides and
five justices vote one way, and the other four do not agree, the prevailing view will be that of the majority opinion, that is, the opinion
written by the five justices. If an opinion, however, has the support
of four justices, and two others issue concurring opinion in a given
sense, and the remaining three issue another concurring opinion, the
prevailing opinion is that voted on by the four initial justices. Although that plurality opinion will decide the case, the force of the
decision is somehow reduced, because it did not have the support of
the court’s absolute majority. Whether an opinion has the support of
a majority or a plurality, that decision will control the case being
decided. Concurring opinions join the majority or plurality, but with
different arguments. We can say that in all of these cases, the language of the judges is performative. When a majority says “the judgment by the lower court is reversed,” for example, by that very utterance the decision of the court below is quashed.
The language of dissents, however, is different.50 A dissent does
not decide the case. As a dissent is not backed by the required
50. Another peculiar case is what happens with “exhortative judgments.” In
the first years of the 20th century, the Argentine Supreme Court has been including exhortations to the other branches of government so that they take measures
to realize what the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court itself, requires. These
appeals to act are a relative innovation in the Argentine Supreme Court practice,
to the extent that the Court had traditionally limited its role to decide a case at
hand. These exhortations may be perceived as an overreach in the power to adjudicate cases. Their efficacy as speech acts is completed by the exhortation itself,
but their legal efficacy depends on the actual reaction of the branches of power
exhorted—they may ignore or observe the exhortation. See Martín Böhmer, Una
aproximación retórica a las sentencias exhortativas, II JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 285 (2012) (discussing the ruling in F., A. L. s/medida autosatisfactiva, in
which the Court “exhorted” the Executive to implement and enforce medical protocols for legally-authorized abortions and the Judiciary to refrain from hearing
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number of judges, it has no authority to decide a case. A judge writing a dissent can only express his or her opinion on how the case
should or could be decided, including his or her arguments. By definition, the language of a dissent cannot be performative. As we shall
see below, dissents attached to opinions of the Supreme Court of the
United States make it clear that they do not dispose of the case, but
that is not what happens with the opinions issued by the Argentine
Supreme Court.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
We should now bring all the concepts discussed in this article
down to earth and see examples of the way dissents are written in
the courts of last resort in Argentina and the United States. For this
purpose, I will only focus on the dispositive part of opinions, without delving into the facts or issues involved in the cases cited.
This is the disposition of a case decided by the Argentine Supreme Court in 2018:
Therefore, after the Attorney General of Argentina has issued the pertaining opinion, it is appropriate to grant certiorari, admit the extraordinary appeal filed and, based on the
grounds already explained, affirm the decision appealed
against. Be this communicated and be these proceedings
sent back to be added to the main case file. Carlos Fernando
Rosenkrantz (dissenting). Elena I. Highton de Nolasco. Juan
Carlos Maqueda (separate opinion). Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti
(separate opinion). Horacio Rosatti (emphasis added).51
cases involving legally authorized abortions). See also Néstor P. Sagüés, Las sentencias constitucionales exhortativas (“apelativas” o “con aviso”), y su recepción en Argentina, LA LEY 1461 (2005) (discussing a thorough classification of
the types of opinions issued by the courts).
51. Fallos: 341:1768 (2018):
Recurso de hecho deducido por Batalla, Rufino en la causa Hidalgo Garzón, Carlos del Señor y otros s/ inf. art. 144 bis inc. 1 —último párrafo—
según ley 14.616, privación ilegal libertad agravada (art. 142 inc. 1), privación ilegal libertad agravada (art. 142 inc. 5), inf. art. 144 ter 1° párrafo
—según ley 14.616—, inf. art. 144 ter 2° párrafo —según ley 14.616-,
homicidio agravado con ensañamiento - alevosía, sustracción de menores de diez años (art. 146) — texto original del C.P. ley 11.179 y supresión del est. civ. de un menor.
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And this is a dissent issued by Justice Rosenkrantz in that very
same case:
Therefore, after hearing the Attorney General of Argentina,
certiorari is granted, the extraordinary appeal is admitted,
and articles 10, 2, and 3 of Law No. 27362 are held to be
unconstitutional, and the judgment appealed against is
hereby reversed. Be this communicated and remanded, so
that the relevant court renders a new judgment consistent
with this opinion.52
A reader who is unfamiliar with the procedure of the Argentine
Supreme Court would be baffled after reading this set of contradicting dispositions. How is it possible that the same opinion affirms the
lower’s court judgment and, at the same time, reverses it?
Let us now take a look at how the Supreme Court of the United
States deals with the same situation. This is the heading and disposition of the majority opinion in a 1991 case:
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 500. . . .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.53

Original text in Spanish:
Por ello, habiendo dictaminado la Procuración General de la Nación, corresponde hacer lugar a la queja, declarar admisible el recurso extraordinario interpuesto y, por los fundamentos expuestos, confirmar la decisión recurrida. Hágase saber y remítase a los fines de su agregación a
los autos principales. Carlos Fernando Rosenkrantz (en disidencia).
Elena I. Highton de Nolasco. Juan Carlos Maqueda (según su voto). Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti (según su voto). Horacio Rosatti. (translated into
English by the author)
52. Id. Original text in Spanish:
Por ello, y oída la señora Procuradora General de la Nación, se hace lugar
a la queja y al recurso extraordinario, se declara la inconstitucionalidad
de los artículos 10, 2° y 3° de la ley 27.362 y se revoca la sentencia
apelada. Notifíquese y remítase a fin de que, por intermedio de quien
corresponda, se dicte un nuevo fallo con arreglo al presente. (emphasis
added) (translated into English by the author)
53. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 306 (1991).
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And this is the Justice Stevens’s dissent, in its pertinent part:
“Justice Stevens, dissenting. . . . Thus, the priority question in this
case was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals and its judgment
should be affirmed. . . . I would therefore affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.”54
The U.S. dissent is much clearer. Even the nonlawyer can easily
understand that something has been decided with a majority vote,
and that is the disposition of the case, and something else was said
in the dissent. That dissent, whatever its content, does not adjudicate
the case. The U.S. dissent does not use performative language, but
language of suggestion. Modal verbs “would” and “should” convey
the idea that whoever is writing is expressing a wish as to how things
should be. Other typical ways of concluding dissents in the U.S. Supreme Court are simply “I dissent,”55 “With all due respect, I dissent,”56 or “I respectfully dissent.”57
A judge writing a dissenting opinion has no authority to decide
the case on his or her own. In courts with several members, as already explained, decisions are made by a majority or a plurality. The
opinion of judges in collegiate bodies is only authoritative if it is
backed by the sufficient number of colleagues. A dissent, therefore,
has no authority to cause any changes in the reality. Dissents are the
province of argumentation and are there to serve purposes of different natures, as discussed in section II of this article.
Writing a dissent with performative language leads to confusion,
especially for students, who have to read piles of cases for their legal
training. When reading a lengthy opinion—and important decisions
rendered by the Argentine Supreme Court are usually lengthy—one
can easily forget what has been said ten pages above. After reading
several pages of a decision, one could be at a loss knowing if what
is being read is the majority opinion, a concurrent opinion, or a
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 708 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Simpson v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 972, 974 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
Mack v. Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 900, 901 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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dissent. Getting to the end of a dissent issued by a justice of the Argentine Supreme Court only makes things worse, as one could read
the dispositive part of a dissent as if it were the majority opinion,
and one could understand the case the other way around! A rewritten
version of the Argentine Supreme Court example would read like
this: “Therefore, after hearing the Attorney General of Argentina,
certiorari should be granted, the extraordinary appeal should be admitted, and articles 10, 2, and 3 of Law No. 27362 should be held
unconstitutional, and the judgment appealed against should be reversed (emphasis added).”
Dissents are always written using performative language in the
decisions of the Argentine Supreme Court. This choice is not about
a personal style of judges—all justices have traditionally been writing dissents with performative language. This reality leads to think
that we are faced with one of those traditions whose only reason for
existence is continued and unreasoned practice.58 Some authors
have suggested that the problem with dissents goes deeper than the
linguistic level. The way dissents are written actually reveals that
there is no real dialog among the justices or, if there is dialog, it is
below the desirable levels, as published opinions do not account for
that interaction. When there is a dissent, the majority does not mention it, and the dissent does not mention the reasons in the majority.
This problem has been labeled an “exchange of the deaf.”59
58. Argentine Supreme Court decisions have also sparked criticism for an
unnecessary proliferation of individual votes when there is a fractured majority.
See Santiago Legarre, Mayoría fracturada y precedente horizontal, LA LEY. SUP.
PENAL (2020) (discussing the complex web of concurring and dissenting opinions
in Ramos v. Louisiana and comparing that approach with the way the Argentine
Supreme Court deals with similar situations. The American model is praised for
highlighting the differences, while the Argentine approach is portrayed as causing
reader confusion. Argentine justices rewrite the majority opinion almost verbatim,
only changing the sections they disagree with. The whole process leads to extremely lengthy opinions whose disentangling requires highly intensive attention).
59. Alberto F. Garay, La Corte Suprema debe sentirse obligada a fallar conforme sus propios precedentes. Aspectos elementales del objeto y de la justificación de una decisión de la Corte Suprema y su relación con el caso “Montalvo,”
II JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 870–892, 879:

2021-2022]

ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT DISSENTS

53

V. THE PLAIN-LANGUAGE CASE FOR CLARITY IN DISSENTS
Another argument to advocate that dissents not be written with
performative language is plain language.60 According to the Plain
Language Federation,61 “A communication is in plain language if its
wording, structure, and design are so clear that the intended readers
can easily find what they need, understand what they find, and use
that information.”62 A court opinion needs to be considered a type
of “communication” in the wide sense of the word for these purposes. While in a court opinion there is no bilateral communication,
as the court merely conveys its decision of how the case is decided,
it is communication in the sense that the opinion conveys the decision to the parties.63
After reading many Supreme Court decisions where there was no unanimity, one oftentimes realizes that neither the majority nor the dissent
reciprocally refute their arguments. Some take a certain position and the
remaining a different one, but none of them tries to prove how mistaken,
inappropriate, or lacking in arguments the other position is. Both opinions may be read in isolation, as if they were independent acts, when
both are actually part of the same decision. These cases, which are not
few, are the archetype of what I understand is not rational debate. . . .
[W]hen one side ignores what the other side said, the final product ends
up looking more like what we would call an ‘exchange of the deaf’ rather
than a rational debate about the interpretation of the Argentine Constitution (translated by the author).
60. The basic reference in this area is MARTIN CUTTS, OXFORD GUIDE TO
PLAIN ENGLISH (4th ed., Oxford U. Press 2013). For a general review of the birth
and development of plain language in the United States, see Karen A. Schriver,
Plain Language in the U.S. Gains Momentum: 1940-2015, 60 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION 343 (2017).
61. This federation was founded in 2007 and is the result of the joint efforts
of three preexisting organizations: Center for Plain Language (United States),
Clarity International (United Kingdom), and the Plain Language Association International (Canada). Given the prestige of the entities which form the Federation
and the professionals behind them, this definition has been widely accepted as
authoritative in plain language studies.
62. See International Plain Language Federation, https://perma.cc/JJN3AWPH.
63. See, e.g., Robert Eagleson, Judicial decisions: acts of communication, 71
CLARITY 11 (2014) (“In giving a decision we are communicating the law.
. . . [B]anding down a decision is not just an application of the law to a particular
situation but also an act of communication to win acceptance from others . . .”).
See also Francis Bennion, Judicial Decisions: a riposte and a retort, 71 CLARITY
14 (2014) (opposing the communicative purpose of judicial decisions: “The purpose is to resolve a dispute by applying the law to it.”). See, finally, Robert
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A comprehensive plain-language approach to opinion writing in
general and dissent writing in particular requires adopting a position
on who the addressees or intended readers of court opinions are.
Identifying the addressees in this case, in turn, requires resorting to
the concept of discursive genre in the law. The communicative situation is not the same in all legal texts—for these purposes, a statute,
a legal memorandum, and a court opinion are very different, to name
just a few examples. Each of these discursive genres is inserted in a
specific communicative situation. The predominant view for lawyers is that the addressees of judgments are other legal professionals.64 Legal translation scholar Susan Šarčević has suggested that a
difference should be made between direct addressees (law enforcement officers and other judges) and indirect addressees (the parties)
of court opinions.65 She emphasizes that the focus on other judges
as primary addressees has to do with precedents that are binding on
the same or lower courts.66 Other authors have used the term “double
voice” for the multiple addressees of judicial opinions and have put
the parties at the forefront.67 In any case, as to judicial opinions, the
Eagleson, Judicial Decisions: A Retort, 71 CLARITY 15 (2014) (“Because the resolution is in terms of the law, and not on any other basis, judgments set out the
law. Judges . . . do not simply declare the finding, but also add their reasons, and
they see it as essential that the finding emerge from the reasons.”).
64. See, e.g., RICARDO LORENZETTI, EL ARTE DE HACER JUSTICIA 40 (Sudamericana 2014) (“[E]n la Corte planteamos que las decisiones son un producto
profesional, redactado en un lenguaje judicial y dirigidas a abogados” [At the
Court, we discussed that opinions are a professional product, written in judicial
language and addressed to lawyers] (translated by the author)). Justice Ricardo
Lorenzetti sits on the Argentine Supreme Court and was its chief justice for eleven
years.
65. SUSAN ŠARČEVIĆ, NEW APPROACH TO LEGAL TRANSLATION 60 (Kluwer
Law Int’t 1997).
66. Id.
67. See John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 447 (2001):
An opinion’s double voice often addresses itself to double or multiple
hearers. An opinion speaks immediately to those interested in the resolution of the case at bar: parties, their lawyers, and lower court judges
who may be called on to preside over further proceedings. At the same
time, the judge speaks to those who will use the opinion to ascertain and
understand the law: lawyers whose clients face legal problems arguably
governed by precedent, and more broadly students, expounders and critics of the law. Usually, judicial opinions make no explicit reference to
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plain-language approach focuses on the parties or citizens at large
as the main and ultimate addressees of these legal instruments.68 The
focus on nonlawyers as the main intended readers shapes the strategies to be used so that the message gets across.
In the common-law world, plain language has usually been considered a must for courts to the extent that pro se representation is
allowed.69 But even beyond this consideration, it is possible to posit
that for the plain-language approach, court decisions need to be
stated in clear terms because the ultimate readers are citizens at
large, especially the parties bringing the case before the court.
Based on the definition of plain language above and assuming
that it is beneficial that court decisions be written in plain terms so
that even nonlawyers may understand, one may ask whether or not
the readers of an Argentine Supreme Court opinion can easily find
the dispositive part of the majority opinion and separate it from the
dissent, understand the dissent, and adequately use that information.
It is possible to assume that readers, especially nonexperts, have a
hard time trying to get the meaning of an Argentine Supreme Court
dissent right the first time. Only after getting acquainted with the
tradition that dissents by the highest court in Argentina are written
“as if” they were deciding the case can they actually realize the nature and scope of the dissent. As Peter Tiersma said, “comprehension can be impaired by linguistic features that are not specifically
these audiences, adopting somewhat the tone of a voice from the heavens, as opposed to a human speaking to humans. Occasionally, however,
a judge will address more directly the bar, the scholarly community, or
the general public.
68. See, e.g., CHRISTINE MOWAT, A PLAIN-LANGUAGE HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL WRITERS 28 (2d ed., Carswell 2015):
Much legal writing is produced with only lawyers or the courts in mind.
One result is that the parties to the document become almost irrelevant,
ignored as outsiders or tourists. With plain-language writing, a new focus
on audience enables clients, consumers, or the public to read documents
as active and knowledgeable participants—or at least to have an option
to do so.
69. See, e.g., Sean McLernon, Why Courts Need to Embrace Plain Language,
24 GEO. J. POV. L. & POLICY 381 (mainly discussing the relevance of plain English in court forms for pro se litigants).
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legal.”70 The defect in how Argentine Supreme Court dissents are
written identified in this article is precisely a linguistic feature which
impairs comprehension and which is not legal in nature.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
The linguistic defect studied in this article may be the reflection
of a deeper, substantive problem: dissents’ failure to interact with
the majority opinion may reveal lack of dialog or an insufficient
level of dialog among justices. It is very difficult to know if Argentine Supreme Court dissents are being written with performative language merely because of tradition or because there is lack of dialog.
Justices writing dissents should be able to express their disagreement with the majority and this expression should make the other
justices revisit their own arguments. If no consensus can be reached,
the dissent will only serve to express the opinion of the dissenter,
but it may well otherwise be a tool to improve the Court’s arguments. In any case, the published dissent must accurately and truthfully account for what it really does—providing an alternative, yet
nonbinding, solution to the case. Performative language has no room
in dissents.
Emulating good practices from other legal traditions is not a sin.
The Argentine Supreme Court has been structured after the American model, a notorious exception to which is the writing of dissents.
In a way, this article proposes a return to basics, to the roots of the
constitutional and judicial model Argentina decided to follow. The
Argentine Supreme Court needs to follow its American model on
dissent writing and get rid of performatives in dissents.
Changing the way dissents are written is in the hands of the justices themselves. Using performative language in dissent has no basis in logic, linguistics, or the law. A single judge may decide to
change the style of his or her decisions and a trend may follow suit.
70. PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 203 (University of Chicago Press
1999).
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Discarding performatives in dissents will better reflect what judges
do and will better convey to all parties interested in reading the decisions of the Court what judges do and do not do with their words.
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ABSTRACT
This article explores the question of legal education in micro jurisdictions using the case of Jersey, a British Crown Dependency,
positioned geographically, historically and culturally between two
larger jurisdictions, France and the UK. It analyses how Jersey’s
legal training is pulled towards those large “big neighbours,” rather than focusing on what makes its specificity and attraction. It
questions how legal education in micro-jurisdiction is actually
linked to ideology. The article starts with the following question: are
we taking micro jurisdictions seriously? It then considers the routes
to legal qualification in micro jurisdictions, before focusing specifically on the case of Jersey and analysing how ideology imposes
asymmetrical views on micro jurisdictions, views that ultimately
may erase the legal specificity of that micro jurisdiction.
Keywords: Jersey, Micro-jurisdictions; legal education in small
states; mixed-jurisdiction; contamination; ideology; comparative legal education.
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It can be said that legal education has been oscillating between
two modes of education; being a part of liberal education and being
treated as professional education.1 As part of liberal education, legal
education is considered to develop specific capacities as described
by Andrew Delbanco:
1. A skeptical discontent with the present, informed by a
sense of the past.
2. The ability to make connections among seemingly disparate phenomena.
3. Appreciation of the natural world, enhanced by
knowledge of science and the arts.
4. A willingness to imagine experience from perspectives
other than one’s own.
5. A sense of ethical responsibility.2
When treated as professional education,
legal education equips law students for filling different
roles in society, and discharging various law jobs, the range
and scope of which are always expanding in modern democratic society, e.g., as policy-makers, administrators,

* Professor David Marrani, Ph.D., is the former Dean at the Institute of
Law in Jersey and former Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex, UK. He is
currently the Director of the International Centre of Law and Business and the
Avant Garde Interdisciplinary Research Group. Various versions of this paper
were presented over the years at academic conferences: ‘Legal education and
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Mixed/Micro Jurisdictions’ with David Zammit (Malta) and Sean Donlan (Limerick), Centre for Small States conference, QMU, 2015; ‘Legal education and
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1. A. Lakshminath, Legal Education, Research and Pedagogy-Ideological
Perceptions, 50 J. INDIAN L. INST. 606, 606-28 (2008).
2. ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD BE 3
(Princeton U. Press 2012) cited in Sherman J. Clark, Law School as Liberal Education, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 242-243, 235-246 (2003).
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lawyers, law teachers, industrials entrepreneurs etc.3
Some consider that legal education is not specifically a professional education but a “science to be studied in its own right, without
reference to other areas of thought,” although it still departs from
liberal education.4
This “oscillation” has been present since the beginning of legal
education, as seen in the history of legal education in common law
countries, where it evolved from “innovation and experimentation”
to “a narrow, vocational teaching of law” by the late 1800s.5 The
“tension” between the two modes of education in legal education
has recently been once more at the core of debates in England; for
instance, through the Legal Education and Training Review
(LETR), which resulted in the solicitor training becoming more liberal.6
What we can consider is that legal education is currently composed of two parts, an initial academic general training, characterised by the need for a university degree, in law or not in law, primary
or advanced, followed by practical or vocational training.
There is a particular issue regarding law and legal education.
They both have a specific ideological function in a society. Althusser’s work interests the law, and particularly its comparison.7
First, it questions the core of the discipline itself. Indeed, Althusser’s
writing on psychoanalysis used a very logical demonstration to
show that psychoanalysis is a science. This demonstration may
simply be applied to comparative law, for instance, to produce the

3. Lakshminath, supra note 1, at 606.
4. Joshua Krook, A Brief History of Legal Education: A Battle Between Law
as a Science and Law as a Liberal Art, 17 LEGAL HIST. 42, 30-61 (2017).
5. Id. at 53.
6. See for discussion Jessica Guth & Chris Ashford, The Legal Education
and Training Review: Regulating Socio-Legal and Liberal Legal Education?, 48
THE LAW TEACHER 5-19 (2014). See also the new SQE for qualify as solicitor
lifting the necessity for a Qualifying law degree (QLD) as prerequisite.
7. David Marrani, Althusser in Avatar Comparative law as a Science and
the Haunting of the Subject, in ALTHUSSER AND LAW 95-110 (Laurent de Sutter
ed., Routledge 2013).
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same outcome.8 Then, there is Althusser’s reading of Marx. Althusser considered Marxism as a discourse with a proper structure
with an “erased” subject, a subject that is “always-already” and
therefore should (in a way) vanish. What this could mean for law
and its comparison, is that it has to deal with legal places without
subjects (of law), but at the same time without totally forgetting the
subjects. It also means that we are immerged in language as a structure that compels us to do “things” unconsciously, without leaving
us the capacity to escape. Which is, for Althusser, the origin of ideology:
We experience ideology as if it emanates freely and spontaneously from within us, as if we were its free subjects,
“working by ourselves.” Actually, we are spoken by and
spoken for, in the ideological discourses which await us
even at our birth, into which we are born and find our
place.9
Ideology works as a mechanism that masks reality, misrepresents
reality, and ultimately creates a fantasy world to allow the continuation of a system. Along its various incarnations, the discourse of a
society is manifested, through ideology, then relayed by the law,
also as ideology, which forms the “common sense” of a period and
thus appears natural, normal, and right. It contributes to dividing
mankind and challenges humanity. For Althusser, ideology is based
on the existence of assumptions, imaginary products of personal stories that are mere reflections of actual conditions of individual existence.10 He analysed the state into separate state apparatuses, dividing the repressive one and ideological ones. Law appeared in
both categories, while education was considered to be the main “Ideological State” apparatus. Althusser ideas have obvious implications

8. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, WRITINGS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, FREUD AND LACAN
17 (Columbia U. Press 1996).
9. Stuart Hall, Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and PostStructuralist Debates, 2 CRITICAL STUD. IN MASS COMM. 109, 91-114 (1985).
10. Claudio Zanchettin, L’epistemologia marxista di Louis Althusser, 2 IL
MULINO 266, 257-280 (1972).
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on the law and on lawyers, academics or practitioners, and particularly legal education.
[School] takes children from every class at infant-school
age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most
‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the Family State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into
them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount
of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French,
arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or
simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children is ejected ‘into production’:
these are the workers or small peasants. Another portion of
scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or
worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle technicians,
white-collar workers, small and middle executives, petty
bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit,
either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the ‘intellectuals of the collective labourer’,
the agents of exploitation (capitalists, managers), the
agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests
of all sorts, most of whom are convinced ‘laymen’).11
If we transpose these words into the specific area of legal education, we can start thinking of law schools and how they create specific workers (“the lawyers”). Legal education would then be a certain “know-how” wrapped into the ruling ideology or simply the
pure state of the ruling ideology. This is particularly true about law,
itself an ideological state apparatus. Legal education in micro jurisdiction is not exempted from this movement but suffers even more
deeply of its impacts.
As we know, “Even when geographically isolated, the small populations—both general and legal—of micro-jurisdictions and small
states typically require them to reach beyond, often far beyond, their

11. Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LOUIS
ALTHUSSER, LENIN, AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 147 (Monthly Review
Press 1971).
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shores.”12 Jersey’s position is a true illustration of this statement.
Jersey is the largest of the Channel Islands, 12 miles from continental Normandy. It was separated from Normandy in 1204 but retained
Norman law, customs, and language. But Jersey administration was
carried out for the King of England.13 Jersey is truly squeezed geographically and legally between the representatives of the two main
western legal traditions, what Legrand described as “discursive formations of sufficient homogeneity.”14 The island is struggling to
maintain its legal identity. Indeed, the “big neighbours” of Jersey
that are France and Great Britain are, as Legrand put it, “autonomous
discursivities.”15 They are sources of tensions that impacts on Jersey
lawyers who are then facing the dilemma of ideology.16 As Fairgrieve stated,
Situated geographically and culturally mid-Channel, between the tectonic plates of civil law and common law, this
jurisdiction is illustrative of an open-minded and diverse
approach to sources of law. With its hybrid interaction of
such different legal systems within a micro-jurisdiction,
this jurisdiction is in many ways the Galapagos Islands for
comparatists!17
Remember that ideology focuses on the existence of imaginary
assumptions, on imaginary, not on reality. They are a reflection of
reality. Therefore, how the Jersey population understand itself is not
based simply on the geography of where Jersey is, although it somehow plays a part in the perception of what Jersey and its population

12. Sean Donlan, David Marrani, Mathilda Twomey & David Zammit, Legal Education and the Profession in Three Mixed/Micro Jurisdictions: Malta, Jersey and Seychelles, in SMALL STATES IN A LEGAL WORLD 191, 191-212 (Petra
Butler & Caroline Morris eds., Springer 2017).
13. ROY PEDERSEN, ONE EUROPE, 100 NATIONS, MULTILINGUAL MATTERS
39 (Channel View Books 1992).
14. Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 240, 232–242
(1996).
15. Id.
16. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY 41 (Verso 1984).
17. DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, COMPARATIVE LAW IN PRACTICE: CONTRACT
LAW IN A MID-CHANNEL JURISDICTION ch. 8 (Hart Publishing 2016).
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are. It affects the perception Jersey lawyers have of themselves as
well. It is easy to understand that some Jersey lawyers may be
pushed to assume and imagine how they relate to the great Duchy of
Normandy, while others may see the link to the Crown as a sort of
romantic interpretation of the real position of Jersey between France
and Great Britain. Due to the size of the micro jurisdiction that is
Jersey and the massive influence that brings ideology here, it is obvious that these imaginary assumptions have consequences on Jersey lawyers as they have become an essential mystification that we
could qualify as essential, intertwined with the society itself.18 As
we know, the law is also an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA),
which intensifies the ideological structure. This ISA is clearly dominated by where the lawyers have been trained (initial training and
to some respect the final one), the core of the imaginary assumptions, augmented in Jersey by the increased use of English as a main
language of communication (although French remains one of the official languages). As such, the law that is known by the lawyers of
Jersey conditions their perception of the law. It conditions not only
the law in Jersey but also the perception of the law of the “other,”
the foreign law, creating value and hierarchy, simply through the
classification in the structure of the law of the other law as foreign
law. Legal education in Jersey has been influenced by these factors.
As most Jersey lawyers are now trained in England, as I will explain
in this paper, they therefore must study a foreign legal culture that
is in fact alien to the jurisdiction and makes the law of Jersey the
foreign law. This could be for instance a result of lack of higher education institutions on the Island, or simply the need of law firms to
have lawyers trained in English law, or even the preference given to
UK education over continental one. These factors taken separately
or together are actually part of what Althusser considers to be constitutive of ideology. The result is the rather illogical but obliged

18. WILLIAM C. DOWLING, JAMESON, ALTHUSSER, MARX, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS 83 (Cornell U. Press 1984).
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prerequisite that is the study of English law. The law of this micro
jurisdiction is often becoming the foreign law itself.
What is at stake in micro jurisdictions legal training is quite simple and can be articulated around the ambivalence between the necessity of retaining a specific knowledge and expertise of the law of
a particular micro jurisdiction, Jersey, what we may name the “legal
identity” of Jersey, and the centrifugal attraction of the large jurisdictions, which defines in fact “two modes of understanding reality
(reflecting the two foundational mythologies).”19 Squeezed between
two modes of understanding reality, Jersey legal training is pulled
towards these large foundational mythology, rather than focusing on
what makes its (legal) attraction. I start this paper by a simple question: are we taking micro jurisdictions seriously? Indeed, when one
micro jurisdiction tries to retain its legal identity, are we considering
this attempt as something that is worthy or not? I then consider the
routes to legal qualification in micro jurisdictions, attempting to propose various families of legal training, before focusing specifically
on the case of Jersey. I then analyse the impacts of ideology on legal
education in micro jurisdiction and how ideology imposes alien
views on micro jurisdictions, views that may contradict in fact the
attraction of the jurisdiction, by removing or erasing its legal identity.
I. ARE WE TAKING MICRO JURISDICTIONS SERIOUSLY?
The first section of this paper is an attempt to answer the following question: Are we taking micro jurisdictions seriously? And as a
sub-question, and consequence, can we take (legal education in) micro jurisdictions seriously?
We found many references in the academic literature to small or
microstates. The issue of their definition itself is so complex that
some scholars, such as Baldacchino, are trying to avoid dealing with

19.

Legrand, supra note 14, at 240.

2021-2022]

LEGAL EDUCATION IN JERSEY

67

it: “the easiest way to ‘deal with the problem’ of how to define the
small state is to ignore or avoid the issue.”20
That said, a study of small states, even if we do not define what
they are, contributes to the understanding of general concepts, as
unique opportunity of a specific study.21 That is somehow what I am
doing here. Even if we had a clear definition of small or microstates,
we would still be far from having a foundation for the study of micro
jurisdictions. Indeed, many jurisdictions are not states as such, for
instance, sub-national divisions like islands. Vlcek, for example, explained the following:
Many states possess sub-national jurisdictions which may
engage in commercial activity extending beyond their national borders. Some of these jurisdictions physically exist
beyond those national borders and as a result effectively
extend the national border in that location.22
It seems that mainstream scholarship has neglected these very
small world’s legal spaces. I am conscious that when writing about
micro jurisdictions I should start with a definition of micro jurisdiction. I suppose that it has to do with how small a jurisdiction should
be to fit in the category, while still being a jurisdiction. Vlcek in his
attempt to define what is a jurisdiction explains that: “[it] includes
the designation of the space or territory (with permanent population,
government, etc.) over which a specific legal regime operates and is
enforced. It also reflects the word’s usage regarding the law, its practice and the range or extent of legal enforcement.”23
We could well consider that we have a jurisdiction on a territory
over a population, if we have: (i) a specific body of law applying
uniquely to that territory or population; (ii) a legislative institution

20. Godfrey Baldacchino, Mainstreaming the Study of Small States and Territories, 1 SMALL STATES & TERRITORIES 3, at 7 (2018).
21. PETRA BUTLER, CAROLINE MORRIS, SMALL STATES IN A LEGAL WORLD
vi (Springer 2017).
22. William Vlcek, Why ‘jurisdiction’? Determining boundaries in offshore
finance, 1 SMALL STATES & TERRITORIES 169, at 171-182 (2018).
23. Id. at 170.
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with capacity to make primary legislation; (iii) a distinct hierarchy
of courts, judges, and public prosecutors; and (iv) a body of legal
professionals recognised by the state or at least through self-regulation. What makes the size of a jurisdiction micro? Baldacchino
adopts a more relaxed posture on the issue. He states that:
attempts at fixed and absolutist definitions of smallness are
not very productive. What, then, is the alternative? One can
argue that smallness is inherently a relative concept. Poland, for instance, has been described as a small state compared to one of its neighbours (Russia); but a large state
when compared to a different neighbour (Lithuania). . . .24
The relativity of the definition would work here for Jersey and its
position between its “big neighbours.” A micro jurisdiction would
be on a territory smaller than the “big neighbours” over a population
that is also smaller than the “big neighbours,” if we have: (i) a specific body of law applying uniquely to that territory or population;
(ii) a legislative institution with capacity to make primary legislation; (iii) a distinct hierarchy of courts, judges and public prosecutors; and (iv) a body of legal professionals recognised by the state or
at least through self-regulation.
Micro jurisdictions can be found in all corners of the world, as
common law, civil law and mixed or hybrid jurisdictions. According
to some authors: “Contemporary small jurisdictions are quite heterogeneous.”25 Some are independent micro-states that have some
level of connections with “big neighbours” (geographically, historically, legally, financially); others are legal places within territories
dependent on larger entities. Most of them share similar economic
development as international finance centres, and the majority have
similar issues concerning legal education.

24. Baldacchino, supra note 20, at 7.
25. Sebastian Wolf, Peter Bussjäger & Patricia Schiess Rütimann, Law,
Small State Theory and the Case of Liechtenstein, 1 SMALL STATES & TERRITORIES 183, at 184-196 (2018).
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In my opinion the most important point is the place of those jurisdictions in a global context rather than a geographical, historical,
legal, or financial context. Through their quirky little rules, most of
them survived from medieval time, these jurisdictions have developed as major players in our global economy. At the same time,
questions are raised about the preservation of their legal heritage
against the normalisation and the homogenisation, or even the fusion
in larger legal spaces. Wolf et al. propose three assumptions regarding law in small states: assumption 1. a small jurisdiction extensively adopts foreign legal norms; assumption 2. a small jurisdiction
features remarkable or unusual constitutional characteristics; assumption; 3. a small jurisdiction is dependent on external resources
to maintain its judicial and legal institutions.26 If a micro jurisdiction
has its own constitutional characteristics, it has a specific constitutional identity, different from the surrounding neighbours. This offers the difference needed to qualify the jurisdiction in a way. I
would quite rely on that assumption solely to define a micro jurisdiction, therefore assumption 2 would become the fundamental
norm for the micro jurisdiction to exist as separate legal entity. Assumption 1 and 3 are different. If the jurisdiction adopts foreign legal norms or relies on external resources to maintain its judicial and
legal institutions, it may be assumed that it may damage what makes
it “a jurisdiction” and therefore affect its legal identity. But those
assumptions are here to remind us about how the question of legal
identity of micro jurisdictions is connected to relation between the
centrifugal global movement towards “big neighbours” and the local
roots of the micro jurisdictions. As a result, we have a “glocal” dimension of how the lawyers are trained. Legal education in micro
jurisdictions is deeply affected by those assumptions, as seen in the
various models for routes to lawyer’s qualification.

26.

Id. at 184-185.
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II. MODELS FOR ROUTES TO QUALIFICATION
IN MICRO JURISDICTIONS
Legal education, as I summarised in the introduction, is evolving
between liberal and professional (or science). In addition, legal education in the context of globalisation has been defined by Flood as
falling into four main categories:
1. Importing foreign students to home law schools for LLM
and research degrees.
2. Exporting domestic law schools’ programmes to foreign
countries, sometimes in conjunction with a host institution.
3. Creating global law schools that attempt to appeal transnationally.
4. Online law schools that could transcend borders but tend
towards the local.27
In addition, legal education has become global. Flood again
stated that local education is becoming international, transnational,
and global.28 In that context, it is evidently complicated for micro
jurisdiction to affirm their legal identity through their own legal education. However, it could be argued that micro jurisdiction, because of their specific position have a crucial part to play in these
phenomena: “international, transnational and global.” Nothing precludes micro jurisdictions to recruit international students, to export
their programme, to appear transnational, or to have online provision. Therefore, micro jurisdiction can truly be a place of legal education for future lawyers.
It could be argued that there are some “models” or archetype of
legal education in these micro jurisdictions that allow us to classify

27. John Flood, Legal Education in the Global Context Challenges from
Globalization, Technology and Changes in Government Regulation, Report for
the Legal Services Board 6-7 (2011). https://perma.cc/B57N-UX43. (Last visited:
July 5, 2022).
28. John Flood, Global Challenges and Legal Education in LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES ch..2, 32 & 78
(Christopher Gane & Robin Hui Huang eds., Taylor & Francis 2017).
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them in families. They would evolve around the two parts: logically,
between the academic part and the vocational part.
First, we may assume that micro jurisdictions rarely rely on 100%
local legal education. This is particularly true of the academic stage
for practitioners, the university phase of education. The reason could
be as simple as the absence of a local university in the micro jurisdiction, or just because there is no faith from the micro jurisdiction
(i.e., its population and/or its political elite) in a possible local education or because again, people or firms want/need students educated outside the micro jurisdiction. This point has dramatic consequences of course, as it obliges the initial legal training of future
local lawyers of micro jurisdictions to be done abroad through foreign law schools. That said, this is less true of the initial vocational
training. For this stage, there seems to be a (near) 100% local initial
training on local laws that exists. We therefore have different families that are as follows:
i) University phase and initial vocational training abroad: Reliance on professional qualifications from another jurisdiction (like currently Gibraltar); most rely on the academic
stage in another jurisdiction, although this may be changing;
ii) University phase abroad/initial vocation training local (without a local law school): Legal education without law schools
(e.g., Isle of Man);
iii) University phase abroad (sometimes offering also local university stage)/initial vocational training local (with a local
law school): this has been the case of some micro jurisdictions that set up micro law school (e.g., Andorra, Jersey, and
to some extend Guernsey);
iv) University phase and initial vocation training local (e.g., San
Marino).
For more than 7 years, I have been involved with the running of
the micro law school providing legal education in Jersey, I would
like to discuss further the case of Jersey.
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III. THE CASE OF JERSEY
Jersey shares related histories and legal histories to the other
Channel Islands, especially of Guernsey. These have broadly common histories and legal traditions but differ in some respects and are
largely governed by separate local institutions. Jersey is very close
geographically to France and its legal history closely relates to continental Normandy. Originally included in the Duchy of Normandy,
Jersey remained attached to the English crown after the loss of Normandy. Jersey is a Crown Dependency, meaning that the island is
neither part of the UK nor the EU. It is autonomous with its own
parliament, the States of Jersey, and its own ordinary courts. English
and French are the official languages.
The relationship between the Channel Islands and the United
Kingdom results from historical and legal events. As one of the
Channel Islands, Jersey, unlike the British Overseas Territories, is
not a British colony. The Channel Islands (i) are not treated as part
of the metropolitan territory under the British constitution and (ii)
do not enjoy central democratic representation. They show a number
of analogies with the British colonies and have a relationship with
the United Kingdom that could be considered as “quasi-colonial.” It
means that there could be some variable geometry in the way the
UK Parliament may or may not act in the domestic affairs of Jersey
and on how far the UK may be able to speak for and bind Jersey on
international affairs.29
During the 20th century, the working language of the law shifted
decisively from French to English: legislation enacted after the
1930s is normally in English, judgments of the Royal Court from
the 1950s adopted both English language and “common law style,”
and English legislation had a great influence over the content and
style of Jersey enactments. Note that Jersey has always enjoyed a

29. INSTITUTE OF LAW JERSEY, 7 JERSEY
TIONAL LAW STUDY GUIDE 2018-2019 87-88.

LEGAL SYSTEM & CONSTITU-
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specific status in relation the EU and Council of Europe. Jersey law
has different layers. As stated by Southwell,
Much help can be found in the Reports of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the criminal law of Jersey
(1847) (“the Criminal Report”) and the civil, municipal and
ecclesiastical laws of Jersey (1861) (“the Civil Report”).
These Commissioners had the tasks of carrying out a thorough investigation of the laws and courts of Jersey, and not
surprisingly they started with the sources of Jersey law,
considering these under the two heads of common or customary law, and legislation.30
Common or customary law can be found compiled in the Ancienne coutume of 1204, the Grande coutume of 1539 and the Coutume reformée of 1585, considered at length by the Privy council as
evidence of customary law of Jersey before the separation, as commented by Le Geyt, Poingdestre, Terrien, Basnage, and Pothier, etc
. . . Legislation comprises the Royal Charters, the laws passed by the
States of Jersey, “triennial regulations,” and some Acts of the British
Parliament concerning Jersey. In addition, we find the influence of
French and English laws. According to Southwell, “French law as
such is not authoritative in Jersey” while “it is inevitable that English doctrines have played a large part in the great development of
Jersey law during the last 50 years.”31 From these words, we already
have the flavour of the asymmetrical situation Jersey law is in. This
had ripple effects on legal education in Jersey.
The question of legal education in Jersey has always oscillated
between the “big neighbours.” Indeed,
Jersey’s approach to legal education and training reflects
these influences, as well as the fact that the jurisdiction has
never had a local university or formal Faculty of Law. In
the nineteenth century, Jersey law students studied in
France. Increasingly in the twentieth century, students

30. Richard Southwell, The Sources of Jersey Law, 1 JERSEY L. REV. 221
(1997).
31. Id.
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typically studied at British, especially English, universities.
. . .32
As explained by Jean-Marie Renouf, the current Jersey system of
legal education is based on The Advocates and Solicitors (Jersey)
Law 1997 (“the Law”)33 that governs “the right to practise as an advocate or solicitor.” It includes setting out the requirements for admission as an advocate or solicitor. In addition, we have The Advocates and Solicitors (Qualifying Examination) (Jersey) Rules 1997
(“the Rules”),34 which set out the structure of the Jersey qualifying
examination.35
Let us briefly describe the different stages of the legal training of
a Jersey lawyer.
Initial training: Before 1997, Jersey lawyers could have a law degree of a British, French, or Irish university and Jersey advocate
could have passed either the examinations set by the Council of Legal Education for call to the Bar by any one of the Inns of Court in
England; or a licence of a French university.36
After 1997, under the 1997 Rules it was decided a candidate applying to sit the qualifying examination of advocate or solicitor (the
local legal practitioners) should have what the rules describe as a
legal or a general qualification, that we will analyse first.37 They

32. Donlan, Marrani, Twomey & Zammit, supra note 12, at 201.
33. The 1997 law. https://perma.cc/S67S-BGNK. (Last visited: July 5,
2022).
34. Advocates and Solicitors (Jersey) Law 1997 (the 1997 Rules).
https://perma.cc/8GX3-EG46. (Last visited: July 5, 2022).
35. Jean-Marie Renouf, Jersey Legal Education Reforms, 12 JERSEY &
GUERNSEY L. REV. §§ 4 & 6 (2008).
36. Before 1997, the Jersey Law 17/1971 Solicitors (Jersey) Law, 1971 mentioned ‘he has a law degree of a British, French or Irish university' and for the
advocate, Jersey Law 15/1968 Advocates (Jersey) Law, 1968 ‘he has passed the
examinations set by the Council of Legal Education for call to the Bar by any one
of the Inns of Court in England; or (ii) he has a diploma of licentiate in law of a
French university’.
37. The 1997 Rules supra note 34.
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may then do their training in Jersey law, what the rules refers to as
the final examination, as we will see.
Under the 1997 Advocates and Solicitors (Jersey) Law (Rules),
Rule 1(2) mentions that a legal qualification should be either a law
degree of a British University although leaving discretion to the
Board to approve one from another university and various training
in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.
For the purposes of these Rules, a person has a legal qualification if the person has:
(a) a law degree of a British University or of such other
university or institution as the Board approves which conforms to the requirements in Rule 2;
(b) passed the examinations and assessments included in
any course validated by the Common Professional Examination Board in England and Wales;
(c) passed the examinations and assessments included in
any course –
(i) validated by the Law Society of England and Wales
for admission as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales (or the examinations formerly set by the
Law Society of England and Wales for that purpose), or
(ii) accredited by the Law Society of Scotland for admission to the Roll of Solicitors in Scotland; or
(d) passed the examinations and assessments included in
any course –
(i) validated by the Bar Council for call to the Bar of
England and Wales by any one of the Inns of Court in England (or the examinations formerly set by the Council of
Legal Education for that purpose), or
(ii) validated by the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland
for admission as a member of the Faculty of Advocates in
Scotland; or
(e) passed the examinations and assessments leading to
the award of a Certificate of Professional Legal Studies by
the Institute of Professional Legal Studies of the Queen’s
University of Belfast or met such equivalent requirements
as may be recognized for the time being by –
(i) the Law Society of Northern Ireland, or
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(ii) the Executive Council of the Honorable Society of
the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland.38
A law degree should contain the following subjects according to
Rule 2 (1):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

the law of contract;
the law of tort;
criminal law;
equity and the law of trusts;
constitutional and administrative law; and
the law of the European Union. 39

Anyone familiar with the English legal training will recognise the
similarity with what is found in English legal training. Indeed, one
may want to compare these to the subjects included in the Joint
Statement issued in 1999 by the Law Society and the General Council of the Bar on the completion of the initial or academic stage of
training by obtaining an undergraduate degree.
The Foundations of Legal Knowledge are:
a. The key elements and general principles of the following
areas of legal study:
i. Public Law, including Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights;
ii. Law of the European Union;
iii. Criminal Law;
iv. Obligations including Contract, Restitution and Tort;
v. Property Law; and
vi. Equity and the Law of Trusts. 40
It seems obvious that the 1997 Rules have been more or less mirroring the requirements for English practitioners. What was therefore referred to as legal qualification in the Jersey 1997 Rules highlights the domination of (English) common law in the initial training, by mirroring the English regulatory bodies “joint statement.”

38. Id. at r. 1 (2).
39. Id. at r. 2(1).
40. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Academic Stage Handbook, version 1.4,
18-19 (July 2014). https://perma.cc/JC3S-N7YP. (Last visited: July 5, 2022).
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General qualification under the 1997 Rules: What was referred
to as general education in the 1997 rules was a non-law degree (anything but a law degree). Someone with a general qualification
would need to sit exams (“preliminary examination”) that specifically refers to English law. The Rules describe the content of the
examination for non-law degree holders.
The preliminary examination consists of 6 papers on the
following subjects:
(a) the English law of contract;
(b) the English law of tort;
(c) principles of English criminal law and the law of evidence;
(d) principles of English constitutional and administrative law;
(e) principles of English equity and the law of trusts; and
(f) the law of the European Union. 41
It is left to the board of examiners (i.e., Jersey lawyers teaching
and examining candidates, specialised in Jersey law) to assess candidates’ knowledge of English law. The board is defined under the
“principal law,” article 9 of the 1997 Law.42
Board of examiners
(1) A board of examiners shall be responsible for the
conduct of the qualifying examination.
(2) The Board is to consist of –
(a) the Deputy Bailiff, as the President of the Board;
(b) the Attorney General;
(c) the Solicitor General;
(d) such advocates and solicitors of the Royal Court as
are for the time being appointed for the purpose by the advocates and solicitors of the Royal Court generally; and
(e) any persons co-opted under paragraph (5)(b).
In S. 9 (3) and (4) of the 1997 Law, we can see that the board
is the body that would assess candidates. In a way, this seems both
coherent and quite illogical. It is coherent if one wants to move to a

41.
42.

The 1997 Rules supra note 34, at Rule 3(3).
The 1997 Law supra note 33, at art. 9(2).
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mainstream English common law education but quite illogical for
the micro jurisdiction to see its most important lawyers assessing
students on English law.
The following table sums up the requirement for the foundation of common law under the 1997 Rules and the 1999 Joint Statement43 for clarity:
1997 Rules
§ 2 (1) (Legal
Qualification)

-

-

the law of contract;
the law of tort;
criminal law;
equity and the law
of trusts;
constitutional and
administrative
law;
the law of the European Union

1997 Rules
§ 3 (3) (General
Qualification
with Preliminary
Examination)
-

-

-

-

the English law of
contract;
the English law of
tort;
principles of English criminal law
and the law of evidence;
principles of English constitutional
and administrative
law;
principles of English equity and the
law of trusts; and
the law of the European Union

1999 Joint Statement

-

-

-

public law, including constitutional law, administrative law and
human rights;
law of the European Union;
criminal law;
obligations including contract,
restitution and
tort;
property law; and
equity and the law
of trusts

43. Joint statement on the academic stage of training (1999 JS).
https://perma.cc/4D3W-XYNB. (Last visited: July 5, 2022).

2021-2022]

LEGAL EDUCATION IN JERSEY

79

Both qualifications, legal and general (together with the preliminary examination) in the 1997 Rules are in fact truly a prerequisite
for Jersey future lawyers to study English common law. We have
therefore here a full picture and illustration of the clash between legal identity of Jersey and the influence of (one of) the “big neighbours.” This was spotted by the legal profession as seen in Renouf:
At a time when much concern is expressed by members of
the profession that the increasing influence of English law
and practice upon Jersey’s lawyers is eroding our identity
and legal roots, the system of education we implement is
surely of paramount importance and worthy of substantial
debate.44
The idea was to revise the initial stage to push further the development of a proposer training in Jersey law. Indeed, Renouf noted
that:
A major concern expressed frequently by the profession as
a whole . . . is that Jersey is succumbing to a tide of English
legal influence, largely resulting from the predominance of
the English language and the English academic and professional training received by most Jersey lawyers. The result
is that lawyers are often unwilling or unable to apply the
traditional Norman French texts and instead rely too heavily upon English legal doctrines.45
When that initial stage is completed, candidates should then
study Jersey law.
Training in Jersey law: During the 1980s and before 1997, provision was made for candidates to take some certification in French
and Normand legal studies at the University of Caen in place of a
Jersey option subject, a route taken in fact by a small number of
candidates that has fallen into disuse.46 Between 1997 and 2007, the

44. Renouf, supra note 35, at § 3.
45. Id. at § 54.
46. Note that if the candidate for admission has passed by the Bar Professional Training Course to become a barrister in England or the Legal Practice
Course in England to become an English solicitor, that period of Jersey work experience is two years; otherwise, it is three years. Almost all candidates work fulltime in a law office while studying part-time for the Jersey Law Course. Call to
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training in Jersey law was minute but examination in Jersey require
candidates to be assessed without proper training for their examination. Prior to the Institute, candidates would more or less study on
their own. Renouf’s report highlights that:
even more striking than the significant failure rates were
the threads of resentment towards the process running
through many candidates’ comments, and the reported effects that the ordeal of learning the totality of prescribed
material had on the health of some. The experience was described as ‘miserable’, and ‘a physical and mental ordeal
that I have not experienced in any other situation’ whilst
the exams themselves were ‘inconsistent, capricious and
amateur in comparison [with the English equivalent exams]’. Experiences such as those recounted, reflected an
unnecessarily arduous process which can only raise questions as to the purpose and legitimacy of the Jersey legal
examination process.47
The Institute of Law, the law school of Jersey, was set up then,
under the leadership of one of the senior leading legal experts in
Jersey, the former Bailiff Sir Philip Bailhache. As the local law
school, the Institute aimed to make the process of training both
smoother and more robust. Renouf added in his report that:
The notion of a law school in Jersey has, however, recently
gained greater momentum under the auspices of the Bailiff
who in November, [sic] 2007 announced the impending incorporation of a Jersey Institute of Law.48
He added, that “[t]he great benefit of a law school would be the
improvement in students’ understanding of Jersey law and in particular the promotion of the island’s Norman texts and customs.”49
Currently, admission to the legal profession requires enrolment on

the Jersey bar and admissions as solicitors take place at special sittings of the
Royal Court. By convention, new advocates make ‘courtesy calls’ on other advocates, a practice made more onerous with the rapid growth of the legal profession.
See also Renouf, supra note 35, at § 7.
47. Renouf, supra note 35, at § 16.
48. Id. at § 51.
49. Id. at § 55.
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the Jersey Law Course (JLC) leading to the Jersey law examinations
and two or three years of work experience with a Jersey law firm.
The Institute became the approved provider of the JLC, with teaching done during intensive study weekends by visiting academics and
local practitioners.
Rule 3(4) of the 1997 Rules, under the title qualifying examination, stated what the subject would be for the final examinations:
The final examination consists of –
(a) 6 papers on the following subjects in Jersey law –
(i) Paper 1: the Jersey legal system (including the history of Jersey law, its sources, customary law, the writers
on Jersey law and the relevance of Norman customary law,
English common law and the law of other legal systems)
and constitutional law;
(ii) Paper 2: the law of contract;
(iii) Paper 3: the law of testate and intestate succession;
(iv) Paper 4: the law of immovable property;
(v) Paper 5: civil procedure and criminal procedure, including legal professional ethics;
(vi) Paper 6: the law of security over movable property
and bankruptcy; and
(b) subject to paragraph (5), one paper on a subject
chosen by the candidate from the following options –
(i) company law,
(ii) trust law, and
(iii) family law.
Again, very similar to what is considered to be the foundation of
English common law by the 1999 Joint Statement, the 1997 Rules
proposed six compulsory subjects in Jersey law and three options.
Interestingly, the 1997 Law offered the possibility for a student under Rule 3(5) to be exempted from being examined for the three options (company law, family law, or trusts law) if the candidate obtained either the University of Caen Certificat d’études juridiques
françaises et normandes, or the Certificat d’études de droit français
et normand. This section proposed a very important point by bringing back I believe an archaic attachment to medieval Normandy and
a more local and relevant aspect of legal education. But it is only a
choice given to exempt candidates from studying some important
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parts of Jersey law. In addition, it does not really eliminate the initial
training in English law and the influence of the common law on the
training of Jersey lawyers. It rather opens the possibility to be influenced by the other big neighbour. As Renouf noted, “in practice this
is really the case.”50
If it is sure that Jersey with its micro law school has now entered
a route for a more local training for its lawyers, the “glocal legal”
community does not work very coherently due to the mounting influence of English law on that legal training. The way the “glocal
legal” community in Jersey has been influenced, between the “big
neighbours,” is the result of the impact of ideology on legal education.
IV. IMPACTS OF IDEOLOGY ON LEGAL EDUCATION
IN MICRO JURISDICTIONS
It is evident that legal education in Jersey is at the forefront of
globalisation for many reasons. First, as mentioned previously, Jersey is an offshore international financial centre that is involved in
many complex worldwide transactions and has many interactions
with larger economies and large multinationals. In its study on offshore jurisdictions, Vlcek detailed what is an offshore archipelago:
“The geographic imaginary of an offshore financial archipelago is
intended to situate the multitude of jurisdictions labelled, by themselves or by others, as locations for offshore finance within the more
extensive geography of global finance.”51
He added that like Jersey, “[a] non-sovereign territory becomes
part of this global capital transportation network by exercising its
capability to legislate for the territory and craft legislation conducive
for the operation of a financial centre.”52 He explained that the offshore archipelago of offshore financial centers was characterized as

50.
51.
52.

Id. at § 7.
Vlcek, supra note 22, at 174.
Id. At 175.
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providing “conduits and sinks” for capital in support of a global corporate ownership network, with Jersey as one of the largest capital
“sinks.”53 The expression “global legal” that I have been using was
precisely to highlight the attraction of the laws of Jersey, a mixed
legal framework that has their roots in archaic time but used (and
useful) in the contemporary global world because of the necessary
pragmatism of the financial industry. For instance, one can obviously see the link between Jersey and the UK economy while not so
much between Jersey and the French economy: one is more attractive. According to the think tank Jersey Finance, 42% of origin of
wealth of investors and 49% of the destination of investment were
from the UK.54 In addition, “Jersey supports an estimated 250,000
British jobs, of which 190,000 from foreign investment alone, and
adds £14 billion to the United Kingdom economy.”55
Connections with larger jurisdictions, what I called the “big
neighbours,” have their importance here. But those connections go
further than just financial connections: they can be physical and historical connections too. There is therefore a specific context of the
micro jurisdiction, like the slice of ham stuck between two slices of
bread in a jambon beurre sandwich. We should go further here and
consider how Jersey has been to some degree, not simply influenced,
but contaminated by the “big neighbours,” even if only by evident
necessity. According to Moréteau,
Contamination . . . is not a clean and comfortable word like
hybrid, transplant, reception, or circulation. It has troubling, unhealthy overtones. . . . Contamination means ‘to
enter in contact with’ . . . . Contact among human beings
generates changes in identity and behavior and the same
applies to human groups and societies. There is always a
risk of being altered by the contact of another. Alter means
otherness but leads to alteration, with its ambivalent

53. Id.
54. Jersey’s Value to Britain, Evaluating the economic, financial and fiscal
linkages between Jersey and the United Kingdom, Capital Economics Report 11
(2016). https://perma.cc/BLD5-QVN5. (Last visited: May 12, 2022).
55. Id. At 5.
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connotation. The same can be said of contamination. The
identity of a group may be altered at the contact of another.
Groups, societies, and individuals have fluctuating identities, and they change when influenced by other groups, societies, and individuals. The same applies to legal systems
that grow organically in symbiosis with the group generating them and react to the contact with other social groups
and legal systems. . . . Contamination refers to the less visible. Its effects, good or bad, may appear later on. A transplant may take place with all its visible effects, yet generating some invisible or less visible changes in the system
of the recipient. This is where contamination takes place. It
is important to identify contamination and be aware of it.
When contamination has a negative effect, remedies or
ways to lessen that effect may be found and implemented.56
As one of the numerous consequences of this remark, we understand there exists an apparent ambivalence between the necessity of
retaining a specific knowledge and expertise of the laws of Jersey,
that we may name its “legal identity” and the centrifugal attraction
of the large jurisdictions. The possible consequence here is the risk
that the training of lawyers in Jersey introduces a contamination that
ultimately will have the effect of departing from the legal identity of
that jurisdiction.
Future Jersey lawyers have studied a foreign legal culture that is
alien to their jurisdiction before starting to study the laws of Jersey.
That has to do with an effect of the dominant legal culture that contaminates Jersey and needs to be known as a prerequisite. In short,
most of the future Jersey lawyers must study for a LL.B. in English
law before undertaking the Jersey law training. And we end up with
a typical example of what Althusser meant by ideology here:
Law is an art of the asymmetry controlled. This asymmetry
is the result of a hierarchy, a dogmatic appreciation of what
is here, what the ‘local’ ideology voices as normal, against
what is over there, that is not ‘as good as’, that is abnormal.
. . . What we have is an acknowledgement of the
56. Olivier Moréteau, An Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD.
10-11 (2010).
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functioning of state apparatus, not the repressive state apparatus (RSA), but the ideological state apparatus (ISA),
not the one functioning predominantly by violence, but the
one functioning by ideology (predominantly so as Althusser stated). If in RSA, the state acts violently by laws
and decrees, in ISA ruling ideology ‘voices’ what is ‘the
best.’ 57
Ideology shows that through—what Althusser called asymmetry—one law (the law of one jurisdiction) is going to be better
than another one (the law of another jurisdiction): a hierarchy, a dogmatic appreciation of what is there. The asymmetry in the sphere of
law of the micro jurisdiction is the fatal attraction towards one of the
“big neighbours.” In addition, that law appears the good one versus
the bad one. Jersey law becomes the victim of this asymmetry,
which in turn proves to be a contamination of Jersey law. Of course,
we first need to be clear about what “is” Jersey law. We have briefly
defined the specific position it has above and as it was anticipated,
there is a clear asymmetry. Insidiously, there is an assumption that
one law is normal or good and that therefore, as a consequence, the
other one is abnormal or bad. The law of England would be normal
and good, as a result, while Jersey law would be abnormal and bad.
Because of the mechanism of ISA, this interpretation will be coming
“freely” from the “victims” who will believe freely and follow. The
contamination is masked by ideology. To be more concrete with the
case of our micro jurisdiction, a lawyer in Jersey, will par défaut
believe that English law (the contamination) is normal or good and
that the local Jersey law is abnormal or bad. This fact does not have
to be a conscious one. Again, because of how ISA works, the ideology produces an effect on the minds that would make it “normal” to
think that way. The contamination is hiding behind the ruling ideology.58 Furthermore, a school leaver studying one legal culture, as it

57. ALTHUSSER, supra note 16, at 19.
58. To be more specific here, we will restrict the ‘messengers’ of the ideology to the ‘educated’ lawyers. But we could have added the political elite of the
Island, the administration, the academic of the Institute although for those, like
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is often the case, can only embrace the belief that this legal culture
is the normal or good one, mainly because he or she would not be
able to critically analyse whether this statement is valid. Then again,
we may safely assume that a lawyer educated in English law will
probably always favour the concepts of English common law, not
because he or she “truly” believes this is the best law but because
ideology makes him believe this is the best law.
To explain further my point on ideology, contamination, and legal education, I would like to give an illustration based on the law
of contract in Jersey. This area of law has sustained a massive attack
in Jersey as I will describe now. It has been complex for lawyers in
Jersey to work with Jersey contract law for a while. Duncan Fairgrieve was the first academic involved in the teaching of Jersey contract law at the Institute of Law. He not only taught the future local
lawyers but also designed the current study guide where he was trying to eliminate the illogical impracticality of the subject. John
Kelleher wrote the following in a short article in the Jersey and
Guernsey Law Review: “Long-time readers of this Review will have
observed its commitment to promoting the development of the Jersey law of contract into something more accessible and coherent,
with proper regard to the historical roots of our law. It has been a
long process, but progress has been made.59” He added in the second
section that “[s]ince the seminal case of Selby v Romeril, the evolution of our contract law has had a decidedly French hue, recognising
as it does our Norman roots and the Norman law reliance on the
French common law (ius commune) for its law of obligations.”60
Fairgrieve was adamant to find the “real” roots of Jersey contract
law. To do so, he has been working on how Jersey contract law has

for the member of the judiciary, the connection with the ‘educated’ lawyers is
quite clear.
59. John Kelleher, Another Puzzling Contract Judgment, 22 JERSEY &
GUERNSEY L. REV. 78 (2018). https://perma.cc/GB2S-LAME. (Last visited: July
5, 2022).
60. Id. at 78.
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drawn from the civil law tradition of France and the common law of
England and what are the various elements that have now merged
with the current Jersey contract law.61
Meanwhile, the work of the law commissioners in Jersey has
been slightly different. In two documents, they considered the law
of contract in Jersey. The position of the Law Commission has been
summarised in the consultation paper on contract law (2002), 62 the
final Topic Report on Contract Law (2004)63 and the Comments of
Proposal for Reform of the Jersey Law of Contract (2019).64 The
commissioners in 2002 wrote the following:
It is interesting to note that prior to the time that English
influence became particularly marked in Jersey law, local
lawyers trained in France. Today, the majority of Jersey
lawyers study law in England and obtain a professional
qualification in that jurisdiction prior to training locally.
The influence of English law today is therefore explicable
on the same basis as the influence of French law referred
to by the Commissioners of 1861 (supra). 65
This statement certainly contradicted Kelleher’s statement on
Fairgrieve’s work. But in my opinion, this is the way ideology
works. Jersey lawyers have been trained in common law countries
that do share English common law but with the particularism of their
places. As put by Kelleher in the book review made on the book of
Fairgrieve:
The practitioner instructed to advise on an aspect of contract law was in great difficulty. Many, unsurprisingly,
turned to the law in which they had almost always received

61. FAIRGRIEVE, supra note 17.
62. The Jersey Law Commission, The Law of Contract, Consultation Paper
(2002), https://perma.cc/Q2SG-SWQ2. (Last visited: May 12, 2022).
63. The Jersey Law Commission, The Law of Contract, Topic report 10
(2004), https://perma.cc/TJE5-2X3C. (Last visited: July 5, 2022).
64. Comments of Proposal for Reform of the Jersey Law of Contract, 2019,
https://perma.cc/E7Q2-7H7W. (Last visited July 5, 2022).
65. Id.
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their legal education and recourse was had to Chitty on
Contract Law and the like on English common law.66
In the commission’s 2002 consultation paper, the Jersey Royal
Court cases on Jersey contract law was quoted:
Perhaps the most notorious cases which referred to the
Code Civil are Kwanza Hotels -v- Sogeo Co. Ltd and Selby
-v- Romeril. At first instance in Kwanza -v- Sogeo the
court stated as follows:
Although the “Code Civil” represents the law of modern
France and not the “Ancienne Coutume” of Normandy
from which the law of Jersey is drawn, I feel that, on a
question such as the one I now have to decide, he [sic] and
the other authorities quoted are a surer guide to the discovery of the Law of Jersey than is the Law of England, where,
as here, the Laws relating to real property have diverged to
a real extent.67
In the reported case, the Jersey judge was guided to make his decision and he decided not to replace the law of Jersey by French law
or English law. That said, the law commissioners considered in their
report that this was in fact a way of leaning toward French law.
Therefore, the Jersey judge gave us a perfect illustration of what the
“glocal legal” is about. Jersey contract law is Jersey contract law and
nothing else. But the guidance towards the judicial decision seemed
to be criticised by the law commissioners. Indeed, Sir Philip then
Bailiff of Jersey, in Selby v Romeril made clear that the root of Jersey contract law are in French contract law. This is simply because
Pothier who commented customary law was also a major influence
on the draftsmen of the Code civil and, therefore, in his opinion, the
current cases relating to the then art. 1108 of the Code that lays down
the conditions for a convention to be valid should be regarded as

66. John Kelleher, Comparative Law in Practice—Contract Law in a midChannel Jurisdiction, 17 JERSEY & GUERNSEY L. REV. 267 (2017) (book review).
https://perma.cc/KG3J-PAEU. (Last visited: July 5, 2022).
67. 2002 Consultation Paper supra note 62, at 5-6.
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guiding Jersey contract law.68 But even though that point could be
viewed as valid, the commissioners concluded their consultation paper by a rather peculiar statement:
[W]e presently favour the incorporation of English law by
statute on the basis of the relative speed by which it could
be carried out, its lack of a negative effect in terms of the
Island’s suitability for doing business and the fact that it
probably reflects the impression, albeit mistaken, that the
majority of islanders have of the basis of the Jersey law of
contract.69
The commission’s 2002 consultation paper was then not an exercise of clarification of Jersey law but more of its eradication. In fact,
the law commissioners did recommend the disappearance of Jersey
law here. This was developed further in the commission’s 2004 report. The report took into consideration various variables, meaning
the commissioners were less abrupt than in the consultation paper,
due to comments they got. Even though the commission softened its
approach, it considered that Jersey should adopt what was described
as the Indian way, by recommending that “a statutory framework be
adopted for the Jersey law of contract and the Indian Contract Act
of 1872 be used as a model.”70 The main point made here was that
Indian contract law was based “heavily on the English common law
of contract as it stood in 1872,” that the law would be familiar to
“both local practitioners and residents alike” as the courts in Jersey
were adopting “more and more of the elements of the English law
of contract.”71 The commission idea although slightly different than

68. See the 1804 version of French Civil Code, Art. 1108: Quatre conditions
sont essentielles pour la validité d’une convention :
Le consentement de la partie qui s’oblige ;
Sa capacité de contracter ;
Un objet certain qui forme la matière de l’engagement ;
Une cause licite dans l’obligation.
https://perma.cc/RCT4-RS9K. Last accessed July 5, 2022.
69. 2002 Consultation Paper supra note 62, at 22.
70. 2004 Report supra note 63, at 7.
71. Id.
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the 2002 consultation paper, also recommended the eradication of
Jersey law.
It is quasi evident that for most lawyers, it makes sense, and it is
certainly more efficient to adopt once and for all mechanisms, concepts, legal institutions of a legal culture they know best. Legal education and the language used by lawyers impacts on their understanding of legal mechanisms. This is not surprising in ideology. In
fact, “[l]anguage and behaviour are the media, so to speak, of the
material registration of ideology, this modality of functioning.” 72
The behaviour of the lawyers and their language have to do with the
way the good law in the asymmetry will eradicate the bad law. It is
not surprising that one of the proposals of the commission was actually “a direct incorporation of the English common law of contract” although, according to the report, the Indian way felt more
suitable.73 It felt more suitable, as reaffirmed in the 2019 comments,
simply because the commission advocated this time an “AngloSaxon” model.
[The Commission] would urge legislative reform based on
an Anglo-Saxon model. Such a legislative reform would
provide a modern framework for contract law, allowing
Jersey businesses and individuals alike to go about their
daily lives making and enforcing agreements in a way that
they would expect.74
Here, the dominant legal domain (English common law), of one
of the “big neighbours” was to be the one crushing the local law of
the micro jurisdiction Jersey. I am trying not to make any judgement
of value here. There are arguments for and against in this illustration. But the point I would like to make is that the Jersey law commissioners were almost all English solicitors, and those who were
already qualified Jersey lawyers had to be trained in English common law anyway. Althusser demonstrated the following:

72.
73.
74.

Hall, supra note 9, at 99.
2004 Report supra note 63, at 5.
2019 Comments supra note 64, at 3.

2021-2022]

LEGAL EDUCATION IN JERSEY

91

Knowledge, whether ideological or scientific, is the production of a practice. It is not the reflection of the real in
discourse, in language. Social relations have to be ‘represented in speech and language’ to acquire meaning. Meaning is produced as a result of ideological or theoretical
work. It is not simply a result of an empiricist epistemology.75
We understand here how legal education, product of a specific
practice, is the legal knowledge. I do not wish to criticise or be too
negative here, but simply to highlight the logic of the frame of mind,
and its result. As legal education has been more professional than
liberal, the scope for any critical analysis has been very slim. It has
somehow become monopolistic and, as a result, we may be able to
affirm that the knowledge of the “educated” lawyers is geographically conditioned: Where you are trained conditions what you
know. This point modifies the perception (the meaning) of what
should be right in the two-fold legal education. The “foreign law”
experience (training in English law) that is consciously or unconsciously imposed (voluntarily or not) seems to take a major space.
It even gives a more or less insidious belief to the trained students
as it provides one global legal discourse, simply by mirroring what
had been done in the dominant country. Ultimately, it is imposing
hegemonic alien views on micro jurisdictions.
V. HOW IDEOLOGY IMPOSES ALIEN VIEWS
ON MICRO JURISDICTIONS?
More than any other places, micro jurisdictions suffer the
“traditional positivist national approach to law.”76 This is a typical
consequence of the monopolistic vision of the law carried by a national discourse of “big neighbours” that overspills. It overspills because of the requirement that the ab initio legal training be done

75. Hall, supra note 9, at 98.
76. Mark Van Hoecke, Globalisation, Europeanisation and Legal Education
in HIGHER LEGAL CULTURE AND POSTGRADUATE LEGAL EDUCATION IN EUROPE
88, 83-89 (Vittorio Olgiati, ed, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2007).
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somewhere else. Jersey lawyers are positioned within an ideological
structure, dominated by the law of the “big neighbours,” and the language, in their ideology. Indeed, as Hall explained, “some of the
basic positionings of individuals in language, as well as certain primary positions in the ideological field, are constituted through unconscious processes in the psychoanalytic sense, at the early stages
of formation.”77
I gave the example of Jersey contract law particularly because it
shows the tension, the conflicts between the dominant laws of the
countries around Jersey and Jersey law: French law, English law,
pulling apart Jersey law. The influence of the “big neighbours” conditions a certain perception of the law and a specific meaning of their
law, the one of the other, creating unbalance, hierarchy, judgement
of values between one law and the other law, between a good law
and a bad law. This asymmetry defined by Althusser is produced
and reproduced unconsciously. Legal education becomes an instrument of a domination of a place over another one, transpiring
through gaps by the means of history and particularly language, as
“[o]ne of the main challenges lying before law education . . . is related to law and language relationship.”78
The relationship “law and country,” as an ideological relationship, expands to a masked contamination of the legal identity of Jersey.79 And we clearly witness a reproduction of a specific vision, a
specific domination, contaminations that go beyond the “law and
country,” as it colonises spaces that are not supposed to be.
One could consider that it is a “good” thing to be educated in
several legal cultures. It has for instance been argued that “[i]n legal
education . . . , lawyers tend to analyse the law and to solve problems
rather isolated from [the context of written law],” the “whole (social,

77. Hall, supra note 9, at 106.
78. Natalia Udina, Law Education: Language and Legal Translation Perspectives, PROCEDIA – SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 214. 1138, 1134-1138
(2015).
79. Moréteau, supra note 56.
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economic, historical, ideological . . .) context of written law” that
represent the legal culture.80 Then, having access to knowledge of
English law (or French law for argument’s sake), as a pre-requisite
to the access of micro jurisdictions law should be seen as a chance
for critical learning rather than a challenge as I mentioned previously.
It is indeed a chance for micro jurisdictions to create an “in between” and contradict the strength of the “big neighbours” ideology,
by critically looking at the law of the “big neighbours.” It also
should help lawyers or candidate lawyers to compare and develop a
critical mind on the one hand and, on the other hand, to raise awareness of what else is there. But the issue is the size of the jurisdictions
involved and the question raised by Althusser about asymmetry. If
Jersey lawyers would be trained in both French law and English law
for instance, there would be scope to acknowledge that there is
something “in between” that could guarantee an equilibrium and remove asymmetry. This is not currently the case. This “in between”
is where the micro jurisdiction finds itself. In an ideal world, identity, and particularly legal identity should not disappear but be taken
into account in a global world, as an added value, that is an adequate
logical little addition, an addition of quality rather than quantity, an
addition that is believed to be of importance.
We may well have French law and English law influence on the
law of Jersey, but what is important here, is the rest, the “in between,” the important “nothing” as the psychoanalyst would say,
that is Jersey law, the local extension of Normand customary law
developed locally, that gives all its flavour to the legal culture of
Jersey and gives its legal identity, its “glocal legal” dimension.
However, that this is not that simple. Jersey faces internal influences
that are repeatedly trying to undermine the “glocal legal” character
of the island. We may illustrate this point once more by referring to

80. DAVID SHIFF & RICHARD NOBLES, LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 273 (Ashgate 2014).
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the Jersey law commission 2002 consultation paper. In section 12,
the commissioners presented us the Summary of present difficulties
in ascertaining the law of contract. The commission listed those difficulties: Accessibility of Norman texts, Language, The Difficulty
of Applying Ancient Concepts, Uncertainty; A legal system for the
modern world of commerce? As a preliminary remark, I would like
to point out that what the commissioners listed would not be considered as such by comparative lawyers. Indeed, academics have ability
to find texts. Legal historian can work on these. In addition, customary law is not strictly speaking a written type of law and using Norman text to describe it is quite untrue. Indeed, according to Ruiter:
The conceptual framework may be helpful in analysing
written law, that is, legal conditions whose validity rests on
the successful performance of legal acts. It remains to be
seen, however, whether this framework can also be used to
analyse legal conditions whose validity does not rest on the
successful performance of legal acts, that is, unwritten law.
Unwritten law can roughly be divided into two categories.
The first is the category of legal principles. The second is
the category of customary law. 81
This is confirmed by Murphy who wrote that “custom . . . is
unwritten law.”82 In the same logic, academics do not have many
issues with applying concepts. And practitioners should not either.
But I would like simply to conclude by considering further the comments made under the difficulties labelled language and efficient legal system.
Language
Apart from the translations to which we have referred in the preceding paragraph, works on Norman customary law and on more
modern French law are almost exclusively written in the French

81. DICK W.P. RUITER, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 119 (Springer 2001).
82. AMANDA PERREAU-SAUSSINE & JAMES B. MURPHY, THE NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 65
(Cambridge U. Press 2007).
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language. Despite the island’s proximity to the coast of France, very
few islanders are fluent in French and in the twenty-first century it
may be difficult to justify a legal system where the laws are written
in a language that is alien to the majority of the population. In addition, the educational system on the island is English-based, both in
terms of language and content.
A Legal System for the Modern World of Commerce?
On an island predominantly inhabited by British nationals, it begs
the question as to why contract law continues to lean towards French
law and, on occasions, modern French law. Both statements relate.
They are also both quite untrue. Jersey’s population is quite diverse.
About half of its population is “really” from Jersey. When the report
of the commission was published it was exactly 53 % (it is 50 %
now), whereas the rest were from elsewhere.83 Of course, around 30
% of the population is from an English-speaking part of the world.
Then again, the island is constitutionally bilingual. That kind of arguments would not stand the analogy for example of Canada. Canada is bilingual, most of Canada communicates predominantly in
English and some part predominantly in French. The presence of a
large English-speaking community does not oblige the people of
Quebec to adopt common law contract, although it is not forbidden
to do so, and vice versa.
If we can assume that higher legal education has moved to some
extent to an internationalisation, within globalisation, then legal education of students in micro jurisdiction is at the essence. But the
whole area of knowledge, again, is bathing in ideology from the
large legal entities that are surrounding these micro spaces. Ideally,
lawyers in Jersey must develop a critical mind and first acknowledge
that law of the “big neighbours” only reflects one law, another foreign law. In ideology, with the point of asymmetry and hierarchy,

83. Island
of
Jersey,
Population
Characteristics,
https://perma.cc/YQA7-FPQV. (Last visited July 5, 2022).

(2011),
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with the question of contamination surrounding the qualitative appreciation of the law, we observe the conflict of one law (or law of
one) versus foreign law (or law of the other), the good versus the
bad. That said, I am pretty sure that most future lawyers see only
one thing that was well spotted by the commissioners: to study a
legal system for the modern world of commerce. We can assume
that this is one of the most important reasons here for the use of the
English language, the new lingua franca, and the use of the English
common law. The difficulty for an international financial centre like
Jersey is to appear to have a legal system (rather than a legal culture)
that is modern and sophisticated as the think tank Jersey Finance put
it.84 Unfortunately, these ideas contribute to an ambiance that advocates for the reduction of the legal identity of Jersey and therefore
also opens the way to less attractivity.
One may assume this is the result of the structural perception of
what is hegemonic in the law. Because of this perception, most law
students in Jersey expect to study the law of the English “big neighbour” even though their true fonds de commerce (goodwill) is in fact
as I said above, “the rest”; that is their legal identity will appear only
if Jersey legal culture was taught or if the legal cultures of both “big
neighbours” would be critically taught, helping the fostering of the
“in between.” It is a perception from the “globalisation” trend, but
also, and maybe this is a related matter, because of the pressure of
peer practitioners. The pair “law-country,” this monolithic, monopolistic approach of the law, created by a specific discourse, a national discourse is exacerbated in micro jurisdictions. In fact, by
analogy, we might consider that it equates the violence described by
Derrida on the way language was imposed in many societies. This
vehicle has many considerations and assumptions that are wrong

84. Jersey the International Finance Centre, https://perma.cc/XDX6-QV6D.
(Last visited: July 5, 2022).
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(like the divide private/public for example), fostered voluntarily or
not by the hegemonic dominance of the “big neighbours” law.
As law may be considered as a specific discourse of a vast discourse,85 as the language carries the “always ready,” which is the
impossibility to get out of the ideology, micro jurisdictions find
themselves in the middle of a competition between hegemonic discourses. Jersey’s position amplifies this position because the micro
jurisdiction itself competes with one competitor that does not have
the same weight as the other and becomes the dominant legal culture, making Jersey law the foreign one. As a last illustration, I
would like to add what the commissioners mentioned in their 2019
comments:
We therefore advocate legislation to establish a statutory
model for Jersey’s contract law. In designing a statutory
model, we recommend that the statute should not be based
on principles of French law. It is not good policy to base a
statute on alien concepts which are introduced deliberately
for cultural, romantic or sentimental reasons to be different.
Laws should serve the people and, so far, as is possible,
meet their expectations and avoid unfamiliar concepts.86
Jersey’s contract law should be Jersey’s, without any epistemological reference to French law, understanding that what they had in
mind with a common law approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, there are ambivalent aspects of legal training in Jersey (identity and the “big neighbours” dilemmas). It highlights the
drama and the trauma of the 21st century legal education in the micro jurisdictions.87 We are all aware that, to a certain extent, and I
would not like to generalise too much here, the teaching of law has

85. ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST
STRATEGY 96 (Verso 1985).
86. 2019 Comments supra note 64, at 3.
87. I would even attempt to generalise here by saying that this might be the
drama and trauma of most micro jurisdictions.
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become mechanistic. This seems to be a result of the necessity to
develop “good” lawyers, “ready to go” lawyers, some sort of good
new blue-collar workers for the structure. It also has become too
restricted and too narrow, to fit nicely within the pair “law and country.” This has to do with efficiency. These remarks may not be a
major shock in the legal profession and therefore in legal education
in a large country. But these remarks need to be addressed and analysed carefully in micro jurisdictions. Jersey legal education is
mostly based on ab initio training in English law prior to a local
training in Jersey law. The entire training is mostly done in English
if we exclude some teaching in French due to conveyancing documents still being written in French in Jersey. The domination of one
“big neighbour” over the other is creating an imbalance that preclude Jersey from truly determining its “in between.” As a result,
one legal identity is contaminating drastically Jersey’s legal identity.
This identity is being erased by a contamination from English common law. Thanks to Althusser, we know that ideology masks reality,
misrepresents reality, creating a fantasy world to allow the continuation of a system. The contamination is masked under the veil of
efficiency and contemporaneity of English common law. English
trained future lawyers in Jersey are not immune to this asymmetry
and this operation. They are unconscious victims within this mechanism. To be complete, it should also be noted that at the time of the
publication of this article, the local law school has somehow turned
even more towards the English side, leaving almost completely the
French side, and drastically diminishing its Jersey specificity.
Along its various incarnations, the discourse of a society is manifested, through ideology, relayed by the law, also as ideology
“which forms the ‘common sense’ of a period and thus appears natural, normal, right.”88 The trouble is that what appears natural,

88. Alan Hunt, Marxist Theory of Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 361, 355-374 (Dennis Patterson edocal, Blackwell
1996).
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normal, right for those studying English law, clashes with the legal
identity of Jersey, which is in fact as I mentioned, the real fonds de
commerce of Jersey lawyers. Zizek would say that this sounds really
like “shooting oneself in the foot”; this is indeed sacrificing what is
most precious, doing the impossible.89 I think this is self-explanatory.

89.

Jodie Dean, Zizek on Law, 15 LAW AND CRITIQUE 1, 21-22 (2004).
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ABSTRACT
The separation of a company from its members, based on legal
personality, is recognized as one of the fundamental principles of
corporate law. It expresses the legal distinction between the two entities. A consequence of the separateness principle is that members
are not liable for the debts of their companies, and companies cannot be held liable for the debts of their members. However, such
consequences of the principle of mutual autonomy of companies and
their members are in sharp contrast with commercial reality, in
which intertwined corporate groups operate as a single economic
entity. In market transactions, a subsidiary often becomes a tool in
the hands of its controlling partner—the parent company—trading
on its own behalf but in the interest of the parent enterprise or the
entire corporate group. Consequently, the subsidiary rather than the
 Professor, University of Silesia. This contribution was written in the
framework of the Research Project 2020/39/B/HS5/02631, funded by the National
Science Centre in Poland.
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controlling company is liable to third parties when harm is caused
to them. In such situations, the application of the principle of corporate separateness gives rise to an unjustified privilege to the parent company—the member of the subsidiary—while parties contracting with the subsidiary are at risk. Many legal systems react by
mitigating the separateness principle, using devices such as as
“piercing (lifting) the corporate veil,” “disregarding (avoiding)
corporate identity,” “intrusion beyond the barrier” (Durchgriff) or
“de facto management” (gestion de fait). The purpose of this study
is to present the terms and preconditions of different veil-piercing
liability mechanisms in selected jurisdictions such as Poland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and the United States. The need
to analyse the construction of veil-piercing liability in the Italian
and Polish legal systems is a consequence of discussion on the methods of protection available to creditors of a limited liability company.
Keywords: Poland, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, United States,
piercing (lifting) the corporate veil, disregarding (avoiding) corporate identity, intrusion beyond the barrier, capital companies, subsidiary, parent company, protection of company creditors, commercial law
I. INTRODUCTION
The separation of a company from its members based on legal
personality1 is recognized as one of the fundamental principles of
corporate law. It is expressed in terms of the legal distinctiveness
between the two2 and extends to include corporate group operations
in which a parent company is the controlling member of a subsidiary. The parent/dependence relationship in this regard does not serve
to lift the principle of separation. While not expressly stated in
Polish law, the principle is inferred from the construction of the legal
personality of group members.
In the present paper, it is argued that discussions on reforming
the capital structure of the limited liability company have exposed
1. See M. Pazdan, in 1 KODEKS CYWILNY. KSIĘGA DRUGA. WŁASNOŚĆ I INNE
PRAWA RZECZOWE. KOMENTARZ 139 (K. Pietrzykowski ed., C.H. Beck 2013).

2. In Polish literature, see, e.g., J. Frąckowiak, Podmioty stosunków cywilnoprawnych – Zagadnienia ogólne, in 1 SYSTEM PRAWA PRYWATNEGO, CZĘŚĆ
OGÓLNA 1016 (M. Safjan ed., C.H. Beck 2007).
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deficiencies in protecting the creditors of such companies. These
shortcomings may be removed by strengthening the protection of
creditors and including the company’s shareholders in the group of
entities that are liable towards the creditors. This does not preclude
the development of other protective instruments such as the motion
of liability of management-board members. In the context of the
above, the present research utilizes as its basic method the comparative method of analysis.
The purpose of this study is to present the terms and preconditions of different veil-piercing liability mechanisms in selected jurisdictions, that is in Polish, German, Swiss, Austrian, Italian, and
American laws. The American system is the departure point and the
adopted benchmark. The choice of the United States stems from the
fact that it was the first jurisdiction to identify and address the abuse
of corporate identity.3 Currently, the notion of veil-piercing liability
seems to most widespread in the US where most of the judgements
regarding this matter are issued. German legislation and doctrine
provide the most comprehensive conceptualization of veil-piercing
liability. Austrian and Swiss legislations, benefitting from the legacy of German literature, introduce certain distinctions in the understanding of veil-piercing liability. As to Italy, it is one of the few
European countries where substantive law provides for a special
mechanism of the dominating company’s private law liability towards the creditors of the daughter companies. The need to analyse
the doctrine of veil-piercing liability in the Polish legal system is a
consequence of a discussion of the means of protection available to
the creditors of a limited liability company.4 German law having introduced and developed the notion of veil-piercing liability in the
context of a civil-law jurisdiction, it may also be adopted in Polish
law, another continental legal system.
3. R. SZCZEPANIAK, NADUŻYCIE PRAWA DO POSŁUGIWANIA SIĘ FORMĄ
PRAWNĄ OSOBY PRAWNEJ 20 (TNOIK 2009); BELLAMY & CHILD: EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF COMPETITION (D. Bailey & L. E. John eds., Oxford U. Press 2014);
B. Cortese, Piercing the Corporate Veil in EU Competition Law: The Parent Subsidiary Relationship and Antitrust Liability, in EU COMPETITION LAW. BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ch. 4 (B. Cortese ed., Wolters Kluwer 2013);
S. Demeyere, Liability of Mother Company for Its Subsidiary in French, Belgian
and English Law, 23 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 385 (2015).
4. Judgements of the Supreme Court, September 18, 2014, III PK 136/13,
OSNP 2016, no. 2, item 17; March 17, 2015, I PK 179/14, OSNP 2016, no. 11,
item 140; Court of Appeal, February 7, 2007, I ACa 1033/06.
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The objective of the current paper is thus to discuss the notion
of veil piercing liability in selected countries in order to analyze the
existing legal solutions. This will allow for assessment of the effects
of adopting particular legal solutions and the advantages, as well as
difficulties that selected jurisdictions face when tackling the difficult
issue of veil-piercing liability.
In broad terms, the essence of separating the two entities is that
members are not liable for the debts of their companies, and companies cannot be held liable for the debts of their members. 5 A company’s assets are to satisfy the claims of its creditors, who may not
seek redress from the company’s members,6 regardless of the impact
they may have on the company’s operation.
However, the aforementioned consequence of the principle of
mutual autonomy of companies and their members is in sharp contrast with commercial reality, in which corporate groups operate as
a single economic entity, regardless of the existence of parent and
daughter companies. In market transactions, a subsidiary often becomes a tool in the hands of its controlling partner—the parent company—acting in commercial reality on its own behalf but in the economic interest of the parent enterprise or the entire corporate group.7
The consequence of such acts is the emergence of the subsidiary’s
liability to third parties when harm is caused to them. In such situations—as it is claimed—the application of the principle of corporate
separateness gives rise to an unjustified privilege to the benefit of
the parent company—the member of the subsidiary8—while placing
those who contract with the subsidiary in a risky position. Incidents
of a parent company’s control over a subsidiary company that lead
to harm being caused to the subsidiary and its creditors are not uncommon. Typically, this results from managerial and/or financial restrictions imposed by the parent company which, in a worst-case
scenario, can bring the subsidiary to a position where it can no
5. Arts. 151 § 4 & 301 § 5, Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies; Act of September 15, 2000, Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies (CCPC), Dz.U. no. 94, poz. 1037, as amended.
6. Frąckowiak, supra note 2.
7. A. Szumański, Spór wokół roli interesu grupy spółek i jego relacji w
szczególności do interesu własnego spółki uczestniczącej w grupie, 9 PRZEGLĄD
PRAWA HANDLOWEGO 9 (2010).
8. A. OPALSKI, PRAWO ZGRUPOWAŃ SPÓŁEK 476 (C.H. Beck 2012).
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longer satisfy its debts. This raises the following question: when this
occurs, why not shifting the liability of the subsidiary to the parent
company? It should be liable for the damage sustained by the subsidiary or directly liable towards parties injured by the by acts of the
subsidiary for which the parent company was ultimately responsible.
Many legal systems are making such a move, primarily in the
jurisprudence of their courts,9 by mitigating the separateness principle with various legal constructions referred to, in most general
terms, as “piercing (lifting) the corporate veil,” “disregarding
(avoiding) corporate identity,” “intrusion beyond the barrier”
(Durchgriff) or “de facto management” (gestion de fait).
The theory of separateness of companies from their members is
recognized in German legislation. § 13(2) of the Limited Liability
Companies Act (GmbHG)10 introduces the principle of corporate
separateness, which means that members are not liable for the company’s debts (Trennungsprinzip).11 As in the Polish legal system,
corporations are independent entities and constitute legal subjects
separate from their members. The separateness of a company from
its members is the case not only in corporate relationships but also
in non-corporate relationships, in which members act with the company as equal parties to civil law relationships, entering into contracts with the company.
In the face of incompatibility of the corporate separateness theory with the economic reality in which commercial companies operate, German, Austrian and Swiss legal systems permit its mitigation by adopting the theory of veil-piercing liability (Durchgrijfshaftung) and, in consequence, exclusion of the principle of members’ limited responsibility for the company’s liabilities. Although
in German doctrine there is no independent and homogenous legal
construction of veil-piercing liability, such liability must be identified with the liability of a member of a company under specific legal
9. A. Szumański, Regulacja prawna holdingu w polskim i europejskim
prawie spółek (zagadnienia pojęciowe), 8 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA HANDLOWEGO
(1996).
10. Gesetz betreffend die Gesellchaften mit beschränkter Haftung, April 20,
1892 (BGB1. I S. 2586).
11. M. LUTTER & P. HOMMELHOFF, GMBH-GESETZ: KOMMENTARHON 142
(14th ed., Otto Schmidt 1995).
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provisions or in a situation of a member’s accession to debt.12 The
purpose of the liability is to set aside or mitigate the principle of
separateness.13 Italian law also provides for restrictions on the principle of legal separateness by affording legal protection to parties
contracting with subsidiary companies. Finally, veil-piercing liability is also associated with the English concept of piercing (lifting)
the corporate veil, drawn from the terminology adopted in American
law.14
In contrast, Polish legislation does not envisage any construction
allowing to limit or mitigate the principle of corporate separateness.
Despite the heterogeneity of the concept and vague boundaries of
piercing liability, there have been many attempts to define the notion
in Polish academic literature. Certain authors indicate that it is an
exception to the principle under which company members incur no
personal liability for the company’s debts, implying “either suppression of the separation principle or, possibly, only of the limited liability principle.”15 Other scholars define it as avoidance or mitigation of the legal separateness of corporations, leading to an attribution of certain legal norms, contractual provisions or liability to another entity,16 or more broadly, as a legal instrument intended to afford protection to the company’s creditors or creditors of a subsidiary. This protection may serve as a basis to disregard the legal personality of a given company, to avoid the separateness of several
companies with capital connections and treat them as a single economic entity, or even to question specific transactions or contracts
concluded between a member and the company.17 It is also indicated
in the literature that the theory involves the direct accountability of
12. O. Sztejnert, Odpowiedzialność przebijająca" i przesłanki jej stosowania
w niemieckim prawie handlowym, PALESTRA 41/9-10 (477-478), 124 (1997).
13. W. Popiołek, Odpowiedzialność spółki dominującej za szkodę
“pośrednią” wyrządzoną przez spółkę zależną, in ROZPRAWY Z PRAWA
PRYWATNEGO ORAZ NOTARIALNEGO. KSIĘGA PAMIĄTKOWA DEDYKOWANA
PROFESOROWI MAKSYMILIANOWI PAZDANOWI 306 (A. Dańko-Roesler, A.
Oleszko & R. Pastuszko eds., 2014).
14. M. Zmysłowska, Odpowiedzialność przebijająca w prawie
amerykańskim i włoskim, IWS 1 (2017).
15. T. TARGOSZ, NADUŻYCIE OSOBOWOŚCI PRAWNEJ 138 (Kraków
Zakamycze 2004).
16. A. Opalski, Problematyka pominięcia prawnej odrębności spółek
kapitałowych, 8 PPH 10 (2012).
17. Zmysłowska, supra note 14, at 2.
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members for the company’s debts by avoiding two principles: legal
separateness of a company from its members and liability of members for the company’s debts.18
II. PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CORPORATE SEPARATENESS
Under the Polish legal system, both partnerships and companies
are characterized by legal separateness from their members. Partnerships were given legal subjectivity by the legislator, which means
the capacity to be a subject of rights and obligations and, consequently, the capacity to incur such rights and obligations (Art. 8 of
the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies (CCPC). In
the same way, beside natural and legal persons, the legislator introduced a third category of subjects,19 the so-called imperfect legal
persons, statutory subjects or non-personal subjects.20 As a result,
partnerships have no legal personality as such and enjoy legal subjectivity only insofar as legal provisions afford them legal capacity.
Thus, affording legal personality to partnerships implies their organizational and legal separation from the members who formed them.21
As opposed to partnerships, companies were afforded legal personality, which means that they obtained the most extensive attributes of personality.22 A company acts through its governing bodies,
its members are not liable for its debts (subject to Art. 13 § 2 CCPC),
and benefits transferred from the company’s assets to its members
require a legal basis in the form of a statutory provision or company
action. In addition, there exists a special corporate relationship between the company and its members.23

18. M. Wiórek, Kilka uwag o teorii nadużycia prawa jako koncepcji
uzasadniającej tzw. odpowiedzialność przebijającą, in WPŁYW EUROPEIZACJI
PRAWA NA INSTYTUCJE PRAWA HANDLOWEGO 237 (J. Kruczalak-Jankowska ed.,
LexisNexis 2013).
19. See W.J. Katner, Podwójna czy potrójna podmiotowość w prawie
cywilnym?, in ROZPRAWY PRAWNICZE. KSIĘGA PAMIĄTKOWA PROFESORA
MAKSYMILIANA PAZDAN 1031 (Kraków Zakamycze 2005).
20. Regarding terminology, see also M. WACH, STATUS UŁOMNYCH OSÓB
PRAWNYCH W POLSKIM PRAWIE CYWILNYM 89 (Warszawa 2008); M. TARSKA,
SPÓŁKA Z O.O. ISTOTA. USTRÓJ. FUNKCJONOWANIE 145 (Warszawa 2003); J.
Frąckowiak, in SYSTEM PRAWA PRYWATNEGO. TOM I. PRAWO CYWILNE – CZĘŚĆ
OGÓLNA 1202 (M. Safjan ed., Warszawa 2012).
21. See IV CK 13/03 Supreme Court, July 8, 2003, Legalis no. 61171.
22. Opalski, supra note 16, at 10.
23. Id.
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Corporate separateness (Trennungsprinzip) performs an important function in the German legal system. The legal personality
of joint-stock companies stems from the provision of the first sentence of § 1(1) AktG,24 and in the case of limited liability companies,
it is defined in the provision of § 13(1) GmbHG, under which a company so incorporated independently exercises its own rights and obligations.25 This refers both to corporate and non-corporate relationships, in which members act with the company as equal contracting
parties.26 The legal personality granted, also means that the claims
of creditors can only satisfied from the company’s assets.27
As in German law, Austrian legislation grants legal personality
to limited liability companies28 and joint-stock companies29 which,
in turn, allows to adopt the legal principle of separateness of a company from its members (§ 61(2) öGmbHG30 in the case of limited
liability companies and § 8 öAktG31 in that of joint-stock companies). In the United States32 and in the Italian Republic,33 the attribution of legal personality to companies gave rise to development of
the concept of veil-piercing liability.
In Poland, under the principle of non-liability of members for
their company’s debts (Art. 151 § 4 CCPC and Art. 301 § 5 CCPC),
which accompanies the principle of corporate separateness, companies are independently liable for their own debts, and their creditors
may not seek satisfaction from the personal assets of their

24. Aktiengesetz v.
06.09.1965, (BGB1. I 1965 p. 1089),
https://perma.cc/27C3-XQQS (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
25. A. Krawczyk, Przebicie przez przypisanie w koncernie, 1 Przegląd
Prawa Handlowego 34 (2016).
26. See LUTTER & HOMMELHOFF, supra note 11 at 142.
27. The German legislator excluded the possibility to assert claims for a
company’s debts directly against its shareholders (§ 13(2) GmbHG), which also
refers to stockholders of joint stock companies (sentence 2 of § 1(1) AktG).
28. § 61(1) öGmbHG.
29. § 1 öAktG.
30. Österreichisches Strafgesetzbuch (Budesgesetz v. January 23, 1974 über
die mit gerichtlicher Strafe bedrohten Handlungen; BGBI. Nr. 60),
https://perma.cc/8ZRH-KRDQ (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
31. Österreichisches
Aktiengesetz
(ÖBGBI.
S.
98)
(CHB)
https://perma.cc/A4H9-9CBU (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
32. W. M. FLETCHER, 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 334 § 41.77 (2015).
33. See also P. Moskała, Konstrukcja odpowiedzialności cywilnoprawnej we
włoskim prawie grup spółek, in 1 STUDIA PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 32 (2016).
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members.34 Authors are divided as to whether the exclusion of personal liability of company members for its debts constitutes a characteristic of corporations or whether it is a natural consequence of
such entities being vested with legal personality.35 The majority
view is that the first opinion should prevail, i.e. that it represents a
corporate characteristic.36
The principle of legal separateness seems a natural solution that
best suits the interests of companies. By contrast, in German law,
the general rule is that corporate members incur personal and unlimited liability, and its mitigation or exclusion constitutes an exception
to that rule.37 As a result, only the combination of the principle of
separateness and the liability incurred by members of a company
permits the conclusion that in civil law the general rule is personal
liability of members, or their solidary liability, even though such
persons are not parties to legal relationships.
The assumption of full separation between the actions and assets
of a company and its members serves as basis for the legislative regimes in Swiss law (Trennung zwischen dem Rechtsträger und seine
Mitgliedern),38 American law39 and Italian law.40
The arguments for excluding corporate members from liability
include: encouraging initiative, promoting creativity and achieving
greater objectivity in decision making processes; all attributes that
lead to optimizing an undertaking’s economic growth.41 Conversely, not just the economic growth but also the efficiency of an
undertaking can suffer when the actions and decisions of members

34. See VI ACa 1561/14, Legalis No. 1392962, Court of Appeal of Warsaw,
October 23, 2015; I ACa 854/14, Court of Appeal of Białystok, March 5, 2015; V
CK 411/02, Supreme Court, October 23, 2003, MONITOR PRAWNICZY no. 9, 2004,
at 417.
35. Opalski, supra note 16, at 11.
36. A. Szajkowski & M. Tarska, in 2 KODEKS SPÓŁEK HANDLOWYCH.
KOMENTARZ DO ARTYKUŁÓW 151-300 Art. 151, no. 65 (P. Sołtysiński ed., C.H.
Beck 2014).
37. T. Raiser, Die Haftungsbeschränkung ist kein Wesensmerkmal der
juristischen Person, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MARCUS LUTTER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG.
DEUTSCHES UND EUROPÄISCHES GESELLSCHAFTS-, KONZERN- UND
KAPITALMARKTRECHT 637 (U.H. Schneider 2000).
38. A. BINDER, T. GEISER & V. ROBERTO, EINFÜHRUNG INS PRIVATRECHT.
OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL, OBLIGATIONENRECT BESONDERER
TEIL, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 15 (U. St. Gallen 2008).
39. FLETCHER, supra note 32, at 334.
40. See also Moskała supra note 33, at 32.
41. Raiser, supra note 37, at 649.
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are influenced solely by the potential risk to their personal assets
should the business fail.42 Notwithstanding, it has to be acknowledged that corporate separateness effectively shifts the liability and
risk of a company’s insolvency to its creditors.
However, the concept of veil-piercing liability must not be regarded as depriving members of a company of the privilege of exclusion of their liability or even as a rule. Such liability is just one
of the aspects involved in the subject of “piercing.”
III. VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY
A. Characteristics of Veil-Piercing Liability
1. Germany
In German law, the term “veil-piercing liability” has no legal
definition. Sharing the opinion expressed in legal doctrine, the concept may refer to situations in which members incur personal, unlimited, solidary liability for the company’s debts towards its creditors.43 Following the broadest of the definitions proposed in the literature, it should be indicated that, in such situations, the liability
regime under § 13(2) GmbHG is stricken out, resulting in the external liability of members towards the company’s creditors or materialization of the obligation to reimburse to the company, as a part of
the internal relationship, all losses suffered by the latter. The point
is to afford to the company’s creditors a possibility of indirect satisfaction of their claims.44 The cited definition is valuable inasmuch
as it accounts for both external and internal liability of company
members. However, its drawbacks also need to be recognized. It
does not account for the legal nature of veil-piercing liability and

42. TARGOSZ, supra note 15, at 72 et seq., M. WIÓREK, OCHRONA WIERZYCIELI SPÓŁKI Z O.O. POPRZEZ OSOBISTĄ ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ JEJ WSPÓLNIKÓW. KONCEPCJA ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI PRZEBIJAJĄCEJ I NADUŻYCIA FORMY PRAWNEJ
SPÓŁKI W PRAWIE POLSKIM I NIEMIECKIM 272 (Wrocław 2016).
43. See K. HEIDER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ: AKTG,
commentary to § 1 AktG, nb. 63 (M. Habersack & W. Goette eds., C.H. Beck
2015).
44. T. Raiser, in GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT
BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG). GROßKOMMENTAR. BAND I. EINLEITUNG §§
1 BIS 28, § 13, nb 52 (P. Ulmer, M. Habersack & M. Winter eds., Mohr Siebeck
2005).
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does not specify the legal basis for the company’s claims against its
members. Finally, it does not take into consideration other situations
that might arise.
In German law, veil-piercing liability does not cover situations
in which members are liable towards the company’s creditors for
delicts of their own making or when the source of their obligations
were legal acts in which they pledged to assume liability for the
company’s debts (unechte Durchgriffshaftung). At the same time,
German authors assume the existence of so-called reverse veilpiercing liability (Umgekehrter Haftungsdurchgriff), which excludes the possibility of personal creditors of a company’s members
to be satisfied from the company’s assets.45
In seeking to provide a wider characterization of veil piercing, it
needs to be understood that in German doctrine there is no independent legal construction of veil-piercing liability. Due to the various
ways in which it is possible to impose liability on company members
for the company’s debt, systematization and comparison was set
forth to address the multitude of situations presented.
In German academic literature, one can distinguish between liability piercing (namely, Durchgriffshaftung, Haftungsdurchgriff)
and attributive piercing (Zurechnungsdurchgriff). The latter consists
in the application and interpretation of legal provisions or contractual clauses so that, by disregarding the separateness of entities, the
consequences of certain events are attributed to a specific entity.46
Attribution may proceed in two directions, meaning attribution of
the company’s actions to a member and the other way round. Along
these lines, authors distinguish various types of “piercing,” namely
the type where the member is charged, the other type with the company being charged and two other types: to the benefit of the member or to the benefit of the company.47
Shortcomings of the proposed definition have been identified in
the literature on the subject. Authors distinguish between proper
(echte Durchgriffslehren) and improper veil-piercing liability. The
first of the two relates to the principle of separateness and gives rise
to the external liability of members of a limited liability company
45.
46.
47.

HEIDER, supra note 43 at commentary to § 1 AktG, no. 63.
TARGOSZ, supra note 15, at 138.
K. SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 221(4th ed., Heymanns 2002).
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for the company’s debts, which is effective directly to the company’s creditors and based on company law.48 In the same way, such
theories question the legal independence of companies, and their attribution with the feature of legal personality. It is assumed that such
liability is legitimate only in situations involving violation of obligations which are intended to afford protection both to the company
or its members and to the company’s creditors.49 Among theories of
proper piercing liabilities, one should point to the subjective (subjektive Mißbrauchslehre) and objective theory of abuse, as well as the
institutional theory and theory of the norm’s purpose (classical
norm’s purpose theory).
On the other hand, improper veil-piercing liability (improper
piercing of liability, unechter Haftungsdurchgriff) is the case when
the liability of members of a limited liability company towards its
creditors, is based on the general regime of liability envisaged in
civil law, thus outside company law, and principally moulded as external liability.50 Other authors indicate that improper veil-piercing
liability also covers situations of internal liability towards the company and those in which member liability is grounded in company
law.51
In German literature, veil-piercing liability is substantiated by
the following theories: abuse theory (Mißbrauchslehren), institutional theories (institutionelle Lehren) and norm application theories
(Normanwendungslehren).52
According to the abuse theory, veil-piercing liability may apply
in situations of abuse of the corporate form (subjective theory).53
This concept is based on the assumption that the exploitation of corporate separateness by a member in any way that is contrary to its
purpose and use, may result in such member being held liable for
the company’s debts, regardless of whether or not he acted with intent to injure creditors or circumvent the law. Since proponents of

48. Raiser, supra note 44 at § 13, no. 54.
49. Id.
50. Id., § 13, no. 90.
51. G. Bitter, in SCHOLZ. KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBH-GESETZ § 13, nb. 90
(11th ed., Otto Schmidt 2012).
52. SCHMIDT, supra note 47, at 221.
53. TARGOSZ, supra note 15, at 122.
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this concept invoke the construction and function of a company as a
corporation, an independent legal subject, objective abuse of the
corporate form is also referred to as the “institutional theory.”
On the other hand, the alternative concept54 focuses on the purpose and role of provisions which, by restricting a member’s liability for company debts, affords that member a liability privilege
(Haftungsprivileg). The analysis of purpose of such norm, considering the circumstances of a specific matter, allows establishing if the
given norm is applicable or if it should be disregarded.55 This theory
had an important influence on the shape of the contemporary socalled teleological reduction56 of legal provisions setting out limited
liability of the members for their company’s debts. This notion is
based on the presumption that the limitation of members’ liability is
not a characteristic of a corporate body but rather a consequence of
a legislative choice. Therefore, only fulfilment of the appropriate
preconditions and minimum conditions allows for the exclusion of
members’ liability for the company’s debts and, where such conditions are not complied with, a member will incur personal and unlimited liability.57
The criterion for another division of the piercing theory is either
reference to the principle of corporate separateness or development
of veil-piercing liability in isolation from that principle. Theories
invoking the principle of separateness render veil-piercing liability
as opposing that principle and put emphasis on independence and
separateness of members and their assets from the company. From
this point of view, theories involving the principle of separateness
include both abuse theories and institutional theories.58

54. W. Müller-Freienfels, Zur Lehre vom sogenannten “Durchgriff” bei
juristischen Personen im Privatrecht: Rechtsform und Realität juristischer
Personen. Ein rechts-vergleichender Beitrag zur Frage des Durchgriffs auf die
Personen oder Gegenstände hinter der juristischen Person by Rolf Serick, 156
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 522 (1958).
55. See also T. Fock, commentary to § 1 AktG, in AKTIENGESETZ no. 45 (G.
Spindler & E. Stilz eds., Munich 2015).
56. M. Grochowski, Reguła de minimis non curat praetor w prawie
prywatnym, in SINE IRA ET STUDIO. KSIĘGA JUBILEUSZOWA DEDYKOWANA
SĘDZIEMU JACKOWI GUDOWSKIEMU 882 (T. Ereciński, P. Gregorczyk & K. Weitz
eds., Wolters Kluwer Polska 2016).
57. WIÓREK, supra note 42, at 112.
58. Bitter, supra note 51 at § 13, no. 117.
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2. Switzerland and Austria
In the Swiss and Austrian legal systems, the concept of veilpiercing liability has not been so amply and comprehensively developed as in German law. Swiss legislation considers that the corporate form may be abused by members of legal persons, and therefore
provides legal solutions offering more protection to creditors.59
Austrian law provides mechanisms protecting the assets of a
company’s creditors against disloyal behaviour of its members.60
However, in fear of insufficient creditor protection, jurisprudence
allows, in exceptional cases, to derogate from the principle of separateness.61 Because of the judiciary’s significant role in the development of the concept of veil-piercing liability, such jurisprudence
lacks homogeneity and covers not only members’ liability for the
company’s debts but also their delictual liability for acts that harm
its creditors.62
In a 1983 decision, the Austrian Supreme Court held that the
concept of veil-piercing liability may not be compatible with the
Austrian legal system.63 At a later time, the concept was admitted
although its practical application remained insignificant. 64 In 1986,
the Austrian Supreme Court defined the scope of liability regarding
a member managing the company’s operations vis-a-vis the company’s creditors. This decision was delivered in a case where the
controlling member, a bank, exerted considerable influence on matters handled by a daughter company. The daughter company, with
its managers acting under the member’s instructions and guidelines,
subsequently became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy. The Supreme Court, when examining claims submitted by the creditors of
the bankrupt company against the controlling member, held that due
to the influence of the member on the controlled entity, the shareholder had a special duty of care in the exercise of its corporate
59.
60.

Binder, Geiser & Roberto, supra note 38 at 15.
F.
WÜNSCHER,
DIE
DURCHGRIFFSHAFTUNG
WEGEN
SPHÄRENVERMISCHUNG IM DEUTSCHEN UND ÖSTERREICHISCHEN GMBH-RECHT 4
(U. Graz 2014).
61. OGH June 16, 1983, 6 Ob 579/83, SZ 56/101.
62. OGH April 12, 2001, 8 ObA 98/00 w, SZ 74/65.
63. OGH June 16, 1983, supra note 61.
64. Judgements of the OGH July 14, 1986, 1 Ob 571/86, JBl 1986, 713; April
29, 2004, 6 Ob. 313/03 B, GeS 2005 no. 1.
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rights and exertion of influence on the management of the controlled
company. In consequence and without any direct reference to veilpiercing liability, it was concluded that the member of the bankrupt
company was liable for negligently driving the company towards
insolvency as per § 159 öStGB.65 In the cited ruling, the risk relating
to participation in the company was found to exceed the value of
capital invested by the member, which accounts for and points to the
ruling’s affinity with veil-piercing liability theory.
In this regard, Austrian law shows many similarities with German legislation. Just as the German legal system, it permits the use
of the interpretation method of legal norms and contractual provisions which recognizes that they relate not only to a member but
also to the company (piercing by attribution, Zurechnungsdurchgriff). The jurisprudence of the Austrian Supreme Court
offers many examples for relativization of the legal separateness of
the company and its members through piercing by attribution, including consideration of the member’s state of awareness while
evaluating if the company acted in good faith or charging the company with the consequences of breach of a contractual prohibition
of competition (namely, vertragliches Wettbewerbsverbot) binding
on the member controlling the company. Moreover, the corporate
separateness of an entity from its members may be avoided by way
of mutual attribution of their features. As a result, an error as to the
characteristics of a company’s controlling member may serve as a
basis for the avoidance of consequences of a legal agreement with
the company. Finally, as in the German legal system, the construction of piercing by attribution works in both directions as, on the one
hand, it allows to burden the company with circumstances relating
to a member and, on the other to shift to members some liability that
would otherwise be on the company.66
3. United States

65. Österreichisches Strafgesetzbuch (federal law of January 23, 1974 über
die mit gerichtlicher Strafe bedrohten Handlungen; BGBI. Nr. 60). See also OGH
July 14, 1986, 1 Ob 571/86, JBl 1986, 713. Cf. OGH April 12, 2001, 8 ObA 98/00
w, SZ 74/65.
66. OGH April 12, 2001, supra note 65. See also P. Mazur, Odpowiedzialność przebijająca w prawie niemieckim, austriackim i szwajcarskim, IWS 49
(2017).
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Under American law, the mechanism of veil-piercing liability is
intended to prevent crime and promote equity in some specific factual situations.67 However, though there is a multitude of cases, state
and federal courts have not yet developed a uniform understanding
and a consistent case law on veil-piercing liability.68
In American law, the concept applies to both tort and contract
liability claims. However, a mere breach of contractual provisions
is insufficient to establish a basis for the application of veil-piercing
liability mechanisms.69
Despite the absence of a uniform definition of veil-piercing liability in American law, the judiciary has developed many theories
substantiating the concept under which, in certain circumstances,
members are liable towards their company’s creditors and, consequently, may be held accountable against such creditors for the company’s debts. Among the classical theories of veil-piercing liability,
one can distinguish the doctrine of instrumental treatment of a company (instrumentality doctrine), the alter ego doctrine and the identity doctrine.
In academic literature and judicial practice, the most widespread
theory allowing bypassing the corporate identity of a company is the
instrumentality doctrine, admissible in situations where a company
is a mere instrument in the hands of another entity.70 Once approved
by the courts in the State of New York, this doctrine became widely
used.71 The theory assumes the existence of three factors: entity exercising such control over a subsidiary that the subsidiary becomes
a tool in the hands of the controlling entity (mere instrumentality);
cases of fraud, injustice, unlawful behaviour or any other act

67. B. Jankowski, Nadużycie formy prawnej spółki w prawie amerykańskim,
2 PIP 70 (1996).
68. See also Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 810,
712 P.2d 511 (1985).
69. Zmysłowska, supra note 14 at 12.
70. M. Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV.
496 (1912), FLECHTER, supra note 32, at 167-195.
71. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1936).
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prohibited by law; and a causal link between the act and the resulting
damage.72
The alter ego doctrine applies in situations where the convergence of interests between a member and the company is such that
the latter may be considered an “alter ego” of the member. On analysis, one cannot help but agree with the opinion that instrumentality
doctrine and alter ego doctrine amount to one and the same thing.73
Nevertheless, contrary views can also be found.74
Among the theories of veil-piercing liability, one should also
mention single factor theories (single factor piercing). This includes
the use of sham or shell corporations, use of the corporate form for
fraudulent, unjust or unlawful purposes, situations involving matters
regulated by federal law and the practice of presenting a group of
companies as a single business enterprise. These are referred to as
equitable theories because American courts apply them when the
collected evidence allows proving one of the factors indicated in the
classical compensatory liability theories. However, the case must involve a gross violation of the corporate form.75
These solutions differ from the regime of veil-piercing liability
as introduced in Italian law. The Italian Republic is a country where,
since 2004, legal provisions expressly set out the liability of a controlling company in relation to the creditors of its subsidiaries.76
4. Italy
Under the Italian legislative framework, companies or entities
which, in the course of management and coordination of other companies, act in their own interest or in the interest of a third party, in
violation of the principles of sound corporate management and business operations in relation to the companies subject to management
and coordination, incur direct liability to the members of such companies for damage arising from the lowering of the company’s
72. P.I. BLUMBERG, K. A. STRASSER, N.L. GEORGAKOPOULOS & E.J.
GOUVIN, BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS 11-3—11-4 (Wolters Kluwer, Supplement 2014-1).
73. Id., 11-01 to 11-04.
74. Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. V. Diners Club International, Inc.
802 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
75. See also Zmysłowska, supra note 14 at 23 et seq.
76. Art. 2497 et seq. of the Italian cod. civ., https://perma.cc/KJ2E-SEWE
(Last accessed: June 29, 2022).
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profitability and the value of shares or stocks held by such members,
and for the damage caused to creditors by compromising the company’s assets. However, liability does not arise when there is no actual damage in light of the totality of consequences of the management and coordination exercised, or when actual damage has been
redressed by subsequent actions undertaken as a part of the management or coordination exercise. Other persons incurring solidary liability alongside those previously identified, are the person or persons who participated in the commission of a harmful act and, within
the limits of the benefits obtained, the person or persons who knowingly reaped benefits from such act. Finally, members and creditors
of the coordinated company may sue the managing and coordinating
company or entity only as far as they have not been satisfied by the
company under the management and coordination exercise. This
legislative reform was to be based on two basic presumptions,
namely: transparency of relationships within a group (trasparenza)
and equilibrium of interests of the entities affected by the existence
of a corporate group (contemperamento degli interessi coinvolti).77
However, it must be remembered that, since the beginning of the
1990s,\the courts have not handled the problems of veil-piercing liability in Italian law.78
5. Poland
In Polish doctrine, no uniform definition of veil-piercing liability has been developed.79 Moreover, Polish law, in light of the mandatory nature of Art. 151 § 4 CCPC and Art. 301 § 5 CCPC, does
not offer an instrument of any description that would allow to exclude corporate separateness. In addition, no comprehensive regime
has been introduced that, following along the lines of the German
model, would govern the rights of corporate groups and provide a
basis for expanding the liability of a controlling entity. Provisions
77. See Moskała, supra note 33, at 32.
78. See for more details V. Cariello, The ‘Compensation’ of Damages with
Advantages Deriving from Management and Coordination Activity (Direzione e
Coordinamento) of the Parent Company (Article 2497, paragraph 1, Italian Civil
Code) – Italian Supreme Court 24 August 2004, no. 16707, 3 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 330 (2006).
79. See TARGOSZ, supra note 15 at 138; Wiórek, supra note 18 at 237.
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of the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies merely
contain rules defining the concepts of a controlling and subsidiary
company, imposing disclosure obligations on companies in relation
to the control relationship, and a number of provisions expanding
the legal regime governing a given parent company to its subsidiaries. Nevertheless, in the conditions of everyday Polish market practice, there are attempts to formulate claims based on the doctrine of
veil-piercing liability.
B. The Scope of Veil-Piercing Liability
To continue with the topic of the nature of veil-piercing liability,
it must be reminded that one of the traditionally important roles in
the structure of a limited liability company and joint-stock company
is the part played by their nominal capital. Both in Polish law and
legislations of other EU Member States, it is a foundation for the
operation of corporations.80 Under the current legislative framework, the construction of nominal capital requirements may be characterized as being both dysfunctional and inadequate regarding the
protection of creditors’ interests.
In response to the shortcomings of nominal capital, there are
voices in Polish literature that propose legislative reform or, more
radically, the abandonment of nominal capital and its replacement
by an alternative system based on a so-called solvency test.81 In the
German legal system, it was judicial practice that played an important role in the correction and supplementation of the construction of nominal capital, and existing jurisprudence was then taken
into consideration by the legislator.82 The amendments introduced,
which were a compromise, streamlined the operation of German

80. A. Radwan, Sens i nonsens kapitału zakładowego – przyczynek do
ekonomicznej analizy ustawowej ochrony wierzycieli spółek kapitałowych, in 2
EUROPEJSKIE PRAWO SPÓŁEK, INSTYTUCJE PRAWNE DYREKTYWY KAPITAŁOWEJ
59 (3rd ed., M. Cejmer, J. Napierała & T. Sójka eds., Zakamycze 2005).
81. See also K. Oplustil & P. Wiórek, Aktualne tendencje w europejskim
prawie spółek – orzecznictwo ETS i planowane działania prawodawcze, 5 PPH 4
(2004).
82. See also BGH “November”-Urteil BGH November 24, 2003, I ZR
171/01, BGHZ 157, 72-79; T. DRYGALA, M. STAAKE & P. SZALAI,
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTSRECHT. MIT GRUNDZUGEN DES KONZERN- UND
UMWANDLUNGSRECHTS 114 (Springer 2012).
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limited liability companies and made them an attractive platform for
conducting business activity.
However, criticism of the protective function of nominal capital
questions its tenet and justifies the pursuit of alternative protection
of creditors.83 Still, regardless of the drawbacks of the discussed
construction, there are many situations in the laws of European
countries where the provisions implementing the guarantee function
of nominal capital do not apply.
Among such situations, one can mention the existence of undercapitalized companies,84 which lack the means to participate in business transactions, engage in the due management of funds or the
preparation of long-term financial plans considering their business
profile. Undercapitalization may be primary or subsequent, depending on whether from the outset the company had not been equipped
with a capital base sufficient to meet the scope of its operation, or if
the capital was subject to certain reduction in the course of the company’s business. Undercapitalization may also be divided into nominal (nominelle Unterkapitalisierung)85 and substantive (materielle
Unterkapitalisierung).86 That said, in the case of undercapitalization, the legitimacy of asserting claims directly against members,
although commonly supported in the doctrine, has not been accepted
by German courts.87
Another problem is to determine which of the assets are the
property of a company and which are the property of a member; a
dilemma posing a threat to the principle of separateness. A peculiar
“confusion” of patrimonies arises when a member of a limited liability company conducts matters of the company as his own business, treating the company’s assets as part of his own patrimony, or
keeps accounts in a non-transparent or unreliable manner.88
83. Act of July 13, 2006 on the protection of employee claims in case of employer’s insolvency (Dz.U. 2006 no. 158 poz. 1121).
84. See also Opalski, supra note 16, at 17-18.
85. T.
ECKHOLD,
MATERIELLE
UNTERKAPITALISIERUNG.
ZUR
GESELLSCHAFTERVERANTWORTLICHKEIT IN DER GESELLSCHAFT MIT
BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG 8 (Heymanns 2002); WIÓREK, supra note 42, at 53-54.
86. Id. at 9; WIÓREK, supra note 42, at 54.
87. BGH April 28, 2008, II ZR 264/06, NJW 2008, 2437.
88. K. WAPPLER, DIE HAFTUNG VON GESELLSCHAFTERN EINER GMBH AUF
GRUND VON EINFLUSSNAHMEN AUF DIE LEITUNG DER GESELLSCHAFT. VOM
QUALIFIZIERT FAKTISCHEN KONZERN ÜBER DURCHGRIFFSHAFTUNG WEGEN
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Undoubtedly, such behaviour may harm the creditors’ interests and
this is why, both in doctrine and in jurisprudence, it creates an indisputable situation that renders the application of veil-piercing liability admissible. On such occasions, the legal basis is § 128 HGB. A
similar situation is the failure to scrupulously maintain the company’s documentation, which repeatedly precludes identification
and elimination of the negative influence exerted by a member regarding the financial situation and operations of a limited liability
company.89 On the other hand, a company’s failure to keep proper
accounts departs from the principle of nominal capital protection (§
30 GmbHG).
The need to separate the patrimonies belonging to the company
and to its members is accentuated in the judicial practice of the Federal Court of Justice. For example, in its judgement of November
12, 1984,90 it was held that clear and substantiated separation of the
company’s assets from the assets of its stockholders, in accounting
entries and financial documents, is one of the necessary conditions
for affording company members the privilege of limiting their liability for the company’s debts. Similar conclusions can be reached
upon analysis of the decision of the Federal Court of Justice of October 14, 2005, which allowed the concept of veil-piercing liability
to be applied because the relevant company kept non-transparent accounts, thus precluding the review of compliance with the provisions on nominal capital. Actual coverage of the nominal capital was
found necessary for the limitation of liability of the company’s
members. At the same time, the Federal Court of Justice concluded
that the liability of members is a derivative of their behaviour
(Verhaltenshaftung) and not a consequence of a specific state of affairs (Zustandshaftung).91
Among other situations posing a threat to a company’s creditors,
one can point to the loss of financial liquidity, the deprivation of
assets necessary to conduct business activity, the transfer of assets
EXISTENZVERNICHTUNG ZUR DELIKTRECHTLICHEN HAFTUNG GEM. § 826 BGB
262 (Nomos 2010).
89. Id. at 276.
90. The Federal Court of Justice also emphasized that the provisions on the
maintenance of capital, intended to protect the interests of corporate creditors, are
based on a clear distinction between the company’s assets and personal assets of
company members. See BGH November 12, 1984, II ZR 250/83, NJW 1985, 740.
91. BGH October 14, 2005, II ZR 178/03, NJW 2006, 1344.
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contrary to trading principles, situations related to securing the
members’ interests (their receivables) and engaging in high-risk
transactions.
Another problem that recently aroused much controversy in the
judicial practice of the Federal Court of Justice, was liability for the
members’ actions leading to termination of the company (Existenzvernichtung). Such possibility was admitted for the first time
in a judgement of 2001.92 However, this line of jurisprudence was
abandoned by the Federal Court of Justice six years later.93 The relevant ruling excluded the possibility of veil-piercing liability where
a member undertook actions that could lead to termination of a corporation. Indeed, the Court pointed to the possibility, open for the
company and its creditors, to file claims in damages against the
members who took such actions based on delictual or tort liability
(§ 826 BGB94).
The Austrian Supreme Court, in a judgement of 2004,95 making
reference to German doctrine, ruled that it was generally possible to
hold members liable for the company’s debts by means of teleological reduction of the provisions granting members the privilege of
limited liability (§ 61(2) öGmbHG and § 48 öAktG). The Court
found that the doctrine of veil-piercing liability may be applied in
four situations. First, excluding the limitation of a member’s liability
for the company’s debts would be possible if the company is an alter
ego of the member. This is the case when the member exercises de
facto management of the company’s operations, acting as a member
of the management board. Second, as in the German legal system,
imposition on a member of liability for the company’s debts was
admitted in case of confusion of the patrimonies of the company and
its members (Sphärenvermischung). Third, the corporate veil could
be pierced in case of an abuse, on the part of a member, of the corporate form (missbrauch der Organisationsfreiheit). Fourth and finally, it was considered admissible to charge members with veil-

92. See BGH June 17, 2001, II ZR 178/99, DNOTI-REPORT 2001, 182.
93. BGH Juy 16, 2007, II ZR 3/04, IBRRS 2007, 3886.
94. Bürgeliche Gesetzbuch (BGBI. I S. 42, ber. S. 2909, ber. 2003 I S. 738),
https://perma.cc/HM7V-GC5P (Last accessed: June 30, 2022).
95. OGH April 29, 2004, 6 Ob 313/03 B, GeS 2005/1.
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piercing liability for the company’s debts in case of substantive undercapitalization of the company (materielle Unterkapitalisierung).
The Italian legislator recognized the need for a special protection
to be afforded to creditors of subsidiary companies participating in
holding structures.96 However, this did not lead to the enactment of
norms introducing direct personal liability of the controlling company for debts of its subsidiaries, which would be an exception to
the principle of a member’s non-liability for corporate debts.
In Italian law, the burden of proof is with minority stockholders
and creditors of the company, who should demonstrate that (1) a
specific act of management violated the terms of proper management; (2) the controlling entity acted in its own interest or in the
economic interest of third parties; (3) the company’s income or the
value of its shares have decreased and, that as a consequence of the
actions undertaken, damage was caused to their assets.9799 The solutions introduced in Italian holding law are to protect the interests of
creditors of subsidiary companies by affording them a claim against
the controlling company for the recovery of damages. A circumstance found to justify the liability of the controlling entity towards
creditors of subsidiary companies was the management of the subsidiary and coordination of the subsidiary’s activities by the controlling company.98 It follows that the limitation of autonomy of a subsidiary company by the controlling company should give rise to special liability of the controlling entity which makes decisions and
gives instructions relating to the daughter company. However, such
a solution also protects the position of the parent company, as its
liability may only materialize when some specific conditions are
met. Nonetheless, because of the mechanisms enabling the controlling company to be discharged of liability to the creditors of subsidiary companies, coupled with the lack of means to relax the burden

96. K. PYZIO, ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ SPÓŁKI DOMINUJĄCEJ WZGLĘDEM
WIERZYCIELI KAPITAŁOWYCH SPÓŁEK ZALEŻNYCH s. 23-24, (C.H. Beck 2015); R.
Truffi & S. Straneo, Groups of Companies Under the New Italian Company Law,
JONES DAY COMMENTARIES 1 (March 2004).
97. Art. 2359 (2) Italian Civ. Code; PYZIO, supra note 96 at s. 23-24.
98. A. Daccò & T. Tatozzi, in COMMENTARIO BREVE AL CODICE CIVILE 3099
(10th ed., G. Cian & A. Trabucchi eds., Cedam 2011); G. Alessi, L’azione di
responsabilità nei gruppi di imprese, in SOCIETÀ. IL DIZIONARIO DELLA RIFORMA
392 (M. de Tilla, G. Alpa & S. Patti eds., 2003).
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of proof creditors are required to provide, this solution is understandably subject to criticism in Italian literature.99
IV. CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF VEIL-PIERCING LIABILITY
Although the literature reveals shortcomings in the protection of
creditors due to the existence of gaps in legislative protection, voices
can be heard questioning judicial developments trying to fill those
gaps. Certain authors deploy methodological100 or constitutional101
arguments. Others criticize the doctrine of veil-piercing liability on
a dogmatic level, with two lines of arguments: first, a general dogmatic criticism that does not refer to the methodological legitimacy
and the need for developing the piercing concept, and second, a general dogmatic criticism recognizing the need for judicial law-making albeit to the exclusion of veil-piercing liability.
As far as the methodological criticism of veil-piercing liability
is concerned, its precursor was U. Ehricke.102 The author points to
the chaos and uncertainty caused by the veil-piercing liability theory. Moving beyond dogmatic and factual levels, he shifted the discourse to the most important level, that of methodology.
First, one wonders whether, from a methodological perspective,
the piercing concept is necessary. Second, upon determination of the
methodological admissibility of legal veil-piercing liability, one
may search to justify the obligation of company members to incur
liability for their company’s debts. On the dogmatic level, one may
consider a limitation to the exclusion of member liability for the
company’s debts in case of malpractice and abuse of the corporate
construction and the need to expand liability for the company’s
debts to its members. Lastly, on the level of facts, one should consider specific situations which substantiate the use of the piercing
construction.103
99. Truffi & Straneo, supra note 96 at s. 1; Daccò & Tatozzi, supra note 98
at s.3099; G. Alessi, supra note 98 at s. 392.
100. U. Ehricke, Zur Begründbarkeit der Durchgriffshaftung in der GmbH,
insbesondere aus methodischer Sicht, 199 ACP 225 (1999).
101. W. Nassall, Der existenzvernichtende Eingriff in die GmbH:
Einwendungen aus verfassungs- und insolvenzrechtlicher Sicht, ZIP 969 (2003).
102. H.C.
GRIGOLEIT,
GESELLSCHAFTERHAFTUNG
FÜR
INTERNE
EINFLUSSNAHME IM RECHT DER GMBH, (C.H. Beck 2006).
103. Ehricke, supra note 100, at 262.
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Other authors criticize the concept of veil-piercing liability from
the methodological and constitutional perspective. W. Nassall, when
criticizing a decision of the Federal Court of Justice, concluded that
the Court supplemented, in an unjustified manner, the provision excluding liability of company members for their company’s debts.104
In the opinion of the Court, this rule will not apply if members deprive the company of its assets or consent to an intervention or if the
damage so inflicted to the company may not be entirely remedied or
if the company, as a result of an intervention, has lost its capacity to
pay debts. In Nassall’s opinion, in such situations, there is no need
nor ground for any judicial development of the law. Indeed, such
legal developments do require careful and constitutional justification and can only take place when overall, the law appears to be
incomplete as initially planned or subsequently amended.105 There
are no sufficient arguments to conclude that there is a legislative gap
to be filled since the system of nominal capital was intended to, and
to some extent does, afford sufficient protection to creditors.
To go further, veil-piercing liability places emphasis on insolvency law rather than company law because it refers to the loss by a
company of its capacity to pay debts. If so, the remedies should be
sought in the provisions of insolvency law. The protective mechanism in insolvency law is composed of two basic elements: liquidation and restructuring. The first obligates managers to file for bankruptcy within a specific deadline calculated from the date of emergence of the grounds for bankruptcy, i.e. insolvency or indebtedness. On the other hand, the restructuring aspect relates to the possibility of contesting the acts of the insolvent debtor and the managers’ obligation to return any payments from the company’s assets,
which were made after the emergence of grounds for bankruptcy.
Further, criticism of the piercing concept on the dogmatic level
is voiced by J. Wilhelm, who questions the grounds for distinguishing proper and improper theories of veil-piercing liability.106 The
author claims that veil-piercing liability has no precise boundaries
or grounds backing up its support by judicial opinions. At the same
104. Nassall, supra note 100, at 970.
105. Id. at 971.
106. J. WILHELM, RECHTSFORM UND HAFTUNG BEI DER JURISTISCHEN PERSON
310-314 (Heymann 1981).
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time, he recognized the risk of legally ungrounded and equitable resolutions being assigned the force of a legal principle based on completely arbitrary argumentation. Theories of abuse, institutional theories and theories involving a norm’s purpose, refer to objective criteria whose ascertainment is problematic even for proponents of
such theories. In addition, conceptions of a norm’s purpose reach
beyond the application of existing rules and move on to the level of
legal policy or de lege ferenda comments. In Wilhelm’s opinion,
those conceptions may indicate that the remedies intended to protect
creditors are insufficient, however, they allow for actions that are
not supported by legislative provisions.107
Others, recognizing the shortcomings of nominal capital, signal
the need for judicial development of law by creating concepts other
than veil-piercing liability, which could enhance the scope and effectiveness of creditor protection. One such possibility is to associate company members’ liability with the principle of dispositional
freedom of such members and its boundaries. This is the case since
the provisions on contributing and maintaining nominal capital
specify situations in which members of a limited liability company
are liable to the company. In particular, they incur compensatory
liability for overstatement of the value of non-monetary contributions (§ 9 GmbHG, c.f. Art. 175 CCPC) and in the case of receipt
of payments constituting the return of the entirety or part of their
contribution, or payments from the company’s assets needed to fully
cover the nominal capital (§ 30 et seq GmbHG, c.f. Art. 198 in conjunction with Art. 189 CCPC). As a consequence, provisions specifying the scope of members’ leeway in the management of the company and disposal of the company’s assets set the boundaries of their
accountability for internal influence on the company (gesellschaftsinterne Einflussnahme der Gesellschafter). As long as company members do not overstep their discretion, they are not liable to
the company.

107.

Id. at 314.
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V. CONCLUSION
The problems with seeking the liability of company members
using the concept of veil-piercing liability—considering the solutions developed in several legal systems—should be assessed as heterogeneous and multithreaded. Even in German or American doctrine,108 where the theories justifying such a liability have been extensively discussed and developed, there is no uniform and consistent concept of veil-piercing liability, both on the theoretical and
methodological level.
On the other hand, the principle of corporate separateness, which
has such rigid foundations from the axiological and normative perspective, may be limited to achieve greater creditor protection.
Nevertheless, the undertaken analyses allow the establishment
of preconditions justifying the use of the discussed concept and the
depiction of the basic theories that substantiate veil-piercing liability. These include the objective abuse theory (theory of institutional
abuse) and the theory of teleological reduction, which was also
based on objective criteria. However, developing veil-piercing liability based on objective criteria, as a mechanism intended to prevent gross abuses of the legal corporate form, gave it a character of
absolute liability. In consequence, it is for the courts to assess the
extent of abuse of the corporate entity, thus depriving members of
the possibility to escape liability by proving that they had not been
guilty of the abuse. Such views give rise to criticism of the construction of veil-piercing liability and to its mitigation by bringing it
closer to compensatory liability.
At the same time, in the German, Austrian, and Swiss legal systems, one can identify tendencies to replace veil-piercing liability
with mechanisms assuming that company members are liable for
their own acts. Such a liability may be based on general terms or
108. M.J. Gaertner, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation
Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667 (1989); L. Fastrich,
A. Baumbach & A. Hueck, in L. MICHALSKI, A. HEIDINGER ET AL., KOMMENTAR
ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG
(GMBH-GESETZ), komentarz do § 13 ust. 2 GmbHG, no. 5 &335 (3rd ed., C.H.
Beck 2017); H. G. Bamberger & H. Roth, Beck'scher Online-Kommentar
GmbHG, komentarz do § 13 GmbHG, no. 55 Beck-online (2017); H. MERKT, H.
FLEISCHER ET AL., MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG), komentarz do § 13
GmbHG, no.332. (3rd ed., C.H. Beck 2015).
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consist in the imposition on the controlling company of specific duties stemming from the influence the parent entity may have on the
decisions of a daughter company. At English law, where the discussed concept was not met with wide approval, it is admitted that
in some cases, a controlling company may be held liable to the creditors of its subsidiary.
Criticism of the veil-piercing liability concept in German doctrine and jurisprudence is much more extensive and multifaceted
when compared to the corresponding criticism of the concept and
construction of abuse of the legal corporate form in the Polish legal
system. Indeed, Polish doctrine has not developed a concept of
abuse of the legal corporate form leading to consequences similar to
the German Durchgriffshaftung, especially providing for the consequence of piercing.
More importantly, from a comparative law perspective, it would
be impossible to conclude that the Polish legal system offers a wider
and more comprehensive system of creditor protection, which justifies a rare application of the piercing concept or its exclusion. It must
be remembered that the remedies envisaged in Art. 299 CCPC109 are
known also in other legal systems, which does not preclude the application of veil-piercing liability or alternative grounds of company
members’ liability.
109. Under art. 299 CCPC,
§ 1. [i]f execution against the company proves ineffective, members of
the management board shall be solidarily liable for the company's liabilities.
§ 2. A member of the management board may be discharged from liability referred to in § 1 above if he proves that the petition in bankruptcy was timely filed or, at the same time, decision was delivered on
the commencement of a restructuring procedure or approving a composition in a procedure for the approval of a composition, or that a failure to file the petition in bankruptcy occurred through no fault on his
part, or that despite the failure to file the petition or non-delivery of a
decision commencing a restructuring procedure or non-approval of a
composition in a procedure for the approval of a composition, the creditor suffered no damage.
§ 3. The provisions of § 1 and 2 above shall not prejudice the provisions
whereby further liability of members of the management board is envisaged.
§ 4. The persons specified in § 1 shall not be liable for a failure to file
the petition for bankruptcy in the course of execution by administrative
receivership or through sale of an enterprise, under the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, if the obligation to file the petition for
bankruptcy arose during the execution.
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From this, it must be concluded that an acceptable and legitimate
solution for creditors of a subsidiary company would be to seek
compensatory liability against the controlling company based on the
general law. In its judgement of 24 November 2009,110 the Polish
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that there are no grounds for
exclusion of direct and personal liability of a member of a limited
liability company for damages caused to third parties. However, in
the opinion of the Court, the company member always holds personal liability for his own culpable behaviours causing damage to
third parties but is not personally liable for the company’s debts.
In the relationship between a company and its member (the controlling corporation), the compensatory liability of the latter may
materialize as a consequence of such member’s violation of the loyalty obligation. Such a duty is generated by the obligational relationship it has with the company.111 Its violation may give rise to contractual liability (Art. 471 et seq. of the Civil Code).112 However, the
only currently available legislative basis113 for claims by creditors
of a subsidiary against the controlling company—as a member of
the subsidiary—is the regime of delictual liability.114 If the controlling member acts to the detriment of creditors of the subsidiary, this
may allow these creditors to sue the controlling member in compensatory damages. On such occasions, the damage may be a detriment
suffered by the subsidiary’s creditor in consequence of non-performance of the subsidiary’s obligations.115 Of course, all conditions of
delictual liability must be met.
When considering the Skanska judgment of the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU)116, it is a justifiable conclusion that
the court accepted veil-piercing liability within the private law realm
of competition law, because it was allowed to direct claims against
110. Supreme Court, November 24, 2009, V CSK 169/09, LEX 627248.
111. D. WAJDA, OBOWIĄZEK LOJALNOŚCI W SPÓŁKACH HANDLOWYCH 132
(C.H. Beck 2009).
112. S. WŁODYKA, PRAWO KONCERNOWE 176 (Zakamycze 2003).
113. P. Wąż, Cywilnoprawna odpowiedzialność uczestników koncernu, 4
PRAWO SPÓŁEK 12 (2008).
114. T. Targosz, Odpowiedzialność wspólnika wobec wierzycieli spółki, 4
PRZEGLĄD PRAWA HANDLOWEGO 27 (2003), WŁODYKA, supra note 112, at
1572.
115. WŁODYKA, supra note 112, at 1573.
116. C-724/17, Court of Justice of the European Union, March 14, 2019,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204.
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entities who, according to national laws, are separate persons, independent of the entity that caused damage. It seems, however, that
another explanation is also admissible, namely that the CJEU, by
accepting the liability of an enterprise, did not refer to the notion of
veil-piercing liability, but rather concentrated on the concept of the
enterprise and concluded that the liable party is one enterprise,
which is composed of various entities.
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Comparative Law (Louisiana State University).
1. Mariano Vitetta, Bilingual English-Spanish Louisiana Civil Code, Book
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Herrero (Rosario, Argentina), and Lécia Vicente (Baton Rouge,
United States of America).
The Center of Civil Law Studies looks forward to any comments
on the translation that readers may have. We welcome corrections,
as well as proposals, to improve the Spanish text.
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LIBRO II. DE LAS COSAS Y DE
LAS DIFERENTES
MODIFICACIONES DE LA
PROPIEDAD

TITLE I. THINGS

TÍTULO I. DE LAS COSAS

CHAPTER 1. DIVISION OF
THINGS

CAPÍTULO 1. DE LA DIVISIÓN
DE LAS COSAS

SECTION 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

SECCIÓN 1. PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES

[Acts 1978, No. 728, §1.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 728 de 1978].

Art. 448. Things are divided into
common, public, and private;
corporeals and incorporeals; and
movables and immovables.

Art. 448. Las cosas pueden ser
comunes, públicas o privadas;
corporales o incorporales; y
muebles o inmuebles.

Art. 449. Common things may
not be owned by anyone. They are
such as the air and the high seas
that may be freely used by
everyone conformably with the use
for which nature has intended
them.

Art. 449. Las cosas comunes son
aquellas cuya propiedad no
corresponde a alguien en
particular, como el aire y alta mar,
y que cualquiera puede usar
libremente conforme al uso al que
están destinadas según la
naturaleza.

Art. 450. Public things are
owned by the state or its political
subdivisions in their capacity as
public persons.
Public things that belong to the
state are such as running waters,
the waters and bottoms of natural
navigable water bodies, the
territorial sea, and the seashore.

Art. 450. Las cosas públicas
pertenecen al estado o a sus
subdivisiones políticas en su
calidad de personas públicas.
Son cosas públicas que
pertenecen al estado aquellas
como los cursos de agua, el agua y
el fondo de los cuerpos de agua
navegables, el mar territorial y la
orilla del mar.
Las cosas públicas que pueden
pertenecer a las subdivisiones
políticas del estado son aquellas

Public things that may belong to
political subdivisions of the state
are such as streets and public
squares.
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como las calles y las plazas
públicas.
Art. 451. Seashore is the space
of land over which the waters of
the sea spread in the highest tide
during the winter season.

Art. 451. La orilla del mar es el
espacio de tierra sobre el que se
expande el agua del mar en la
marea más alta durante el
invierno.

Art. 452. Public things and
common things are subject to
public use in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations.
Everyone has the right to fish in
the rivers, ports, roadsteads, and
harbors, and the right to land on
the seashore, to fish, to shelter
himself, to moor ships, to dry nets,
and the like, provided that he does
not cause injury to the property of
adjoining owners.

Art. 452. Las cosas públicas y
las cosas comunes están sujetas al
uso público de acuerdo con las
leyes aplicables. Todos tienen el
derecho de pescar en los ríos,
puertos, radas y amarraderos, y el
derecho de desembarcar en la
orilla, pescar, guarecerse, amarrar
embarcaciones, secar redes y
realizar actividades similares,
siempre y cuando no causen daños
a los bienes de los propietarios
contiguos.
La orilla del mar ubicada dentro
de los límites de una municipalidad
está sujeta a su poder de policía, y
su uso público se rige por las
ordenanzas y otras normas
municipales.

The seashore within the limits of
a municipality is subject to its
police power, and the public use is
governed by municipal ordinances
and regulations.
Art. 453. Private things are
owned by individuals, other private
persons, and by the state or its
political subdivisions in their
capacity as private persons.

Art. 453. Las cosas privadas
pertenecen a las personas físicas,
otras personas privadas y al estado
o a sus subdivisiones políticas en
su calidad de personas privadas.

Art. 454. Owners of private
things may freely dispose of them
under modifications established by
law.

Art. 454. Los dueños de las
cosas privadas pueden disponer de
ellas libremente conforme a las
restricciones que establezca la ley.
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Art. 455. Private things may be
subject to public use in accordance
with law or by dedication.

Art. 455. Las cosas privadas
pueden estar sujetas a uso público
en virtud de la ley o por su
afectación.

Art. 456. The banks of navigable
rivers or streams are private things
that are subject to public use.

Art. 456. Las riberas de los ríos
u otros cursos de agua navegables
son cosas privadas afectadas al
uso público.
La ribera de un río u otro curso
de agua navegable consiste en la
tierra que está entre el nivel del
agua más bajo y el más alto
habituales. No obstante, cuando
haya un dique cerca del agua,
establecido conforme a la ley, el
dique será la ribera.

The bank of a navigable river or
stream is the land lying between
the ordinary low and the ordinary
high stage of the water.
Nevertheless, when there is a levee
in proximity to the water,
established according to law, the
levee shall form the bank.
Art. 457. A road may be either
public or private.
A public road is one that is
subject to public use. The public
may own the land on which the
road is built or merely have the
right to use it.
A private road is one that is not
subject to public use.
Art. 458. Works built without
lawful permit on public things,
including the sea, the seashore, and
the bottom of natural navigable
waters, or on the banks of
navigable rivers, that obstruct the
public use may be removed at the
expense of the persons who built or
own them at the instance of the
public authorities, or of any person
residing in the state.

Art. 457. Los caminos pueden
ser públicos o privados.
Es público el camino afectado al
uso público. La población puede
ser dueña de la tierra sobre la que
está construido el camino o
simplemente tener derecho a
usarla.
Es privado el camino que no
está afectado al uso público.
Art. 458. Las construcciones
realizadas sin la habilitación
debida sobre cosas públicas,
incluidos el mar, la orilla del mar y
el fondo de los cursos de agua
naturales navegables, o sobre la
ribera de ríos navegables, que
obstruyan el uso público podrán
ser retiradas a costa de las
personas que las hayan construido
o que sean sus dueños, a instancia
de las autoridades públicas o de
cualquier persona que resida en el
estado.
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The owner of the works may not
prevent their removal by alleging
prescription or possession.

El dueño de las construcciones
no podrá evitar su remoción
alegando prescripción o posesión.

Art. 459. A building that merely
encroaches on a public way
without preventing its use, and
which cannot be removed without
causing substantial damage to its
owner, shall be permitted to
remain. If it is demolished from
any cause, the owner shall be
bound to restore to the public the
part of the way upon which the
building stood.

Art. 459. Se permitirá la
conservación de la edificación que
apenas invada una vía pública sin
obstruir su uso y que no pueda ser
eliminada sin causar un daño
sustancial al dueño. Si por alguna
razón fuera demolida, el dueño
deberá devolver al uso público la
parte de la vía sobre la que se
erigía la edificación.

Art. 460. Port commissions of
the state, or in the absence of port
commissions having jurisdiction,
municipalities may, within the
limits of their respective
jurisdictions, construct and
maintain on public places, in beds
of natural navigable water bodies,
and on their banks or shores, works
necessary for public utility,
including buildings, wharves, and
other facilities for the mooring of
vessels and the loading or
discharging of cargo and
passengers.

Art. 460. Las comisiones
portuarias del estado o, en
ausencia de comisiones portuarias
con competencia, las
municipalidades podrán permitir,
dentro de los límites de su
respectiva jurisdicción, la
construcción y el mantenimiento en
lugares públicos, en los lechos de
cuerpos de agua naturales
navegables, y en sus riberas u
orillas, de las obras que fueran
necesarias con fines de utilidad
pública, incluidas las
edificaciones, puertos y otras
instalaciones para el amarre de
buques y para actividades de carga
o descarga y para el embarque o
desembarco de pasajeros.

Art. 461. Corporeals are things
that have a body, whether animate
or inanimate, and can be felt or
touched.
Incorporeals are things that have
no body, but are comprehended by

Art. 461. Son cosas corporales
aquellas que tienen cuerpo, ya sea
animado o inanimado, y pueden
sentirse o tocarse.
Son cosas incorporales aquellas
que no tienen cuerpo, pero que
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rights of inheritance, servitudes,
obligations, and right of
intellectual property.
SECTION 2. IMMOVABLES
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pueden comprenderse por el
entendimiento, como los derechos
de herencia, las servidumbres, las
obligaciones y los derechos de
propiedad intelectual.
SECCIÓN 2. DE LOS
INMUEBLES

Art. 462. Tracts of land, with
their component parts, are
immovables.

Art. 462. El fundo, con sus
partes integrantes, son inmuebles.

Art. 463. Buildings, other
constructions permanently attached
to the ground, standing timber, and
unharvested crops or ungathered
fruits of trees, are component parts
of a tract of land when they belong
to the owner of the ground.

Art. 463. Las edificaciones, otras
construcciones unidas de manera
permanente al suelo, la madera en
pie y los cultivos no cosechados o
frutos no recolectados de los
árboles son partes integrantes del
fundo si pertenecen al dueño del
suelo.

Art. 464. Buildings and standing
timber are separate immovables
when they belong to a person other
than the owner of the ground.

Art. 464. Las edificaciones y la
madera en pie son inmuebles
independientes si su dueño no es el
dueño del suelo.

Art. 465. Things incorporated
into a tract of land, a building, or
other construction, so as to become
an integral part of it, such as
building materials, are its
component parts.

Art. 465. Las cosas
incorporadas a un fundo, una
edificación u otro tipo de
construcción de manera tal que
pasan a ser parte inescindible
suya, como los materiales de
construcción, son partes
integrantes de ese fundo,
edificación u otro tipo de
construcción.

Art. 466. Things that are
attached to a building and that,
according to prevailing usages,
serve to complete a building of the
same general type, without regard

Art. 466. Son partes integrantes
las cosas unidas a una edificación
y que, según la práctica habitual,
sirven para completar una
edificación del mismo tipo general,
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to its specific use, are its
component parts. Component parts
of this kind may include doors,
shutters, gutters, and cabinetry, as
well as plumbing, heating, cooling,
electrical, and similar systems.
Things that are attached to a
construction other than a building
and that serve its principal use are
its component parts.
Other things are component
parts of a building or other
construction if they are attached to
such a degree that they cannot be
removed without substantial
damage to themselves or to the
building or other construction.
[Acts 2005, No. 301, §1, eff. June
29, 2005; Acts 2006, No. 765, §1;
Acts 2008, No. 632, §1, eff. July 1,
2008.]
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independientemente de su uso
específico. Son partes integrantes
de este tipo las puertas, las
persianas, los desagües y la
ebanistería, así como los sistemas
de plomería, calefacción,
refrigeración, electricidad y otros
similares.
Las cosas unidas a una
construcción que no sean
edificaciones y que sirvan a su uso
principal son sus partes
integrantes.
Son también partes integrantes
de una edificación u otra
construcción las cosas unidas de
tal modo que no pueden quitarse
sin causar un daño sustancial a
esas cosas o a la edificación u otra
construcción. [Sección 1, ley n.o
301 de 2005, vigente desde el 29 de
junio de 2005; sección 1, ley n.o
765 de 2006; sección 1, ley n.o 632
de 2008, vigente desde el 1 de julio
de 2008].

Art. 467. The owner of an
immovable may declare that
machinery, appliances, and
equipment owned by him and
placed on the immovable, other
than his private residence, for its
service and improvement are
deemed to be its component parts.
The declaration shall be filed for
registry in the conveyance records
of the parish in which the
immovable is located.

Art. 467. El dueño de un
inmueble puede declarar que son
partes integrantes la maquinaria,
los artefactos y los equipos de su
propiedad y ubicados en el
inmueble, si no es su residencia
privada, para el funcionamiento y
mejora del inmueble. La
declaración se deberá presentar
para su inscripción en el registro
de transferencias de la parroquia
en que se sitúe el inmueble.

Art. 468. Component parts of an
immovable so damaged or
deteriorated that they can no longer

Art. 468. Las partes integrantes
de un inmueble dañadas o
deterioradas de modo tal que ya no
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serve the use of lands or buildings
are deimmobilized.
The owner may deimmobilize
the component parts of an
immovable by an act translative of
ownership and delivery to
acquirers in good faith.
In the absence of rights of third
persons, the owner may
deimmobilize things by
detachment or removal. [Amended
by Acts 1979, No. 180, §2.]
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puedan cumplir su función con
relación al terreno o a las
edificaciones dejan de
considerarse inmuebles.
El dueño puede desafectar las
partes integrantes de un inmueble
por un acto traslativo del dominio
y tradición a adquirentes de buena
fe.
Si no hay involucrados derechos
de terceros, el dueño podrá alterar
la calidad de inmuebles de las
cosas mediante su separación o
remoción. [Modificado por sección
2, ley n.o 180 de 1979].

Art. 469. The transfer or
encumbrance of an immovable
includes its component parts.
[Amended by Acts 1979, No. 180,
§2.]

Art. 469. La transferencia o el
gravamen de un inmueble incluye
sus partes integrantes. [Modificado
por sección 2, ley n.o 180 de 1979].

Art. 470. Rights and actions that
apply to immovable things are
incorporeal immovables.
Immovables of this kind are such
as personal servitudes established
on immovables, predial servitudes,
mineral rights, and petitory or
possessory actions.

Art. 470. Los derechos y las
acciones que rigen para los bienes
inmuebles son inmuebles
incorporales. Los inmuebles de
este tipo comprenden, entre otros,
las servidumbres personales
constituidas sobre inmuebles, las
servidumbres reales, los derechos
de explotación de minerales y las
acciones petitorias o posesorias.

SECTION 3. MOVABLES

SECCIÓN 3. DE LOS MUEBLES

Art. 471. Corporeal movables
are things, whether animate or
inanimate, that normally move or
can be moved from one place to
another.

Art. 471. Son muebles
corporales las cosas, animadas o
inanimadas, que normalmente se
trasladan o pueden ser trasladadas
de un lugar a otro.

Art. 472. Materials gathered for
the erection of a new building or

Art. 472. Los materiales
reunidos para la construcción de
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other construction, even though
deriving from the demolition of an
old one, are movables until their
incorporation into the new building
or after construction.

una nueva edificación u otro tipo
de construcción, aunque deriven de
la demolición de otra anterior, son
muebles hasta que se incorporen
en la nueva edificación o una vez
concluida la construcción.
Materials separated from a
Los materiales separados de una
building or other construction for
edificación o de otro tipo de
the purpose of repair, addition, or
construcción para su reparación,
alteration to it, with the intention of adición o modificación, con la
putting them back, remain
intención de volver a colocarlos en
immovables.
su lugar, siguen siendo inmuebles.
Art. 473. Rights, obligations,
and actions that apply to a movable
thing are incorporeal movables.
Movables of this kind are such as
bonds, annuities, and interests or
shares in entities possessing
juridical personality.
Interests or shares in a juridical
person that owns immovables are
considered as movables as long as
the entity exists; upon its
dissolution, the right of each
individual to a share in the
immovables is an immovable.

Art. 474. Unharvested crops and
ungathered fruits of trees are
movables by anticipation when
they belong to a person other than
the landowner. When encumbered
with security rights of third
persons, they are movables by
anticipation insofar as the creditor
is concerned.

Art. 473. Los derechos, las
obligaciones y las acciones que
rigen para la cosa mueble son
muebles incorporales. Los muebles
de este tipo comprenden los bonos,
las rentas vitalicias y las
participaciones o acciones en
personas jurídicas.
Las participaciones o acciones
en una persona jurídica dueña de
bienes inmuebles se consideran
muebles en tanto exista la persona
jurídica. Disuelta la persona
jurídica, el derecho de cada
persona física a una participación
en los bienes inmuebles es de
naturaleza inmueble.
Art. 474. Los cultivos no
cosechados y los frutos no
recogidos de los árboles son
muebles por anticipación cuando
pertenecen a una persona que no
sea el dueño de la tierra. Si están
gravados con derechos de garantía
de terceros, son muebles por
anticipación en lo relativo al
acreedor.
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The landowner may, by act
translative of ownership or by
pledge, mobilize by anticipation
unharvested crops and ungathered
fruits of trees that belong to him.

El dueño de la tierra puede, por
acto traslativo de la propiedad o
por prenda, convertir en muebles
los cultivos no cosechados y los
frutos no recolectados de los
árboles que le pertenezcan.

Art. 475. All things, corporeal or
incorporeal, that the law does not
consider as immovables, are
movables.

Art. 475. Son muebles todas las
cosas, corporales e incorporales,
que la ley no considera inmuebles.

CHAPTER 2. RIGHTS IN
THINGS

CAPÍTULO 2. DE LOS
DERECHOS SOBRE LAS COSAS

Art. 476. One may have various
rights in things:
1. Ownership;
2. Personal and predial
servitudes; and
3. Such other real rights as the
law allows.

Art. 476. Se puede tener
diferentes derechos sobre las
cosas:
1. La propiedad.
2. Las servidumbres personales
y reales.
3. Todo otro derecho real que
permita la ley.

TITLE II. OWNERSHIP
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

TÍTULO II. DE LA PROPIEDAD
CAPÍTULO 1. PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES

[Acts 1979, No. 180, §1.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 180 de 1979].

Art. 477. A. Ownership is the
right that confers on a person
direct, immediate, and exclusive
authority over a thing. The owner
of a thing may use, enjoy, and
dispose of it within the limits and
under the conditions established by
law.

Art. 477. A. La propiedad es el
derecho que confiere a una
persona autoridad directa,
inmediata y exclusiva sobre una
cosa. El dueño de una cosa puede
usarla, disfrutarla y disponer de
ella dentro de los límites y
conforme a las condiciones
previstas por la ley.
B. El comprador y ocupante de
una residencia en virtud de un
contrato de compraventa con pacto
de reserva de dominio será

B. A buyer and occupant of a
residence under a bond for deed
contract is the owner of the thing
for purposes of the homestead
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exemption granted to other
property owners pursuant to
Article VII, Section 20(A) of the
Constitution of Louisiana. The
buyer under a bond for deed
contract shall apply for the
homestead exemption each year.
[Acts 1995, No. 640, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1996; HR 17, 1998 1st Ex. Sess.;
HCR 13, 1998 R.S.]

considerado dueño de la cosa a los
fines de la exención de bien de
familia otorgada a favor de los
dueños de otros bienes conforme al
inciso A, sección 20, artículo VII
de la Constitución de Luisiana. En
este caso, el comprador deberá
solicitar la exención de bien de
familia todos los años. [Sección 1,
ley n.o 640 de 1995, vigente desde
el 1 de enero de 1996; HR 17, 1998
1.a Ses. Ex. HCR 13, 1998 R.S.].

Art. 478. The right of ownership
may be subject to a resolutory
condition, and it may be burdened
with a real right in favor of another
person as allowed by law. The
ownership of a thing burdened with
a usufruct is designated as naked
ownership.

Art. 478. El derecho de
propiedad puede estar sujeto a
condición resolutoria, y puede
estar gravado por un derecho real
a favor de otra persona según lo
permita la ley. La propiedad de
una cosa gravada con un usufructo
implica que el dueño tiene la nuda
propiedad.

Art. 479. The right of ownership
may exist only in favor of a natural
person or a juridical person.

Art. 479. El derecho de
propiedad solo puede existir a
favor de una persona física o
jurídica.

Art. 480. Two or more persons
may own the same thing in
indivision, each having an
undivided share.

Art. 480. Dos o más personas
pueden ser dueñas de la misma
cosa de manera indivisa; cada una
tendrá una porción indivisa.

Art. 481. The ownership and the
possession of a thing are distinct.

Art. 481. La propiedad y la
posesión de una cosa son
conceptos diferentes.
La propiedad existe con
prescindencia de su ejercicio y no
se pierde por falta de uso. Se
pierde la propiedad cuando un
tercero poseedor la adquiere por
prescripción adquisitiva.

Ownership exists independently
of any exercise of it and may not
be lost by nonuse. Ownership is
lost when acquisitive prescription
accrues in favor of an adverse
possessor.
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Art. 482. The ownership of a
thing includes by accession the
ownership of everything that it
produces or is united with it, either
naturally or artificially, in
accordance with the following
provisions.

Art. 482. La propiedad de la
cosa incluye por accesión la
propiedad de todo aquello que la
cosa produce o que está unido a
ella, de manera natural o artificial,
de acuerdo con las siguientes
disposiciones.

CHAPTER 2. RIGHT OF
ACCESSION

CAPÍTULO 2. DEL DERECHO
DE ACCESIÓN

SECTION 1. OWNERSHIP OF
FRUITS

SECCIÓN 1. DE LA PROPIEDAD
DE LOS FRUTOS

Art. 483. In the absence of rights
of other persons, the owner of a
thing acquires the ownership of its
natural and civil fruits.

Art. 483. A falta de derechos de
terceros, el dueño de la cosa
adquiere la propiedad de sus frutos
naturales y civiles.

Art. 484. The young of animals
belong to the owner of the mother
of them.

Art. 484. Las crías de los
animales pertenecen al dueño de la
madre.

Art. 485. When fruits that
belong to the owner of a thing by
accession are produced by the
work of another person, or from
seeds sown by him, the owner may
retain them on reimbursing such
person his expenses.

Art. 485. Cuando los frutos que
pertenecen por accesión al dueño
de una cosa son producidos por el
trabajo de un tercero o a partir de
semillas sembradas por un tercero,
el dueño podrá conservarlos
después de reintegrarle a ese
tercero los gastos que haya
efectuado.

Art. 486. A possessor in good
faith acquires the ownership of
fruits he has gathered. If he is
evicted by the owner, he is entitled
to reimbursement of expenses for
fruits he was unable to gather.

Art. 486. El poseedor de buena
fe adquiere la propiedad sobre los
frutos que haya recolectado. Si es
despojado por el dueño, tiene
derecho al reintegro de los gastos
por los frutos que no haya podido
recoger.
El poseedor de mala fe está
obligado a reintegrar al dueño los

A possessor in bad faith is
bound to restore to the owner the
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fruits he has gathered, or their
value, subject to his claim for
reimbursement of expenses.

frutos que haya recolectado o su
valor, sujeto a su reclamo por
reintegro de gastos.

Art. 487. For purposes of
accession, a possessor is in good
faith when he possesses by virtue
of an act translative of ownership
and does not know of any defects
in his ownership. He ceases to be
in good faith when these defects
are made known to him or an
action is instituted against him by
the owner for the recovery of the
thing.

Art. 487. A los efectos de la
accesión, el poseedor es de buena
fe cuando posee en virtud de un
acto traslativo de la propiedad y
no sabe de la existencia de defectos
en su propiedad. Cesa su buena fe
al ser informado sobre los defectos
o cuando el dueño de la cosa inicia
una acción en su contra con el
objetivo de recuperarla.

Art. 488. Products derived from
a thing as a result of diminution of
its substance belong to the owner
of that thing. When they are
reclaimed by the owner, a
possessor in good faith has the
right to reimbursement of his
expenses. A possessor in bad faith
does not have this right.

Art. 488. Los productos
derivados de una cosa a
consecuencia de la disminución de
su sustancia pertenecen al dueño
de la cosa. Si los reclama el dueño,
el poseedor de buena fe tiene
derecho al reintegro de los gastos
en los que haya incurrido. El
poseedor de mala fe no tiene este
derecho.

Art. 489. In the absence of other
provisions, one who is entitled to
the fruits of a thing from a certain
time or up to a certain time
acquires the ownership of natural
fruits gathered during the existence
of his right, and a part of the civil
fruits proportionate to the duration
of his right.

Art. 489. En ausencia de otras
disposiciones, el que tenga derecho
a los frutos de una cosa desde un
cierto momento o hasta un cierto
momento adquiere la propiedad de
los frutos naturales recogidos
durante la existencia de su derecho
y una parte de los frutos civiles en
proporción a la duración de su
derecho.
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SECTION 2. ACCESSION IN
RELATION TO IMMOVABLES

SECCIÓN 2. DE LA ACCESIÓN
EN RELACIÓN CON LOS
INMUEBLES

Art. 490. Unless otherwise
provided by law, the ownership of
a tract of land carries with it the
ownership of everything that is
directly above or under it.
The owner may make works on,
above, or below the land as he
pleases, and draw all the
advantages that accrue from them,
unless he is restrained by law or by
rights of others.

Art. 490. A menos que la ley
indique otra cosa, la propiedad
sobre un fundo implica la
propiedad de lo que está debajo o
arriba de ella.
El dueño puede hacer obras en la
tierra, sobre ella o debajo de ella
según lo desee, y obtener todas las
ventajas derivadas de ello, a menos
que esté limitado por la ley o por
derechos de terceros.

Art. 491. Buildings, other
constructions permanently attached
to the ground, standing timber, and
unharvested crops or ungathered
fruits of trees may belong to a
person other than the owner of the
ground. Nevertheless, they are
presumed to belong to the owner of
the ground, unless separate
ownership is evidenced by an
instrument filed for registry in the
conveyance records of the parish in
which the immovable is located.

Art. 491. Las edificaciones, otras
construcciones unidas de manera
permanente al suelo, la madera en
pie y los cultivos no cosechados o
frutos no recolectados de los
árboles pueden pertenecer a una
persona que no sea el dueño del
suelo. No obstante, se presume que
pertenecen al dueño del suelo, a
menos que se demuestre lo
contrario mediante instrumento
presentado para su inscripción en
el registro de transferencias
inmobiliarias de la parroquia en
que esté ubicado el inmueble.

Art. 492. Separate ownership of
a part of a building, such as a floor,
an apartment, or a room, may be
established only by a juridical act
of the owner of the entire building
when and in the manner expressly
authorized by law.

Art. 492. La propiedad separada
de una parte de una edificación, tal
como un piso, un apartamento o
una habitación solo puede
establecerse mediante acto jurídico
del dueño de toda la edificación en
los supuestos y conforme a las
formalidades exigidas por la ley.

Art. 493. Buildings, other
constructions permanently attached

Art. 493. Las edificaciones, otras
construcciones unidas al suelo de
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to the ground, and plantings made
on the land of another with his
consent belong to him who made
them. They belong to the owner of
the ground when they are made
without his consent.
When the owner of buildings,
other constructions permanently
attached to the ground, or plantings
no longer has the right to keep
them on the land of another, he
may remove them subject to his
obligation to restore the property to
its former condition. If he does not
remove them within ninety days
after written demand, the owner of
the land may, after the ninetieth
day from the date of mailing the
written demand, appropriate
ownership of the improvements by
providing an additional written
notice by certified mail, and upon
receipt of the certified mail by the
owner of the improvements, the
owner of the land obtains
ownership of the improvements
and owes nothing to the owner of
the improvements. Until such time
as the owner of the land
appropriates the improvements, the
improvements shall remain the
property of he who made them and
he shall be solely responsible for
any harm caused by the
improvements.
When buildings, other
constructions permanently attached
to the ground, or plantings are
made on the separate property of a
spouse with community assets or
with separate assets of the other

[Vol. 14

manera permanente y las
plantaciones hechas sobre la tierra
de un tercero con su
consentimiento corresponden a
quien las hizo. Pertenecen al dueño
del suelo cuando son hechas sin su
consentimiento.
Si el dueño de las edificaciones,
otras construcciones unidas al
suelo de manera permanente o
plantaciones pierde el derecho de
conservarlas en la tierra de un
tercero, puede quitarlas con
sujeción a la obligación de
restaurar el bien a su condición
anterior. Si no las retira dentro de
los noventa días siguientes a que le
sea solicitado por escrito, el dueño
de la tierra puede, transcurridos
noventa días de enviada la
notificación por correo, adquirir la
propiedad de las mejoras, lo cual
también debe ser notificado por
correo certificado. Después de
recibir el dueño de las mejoras la
notificación por correo certificado,
el dueño de la tierra obtiene la
propiedad de las mejoras sin deber
nada al dueño de las mejoras.
Hasta que el dueño de la tierra
adquiere la propiedad de las
mejoras, estas siguen siendo
propiedad de quien las hizo y esta
persona es la única responsable
por todo daño causado por ellas.
Este artículo no se aplica
cuando las edificaciones, otras
construcciones unidas al suelo de
manera permanente o plantaciones
se hacen en el bien propio de un
cónyuge con bienes gananciales o
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spouse and when such
improvements are made on
community property with the
separate assets of a spouse, this
Article does not apply. The rights
of the spouses are governed by
Articles 2366, 2367, and 2367.1.
[Acts 1984, No. 933, §1; Acts
2003, No. 715, §1.]

con bienes propios del otro
cónyuge y cuando las mejoras se
hacen sobre bienes conyugales con
bienes propios de un cónyuge. Los
derechos de los cónyuges se rigen
por los artículos 2366, 2367 y
2367.1. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 933 de
1984; sección 1, ley n.o 715 de
2003].

Art. 493.1. Things incorporated
in or attached to an immovable so
as to become its component parts
under Articles 465 and 466 belong
to the owner of the immovable.
[Acts 1984, No. 933, §1.]

Art. 493.1. Las cosas
incorporadas a un inmueble o
adheridas a él de modo que se
hayan convertido en partes
integrantes conforme a los
artículos 465 y 466 pertenecen al
dueño del inmueble. [Sec. 1, ley n.o
933 de 1984].

Art. 493.2. One who has lost the
ownership of a thing to the owner
of an immovable may have a claim
against him or against a third
person in accordance with the
following provisions. [Acts 1984,
No. 933, §1.]

Art. 493.2. Quien pierde la
propiedad de una cosa a favor del
dueño de un inmueble puede
reclamarle a él o a un tercero de
acuerdo con las siguientes
disposiciones. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 933
de 1984].

Art. 494. When the owner of an
immovable makes on it
constructions, plantings, or works
with materials of another, he may
retain them, regardless of his good
or bad faith, on reimbursing the
owner of the materials their current
value and repairing the injury that
he may have caused to him.

Art. 494. Cuando el dueño de un
inmueble hace construcciones,
plantaciones u otras obras con
materiales de un tercero, puede
conservarlas, con prescindencia de
su buena o mala fe, después de
reintegrar al dueño de los
materiales su valor actualizado y
reparar el daño que le hubiera
causado.

Art. 495. One who incorporates
in, or attaches to, the immovable of
another, with his consent, things
that become component parts of
the immovable under Articles 465

Art. 495. Quien incorpora o une
a un inmueble de un tercero, con
consentimiento del tercero, cosas
que se transformen en partes
integrantes del inmueble en virtud
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and 466, may, in the absence of
other provisions of law or juridical
acts, remove them subject to his
obligation of restoring the property
to its former condition.
If he does not remove them after
demand, the owner of the
immovable may have them
removed at the expense of the
person who made them or elect to
keep them and pay, at his option,
the current value of the materials
and of the workmanship or the
enhanced value of the immovable.

[Vol. 14

de los artículos 465 y 466, puede
quitarlas, en ausencia de
disposiciones legales o actos
jurídicos en contrario, con sujeción
a la obligación de restablecer el
bien a su condición anterior.
Si no las quita después del
pedido de hacerlo, el dueño del
inmueble puede quitarlas a costa
de la persona que las hizo o
conservarlas y pagar, a su
elección, el valor actualizado de
los materiales y la mano de obra o
la mejora en el valor del inmueble.

Art. 496. When constructions,
plantings, or works are made by a
possessor in good faith, the owner
of the immovable may not demand
their demolition and removal. He is
bound to keep them and at his
option to pay to the possessor
either the cost of the materials and
of the workmanship, or their
current value, or the enhanced
value of the immovable.

Art. 496. Cuando las
construcciones, plantaciones u
obras son realizadas por un
poseedor de buena fe, el dueño del
inmueble no puede requerir su
demolición y extracción. Está
obligado a conservarlas y, a su
elección, pagar al poseedor el
costo de los materiales y la mano
de obra, o su valor actualizado, o
la mejora en el valor del inmueble.

Art. 497. When constructions,
plantings, or works are made by a
bad faith possessor, the owner of
the immovable may keep them or
he may demand their demolition
and removal at the expense of the
possessor, and, in addition,
damages for the injury that he may
have sustained. If he does not
demand demolition and removal,
he is bound to pay at his option
either the current value of the
materials and of the workmanship
of the separable improvements that

Art. 497. Cuando las
construcciones, plantaciones u
obras son realizadas por un
poseedor de mala fe, el dueño del
inmueble puede conservarlas o
exigir la demolición y extracción a
costa del poseedor, y, además, una
indemnización por los daños y
perjuicios que haya sufrido. Si no
exige la demolición y extracción,
debe pagar a su elección el valor
actualizado de los materiales y la
mano de obra de las mejoras
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he has kept or the enhanced value
of the immovable.

separables que conserve o la
mejora en el valor del inmueble.

Art. 498. One who has lost the
ownership of a thing to the owner
of an immovable may assert
against third persons his rights
under Articles 493, 493.1, 494,
495, 496, or 497 when they are
evidenced by an instrument filed
for registry in the appropriate
conveyance or mortgage records of
the parish in which the immovable
is located. [Acts 1984, No. 933,
§1.]

Art. 498. Quien pierde la
propiedad de una cosa a favor del
dueño de un inmueble puede
oponer frente a terceros los
derechos que le corresponden
conforme a los artículos 493,
493.1, 494, 495, 496, o 497,
cuando la existencia de esos
derechos conste en un instrumento
presentado para su inscripción en
el registro de transferencias
inmobiliarias o de hipotecas
correspondiente de la parroquia en
la que se sitúa el inmueble. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 933 de 1984].

Art. 499. Accretion formed
successively and imperceptibly on
the bank of a river or stream,
whether navigable or not, is called
alluvion. The alluvion belongs to
the owner of the bank, who is
bound to leave public that portion
of the bank which is required for
the public use.
The same rule applies to
dereliction formed by water
receding imperceptibly from a
bank of a river or stream. The
owner of the land situated at the
edge of the bank left dry owns the
dereliction.

Art. 499. Se denomina aluvión al
acrecentamiento formado de
manera continuada e imperceptible
en la orilla de un río o arroyo,
navegable o no. El aluvión
corresponde al dueño de la orilla,
quien está obligado a mantener
pública la parte de la orilla que
sea necesaria para su uso público.
La misma regla rige para los
terrenos que queden descubiertos
por el retiro imperceptible del
agua de la orilla de un río o
arroyo. El terreno descubierto
pertenece al dueño de la tierra
ubicada al borde de la orilla que
ha quedado seca.

Art. 500. There is no right to
alluvion or dereliction on the shore
of the sea or of lakes.

Art. 500. No hay derecho a
aluvión ni a terrenos descubiertos
en la orilla del mar o de los lagos.

Art. 501. Alluvion formed in
front of the property of several

Art. 501. El aluvión formado
frente a inmuebles de varios

150

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

owners is divided equitably, taking
into account the extent of the front
of each property prior to the
formation of the alluvion in issue.
Each owner is entitled to a fair
proportion of the area of the
alluvion and a fair proportion of
the new frontage on the river,
depending on the relative values of
the frontage and the acreage.

dueños se divide en partes iguales,
teniendo en cuenta la extensión del
frente de cada inmueble antes de la
formación del aluvión en cuestión.
Cada dueño tiene derecho a una
proporción justa del área del
aluvión y a una proporción justa
del nuevo frente en el río, según los
valores relativos del frente y la
superficie.

Art. 502. If a sudden action of
the waters of a river or stream
carries away an identifiable piece
of ground and unites it with other
lands on the same or on the
opposite bank, the ownership of
the piece of ground so carried
away is not lost. The owner may
claim it within a year, or even later,
if the owner of the bank with
which it is united has not taken
possession.

Art. 502. Si la acción repentina
del agua de un río o arroyo
arrastra un pedazo de suelo
identificable y lo une a otras
tierras del mismo lado de la ribera
o del contrario, la propiedad de
ese pedazo de tierra arrastrado no
se pierde. El dueño puede
reclamarlo dentro del año o
incluso después, si el dueño de la
ribera con el que se haya unido no
ha tomado posesión.

Art. 503. When a river or
stream, whether navigable or not,
opens a new channel and surrounds
riparian land making it an island,
the ownership of that land is not
affected.

Art. 503. Cuando un río o
arroyo, navegable o no, abre un
nuevo canal y circunda tierra
ribereña y la convierte en una isla,
la propiedad de esa tierra no se ve
afectada.

Art. 504. When a navigable river
or stream abandons its bed and
opens a new one, the owners of the
land on which the new bed is
located shall take by way of
indemnification the abandoned
bed, each in proportion to the
quantity of land that he lost.
If the river returns to the old
bed, each shall take his former
land.

Art. 504. Cuando un río o
arroyo navegable abandona su
curso y abre uno nuevo, los dueños
de la tierra por donde pasa el
nuevo curso tomarán en concepto
de reparación el lecho
abandonado, cada uno en
proporción a la cantidad de tierra
perdida.
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Si el río vuelve al curso anterior,
cada uno recupera su tierra
anterior.
Art. 505. Islands, and sandbars
that are not attached to a bank,
formed in the beds of navigable
rivers or streams, belong to the
state.

Art. 505. Corresponden al
estado las islas y los bancos de
arena que no están adheridos a
una ribera formados en el curso de
ríos o arroyos navegables.

Art. 506. In the absence of title
or prescription, the beds of
nonnavigable rivers or streams
belong to the riparian owners along
a line drawn in the middle of the
bed.

Art. 506. En ausencia de título o
prescripción, el lecho de los ríos o
arroyos no navegables
corresponde a los dueños
ribereños a lo largo de una línea
trazada en el medio del lecho.

SECTION 3. ACCESSION IN
RELATION TO MOVABLES

SECCIÓN 3. DE LA ACCESIÓN
EN RELACIÓN CON LOS
MUEBLES

Art. 507. In the absence of other
provisions of law or contract, the
consequences of accession as
between movables are determined
according to the following rules.

Art. 507. En ausencia de otras
disposiciones legales o
contractuales, las consecuencias
de la accesión entre los muebles se
determinan conforme a las
siguientes reglas.

Art. 508. Things are divided into
principal and accessory. For
purposes of accession as between
movables, an accessory is a
corporeal movable that serves the
use, ornament, or complement of
the principal thing.
In the case of a principal thing
consisting of a movable
construction permanently attached
to the ground, its accessories
include things that would
constitute its component parts
under Article 466 if the
construction were immovable.

Art. 508. Las cosas son
principales o accesorias. A los
efectos de la accesión entre
muebles, es accesoria la cosa
mueble corporal que sirve para
usar, ornamentar o complementar
la cosa principal.
En el caso de una cosa principal
que consiste en una construcción
mueble unida al suelo de manera
permanente, sus cosas accesorias
comprenden aquellas que
constituirían sus partes integrantes
conforme al artículo 466 si la
construcción fuera un bien
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[Acts 2008, No. 632, §1, eff. July
1, 2008.]

inmueble. [Sección 1, ley n.o 632
de 2008, vigente desde el 1 de julio
de 2008].

Art. 509. In case of doubt as to
which is a principal thing and
which is an accessory, the most
valuable, or the most bulky if value
is nearly equal, shall be deemed to
be principal.

Art. 509. En caso de duda
respecto de qué cosa es principal y
cuál accesoria, la más valiosa o, si
el valor fuera aproximadamente
igual, la más voluminosa se
considera la principal.

Art. 510. When two corporeal
movables are united to form a
whole, and one of them is an
accessory of the other, the whole
belongs to the owner of the
principal thing. The owner of the
principal thing is bound to
reimburse the owner of the
accessory its value. The owner of
the accessory may demand that it
be separated and returned to him,
although the separation may cause
some injury to the principal thing,
if the accessory is more valuable
than the principal and has been
used without his knowledge.

Art. 510. Cuando dos muebles
corporales están unidos y forman
una unidad, y uno de ellos es
accesorio al otro, la unidad
corresponde al dueño de la cosa
principal. El dueño de la cosa
principal está obligado a
reintegrar el valor de la cosa
accesoria a su dueño. El dueño de
la cosa accesoria puede exigir su
separación y que le sea devuelta,
aunque la separación pueda
causarle algún daño a la cosa
principal, si la cosa accesoria es
más valiosa que la principal y fue
usada sin su conocimiento.

Art. 511. When one uses
materials of another to make a new
thing, the thing belongs to the
owner of the materials, regardless
of whether they may be given their
earlier form. The owner is bound to
reimburse the value of the
workmanship.

Art. 511. Cuando alguien usa
materiales de otra persona para
hacer una cosa nueva, la cosa
pertenece al dueño de los
materiales, con independencia de
que se los pueda restituir a su
forma anterior o no. El dueño está
obligado a reintegrar el valor de la
mano de obra.
No obstante, cuando el valor de
la mano de obra excede
sustancialmente el de los
materiales, la cosa corresponde a
quien la hizo. En este caso, tiene

Nevertheless, when the value of
the workmanship substantially
exceeds that of the materials, the
thing belongs to him who made it.
In this case, he is bound to
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reimburse the owner of the
materials their value.

que reintegrar el valor de los
materiales a su dueño.

Art. 512. If the person who
made the new thing was in bad
faith, the court may award its
ownership to the owner of the
materials.

Art. 512. Si la persona que hizo
la cosa nueva actuó de mala fe, el
juez podrá asignar la propiedad al
dueño de los materiales.

Art. 513. When one used partly
his own materials and partly the
materials of another to make a new
thing, unless the materials can be
conveniently separated, the thing
belongs to the owners of the
materials in indivision. The share
of one is determined in proportion
to the value of his materials and of
the other in proportion to the value
of his materials and workmanship.

Art. 513. Cuando alguien usó en
parte materiales propios y en parte
materiales de un tercero para
hacer una cosa nueva, a menos que
los materiales puedan separarse
adecuadamente, la cosa pertenece
a los dueños de los materiales de
manera indivisa. La parte de uno
de ellos se determina en
proporción al valor de sus
materiales, y la del otro, en
proporción al valor de sus
materiales y de la mano de obra.

Art. 514. When a new thing is
formed by the mixture of materials
of different owners, and none of
them may be considered as
principal, an owner who has not
consented to the mixture may
demand separation if it can be
conveniently made.

Art. 514. Cuando se forma una
cosa nueva por la combinación de
materiales de dueños diferentes y
ninguno de ellos puede
considerarse el principal, el dueño
que no prestó su consentimiento
respecto de la combinación puede
exigir que se realice la separación
si esta puede hacerse
adecuadamente.
Si la separación no es posible de
manera adecuada, la cosa
resultante de la combinación
pertenece a los dueños de los
materiales de manera indivisa. La
parte de cada uno se determina en
proporción al valor de sus
materiales.
Aquel cuyos materiales sean de
un valor muy superior a los de

If separation cannot be
conveniently made, the thing
resulting from the mixture belongs
to the owners of the materials in
indivision. The share of each is
determined in proportion to the
value of his materials.
One whose materials are far
superior in value in comparison
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with those of any one of the others,
may claim the thing resulting from
the mixture. He is then bound to
reimburse the others the value of
their materials.

cualquiera de los demás podrá
reclamar la cosa resultante de la
combinación. Estará obligado a
reintegrar a los demás el valor de
sus materiales.

Art. 515. When an owner of
materials that have been used
without his knowledge for the
making of a new thing acquires the
ownership of that thing, he may
demand that, in lieu of the
ownership of the new thing,
materials of the same species,
quantity, weight, measure and
quality or their value be delivered
to him.

Art. 515. Cuando un dueño de
materiales usados sin su
conocimiento para hacer una cosa
nueva adquiere la titularidad de
esa cosa, puede exigir que, en
lugar de la propiedad sobre la
cosa nueva, se le entreguen
materiales de la misma especie,
cantidad, peso, medida y calidad o
el valor equivalente.

Art. 516. One who uses a
movable of another, without his
knowledge, for the making of a
new thing may be liable for the
payment of damages.

Art. 516. Quien utiliza un
mueble de un tercero sin su
conocimiento para hacer una cosa
nueva puede ser responsable por el
pago de una indemnización en
concepto de daños y perjuicios.

CHAPTER 3. TRANSFER OF
OWNERSHIP BY AGREEMENT

CAPÍTULO 3. DE LA
TRANSMISIÓN DE LA
PROPIEDAD POR CONTRATO

Art. 517. The ownership of an
immovable is voluntarily
transferred by a contract between
the owner and the transferee that
purports to transfer the ownership
of the immovable. The transfer of
ownership takes place between the
parties by the effect of the
agreement and is not effective
against third persons until the
contract is filed for registry in the
conveyance records of the parish in

Art. 517. La propiedad sobre un
inmueble se transmite
voluntariamente mediante contrato
entre el dueño y el adquirente por
el que se pretende transmitir la
propiedad del inmueble. La
transferencia de la propiedad se
produce entre las partes por efecto
del contrato y no es oponible a
terceros hasta que el contrato se
presente para su inscripción en el
registro de transmisiones
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which the immovable is located.
[Acts 2005, No. 169, §2, eff. July
1, 2006; Acts 2005, 1st Ex. Sess.,
No. 13, §1, eff. Nov. 29, 2005.]

inmobiliarias de la parroquia en la
que se sitúa el inmueble. [Sección
2, ley n.o 169 de 2005, vigente
desde el 1 de julio de 2006; sección
1, ley n.o 13 de 2005, 1.a Ses. Ex.,
vigente desde el 29 de noviembre
de 2005].

Art. 518. The ownership of a
movable is voluntarily transferred
by a contract between the owner
and the transferee that purports to
transfer the ownership of the
movable. Unless otherwise
provided, the transfer of ownership
takes place as between the parties
by the effect of the agreement and
against third persons when the
possession of the movable is
delivered to the transferee.
When possession has not been
delivered, a subsequent transferee
to whom possession is delivered
acquires ownership provided he is
in good faith. Creditors of the
transferor may seize the movable
while it is still in his possession.
[Acts 1984, No. 331, §2, eff. Jan.
1, 1985.]

Art. 518. La propiedad sobre un
bien mueble se transmite
voluntariamente mediante contrato
entre el dueño y el adquirente por
el que se pretende transmitir la
propiedad de tal bien. A menos que
se disponga otra cosa, la
transferencia de la propiedad se
produce entre las partes por efecto
del contrato, y frente a terceros,
cuando se entrega la posesión del
bien mueble al adquirente.
Cuando no se haya entregado la
posesión, el adquirente posterior al
que se le transmita la posesión
adquiere la propiedad si actúa de
buena fe. Los acreedores del
enajenante podrán embargar el
bien mueble mientras aún esté en
su posesión. [Sec. 2, ley n.o 331 de
1984, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 1985].

Art. 519. When a movable is in
the possession of a third person,
the assignment of the action for the
recovery of that movable suffices
for the transfer of its ownership.

Art. 519. Cuando un bien mueble
está en posesión de un tercero, la
cesión de la acción de
reivindicación de ese bien basta
para transmitir la propiedad.

Art. 520. [Repealed by Acts
1981, No. 125, §1.]

Art. 520. [Derogado por sección
1, ley n.o 125 de 1981].

Art. 521. One who has
possession of a lost or stolen thing
may not transfer its ownership to

Art. 521. El que tiene la
posesión de una cosa perdida o
robada no puede transferir la
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another. For purposes of this
Chapter, a thing is stolen when one
has taken possession of it without
the consent of its owner. A thing is
not stolen when the owner delivers
it or transfers its ownership to
another as a result of fraud.

propiedad sobre ella a un tercero.
A los efectos de este capítulo, se
considera robada aquella cosa
tomada sin el consentimiento de su
dueño. La cosa no se considera
robada cuando el dueño la entrega
o transmite su propiedad a un
tercero a consecuencia de un
engaño.

Art. 522. A transferee of a
corporeal movable in good faith
and for fair value retains the
ownership of the thing even though
the title of the transferor is
annulled on account of a vice of
consent. [Acts 1979, No. 180, §1.]

Art. 522. El adquirente de buena
fe y por el valor de mercado de un
bien mueble corporal conserva la
propiedad de la cosa aunque el
título del enajenante sea anulado a
raíz de un vicio del consentimiento.

Art. 523. An acquirer of a
corporeal movable is in good faith
for purposes of this Chapter unless
he knows, or should have known,
that the transferor was not the
owner.

Art. 523. El adquirente de un
bien mueble corporal es de buena
fe a los efectos de este capítulo a
menos que sepa o haya debido
saber que el enajenante no era el
dueño.

Art. 524. The owner of a lost or
stolen movable may recover it
from a possessor who bought it in
good faith at a public auction or
from a merchant customarily
selling similar things on
reimbursing the purchase price.

Art. 524. El dueño de un bien
mueble perdido o robado puede
recuperarlo del poseedor que lo
adquirió de buena fe en subasta
pública o de un comerciante que
habitualmente vende cosas
similares si le reintegra el precio
de compra.
El dueño anterior de un bien
mueble perdido, robado o
abandonado que fue vendido al
amparo de una disposición legal
no puede recuperarlo del
adquirente.

The former owner of a lost,
stolen, or abandoned movable that
has been sold by authority of law
may not recover it from the
purchaser.
Art. 525. The provisions of this
Chapter do not apply to movables

Art. 525. Las disposiciones de
este capítulo no se aplican a los
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that are required by law to be
registered in public records.
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bienes muebles que por ley deban
inscribirse en los registros
públicos.

CHAPTER 4. PROTECTION OF
OWNERSHIP

CAPÍTULO 4. DE LA
PROTECCIÓN DE LA
PROPIEDAD

Art. 526. The owner of a thing is
entitled to recover it from anyone
who possesses or detains it without
right and to obtain judgment
recognizing his ownership and
ordering delivery of the thing to
him.

Art. 526. El dueño de una cosa
tiene derecho a recuperarla de
cualquiera que la posea o la
detente sin derecho y a obtener una
sentencia en la que se reconozca su
titularidad y se ordene la entrega
de la cosa a su favor.

Art. 527. The evicted possessor,
whether in good or in bad faith, is
entitled to recover from the owner
compensation for necessary
expenses incurred for the
preservation of the thing and for
the discharge of private or public
burdens. He is not entitled to
recover expenses for ordinary
maintenance or repairs.

Art. 527. El poseedor, de buena
o mala fe, que ha sido despojado
tiene derecho a percibir del dueño
una indemnización por los gastos
necesarios en los que haya
incurrido para la conservación de
la cosa y para cumplir con las
cargas públicas o privadas. No
tiene derecho a recuperar los
gastos por reparaciones o
mantenimiento corrientes.

Art. 528. An evicted possessor
in good faith is entitled to recover
from the owner his useful expenses
to the extent that they have
enhanced the value of the thing.

Art. 528. El poseedor de buena
fe que ha sido despojado tiene
derecho a recuperar del dueño los
gastos útiles en tanto hayan
mejorado el valor de la cosa.

Art. 529. The possessor, whether
in good or in bad faith, may retain
possession of the thing until he is
reimbursed for expenses and
improvements which he is entitled
to claim.

Art. 529. El poseedor,
independientemente de su buena o
mala fe, puede conservar la
posesión de la cosa hasta que se le
reintegren los gastos y las mejoras
que tenga derecho a reclamar.

Art. 530. The possessor of a
corporeal movable is presumed to

Art. 530. Se presume dueño al
poseedor de un bien mueble

158

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

be its owner. The previous
possessor of a corporeal movable is
presumed to have been its owner
during the period of his possession.
These presumptions do not avail
against a previous possessor who
was dispossessed as a result of loss
or theft.

corporal. Se presume que el
poseedor anterior de un bien
mueble corporal fue el dueño
durante su posesión.
Estas presunciones no rigen
contra un poseedor anterior que
fue desapoderado a consecuencia
de una pérdida o hurto.

Art. 531. One who claims the
ownership of an immovable
against another in possession must
prove that he has acquired
ownership from a previous owner
or by acquisitive prescription. If
neither party is in possession, he
need only prove a better title.

Art. 531. El que reclama la
propiedad sobre un bien inmueble
contra quien es poseedor debe
probar que adquirió la propiedad
de un dueño anterior o por
prescripción adquisitiva. Si
ninguna de las partes está en
posesión, solo debe probar mejor
título.

Art. 532. When the titles of the
parties are traced to a common
author, he is presumed to be the
previous owner.

Art. 532. Cuando los títulos de
las partes se remontan a un autor
común, se presume que este es el
dueño anterior.

TITLE III. PERSONAL
SERVITUDES

TÍTULO III. DE LAS
SERVIDUMBRES PERSONALES

CHAPTER 1. KINDS OF
SERVITUDES

CAPÍTULO 1. DE LOS TIPOS DE
SERVIDUMBRES

[Acts 1976, No. 103, §1.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 103 de 1976].

Art. 533. There are two kinds of
servitudes: personal servitudes and
predial servitudes.

Art. 533. Las servidumbres son
personales o reales.

Art. 534. A personal servitude is
a charge on a thing for the benefit
of a person. There are three sorts of
personal servitudes: usufruct,
habitation, and rights of use.

Art. 534. La servidumbre personal
grava la cosa en beneficio de una
persona. Hay tres tipos de
servidumbres personales: el
usufructo, la habitación y los
derechos de uso.
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CHAPTER 2. USUFRUCT

CAPÍTULO 2. DEL USUFRUCTO

SECTION 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

SECCIÓN 1. PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES

Art. 535. Usufruct is a real right
of limited duration on the property
of another. The features of the right
vary with the nature of the things
subject to it as consumables or
nonconsumables.

Art. 535. El usufructo es el
derecho real de duración limitada
sobre un bien de un tercero. Las
características del derecho varían
de acuerdo con la naturaleza de
las cosas sujetas a él según sean
consumibles o no consumibles.

Art. 536. Consumable things are
those that cannot be used without
being expended or consumed, or
without their substance being
changed, such as money, harvested
agricultural products, stocks of
merchandise, foodstuffs, and
beverages.

Art. 536. Son consumibles las
cosas que no pueden usarse sin
gastarse o consumirse, o sin que se
altere su sustancia, como el dinero,
los productos agrícolas
cosechados, las existencias de
mercadería, los comestibles y las
bebidas.

Art. 537. Nonconsumable things
are those that may be enjoyed
without alteration of their
substance, although their substance
may be diminished or deteriorated
naturally by time or by the use to
which they are applied, such as
lands, houses, shares of stock,
animals, furniture, and vehicles.

Art. 537. Son no consumibles las
cosas que se pueden usar sin
alterar su sustancia, aunque su
sustancia pueda verse disminuida o
deteriorada naturalmente por el
paso del tiempo o por el uso al que
se aplican, como es el caso de las
fracciones de tierra, las casas, las
acciones, los animales, el
mobiliario y los vehículos.

Art. 538. If the things subject to
the usufruct are consumables, the
usufructuary becomes owner of
them. He may consume, alienate,
or encumber them as he sees fit. At
the termination of the usufruct he
is bound either to pay to the naked
owner the value that the things had
at the commencement of the

Art. 538. Si las cosas sujetas al
usufructo son consumibles, el
usufructuario se transforma en su
dueño. Puede consumirlas,
enajenarlas o gravarlas según su
criterio. Extinguido el usufructo,
está obligado a pagar al nudo
propietario el valor que las cosas
tenían al inicio del usufructo o
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usufruct or to deliver to him things
of the same quantity and quality.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

entregarle cosas en la misma
cantidad y de la misma calidad.
[Sección 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 539. If the things subject to
the usufruct are nonconsumables,
the usufructuary has the right to
possess them and to derive the
utility, profits, and advantages that
they may produce, under the
obligation of preserving their
substance.
He is bound to use them as a
prudent administrator and to
deliver them to the naked owner at
the termination of the usufruct.

Art. 539. Si las cosas sujetas al
usufructo son no consumibles, el
usufructuario tiene derecho a
poseerlas y a obtener la utilidad,
las ganancias y las ventajas que
produzca, con la obligación de
conservar su sustancia.

Art. 540. Usufruct is an
incorporeal thing. It is movable or
immovable according to the nature
of the thing upon which the right
exists.

Art. 540. El usufructo es un bien
incorporal. Es mueble o inmueble
según la naturaleza de la cosa
sobre la que recae el derecho.

Art. 541. Usufruct is susceptible
to division, because its purpose is
the enjoyment of advantages that
are themselves divisible. It may be
conferred on several persons in
divided or undivided shares, and it
may be partitioned among the
usufructuaries.

Art. 541. El usufructo es
susceptible de división, porque su
fin es el goce de ventajas que son
divisibles en sí mismas. Puede
otorgarse a favor de varias
personas por porciones divisas o
indivisas, y puede dividirse entre
los usufructuarios.

Art. 542. The naked ownership
may be partitioned subject to the
rights of the usufructuary.

Art. 542. La nuda propiedad
puede dividirse con sujeción a los
derechos del usufructuario.

Art. 543. When property is held
in indivision, a person having a
share in full ownership may
demand partition of the property in

Art. 543. Cuando se posee un
bien de manera indivisa, la
persona que tiene una
participación en la propiedad

Está obligado a usarlas como
administrador prudente y
entregarlas al nudo propietario a
la extinción del usufructo.
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kind or by licitation, even though
there may be other shares in naked
ownership and usufruct.
A person having a share in
naked ownership only or in
usufruct only does not have this
right, unless a naked owner of an
undivided share and a usufructuary
of that share jointly demand
partition in kind or by licitation, in
which event their combined shares
shall be deemed to constitute a
share in full ownership. [Acts
1983, No. 535, §1.]
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plena puede exigir la división del
bien en especie o por licitación,
aunque haya otras participaciones
en la nuda propiedad y el
usufructo.
La persona que tiene una
participación en la nuda propiedad
o en el usufructo solamente no
tiene este derecho, a menos que el
nudo propietario de una porción
indivisa y el usufructuario de esa
parte soliciten conjuntamente la
partición en especie o por
licitación, en cuyo caso la
combinación de sus
participaciones se considerará
participación en la propiedad
plena. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 535 de
1983].

Art. 544. Usufruct may be
established by a juridical act either
inter vivos or mortis causa, or by
operation of law. The usufruct
created by juridical act is called
conventional; the usufruct created
by operation of law is called legal.
Usufruct may be established on
all kinds of things, movable or
immovable, corporeal or
incorporeal.

Art. 544. El usufructo puede
crearse por acto jurídico entre
vivos o por causa de muerte, o por
disposición de la ley. Es
convencional el usufructo creado
por acto jurídico; es legal el
creado por disposición de la ley.
El usufructo puede constituirse
sobre todo tipo de cosas, muebles o
inmuebles, corporales o
incorporales.

Art. 545. Usufruct may be
established for a term or under a
condition, and subject to any
modification consistent with the
nature of usufruct.
The rights and obligations of the
usufructuary and of the naked
owner may be modified by
agreement unless modification is
prohibited by law or by the grantor
in the act establishing the usufruct.

Art. 545. El usufructo puede
crearse sujeto a plazo o condición,
y con sujeción a toda restricción
acorde a su naturaleza.
Los derechos y las obligaciones
del usufructuario y del nudo
propietario pueden ser modificados
por acuerdo a menos que lo
prohíba la ley o quien constituyó el
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usufructo en el acto de constitución
del usufructo.
Art. 546. Usufruct may be
established in favor of successive
usufructuaries.

Art. 546. El usufructo puede
constituirse a favor de
usufructuarios sucesivos.

Art. 547. When the usufruct is
established in favor of several
usufructuaries, the termination of
the interest of one usufructuary
inures to the benefit of those
remaining, unless the grantor has
expressly provided otherwise.

Art. 547. Cuando el usufructo se
creó a favor de varios
usufructuarios, la extinción del
derecho de uno de ellos beneficia a
los demás, a menos que quien
constituyó el usufructo haya
dispuesto expresamente de otro
modo.

Art. 548. When the usufruct is
established by an act inter vivos,
the usufructuary must exist or be
conceived at the time of the
execution of the instrument. When
the usufruct is established by an act
mortis causa, the usufructuary must
exist or be conceived at the time of
the death of the testator.

Art. 548. Cuando se constituye
un usufructo por acto entre vivos,
el usufructuario debe existir o
haber sido concebido al momento
de la suscripción del instrumento.
Cuando se constituye un usufructo
por causa de muerte, el
usufructuario debe existir o haber
sido concebido al momento del
fallecimiento del testador.

Art. 549. Usufruct may be
established in favor of a natural
person or a juridical person. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

Art. 549. El usufructo puede
constituirse a favor de una persona
física o jurídica. [Sección 1, ley n.o
881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de
julio de 2010].

SECTION 2. RIGHTS OF THE
USUFRUCTUARY

SECCIÓN 2. DE LOS DERECHOS
DEL USUFRUCTUARIO

Art. 550. The usufructuary is
entitled to the fruits of the thing
subject to usufruct according to the
following articles.

Art. 550. El usufructuario tiene
derecho a los frutos de la cosa
sujeta a usufructo conforme a lo
dispuesto en los siguientes
artículos.
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Art. 551. Fruits are things that
are produced by or derived from
another thing without diminution
of its substance.
There are two kinds of fruits;
natural fruits and civil fruits.
Natural fruits are products of the
earth or of animals.
Civil fruits are revenues derived
from a thing by operation of law or
by reason of a juridical act, such as
rentals, interest, and certain
corporate distributions.
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Art. 551. Los frutos son las
cosas producidas por otra cosa o
derivadas de otra cosa sin
disminución de su sustancia.
Los frutos son naturales o
civiles.
Los frutos naturales son
productos de la tierra o de los
animales.
Los frutos civiles son los
ingresos obtenidos a partir de la
cosa por disposición de la ley o en
virtud de un acto jurídico, como las
rentas, los intereses y ciertos
dividendos distribuidos por las
sociedades.

Art. 552. A cash dividend
declared during the existence of the
usufruct belongs to the
usufructuary. A liquidation
dividend or a stock redemption
payment belongs to the naked
owner subject to the usufruct.

Art. 552. Los dividendos en
efectivo declarados durante la
existencia del usufructo
corresponden al usufructuario. Los
dividendos de liquidación y el pago
de rescate de acciones
corresponden al nudo propietario,
con sujeción al usufructo.
Stock dividends and stock splits
Los dividendos en acciones y las
declared during the existence of the divisiones de acciones declaradas
usufruct belong to the naked owner durante la existencia del usufructo
subject to the usufruct.
corresponden al nudo propietario,
con sujeción al usufructo.
A stock warrant and a
La opción de suscripción de
subscription right declared during
acciones a largo plazo y a un
the existence of the usufruct belong precio fijo y el derecho de
to the naked owner free of the
suscripción declarados durante la
usufruct.
existencia del usufructo
corresponden al nudo propietario
en plena propiedad.
Art. 553. The usufructuary has
the right to vote shares of stock in
corporations and to vote or
exercise similar rights with respect
to interests in other juridical

Art. 553.El usufructuario tiene el
derecho de ejercer el derecho a
voto de las acciones en sociedades
anónimas y de votar o ejercer
derechos similares con respecto a
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persons, unless otherwise provided. participaciones en otras personas
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
jurídicas, salvo disposición en
2, 2010.]
contrario. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].
Art. 554. The usufructuary's
right to fruits commences on the
effective date of the usufruct.

Art. 554. El derecho del
usufructuario a los frutos comienza
con la constitución del usufructo.

Art. 555. The usufructuary
acquires the ownership of natural
fruits severed during the existence
of the usufruct. Natural fruits not
severed at the end of the usufruct
belong to the naked owner.

Art. 555. El usufructuario
adquiere la propiedad de los frutos
naturales extraídos durante la
existencia del usufructo. Los frutos
naturales no extraídos al fin del
usufructo corresponden al nudo
propietario.

Art. 556. The usufructuary
acquires the ownership of civil
fruits accruing during the existence
of the usufruct.
Civil fruits accrue day by day
and the usufructuary is entitled to
them regardless of when they are
received.

Art. 556. El usufructuario
adquiere la propiedad de los frutos
civiles devengados durante la
existencia del usufructo.
Los frutos civiles se devengan
diariamente, y el usufructuario
tiene derecho a ellos
independientemente de cuándo se
perciban.

Art. 557. The usufructuary takes
the things in the state in which they
are at the commencement of the
usufruct.

Art. 557. El usufructuario toma
las cosas en el estado en que se
encuentren al inicio del usufructo.

Art. 558. The usufructuary may
make improvements and alterations
on the property subject to the
usufruct at his cost and with the
written consent of the naked
owner. If the naked owner fails or
refuses to give his consent, the
usufructuary may, after notice to
the naked owner and with the

Art. 558. El usufructuario puede
hacer mejoras y modificaciones en
el bien sujeto a usufructo a su
propio costo y con el
consentimiento por escrito del
nudo propietario. Si el nudo
propietario omite prestar su
consentimiento o se niega a
hacerlo, el usufructuario puede,
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approval of the court, make at his
cost those improvements and
alterations that a prudent
administrator would make. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

después de notificar al nudo
propietario y con la venia del juez,
hacer a su propio costo las
mejoras y modificaciones que
haría un administrador prudente.
[Sección 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 559. The right of usufruct
extends to the accessories of the
thing at the commencement of the
usufruct.

Art. 559. El derecho de
usufructo se extiende a los
accesorios de la cosa al inicio del
usufructo.

Art. 560. The usufructuary may
cut trees growing on the land of
which he has the usufruct and take
stones, sand, and other materials
from it, but only for his use or for
the improvement or cultivation of
the land.

Art. 560. El usufructuario puede
cortar los árboles que crezcan en
la tierra sobre la que tiene el
usufructo y puede tomar piedras,
arena y otros materiales de ella,
pero solo para su uso o para
mejora o cultivo de la tierra.

Art. 561. The rights of the
usufructuary and of the naked
owner in mines and quarries are
governed by the Mineral Code.

Art. 561. Los derechos del
usufructuario y del nudo
propietario sobre las minas y
canteras se rigen por el Código de
Minería.

Art. 562. When the usufruct
includes timberlands, the
usufructuary is bound to manage
them as a prudent administrator.
The proceeds of timber operations
that are derived from proper
management of timberlands belong
to the usufructuary.

Art. 562. Si el usufructo incluye
bosques maderables, el
usufructuario está obligado a
administrarlos como administrador
prudente. Los fondos derivados de
la actividad maderera que sean
consecuencia de la correcta
administración de los bosques
maderables corresponden al
usufructuario.

Art. 563. The usufruct extends to
the increase to the land caused by
alluvion or dereliction.

Art. 563. El usufructo se
extiende al acrecentamiento de
tierra causado por aluvión o
terreno descubierto.
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Art. 564. The usufructuary has
no right to the enjoyment of a
treasure found in the property of
which he has the usufruct. If the
usufructuary has found the
treasure, he is entitled to keep onehalf of it as finder.

Art. 564. El usufructuario no
tiene derecho al goce del tesoro
encontrado en el inmueble sobre el
que tiene usufructo. Si el
usufructuario es quien encuentra el
tesoro, tiene derecho a conservar
la mitad en calidad de descubridor.

Art. 565. The usufructuary has a
right to the enjoyment of predial
servitudes due to the estate of
which he has the usufruct. When
the estate is enclosed within other
lands belonging to the grantor of
the usufruct, the usufructuary is
entitled to a gratuitous right of
passage.

Art. 565. El usufructuario tiene
derecho al goce de las
servidumbres reales de las que se
beneficia el inmueble sobre el que
recae el usufructo. Cuando el
inmueble está encerrado entre
otros inmuebles pertenecientes al
otorgante del usufructo, el
usufructuario tiene derecho de
paso gratuito.

Art. 566. The usufructuary may
institute against the naked owner or
third persons all actions that are
necessary to insure the possession,
enjoyment, and preservation of his
right.

Art. 566. El usufructuario puede
iniciar todas las acciones que sean
necesarias contra el nudo
propietario o terceros para
garantizar la posesión, el goce y la
conservación de su derecho.

Art. 567. The usufructuary may
lease, alienate, or encumber his
right. All such contracts cease of
right at the end of the usufruct.

Art. 567. El usufructuario puede
arrendar, enajenar o gravar su
derecho. Los contratos celebrados
a esos efectos quedan sin efecto de
pleno derecho cuando se extingue
el usufructo.
Si el usufructuario arrienda,
enajena o grava su derecho, es
responsable frente al nudo
propietario por el abuso que haga
sobre el bien la persona con la que
contrató. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881 de
2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

If the usufructuary leases,
alienates, or encumbers his right,
he is responsible to the naked
owner for the abuse that the person
with whom he has contracted
makes of the property. [Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. July 2, 2010.]
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Art. 568. The usufructuary may
not dispose of nonconsumable
things unless the right to do so has
been expressly granted to him.
Nevertheless, he may dispose of
corporeal movables that are
gradually and substantially
impaired by use, wear, or decay,
such as equipment, appliances, and
vehicles, provided that he acts as a
prudent administrator.
The right to dispose of a
nonconsumable thing includes the
rights to lease, alienate, and
encumber the thing. It does not
include the right to alienate by
donation inter vivos, unless that
right is expressly granted. [Acts
1986, No. 203, §1; Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 568.1 If a thing subject to
the usufruct is donated inter vivos
by the usufructuary, he is obligated
to pay to the naked owner at the
termination of the usufruct the
value of the thing as of the time of
the donation. If a thing subject to
the usufruct is otherwise alienated
by the usufructuary, the usufruct
attaches to any money or other
property received by the
usufructuary. The property
received shall be classified as
consumable or nonconsumable in
accordance with the provisions of
this Title, and the usufruct shall be
governed by those provisions
subject to the terms of the act
establishing the original usufruct.
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Art. 568. El usufructuario no
puede disponer de las cosas no
consumibles a menos que se le
haya otorgado expresamente el
derecho de hacerlo. No obstante,
puede disponer de los muebles
corporales que se ven afectados
gradual y sustancialmente por el
uso, el desgaste o el deterioro,
como los equipos, artefactos y
vehículos, siempre que actúe como
administrador prudente.
El derecho a disponer de una
cosa no consumible incluye el
derecho a arrendar, enajenar y
gravar la cosa. No incluye el
derecho de enajenar mediante
donación entre vivos, a menos que
ese derecho haya sido otorgado
expresamente. [Sección 1, ley n.o
203 de 1986; sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].
Art. 568.1. Si una cosa sujeta a
usufructo es objeto de una
donación entre vivos realizada por
el usufructuario, este debe pagar al
nudo propietario a la extinción del
usufructo el valor de la cosa al
momento de la donación. Si una
cosa sujeta a usufructo es
enajenada de otro modo por el
usufructuario, el usufructo afecta
al dinero o cualquier otro bien
recibido por el usufructuario. Los
bienes recibidos se clasificarán
como consumibles o no
consumibles de acuerdo con las
disposiciones de este título, y el
usufructo se regirá por los
términos del acto por el que se
haya creado el usufructo original.
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If, at the time of the alienation, the
value of the property received by
the usufructuary is less than the
value of the thing alienated, the
usufructuary is bound to pay the
difference to the naked owner at
the termination of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

Si, al momento de la enajenación,
el valor de los bienes recibidos por
el usufructuario fuera inferior al
valor de la cosa enajenada, el
usufructuario deberá pagar la
diferencia al nudo propietario
cuando finalice el usufructo. [Sec.
1, ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente
desde el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 568.2 The right to dispose
of a nonconsumable thing includes
the right to lease the thing for a
term that extends beyond the
termination of the usufruct. If, at
the termination of the usufruct, the
thing remains subject to the lease,
the usufructuary is accountable to
the naked owner for any
diminution in the value of the thing
at that time attributable to the
lease. [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff.
July 2, 2010.]

Art. 568.2. El derecho a
disponer de un bien no consumible
incluye el derecho de arrendar la
cosa por un plazo que exceda la
extinción del usufructo. Si, a la
extinción del usufructo, la cosa
sigue sujeta a arrendamiento, el
usufructuario será responsable
frente al nudo propietario por
cualquier disminución en el valor
de la cosa en ese momento
atribuible al arrendamiento. [Sec.
1, ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente
desde el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 568.3 If, at the termination
of the usufruct, the thing subject to
the usufruct is burdened by an
encumbrance established by the
usufructuary to secure an
obligation, the usufructuary is
bound to remove the encumbrance.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

Art. 568.3. Si, a la extinción del
usufructo, la cosa objeto del
usufructo está afectada por un
gravamen creado por el
usufructuario para garantizar una
obligación, el usufructuario estará
obligado a quitar el gravamen.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 569. If the usufructuary has
not disposed of corporeal movables
that are by their nature impaired by
use, wear, or decay, he is bound to
deliver them to the owner in the

Art. 569. Si el usufructuario no
dispuso de los bienes muebles
corporales que por su propia
naturaleza se ven afectados por el
uso, el desgaste o el deterioro,
deberá entregarlos al dueño en el

2021-2022]

BILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

state in which they may be at the
end of the usufruct.
The usufructuary is relieved of
this obligation if the things are
entirely worn out by normal use,
wear, or decay. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. July 2, 2010.]
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estado en que se encuentren a la
extinción del usufructo.
El usufructuario queda liberado
de su obligación si las cosas se
desgastan completamente por
efecto del uso o deterioro
normales. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

SECTION 3. OBLIGATIONS OF
THE USUFRUCTUARY

SECCIÓN 3. DE LAS
OBLIGACIONES DEL
USUFRUCTUARIO

Art. 570. The usufructuary shall
cause an inventory to be made of
the property subject to the usufruct.
In the absence of an inventory the
naked owner may prevent the
usufructuary’s entry into
possession of the property.
The inventory shall be made in
accordance with the rules
established in Articles 3131
through 3137 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

Art. 570. El usufructuario debe
procurar que se haga inventario de
los bienes sujetos al usufructo. A
falta de inventario, el nudo
propietario podrá evitar que el
usufructuario tome posesión del
bien.
El inventario debe realizarse de
acuerdo con las reglas de los
artículos 3131 a 3137 del Código
Procesal Civil.

Art. 571. The usufructuary shall
give security that he will use the
property subject to the usufruct as
a prudent administrator and that he
will faithfully fulfill all the
obligations imposed on him by law
or by the act that established the
usufruct unless security is
dispensed with. If security is
required, the court may order that it
be provided in accordance with
law. [Acts 2004, No. 158, §1.]

Art. 571. A menos que se
dispense la garantía, el
usufructuario debe garantizar que
utilizará los bienes objeto del
usufructo como administrador
prudente y que cumplirá fielmente
todas las obligaciones que le
imponga la ley o el acto por el que
se constituyó el usufructo. Si se
exige garantía, el juez puede
ordenar que se preste conforme a
la ley. [Sección 1, ley n.o 158 de
2004].
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Art. 572. The security shall be in
the amount of the total value of the
property subject to the usufruct.
The court may increase or
reduce the amount of the security,
on proper showing, but the amount
shall not be less than the value of
the movables subject to the
usufruct.
Art. 573. A. Security is
dispensed with when any of the
following occur:
(1) A person has a legal usufruct
under Civil Code Article 223 or
3252.
(2) A surviving spouse has a
legal usufruct under Civil Code
Article 890 unless the naked owner
is not a child of the usufructuary or
if the naked owner is a child of the
usufructuary and is also a forced
heir of the decedent, the naked
owner may obtain security but only
to the extent of his legitime.

[Vol. 14

Art. 572. La garantía debe ser
por el monto total del bien sujeto al
usufructo.
El juez puede aumentar o
reducir el monto de la garantía,
siempre que el pedido respectivo
esté debidamente fundado, pero el
monto no podrá ser inferior al
valor de los bienes muebles sujetos
al usufructo.

Art. 573. A. Se dispensa la
garantía si ocurre alguno de los
siguientes supuestos:
1) una persona tiene el usufructo
legal conforme al artículo 223 o
3252 del Código Civil;
2) el cónyuge superviviente tiene
un usufructo legal conforme al
artículo 890 del Código Civil, a
menos que el nudo propietario no
sea hijo del usufructuario o, si el
nudo propietario es hijo del
usufructuario y también es
heredero forzoso del causante, el
nudo propietario podrá obtener
una garantía, pero solo en la
medida de su legítima;
(3) A parent has a legal usufruct
3) un progenitor tiene el
under Civil Code Article 891
usufructo legal conforme al
unless the naked owner is not a
artículo 891 del Código Civil, a
child of the usufructuary.
menos que el nudo propietario no
sea hijo del usufructuario;
(4) A surviving spouse has a
4) el cónyuge sobreviviente tiene
legal usufruct under Civil Code
el usufructo legal conforme al
Article 2434 unless the naked
artículo 2434 del Código Civil, a
owner is a child of the decedent but menos que el nudo propietario sea
not a child of the usufructuary.
hijo del causante, pero no hijo del
usufructuario.
B. A seller or donor of property
B. No están obligados a prestar
under reservation of usufruct are
garantía el vendedor ni el donante
not required to give security. [Acts de un bien con reserva de
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2004, No. 158, §1; Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

usufructo. [Sección 1, ley n.o 158
de 2004; sección 1, ley n.o 881 de
2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 574. A delay in giving
security does not deprive the
usufructuary of the fruits derived
from the property since the
commencement of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.].]

Art. 574. La demora en la
prestación de la garantía no priva
al usufructuario de los frutos
derivados del bien desde el
comienzo del usufructo. [Sección 1,
ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde
el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 575. If the usufructuary
does not give security, the court
may order that the property be
delivered to an administrator
appointed in accordance with
Articles 3111 through 3113 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for
administration on behalf of the
usufructuary. The administration
terminates if the usufructuary gives
security. [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 575. Si el usufructuario no
ofrece garantía, el juez puede
ordenar que los bienes se
entreguen a un administrador
designado conforme a los artículos
3111 a 3113 del Código Procesal
Civil para su administración en
nombre del usufructuario. Cesa la
administración si el usufructuario
ofrece la garantía. [Sección 1, ley
n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2
de julio de 2010].

Art. 576. The usufructuary is
answerable for losses resulting
from his fraud, default, or neglect.

Art. 576. El usufructuario
responde por el deterioro derivado
de su dolo, culpa o negligencia.

Art. 577. The usufructuary is
responsible for ordinary
maintenance and repairs for
keeping the property subject to the
usufruct in good order, whether the
need for these repairs arises from
accident or force majeure, the
normal use of things, or his fault or
neglect.

Art. 577. El usufructuario es
responsable por el mantenimiento
y las reparaciones ordinarias para
mantener el bien objeto del
usufructo en buenas condiciones,
ya sea que la necesidad de las
reparaciones surja de un accidente
o por fuerza mayor, el uso normal
de las cosas, o su culpa o
negligencia.
Las reparaciones
extraordinarias están a cargo del
nudo propietario, a menos que

The naked owner is responsible
for extraordinary repairs, unless
they have become necessary as a
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result of the usufructuary's fault or
neglect in which case the
usufructuary is bound to make
them at his cost. [Amended by
Acts 1979, No. 157, §1; Acts 2010,
No. 881, §1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

hayan devenido necesarias a
consecuencia de la culpa o
negligencia del usufructuario, en
cuyo caso este estará obligado a
hacer las reparaciones a su costo.
[Modificado por sección 1, ley n.o
157 de 1979; sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 578. Extraordinary repairs
are those for the reconstruction of
the whole or of a substantial part of
the property subject to the usufruct.
All others are ordinary repairs.

Art. 578. Son extraordinarias las
reparaciones necesarias para la
reconstrucción de la totalidad o de
una parte sustancial del bien
objeto del usufructo. Todas las
demás son reparaciones
ordinarias.

Art. 579. During the existence of
the usufruct, the naked owner may
compel the usufructuary to make
the repairs for which the
usufructuary is responsible.
The usufructuary may not
compel the naked owner to make
the extraordinary repairs for which
the owner is responsible. If the
naked owner refuses to make them,
the usufructuary may do so, and he
shall be reimbursed without
interest by the naked owner at the
end of the usufruct.

Art. 579. Durante la vigencia del
usufructo, el nudo propietario
puede exigir al usufructuario que
haga las reparaciones que están a
cargo del usufructuario.
El usufructuario no puede exigir
al nudo propietario que haga las
reparaciones extraordinarias que
están a cargo del nudo propietario.
Si el nudo propietario se niega a
hacerlas, el usufructuario puede
hacerlas, y el nudo propietario le
deberá reintegrar la suma
correspondiente sin intereses al
finalizar el usufructo.

Art. 580. If, after the usufruct
commences and before the
usufructuary is put in possession,
the naked owner incurs necessary
expenses or makes repairs for
which the usufructuary is
responsible, the naked owner has
the right to claim the cost from the

Art. 580. Si, después de iniciado
el usufructo y antes de que el
usufructuario esté en posesión, el
nudo propietario incurre en gastos
o hace reparaciones que están a
cargo del usufructuario, el nudo
propietario tiene derecho a
reclamar el costo al usufructuario
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usufructuary and may retain the
possession of the things subject to
the usufruct until he is paid. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

y puede conservar la posesión de
las cosas objeto del usufructo hasta
recibir el pago. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 581. The usufructuary is
answerable for all expenses that
become necessary for the
preservation and use of the
property after the commencement
of the usufruct. [Acts 2010, No.
881, §1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 581. El usufructuario es
responsable por todos los gastos
necesarios para la conservación y
el uso del bien que surjan después
del inicio del usufructo. [Sección 1,
ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde
el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 582. The usufructuary may
release himself from the obligation
to make repairs by abandoning the
usufruct or, with the approval of
the court, a portion thereof, even if
the owner has instituted suit to
compel him to make repairs or bear
the expenses of them, and even if
the usufructuary has been cast in
judgment.
He may not release himself from
the charges of the enjoyment
during the period of his possession,
nor from accountability for the
damages that he, or persons for
whom he is responsible, may have
caused.

Art. 582. El usufructuario puede
liberarse de la obligación de hacer
reparaciones abandonando el
usufructo o, con la venia del juez,
una parte de él, aun si el nudo
propietario lo demandó para
exigirle que haga las reparaciones
o que cubra su costo, y aun si se
condenó al usufructuario.

Art. 583. Neither the
usufructuary nor the naked owner
is bound to restore property that
has been totally destroyed through
accident, force majeure, or age.

Art. 583. Ni el usufructuario ni
el nudo propietario están
obligados a restablecer el bien que
haya sido totalmente destruido a
causa de un accidente, fuerza
mayor o paso del tiempo.
Si el nudo propietario opta por
restablecer el bien o hacer las
reparaciones extraordinarias, lo
hará dentro de un período
razonable y del modo que sea

If the naked owner elects to
restore the property or to make
extraordinary repairs, he shall do
so within a reasonable time and in
the manner least inconvenient and

No puede liberarse de los cargos
del goce durante su período de
posesión, ni de la responsabilidad
por los daños que hayan causado
él o personas por las que él
responde.
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onerous for the usufructuary. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

menos incómodo y oneroso para el
usufructuario. [Sección 1, ley n.o
881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de
julio de 2010].

Art. 584. The usufructuary is
bound to pay the periodic charges,
such as property taxes, that may be
imposed, during his enjoyment of
the usufruct. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 584. El usufructuario está
obligado a pagar los cargos
periódicos, como los impuestos a
la propiedad, que se puedan
imponer durante su goce del
usufructo. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 585. The usufructuary is
bound to pay the extraordinary
charges that may be imposed,
during the existence of the
usufruct, on the property subject to
it. If these charges are of a nature
to augment the value of the
property subject to the usufruct, the
naked owner shall reimburse the
usufructuary at the end of the
usufruct only for the capital
expended.

Art. 585. El usufructuario está
obligado a pagar las cargas
extraordinarias que se puedan
imponer durante la existencia del
usufructo al bien objeto de él. Si
estos cargos son de tal naturaleza
que aumentan el valor del bien
objeto del usufructo, el nudo
propietario reintegrará al
usufructuario al final del usufructo
solo el capital gastado.

Art. 586. When the usufruct is
established inter vivos, the
usufructuary is not liable for debts
of the grantor, but if the debt is
secured by an encumbrance of the
thing subject to the usufruct, the
thing may be sold for the payment
of the debt. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 586. Cuando el usufructo se
constituye entre vivos, el
usufructuario no es responsable
por las deudas del que lo
constituya, pero si la deuda está
garantizada con un gravamen
sobre la cosa objeto del usufructo,
se puede vender la cosa para
pagar la deuda. [Sección 1, ley n.o
881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de
julio de 2010].

Art. 587. When the usufruct is
established mortis causa, the
usufructuary is not liable for estate

Art. 587. Cuando el usufructo se
constituye por causa de muerte, el
usufructuario no es responsable
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debts, but the property subject to
the usufruct may be sold for the
payment of estate debts, in
accordance with the rules provided
for the payment of the debt of an
estate in Book III of this Code.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

por las deudas de la sucesión, pero
el bien objeto del usufructo puede
venderse para el pago de las
deudas de la sucesión, de acuerdo
con las reglas establecidas para el
pago de las deudas sucesorias en
el Libro III del presente Código.
[Sección 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 588. When property subject
to a usufruct established inter vivos
is encumbered to secure a debt
before the commencement of the
usufruct, the usufructuary may
advance the funds needed to
discharge the indebtedness. If he
does so, the naked owner shall
reimburse the usufructuary,
without interest, at the termination
of the usufruct, for the principal of
the debt the usufructuary has
discharged, and for any interest the
usufructuary has paid that had
accrued on the debt before the
commencement of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

Art. 588. Cuando el bien objeto
de un usufructo constituido entre
vivos es gravado para garantizar
una deuda antes del inicio del
usufructo, el usufructuario puede
adelantar los fondos necesarios
para pagar la deuda. Si así lo
hace, el nudo propietario debe
reintegrar al usufructuario, sin
intereses, a la finalización del
usufructo, el capital de la deuda
que saldó el usufructuario y el
importe en concepto de intereses
abonado por el usufructuario que
se hubiera devengado sobre la
deuda antes del inicio del
usufructo. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 589. If the usufructuary of a
usufruct established mortis causa
advances funds to discharge an
estate debt charged to the property
subject to the usufruct, the naked
owner shall reimburse the
usufructuary, without interest, at
the termination of the usufruct, but
only to the extent of the principal
of the debt he has discharged and
for any interest he has paid that had
accrued on the debt before the

Art. 589. Si el usufructuario de
un usufructo constituido por causa
de muerte adelanta fondos para
pagar una deuda de la sucesión
que pesa sobre el bien objeto del
usufructo, el nudo propietario debe
reintegrar su importe al
usufructuario, sin intereses, a la
finalización del usufructo, pero
solo en la medida del capital de la
deuda que haya abonado y los
intereses que haya pagado y que se
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commencement of the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

hayan devengado sobre la deuda
antes del inicio del usufructo.
[Sección 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 590. If the usufructuary fails
or refuses to advance the funds
needed to discharge a debt secured
by property subject to the usufruct,
or an estate debt that is charged to
the property subject to the usufruct,
the naked owner may advance the
funds needed. If he does so, the
naked owner may demand that the
usufructuary pay him interest
during the period of the usufruct. If
the naked owner does not advance
the funds, he may demand that all
or part of the property be sold as
needed to discharge the debt. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

Art. 590. Si el usufructuario
omite o se niega a adelantar los
fondos necesarios para pagar la
deuda garantizada por el bien
objeto del usufructo, o una deuda
de la sucesión que pesa sobre el
bien objeto del usufructo, el nudo
propietario puede adelantar los
fondos necesarios. Si lo hace, el
nudo propietario puede exigir al
usufructuario que le pague
intereses durante el período del
usufructo. Si el nudo propietario
no adelanta los fondos, puede
exigir que la totalidad o parte del
bien se venda según sea necesario
para pagar la deuda. [Sección 1,
ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde
el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 591. If property subject to
the usufruct is sold to pay an estate
debt, or a debt of the grantor, the
usufruct attaches to any proceeds
of the sale of the property that
remain after payment of the debt.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

Art. 591. Si los bienes objeto del
usufructo se venden para pagar
deudas de la sucesión o una deuda
de quien constituyó el usufructo, el
usufructo continúa sobre los
fondos resultantes de la venta del
bien que queden después de pago
de la deuda. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 592. If there is more than
one usufructuary of the same
property, each contributes to the
payment of estate debts that are
charged to the property in

Art. 592. En caso de que haya
más de un usufructuario del mismo
bien, cada uno contribuye al pago
de las deudas de la sucesión que
pesen sobre el bien en proporción
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proportion to his enjoyment of the
property. If one or more of the
usufructuaries fails to advance his
share, those of them who advance
the funds shall have the right to
recover the funds they advance
from those who do not advance
their shares. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

a su uso del bien. En caso de que
uno o más usufructuarios no
adelanten su parte, los que
adelanten los fondos tendrán el
derecho de recuperarlos de los que
no hayan contribuido. [Sección 1,
ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde
el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 593. Unless there is a
governing testamentary
disposition, the legacy of an
annuity that is chargeable to
property subject to a usufruct is
payable first from the fruits and
products of the property subject to
the usufruct and then from the
property itself. [Acts 1990, No.
706, §1; Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 593. A menos que rija una
disposición testamentaria, el
legado de la renta vitalicia que
afecta al bien objeto del usufructo
se debe pagar primero con los
frutos y productos del bien objeto
del usufructo y luego con el bien
mismo. [Sección 1, ley n.o 706 de
1990; sección 1, ley n.o 881 de
2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 594. Court costs in actions
concerning the property subject to
the usufruct are taxed in
accordance with the rules of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Expenses
of litigation other than court costs
are apportioned between
usufructuaries and naked owners in
accordance with the following
Articles. [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 594. Las costas judiciales en
los procesos vinculados con el bien
objeto del usufructo se regulan de
acuerdo con las reglas del Código
Procesal Civil. Los gastos de
litigación que no sean las costas
judiciales se distribuyen entre
usufructuarios y nudos
propietarios conforme a los
siguientes artículos. [Sección 1, ley
n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2
de julio de 2010].

Art. 595. Parents who have a
legal usufruct of the property of
their children are bound for
expenses of litigation concerning
that property, in the same manner
as if they were owners of it; but
reimbursement may be ordered by
the court at the termination of the

Art. 595. Los padres que tienen
el usufructo legal sobre los bienes
de sus hijos están obligados por los
gastos de litigación en relación con
los bienes de la misma manera que
si fueran dueños. Sin embargo, el
juez puede ordenar que, finalizado
el usufructo, se reintegren los
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usufruct in cases in which inequity
might otherwise result.

gastos en caso de que obrar de
otro modo lleve a inequidad.

Art. 596. Conventional
usufructuaries are bound for
expenses of litigation with third
persons concerning the enjoyment
of the property. Expenses of
litigation with third persons
concerning both the enjoyment and
the ownership are divided
equitably between the usufructuary
and the naked owner. Expenses of
litigation between the usufructuary
and the naked owner are borne by
the person who has incurred them.

Art. 596. Los usufructuarios
convencionales están obligados
por los gastos de litigación con
terceros en relación con el goce de
los bienes. Los gastos de litigación
con terceros en relación con el
goce y la titularidad se dividen
equitativamente entre el
usufructuario y el nudo
propietario. Los gastos de
litigación entre el usufructuario y
el nudo propietario están a cargo
de la persona que los contrajo.

Art. 597. The usufructuary who
loses a predial servitude by nonuse
or who permits a servitude to be
acquired on the property by
prescription is responsible to the
naked owner.

Art. 597. El usufructuario que
pierde una servidumbre predial
por falta de uso o que permite que
se adquiera una servidumbre sobre
el bien por prescripción responde
ante el nudo propietario.

Art. 598. If, during the existence
of the usufruct, a third person
encroaches on the immovable
property or violates in any other
way the rights of the naked owner,
the usufructuary must inform the
naked owner. When he fails to do
so, he shall be answerable for the
damages that the naked owner may
suffer.

Art. 598. Si, durante la
existencia del usufructo, un tercero
usurpa el inmueble o vulnera de
otro modo los derechos del nudo
propietario, el usufructuario debe
informar al nudo propietario. En
caso de que no lo haga, será
responsable por los daños que
pueda sufrir el nudo propietario.

Art. 599. When the usufruct
includes a herd of animals, the
usufructuary is bound to use it as a
prudent administrator and, from the
increase of the herd, replace
animals that die. If the entire herd
perishes without the fault of the

Art. 599. Cuando el usufructo
incluye una manada de animales,
el usufructuario está obligado a
usarla como administrador
prudente y a reemplazar mediante
el aumento de la manada a los
animales que mueran. Si perece la
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usufructuary, the loss is borne by
the naked owner.

manada completa sin culpa del
usufructuario, la pérdida es
soportada por el nudo propietario.

Art. 600. The usufructuary may
dispose of individual animals of
the herd, subject to the obligation
to deliver to the naked owner at the
end of the usufruct the value that
the animals had at the time of
disposition.
The usufructuary may also
dispose of the herd or of a
substantial part thereof, provided
that he acts as a prudent
administrator. In such a case, the
proceeds are subject to the
provisions of Article 618.

Art. 600. El usufructuario puede
disponer de animales determinados
de la manada, con sujeción a la
obligación de entregar al nudo
propietario a la finalización del
usufructo el valor que tenían los
animales al momento de la
disposición.
El usufructuario también puede
disponer de la manada o de una
parte sustancial de ella, siempre y
cuando actúe como administrador
prudente. En tal caso, el producido
está sujeto a las disposiciones del
artículo 618.

Art. 601. The usufructuary may
remove all improvements he has
made, subject to the obligation of
restoring the property to its former
condition. He may not claim
reimbursement from the owner for
improvements that he does not
remove or that cannot be removed.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

Art. 601. El usufructuario puede
quitar todas las mejoras que haya
hecho, con sujeción a la obligación
de restituir el bien a su estado
anterior. No puede reclamar al
propietario el reintegro por las
mejoras que no quite o que no
puedan quitarse. [Sección 1, ley n.o
881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de
julio de 2010].

Art. 602. The usufructuary may
set off against damages due to the
owner for the destruction or
deterioration of the property
subject to the usufruct the value of
improvements that cannot be
removed, provided they were made
in accordance with Article 558.

Art. 602. El usufructuario puede
compensar el valor de las mejoras
que no puedan quitarse con la
indemnización debida al
propietario por la destrucción o el
deterioro del bien objeto del
usufructo, siempre que las mejoras
hayan sido realizadas conforme al
artículo 558.
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SECTION 4. RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE NAKED
OWNER

SECCIÓN 4. DE LOS DERECHOS
Y LAS OBLIGACIONES DEL
NUDO PROPIETARIO

Art. 603. The naked owner may
dispose of the naked ownership,
but he cannot thereby affect the
usufruct [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1,
eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 603. El nudo propietario
puede disponer de la nuda
propiedad, pero sin afectar el
usufructo. [Sección 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 604. The naked owner may
establish real rights on the property
subject to the usufruct, provided
that they may be exercised without
impairing the usufructuary’s rights.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

Art. 604. El nudo propietario
puede constituir derechos reales
sobre el bien objeto del usufructo,
siempre que tales derechos puedan
ejercerse sin afectar los derechos
del usufructuario. [Sección 1, ley
n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde el 2
de julio de 2010].

Art. 605. The naked owner must
not interfere with the rights of the
usufructuary.

Art. 605. El nudo propietario no
puede interferir en los derechos del
usufructuario.

Art. 606. The naked owner may
not make alterations or
improvements on the property
subject to the usufruct.

Art. 606. El nudo propietario no
puede hacer modificaciones ni
mejoras sobre el bien objeto del
usufructo.

SECTION 5. TERMINATION OF
USUFRUCT

SECCIÓN 5. DE LA EXTINCIÓN
DEL USUFRUCTO

Art. 607. The right of usufruct
expires upon the death of the
usufructuary.

Art. 607. El derecho de
usufructo se extingue con la muerte
del usufructuario.

Art. 608. A usufruct established
in favor of a juridical person
terminates if the juridical person is
dissolved or liquidated, but not if
the juridical person is converted,
merged or consolidated into a

Art. 608. El usufructo
constituido a favor de una persona
jurídica cesa si se disuelve o se
liquida la persona jurídica, pero
no si la persona jurídica se
transforma o fusiona en una
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successor juridical person. In any
event, a usufruct in favor of a
juridical person shall terminate
upon the lapse of thirty years from
the date of the commencement of
the usufruct. This Article shall not
apply to a juridical person in its
capacity as the trustee of a trust.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

persona jurídica que la suceda. En
cualquier caso, el usufructo a favor
de una persona jurídica se extingue
a los treinta años desde la fecha de
inicio del usufructo. Este artículo
no se aplica a la persona jurídica
en su calidad de fiduciaria de un
fideicomiso. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de
2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 609. A legacy of revenues
from specified property is a kind of
usufruct and terminates upon death
of the legatee unless a shorter
period has been expressly
stipulated.

Art. 609. El legado de rentas de
bienes determinados es un tipo de
usufructo y finaliza a la muerte del
legatario a menos que se haya
pactado expresamente un período
más corto.

Art. 610. A usufruct established
for a term or subject to a condition
terminates upon the expiration of
the term or the happening of the
condition.

Art. 610. El usufructo sujeto a
plazo o condición finaliza con la
extinción del plazo o el
acaecimiento de la condición.

Art. 611. When the usufructuary
is charged to restore or transfer the
usufruct to another person, his
right terminates when the time for
restitution or delivery arrives.

Art. 611. Cuando el
usufructuario tiene la carga de
restituir o transferir el usufructo a
otra persona, su derecho finaliza
cuando llega el momento de la
restitución o la entrega.

Art. 612. A usufruct granted
until a third person reaches a
certain age is a usufruct for a term.
If the third person dies, the
usufruct continues until the date
the deceased would have reached
the designated age.

Art. 612. El usufructo
constituido hasta que un tercero
cumpla determinada edad es un
usufructo sujeto a plazo. Si muere
el tercero, el usufructo continúa
hasta la fecha en que el fallecido
habría alcanzado la edad indicada.

Art. 613. The usufruct of
nonconsumables terminates by the
permanent and total loss,
extinction, or destruction through

Art. 613. El usufructo de bienes
no consumibles cesa con la
pérdida, extinción o destrucción
total y permanente por accidente,
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accident, force majeure or decay of
the property subject to the usufruct.
[Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July
2, 2010.]

fuerza mayor o deterioro de los
bienes objeto del usufructo. [Sec.
1, ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente
desde el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 614. When any loss,
extinction, or destruction of
property subject to usufruct is
attributable to the fault of a third
person, the usufruct does not
terminate but attaches to any claim
for damages and the proceeds
therefrom.

Art. 614. Cuando la pérdida,
extinción o destrucción del bien
objeto del usufructo es atribuible a
la culpa de un tercero, el usufructo
no se extingue, sino que se
incorpora al reclamo y se extiende
a la indemnización por daños y
perjuicios.

Art. 615. When property subject
to usufruct changes form without
an act of the usufructuary, the
usufruct does not terminate even
though the property may no longer
serve the use for which it was
originally destined.
When property subject to
usufruct is converted into money or
other property without an act of the
usufructuary, as in a case of
expropriation of an immovable or
liquidation of a corporation, the
usufruct terminates as to the
property converted and attaches to
the money or other property
received by the usufructuary. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

Art. 615. Cuando el bien objeto
del usufructo cambia de forma sin
acción del usufructuario, no se
extingue el usufructo aunque el
bien ya no sirva para el uso para el
que fue destinado originalmente.
Cuando el bien objeto del
usufructo se transforma en dinero
u otro tipo de bien sin acción del
usufructuario, como en el caso de
la expropiación de un inmueble o
la liquidación de una sociedad, el
usufructo se extingue respecto del
bien transformado y se extiende al
dinero u otro bien recibido por el
usufructuario. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 616. When property subject
to usufruct is sold or exchanged,
whether in an action for partition
or by agreement between the
usufructuary and the naked owner
or by a usufructuary who has the
power to dispose of
nonconsumable property, the

Art. 616. Cuando el bien objeto
del usufructo se vende o
intercambia, ya sea en una acción
de partición o por acuerdo entre el
usufructuario y el nudo propietario
o por el usufructuario con facultad
de disponer del bien no
consumible, el usufructo cesa
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usufruct terminates as to the
nonconsumable property sold or
exchanged, but as provided in
Article 568.1, the usufruct attaches
to the money or other property
received by the usufructuary,
unless the parties agree otherwise.
Any tax or expense incurred as the
result of the sale or exchange of
property subject to usufruct shall
be paid from the proceeds of the
sale or exchange, and shall be
deducted from the amount due by
the usufructuary to the naked
owner at the termination of the
usufruct. [Acts 1983, No. 525, §1;
Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

respecto del bien no consumible
vendido o intercambiado, pero,
conforme a lo dispuesto en el
artículo 568.1, el usufructo se
extiende al dinero u otros bienes
recibidos por el usufructuario, a
menos que las partes hayan
acordado algo diferente. Todo
gravamen o gasto en el que se
incurra a consecuencia de la venta
o el intercambio del bien objeto del
usufructo se paga con los fondos
obtenidos de la venta o el
intercambio y se deduce del monto
debido por el usufructuario al nudo
propietario a la finalización del
usufructo. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 525 de
1983; sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 617. When proceeds of
insurance are due on account of
loss, extinction, or destruction of
property subject to usufruct, the
usufruct attaches to the proceeds. If
the usufructuary or the naked
owner has separately insured his
interest only, the proceeds belong
to the insured party.

Art. 617. Cuando existan
ingresos derivados de seguros en
razón de la pérdida, extinción o
destrucción del bien objeto del
usufructo, el usufructo se extiende
a esos ingresos. Si el usufructuario
o el nudo propietario aseguraron
solo su propio derecho, los fondos
corresponden al asegurado.

Art. 618. In cases governed by
Articles 614, 615, 616, and the first
sentence of Article 617, the naked
owner may demand, within one
year from receipt of the proceeds
by the usufructuary that the
usufructuary give security for the
proceeds. If such a demand is
made, and the parties cannot agree,
the nature of the security shall be
determined by the court. This
Article does not apply to corporeal

Art. 618. En los casos
comprendidos en los artículos 614,
615, 616 y la primera oración del
artículo 617, el nudo propietario
puede exigir, dentro de un año
desde la recepción de los fondos
por el usufructuario, que este
ofrezca una garantía por ellos. Si
se hace tal pedido y las partes no
pueden ponerse de acuerdo, el juez
decidirá qué garantía debe
ofrecerse. Este artículo no se
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movables referred to in the second
sentence of Article 568, or to
property disposed of by the
usufructuary pursuant to the power
to dispose of nonconsumables if
the grantor of the usufruct has
dispensed with the security. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

aplica a los muebles corporales
mencionados en la segunda
oración del artículo 568 ni a los
bienes de los que haya dispuesto el
usufructuario conforme a la
facultad de disponer de bienes no
consumibles si quien constituyó el
usufructo dispensó la garantía.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 619. A usufruct by donation
mortis causa is not considered
revoked merely because the
testator has made changes in the
property after the date of his
testament. The effect of the legacy
is determined by application of the
rules contained in the title: Of
donations inter vivos and mortis
causa. [Acts 2010, No. 881, §1, eff.
July 2, 2010.]

Art. 619. El usufructo por
donación por causa de muerte no
se considera revocado por el mero
hecho de que el testador haya
hecho cambios en el bien después
de la fecha del testamento. El
efecto del legado se determina por
aplicación de las reglas contenidas
en el título De las donaciones.6
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 620. Usufruct terminates by
the enforcement of an
encumbrance established upon the
property prior to the creation of the
usufruct to secure a debt. The
usufructuary may have an action
against the grantor of the usufruct
or against the naked owner under
the provisions established in
Section 3 of this Chapter.

Art. 620. El usufructo se
extingue por la ejecución del
gravamen constituido sobre el bien
antes de la constitución del
usufructo para garantizar una
deuda. El usufructuario puede
accionar contra quien haya
constituido el usufructo o contra el
nudo propietario conforme a las
disposiciones de la sección 3 del
presente capítulo.
La venta judicial del usufructo
por los acreedores del
usufructuario priva a este de su

The judicial sale of the usufruct
by creditors of the usufructuary
deprives the usufructuary of his

6. N. de T.: En el 2008 se modificó este título, pero no se actualizó la
referencia en el artículo. La traducción en español incluye el título que
corresponde en la actualidad.
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enjoyment of the property but does
not terminate the usufruct. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

goce del bien, pero no extingue el
usufructo. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de
2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 621. A usufruct terminates
by the prescription of nonuse if
neither the usufructuary nor any
other person acting in his name
exercises the right during a period
of ten years. This applies whether
the usufruct has been constituted
on an entire estate or on a divided
or undivided part of an estate.

Art. 621. El usufructo se
extingue en razón de la falta de uso
si ni el usufructuario ni ninguna
otra persona que actúe en su
nombre ejercen el derecho
correspondiente durante un
período de diez años,
independientemente de que el
usufructo se haya constituido sobre
la totalidad de un fundo o sobre
una parte divisa o indivisa de él.

Art. 622. A usufruct terminates
by confusion when the usufruct
and the naked ownership are united
in the same person.
The usufruct does not terminate
if the title by which the usufruct
and the naked ownership were
united is annulled for some
previously existing defect or some
vice inherent in the act.

Art. 622. El usufructo se
extingue por confusión cuando el
usufructo y la nuda propiedad
recaen sobre la misma persona.
No se extingue si el título por el
que se unieron el usufructo y la
nuda propiedad se anula por un
defecto ya existente o por un vicio
inherente al acto.

Art. 623. The usufruct may be
terminated by the naked owner if
the usufructuary commits waste,
alienates things without authority,
neglects to make ordinary repairs,
or abuses his enjoyment in any
other manner. [Acts 2010, No. 881,
§1, eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 623. El nudo propietario
puede ponerle fin al usufructo si el
usufructuario genera un deterioro,
enajena cosas sin autorización,
omite hacer las reparaciones
ordinarias o abusa de su derecho
de uso y goce de algún otro modo.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 881 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 624. In the cases covered by
the preceding Article, the court
may decree termination of the
usufruct or decree that the property

Art. 624. En los supuestos
cubiertos por el artículo anterior,
el juez puede ordenar la extinción
del usufructo o que el bien sea
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be delivered to the naked owner on
the condition that he shall pay to
the usufructuary a reasonable
annuity until the end of the
usufruct. The amount of the
annuity shall be based on the value
of the usufruct.
The usufructuary may prevent
termination of the usufruct or
delivery of the property to the
naked owner by giving security to
insure that he will take appropriate
corrective measures within a
period fixed by the court. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

entregado al nudo propietario con
la condición de que pague al
usufructuario una renta por un
monto razonable hasta la
finalización del usufructo. El
monto de la renta se basa en el
valor del usufructo.
El usufructuario puede evitar la
extinción del usufructo o la entrega
de la propiedad al nudo
propietario ofreciendo garantía
para asegurar que tomará las
medidas correctivas
correspondientes dentro del
período fijado por el juez. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 881 de 2010, vigente desde
el 2 de julio de 2010].

Art. 625. A creditor of the
usufructuary may intervene and
may prevent termination of the
usufruct and delivery of the
property to the naked owner by
offering to repair the damages
caused by the usufructuary and by
giving security for the future. [Acts
2010, No. 881, §1, eff. July 2,
2010.]

Art. 625. Los acreedores del
usufructuario pueden intervenir y
evitar la extinción del usufructo y
la entrega del bien al nudo
propietario ofreciendo reparar los
daños causados por el
usufructuario y prestando caución
para el futuro. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 881
de 2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio
de 2010].

Art. 626. A usufruct terminates
by an express written renunciation.
A creditor of the usufructuary
may cause to be annulled a
renunciation made to his prejudice.

Art. 626. El usufructo se
extingue por renuncia expresa por
escrito.
El acreedor del usufructuario
puede solicitar la anulación de la
renuncia realizada en su perjuicio.

Art. 627. Upon termination of
the usufruct, the usufructuary or
his heirs have the right to retain
possession of the property until
reimbursed for all expenses and
advances for which they have

Art. 627. Extinguido el
usufructo, el usufructuario o sus
herederos tienen el derecho de
conservar la posesión del bien
hasta que les reintegren todos los
gastos y adelantos que tengan
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recourse against the owner or his
heirs.

derecho a reclamar al propietario
o a sus herederos.

Art. 628. Upon termination of a
usufruct of nonconsumables for a
cause other than total and
permanent destruction of the
property, full ownership is
restored. The usufructuary or his
heirs are bound to deliver the
property to the owner with its
accessories and fruits produced
since the termination of the
usufruct.
If property has been lost or
deteriorated through the fault of the
usufructuary, the owner is entitled
to the value the property otherwise
would have had at the termination
of the usufruct.

Art. 628. Se recupera la
propiedad plena una vez
extinguido el usufructo de bienes
no consumibles por una razón que
no sea la destrucción total y
permanente del bien. El
usufructuario o sus herederos
están obligados a entregar el bien
al propietario con sus accesorios y
frutos producidos desde la
extinción del usufructo.
Si se perdió o deterioró el bien
por culpa del usufructuario, el
propietario tiene derecho al valor
que el bien habría tenido a la
extinción del usufructo.

Art. 629. At the termination of a
usufruct of consumables, the
usufructuary is bound to deliver to
the owner things of the same
quantity and quality or the value
they had at the commencement of
the usufruct.

Art. 629. Extinguido el usufructo
de bienes consumibles, el
usufructuario tiene derecho a
entregar al dueño cosas en igual
cantidad y de la misma calidad o
del mismo valor que tenían al
inicio del usufructo.

CHAPTER 3. HABITATION

CAPÍTULO 3. DE LA
HABITACIÓN

Art. 630. Habitation is the
nontransferable real right of a
natural person to dwell in the
house of another.

Art. 630. La habitación es el
derecho real no transferible de una
persona física de vivir en la casa
de otra persona.

Art. 631. The right of habitation
is established and extinguished in
the same manner as the right of
usufruct.

Art. 631. El derecho de
habitación se constituye y se
extingue del mismo modo que el
usufructo.

188

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

Art. 632. The right of habitation
is regulated by the title that
establishes it. If the title is silent as
to the extent of habitation, the right
is regulated in accordance with
Articles 633 through 635.

Art. 632. El derecho de
habitación se rige por el título por
el que se constituye. Si el título no
dice nada sobre el alcance de la
habitación, el derecho se regula
conforme a lo dispuesto en los
artículos 633 a 635.

Art. 633. A person having the
right of habitation may reside in
the house with his family, although
not married at the time the right
was granted to him.

Art. 633. La persona que tiene el
derecho de habitación puede
residir en la casa con su familia,
aunque no estuviera casada al
momento en que le fue otorgado el
derecho.

Art. 634. A person having the
right of habitation is entitled to the
exclusive use of the house or of the
part assigned to him, and, provided
that he resides therein, he may
receive friends, guests, and
boarders.

Art. 634. La persona que tiene el
derecho de habitación está
facultada al uso exclusivo de la
casa o de la parte asignada y,
siempre y cuando la persona viva
allí, puede recibir amigos, visitas y
huéspedes.

Art. 635. A person having the
right of habitation is bound to use
the property as a prudent
administrator and at the expiration
of his right to deliver it to the
owner in the condition in which he
received it, ordinary wear and tear
excepted.

Art. 635. La persona que tiene el
derecho de habitación está
obligada a usar el inmueble como
administrador prudente y,
extinguido el derecho, debe
entregarlo al propietario en la
condición en la que lo recibió, con
excepción del desgaste normal.

Art. 636. When the person
having the right of habitation
occupies the entire house, he is
liable for ordinary repairs, for the
payment of taxes, and for other
annual charges in the same manner
as the usufructuary.
When the person having the
right of habitation occupies only a
part of the house, he is liable for

Art. 636. Cuando la persona que
tiene el derecho de habitación
ocupa toda la casa, tiene a su
cargo las reparaciones habituales,
el pago de los impuestos y todo
otro cargo anual del mismo modo
que el usufructuario.
Cuando ocupa solo una parte de
la casa, debe hacerse cargo en
proporción a su uso.
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ordinary repairs to the part he
occupies and for all other expenses
and charges in proportion to his
enjoyment.
Art. 637. The right of habitation
is neither transferable nor heritable.
It may not be alienated, let, or
encumbered.

Art. 637. El derecho de
habitación no puede cederse ni
puede adquirirse por causa de
muerte. No puede ser enajenado,
arrendado ni gravado.

Art. 638. The right of habitation
terminates at the death of the
person having it unless a shorter
period is stipulated.

Art. 638. El derecho de
habitación se extingue con la
muerte de la persona que lo posee
a menos que se pacte un período
más corto.

CHAPTER 4. RIGHTS OF USE

CAPÍTULO 4. DEL DERECHO
DE USO

Art. 639. The personal servitude
of right of use confers in favor of a
person a specified use of an estate
less than full enjoyment.

Art. 639. La servidumbre
personal del derecho de uso otorga
a favor de una persona el derecho
de usar un inmueble de manera
específica sin que posea el pleno
goce.

Art. 640. The right of use may
confer only an advantage that may
be established by a predial
servitude.

Art. 640. El derecho de uso no
puede otorgar un beneficio que
exceda los que puedan establecerse
por servidumbre real.

Art. 641. A right of use may be
established in favor of a natural
person or a legal entity.

Art. 641. El derecho de uso
puede constituirse a favor de una
persona física o jurídica.

Art. 642. A right of use includes
the rights contemplated or
necessary to enjoyment at the time
of its creation as well as rights that
may later become necessary,
provided that a greater burden is

Art. 642. El derecho de uso
incluye los derechos contemplados
al momento de su creación y
aquellos necesarios para su goce
en ese momento o posteriormente,
pero, en todo caso, la carga
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not imposed on the property unless
otherwise stipulated in the title.

impuesta sobre el bien no podrá
exceder lo establecido en el título.

Art. 643. The right of use is
transferable unless prohibited by
law or contract.

Art. 643. El derecho de uso
puede transmitirse a menos que lo
prohíba la ley o el contrato.

Art. 644. A right of use is not
extinguished at the death of the
natural person or at the dissolution
of any other entity having the right
unless the contrary is provided by
law or contract.

Art. 644. El derecho de uso no se
extingue con el fallecimiento ni con
la disolución de su titular, a menos
que la ley o el contrato establezcan
lo contrario.

Art. 645. A right of use is
regulated by application of the
rules governing usufruct and
predial servitudes to the extent that
their application is compatible with
the rules governing a right of use
servitude.

Art. 645. El derecho de uso se
rige por la aplicación de las
normas del usufructo y las
servidumbres reales en tanto su
aplicación sea compatible con las
normas que regulan la
servidumbre del derecho de uso.

TITLE IV. PREDIAL
SERVITUDES

TÍTULO IV. DE LAS
SERVIDUMBRES REALES

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CAPÍTULO 1. PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES

[Acts 1977, No. 514, §1.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 514 de 1977].

Art. 646. A predial servitude is a
charge on a servient estate for the
benefit of a dominant estate.
The two estates must belong to
different owners.

Art. 646. La servidumbre real
grava el predio sirviente en
beneficio del predio dominante.
Los predios deben pertenecer a
dueños diferentes.

Art. 647. There must be a
benefit to the dominant estate. The
benefit need not exist at the time
the servitude is created; a possible
convenience or a future advantage
suffices to support a servitude.

Art. 647. Debe haber un
beneficio para el predio
dominante, sin que sea necesario
que exista al momento en que se
constituya la servidumbre; la
posible conveniencia o la ventaja
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futura bastan para que la
servidumbre sea válida.
No hay servidumbre real si no se
puede esperar razonablemente que
la carga impuesta beneficie al
predio dominante.

Art. 648. Neither contiguity nor
proximity of the two estates is
necessary for the existence of a
predial servitude. It suffices that
the two estates be so located as to
allow one to derive some benefit
from the charge on the other.

Art. 648. Ni la contigüidad ni la
proximidad entre los dos predios
son necesarias para la existencia
de una servidumbre real. Basta con
que los dos predios estén ubicados
de tal modo que sea posible que
uno obtenga un beneficio del cargo
que pese sobre el otro.

Art. 649. A predial servitude is
an incorporeal immovable.

Art. 649. La servidumbre real es
un bien inmueble incorporal.

Art. 650. A. A predial servitude
is inseparable from the dominant
estate and passes with it. The right
of using the servitude cannot be
alienated, leased, or encumbered
separately from the dominant
estate.
B. The predial servitude
continues as a charge on the
servient estate when ownership
changes. [Acts 2004, No. 821, §2,
eff. Jan. 1, 2005.]

Art. 650. A. La servidumbre real
es inseparable del predio
dominante y se transmite con él. El
derecho de usar la servidumbre no
puede enajenarse, arrendarse ni
gravarse de manera independiente
del predio dominante.
B. La servidumbre real continúa
como carga sobre el predio
sirviente cuando cambia la
propiedad. [Sec. 2, ley n.o 821 de
2004, vigente desde el 1 de enero
de 2005].

Art. 651. The owner of the
servient estate is not required to do
anything. His obligation is to
abstain from doing something on
his estate or to permit something to
be done on it. He may be required
by convention or by law to keep
his estate in suitable condition for
the exercise of the servitude due to
the dominant estate. A servitude

Art. 651. El dueño del predio
sirviente no tiene obligación de
hacer nada en particular, sino que
debe abstenerse de hacer algo en
su predio o permitir que se haga
algo en él. El contrato o la ley
pueden exigirle que mantenga su
predio en condiciones adecuadas
para el ejercicio de la servidumbre
debida al predio dominante. La
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may not impose upon the owner of
the servient estate or his successors
the obligation to pay a fee or other
charge on the occasion of an
alienation, lease, or encumbrance
of the servient estate. [Acts 2010,
No. 938, §2, eff. Jul. 2, 2010.]

servidumbre no puede imponer al
dueño del predio sirviente ni a sus
sucesores la obligación de pagar
cargo alguno en ocasión de la
enajenación, el arrendamiento o el
gravamen del predio sirviente.
[Sec. 2, ley n.o 938 de 2010,
vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 652. A predial servitude is
indivisible. An estate cannot have
upon another estate part of a right
of way, or of view, or of any other
servitude, nor can an estate be
charged with a part of a servitude.

Art. 652. La servidumbre real es
indivisible. Un predio no puede
tener sobre otro una parte de un
derecho de paso o de vista ni de
ningún otro tipo de servidumbre,
así como tampoco puede estar
gravado con una parte de una
servidumbre.
El uso de una servidumbre
puede estar limitado a ciertos días
u horarios; cuando lo esté,
conserva de todos modos su
naturaleza de derecho completo.
La servidumbre corresponde a la
totalidad del predio dominante y a
todas sus partes; si el predio
estuviera dividido, cada uno de los
adquirentes de una parte tendrá el
derecho de usar la servidumbre en
su totalidad.

The use of a servitude may be
limited to certain days or hours;
when limited, it is still an entire
right. A servitude is due to the
whole of the dominant estate and
to all parts of it; if this estate is
divided, every acquirer of a part
has the right of using the servitude
in its entirety.

Art. 653. The advantages
resulting from a predial servitude
may be divided, if they are
susceptible of division.

Art. 653. Si son susceptibles de
división, las ventajas resultantes de
la servidumbre real pueden
dividirse.

Art. 654. Predial servitudes may
be natural, legal, and voluntary or
conventional. Natural servitudes
arise from the natural situation of
estates; legal servitudes are
imposed by law; and voluntary or

Art. 654. La servidumbre real
puede ser natural, legal, y
voluntaria o convencional. La
servidumbre natural surge de la
situación natural de los predios. La
servidumbre legal es impuesta por
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la ley. La servidumbre voluntaria o
convencional es aquella creada
por acto jurídico, prescripción o
destino que le dé el dueño.
CAPÍTULO 2. DE LAS
SERVIDUMBRES NATURALES

Art. 655. An estate situated
below is bound to receive the
surface waters that flow naturally
from an estate situated above
unless an act of man has created
the flow.

Art. 655. El predio situado más
abajo recibirá el agua superficial
que fluya naturalmente del predio
situado más arriba a menos que la
acción del hombre haya originado
su curso.

Art. 656. The owner of the
servient estate may not do anything
to prevent the flow of the water.
The owner of the dominant estate
may not do anything to render the
servitude more burdensome.

Art. 656. El dueño del predio
sirviente no debe hacer nada que
evite el flujo del agua. El dueño del
predio dominante no debe hacer
nada que haga que la servidumbre
sea más gravosa.

Art. 657. The owner of an estate
bordering on running water may
use it as it runs for the purpose of
watering his estate or for other
purposes.

Art. 657. El dueño de un predio
que linda con un curso de agua
puede usarla como fluye para
regar su predio o para otros fines.

Art. 658. The owner of an estate
through which water runs, whether
it originates there or passes from
lands above, may make use of it
while it runs over his lands. He
cannot stop it or give it another
direction and is bound to return it
to its ordinary channel where it
leaves his estate.

Art. 658. El dueño de un predio
por el que corre agua, ya sea que
se origine allí o que pase desde
tierras más altas, puede usarla en
sus tierras mientras pase por ellas.
No puede detenerla ni darle otra
dirección y está obligado a
devolverla a su curso habitual
cuando abandona su predio.
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CAPÍTULO 3. DE LA
SERVIDUMBRE LEGAL
SECCIÓN 1. DE LAS
LIMITACIONES A LA
PROPIEDAD
Art. 659. La servidumbre legal
es una limitación a la propiedad
creada por la ley en beneficio del
público en general o de personas
en particular.

Art. 660. The owner is bound to
keep his buildings in repair so that
neither their fall nor that of any
part of their materials may cause
damage to a neighbor or to a
passerby. However, he is
answerable for damages only upon
a showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should
have known of the vice or defect
which caused the damage, that the
damage could have been prevented
by the exercise of reasonable care,
and that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nothing in this
Article shall preclude the court
from the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in an
appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st
Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16,
1996.]

Art. 660. El dueño está obligado
a mantener en buen estado su
construcción de modo tal que ni su
eventual caída ni la de ninguno de
sus materiales pueda causar un
daño a un vecino o a un
transeúnte. Sin embargo, es
responsable por los daños solo si
se demuestra que sabía o que,
ejerciendo un cuidado razonable,
debería haber sabido del vicio o
defecto que causó el daño, que el
daño se podría haber evitado
mediante el ejercicio de un cuidado
razonable y que omitió ejercer tal
cuidado razonable. Ninguna de las
disposiciones de este artículo
impide que el juez aplique la
doctrina de res ipsa loquitur
cuando corresponda. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 25 de 1996, 1.a Ses. Ex., vigente
desde el 16 de abril de 1996].

Art. 661. When a building or
other construction is in danger of
falling a neighbor has a right of
action to compel the owner to have
it properly supported or
demolished. When the danger is
imminent the court may authorize

Art. 661. Cuando una
edificación o cualquier otro tipo de
construcción está en riesgo de
desmoronarse, cualquier vecino
puede accionar judicialmente para
exigirle al dueño que la apuntale o
la demuela. Cuando el peligro es
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the neighbor to do the necessary
work for which he shall be
reimbursed by the owner.

inminente, el juez puede autorizar
al vecino a hacer las obras
necesarias, con derecho a obtener
reembolso del dueño.

Art. 662. One who builds near a
wall, whether common or not, is
bound to take all necessary
precautions to protect his neighbor
against injury.

Art. 662. Quien construye cerca
de un muro, común o no, está
obligado a tomar todas las
medidas de precaución necesarias
para proteger a su vecino de todo
daño.

Art. 663. A landowner may not
build projections beyond the
boundary of his estate.

Art. 663. El propietario no
puede construir salientes más allá
de los límites de su predio.

Art. 664. A landowner is bound
to fix his roof so that rainwater
does not fall on the ground of his
neighbor.

Art. 664. El propietario debe
mantener el techo de manera tal
que el agua de lluvia no caiga
sobre su vecino.

Art. 665. Servitudes imposed for
the public or common utility relate
to the space which is to be left for
the public use by the adjacent
proprietors on the shores of
navigable rivers and for the making
and repairing of levees, roads, and
other public or common works.
Such servitudes also exist on
property necessary for the building
of levees and other water control
structures on the alignment
approved by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers as provided by law,
including the repairing of hurricane
protection levees.

Art. 665. Las servidumbres
impuestas a favor de la utilidad
pública o común se relacionan con
el espacio que se debe dejar para
el uso público de propietarios
adyacentes en las orillas de ríos
navegables y para hacer y reparar
diques, caminos y otras obras
públicas o comunes. Tales
servidumbres también existen
sobre los inmuebles necesarios
para la construcción de diques y
otras estructuras de control del
agua conforme a las directivas
aprobadas por el Cuerpo de
Ingenieros del Ejército de los
Estados Unidos de América según
lo dispuesto por la ley, lo que
incluye la reparación de diques de
protección contra huracanes.
Todo lo relativo a este tipo de
servidumbre se rige por las leyes o

All that relates to this kind of
servitude is determined by laws or
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particular regulations. [Acts 2006,
No. 776, §1.]

por normas particulares. [Sec. 1,
ley n.o 776 de 2006].

Art. 666. He who from his title
as owner is bound to give a public
road on the border of a river or
stream, must furnish another
without any compensation, if the
first be destroyed or carried away.

Art. 666. Quien está obligado en
razón de su calidad de propietario
a proporcionar un camino público
en la orilla de un río u otro curso
de agua debe proporcionar otro
camino sin derecho a
compensación alguna en caso de
que el primero sea destruido o
arrastrado.
En caso de que el camino fuera
dañado o inundado sin ser
arrastrado de manera tal que sea
imposible el paso, el propietario
está obligado a permitir al público
el paso por su predio, tan cerca
como sea posible del camino
público, sin derecho a obtener
compensación alguna por ello.

And if the road be so injured or
inundated by the water, without
being carried away, that it becomes
impassable, the owner is obliged to
give the public a passage on his
lands, as near as possible to the
public road, without recompense
therefor.
Art. 667. Although a proprietor
may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he cannot make any
work on it, which may deprive his
neighbor of the liberty of enjoying
his own, or which may be the
cause of any damage to him.
However, if the work he makes on
his estate deprives his neighbor of
enjoyment or causes damage to
him, he is answerable for damages
only upon a showing that he knew
or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known that his
works would cause damage, that
the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed
to exercise such reasonable care.
Nothing in this Article shall

Art. 667. Si bien el propietario
puede hacer con su inmueble lo
que desee, no puede hacer ninguna
obra sobre él que prive a su vecino
de la libertad de goce del propio
inmueble o que pueda causarle un
daño. Si las obras que hace en su
inmueble privan al vecino del goce
de su propio derecho o le causan
un daño, será responsable por los
daños solo cuando se demuestre
que sabía o que, ejerciendo un
cuidado razonable, debería haber
sabido que sus obras causarían un
daño, que el daño se podría haber
evitado mediante el ejercicio de un
cuidado razonable y que omitió
ejercer tal cuidado razonable.
Ninguna de las disposiciones de
este artículo impedirá que el juez
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preclude the court from the
application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in an appropriate
case. Nonetheless, the proprietor is
answerable for damages without
regard to his knowledge or his
exercise of reasonable care, if the
damage is caused by an
ultrahazardous activity. An
ultrahazardous activity as used in
this Article is strictly limited to
pile driving or blasting with
explosives. [Acts 1996, 1st Ex.
Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16,
1996.]

aplique la doctrina de res ipsa
loquitur cuando corresponda. No
obstante, el propietario debe
responder por los daños con
prescindencia de su conocimiento
o de su ejercicio de un cuidado
razonable si el daño es causado
por una actividad
extraordinariamente peligrosa. A
los efectos del presente artículo,
son actividades
extraordinariamente peligrosas
exclusivamente el hincado de
pilotes o la voladura con
explosivos. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 25 de
1996, 1.a Ses. Ex., vigente desde el
16 de abril de 1996].

Art. 668. Although one be not at
liberty to make any work by which
his neighbor's buildings may be
damaged, yet every one has the
liberty of doing on his own ground
whatsoever he pleases, although it
should occasion some
inconvenience to his neighbor.
Thus he who is not subject to
any servitude originating from a
particular agreement in that
respect, may raise his house as
high as he pleases, although by
such elevation he should darken
the lights of his neighbors's
[neighbor's.] house, because this
act occasions only an
inconvenience, but not a real
damage.

Art. 668. Si bien no se pueden
hacer obras que causen un daño en
la construcción del vecino, todos
tienen la libertad de hacer en su
propio predio lo que deseen,
aunque cause alguna molestia al
vecino.

Art. 669. If the works or
materials for any manufactory or
other operation, cause an
inconvenience to those in the same
or in the neighboring houses, by

Art. 669. Si las obras o los
materiales usados para una fábrica
u otro tipo de operación causan
molestias a quienes están en la
misma casa o en las casas vecinas,

Así, quien no está sujeto a una
servidumbre creada por un
acuerdo particular a tal fin puede
elevar su casa tanto como desee,
aunque tal elevación oscurezca la
casa del vecino, porque este acto
solo causa una molestia, pero no
un daño real.
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diffusing smoke or nauseous smell,
and there be no servitude
established by which they are
regulated, their sufferance must be
determined by the rules of the
police, or the customs of the place.

por la difusión de humo o de olor
nauseabundo, y no hay una
servidumbre por la que se rijan, la
molestia se regirá por los
reglamentos de policía o los usos
del lugar.

Art. 670. When a landowner
constructs in good faith a building
that encroaches on an adjacent
estate and the owner of that estate
does not complain within a
reasonable time after he knew or
should have known of the
encroachment, or in any event
complains only after the
construction is substantially
completed the court may allow the
building to remain. The owner of
the building acquires a predial
servitude on the land occupied by
the building upon payment of
compensation for the value of the
servitude taken and for any other
damage that the neighbor has
suffered.

Art. 670. Si un propietario
construye de buena fe una
edificación que invade un predio
adyacente y el propietario de ese
predio no se queja dentro de un
período razonable después de
enterarse o de haber debido
enterarse de la invasión, o si se
queja solo después de que la
edificación está sustancialmente
terminada, el juez puede permitir
que se mantenga la edificación. El
propietario de la edificación
adquiere una servidumbre real
sobre el predio ocupado por la
edificación mediante el pago de
una compensación por el valor de
la servidumbre tomada y por
cualquier otro daño que haya
sufrido el vecino.

Art. 671. Governing bodies of
parishes and municipalities are
authorized to adopt regulations
determining the mode of
proceeding to prevent the spread of
fire by the destruction of buildings.

Art. 671. Los órganos de
gobierno de las parroquias y
municipalidades están autorizados
a aprobar reglamentos por los que
se determine el modo de proceder
para evitar la difusión de un
incendio mediante la destrucción
de construcciones.
Cuando se destruya propiedad
privada de este modo para
combatir un incendio, el dueño
debe ser resarcido por la
subdivisión política

When private property is so
destroyed in order to combat a
conflagration, the owner shall be
indemnified by the political
subdivision for his actual loss.
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correspondiente por la pérdida
sufrida.
Art. 672. Other legal servitudes
relate to common enclosures, such
as common walls, fences and
ditches, and to the right of passage
for the benefit of enclosed estates.

Art. 672. Las demás
servidumbres legales se refieren a
los cercos comunes, como los
muros compartidos, las vallas y las
zanjas, y al derecho de paso en
beneficio de predios sin salida.

SECTION 2. COMMON
ENCLOSURES

SECCIÓN 2. DE LOS CERCOS
COMUNES

Art. 673. A landowner who
builds first may rest one-half of a
partition wall on the land of his
neighbor, provided that he uses
solid masonry at least as high as
the first story and that the width of
the wall does not exceed eighteen
inches, not including the plastering
which may not be more than three
inches in thickness.

Art. 673. El propietario que
construye primero puede apoyar la
mitad de la medianera en el predio
del vecino, siempre y cuando use
materiales sólidos que alcancen al
menos hasta el primer piso y el
ancho del muro no supere las
dieciocho pulgadas, excluido el
enyesado, que no puede superar
las tres pulgadas de espesor.

Art. 674. The wall thus raised
becomes common if the neighbor
is willing to contribute one-half of
its cost. If the neighbor refuses to
contribute, he preserves the right to
make the wall common in whole or
in part, at any time, by paying to
the owner one-half of the current
value of the wall, or of the part that
he wishes to make common.

Art. 674. El muro construido de
este modo se transforma en común
si el vecino está dispuesto a
aportar la mitad de su costo. Si el
vecino se niega a aportar,
conserva el derecho de hacer
común el muro en su totalidad o en
parte, en cualquier momento,
pagando al dueño la mitad del
valor actualizado del muro o de la
parte que quiera que sea común.

Art. 675. A wall that separates
adjoining buildings and is partly on
one estate and partly on another is
presumed to be common up to the
highest part of the lower building
unless there is proof to the
contrary.

Art. 675. El muro que separa
construcciones contiguas y está en
parte sobre un predio y en parte
sobre otro se presume común hasta
la parte más alta de la edificación
más baja a menos que haya prueba
en contrario.
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Art. 676. When a solid masonry
wall adjoins another estate, the
neighbor has a right to make it a
common wall, in whole or in part,
by paying to its owner one-half of
the current value of the wall, or of
the part that he wishes to make
common, and one-half of the value
of the soil on which the wall is
built.

Art. 676. Cuando un muro de
materiales sólidos colinda con otro
inmueble, el vecino tiene derecho a
hacerlo muro común en su
totalidad o en parte, pagando al
dueño la mitad del valor
actualizado del muro o de la parte
que quiera hacer común, y la mitad
del valor del suelo sobre el que
está construido el muro.

Art. 677. In the absence of a
written agreement or controlling
local ordinance the rights and
obligations of the co-owners of a
common wall, fence, or ditch are
determined in accordance with the
following provisions.

Art. 677. A falta de acuerdo por
escrito o de una ordenanza local
aplicable, los derechos y
obligaciones de los copropietarios
de un muro, cerca o zanja común
se determinan conforme a las
siguientes disposiciones.

Art. 678. Necessary repairs to a
common wall, including partial
rebuilding, are to be made at the
expense of those who own it in
proportion to their interests.

Art. 678. Las reparaciones
necesarias de un muro común,
incluida la reconstrucción parcial,
deben hacerse a costa de sus
dueños en proporción a sus
respectivos derechos de propiedad.

Art. 679. The co-owner of a
common wall may be relieved of
the obligation to contribute to the
cost of repairs by abandoning in
writing his right to use it, if no
construction of his is actually
supported by the common wall.

Art. 679. El copropietario de un
muro común puede ser dispensado
de la obligación de contribuir en el
costo de las reparaciones mediante
la renuncia por escrito a su
derecho a usarlo, siempre que el
muro común no soporte
efectivamente una construcción
suya.

Art. 680. The co-owner of a
common wall may use it as he sees
fit, provided that he does not
impair its structural integrity or

Art. 680. El copropietario de un
muro común puede darle el uso
que considere adecuado, siempre y
cuando no afecte su integridad
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infringe on the rights of his
neighbor.

estructural ni vulnere los derechos
del vecino.

Art 681. The co-owner of a
common wall may not make any
opening in the wall without the
consent of his neighbor.

Art. 681. El copropietario de un
muro común no puede hacer una
apertura en el muro sin el
consentimiento del vecino.

Art. 682. A co-owner may raise
the height of a common wall at his
expense provided the wall can
support the additional weight. In
such a case, he alone is responsible
for the maintenance and repair of
the raised part.

Art. 682. Un copropietario
puede elevar la altura de un muro
común a su costa siempre y cuando
el muro pueda soportar el peso
adicional. En tal caso, él es el
único responsable por el
mantenimiento y las reparaciones
necesarios en la parte elevada.

Art. 683. The neighbor who does
not contribute to the raising of the
common wall may at any time
cause the raised part to become
common by paying to its owner
one-half of its current value.

Art. 683. El vecino que no
aporta para la erección del muro
común puede, en cualquier
momento, convertir en común la
parte elevada pagando a su dueño
la mitad de su valor actualizado.

Art. 684. A landowner has the
right to enclose his land.

Art. 684. El propietario del
terreno tiene el derecho de cercar
su predio.

Art. 685. A fence on a boundary
is presumed to be common unless
there is proof to the contrary.
When adjoining lands are
enclosed, a landowner may compel
his neighbors to contribute to the
expense of making and repairing
common fences by which the
respective lands are separated.
When adjoining lands are not
enclosed, a landowner may compel
his neighbors to contribute to the
expense of making and repairing
common fences only as prescribed
by local ordinances.

Art. 685. La cerca ubicada en el
límite se presume común a menos
que haya prueba en contrario.
Cuando están cercados predios
contiguos, el propietario puede
exigir a los vecinos que aporten a
los gastos de hacer y reparar los
cercos comunes por los que están
separados los respectivos predios.
Cuando no están cercados los
predios contiguos, el propietario
puede exigir a los vecinos que
aporten a los gastos de hacer y
reparar los cercos comunes solo
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conforme a lo dispuesto por las
ordenanzas locales.
Art. 686. A ditch between two
estates is presumed to be common
unless there be proof to the
contrary.
Adjoining owners are
responsible for the maintenance of
a common ditch.

Art. 686. La zanja entre dos
predios se presume común a menos
que haya prueba en contrario.
Los propietarios de predios
contiguos deben hacerse cargo del
mantenimiento de la zanja común.

Art. 687. Trees, bushes, and
plants on the boundary are
presumed to be common unless
there be proof to the contrary.

Art. 687. Los árboles, los
arbustos y las plantas ubicados en
el límite se presumen comunes a
menos que haya prueba en
contrario.
Los propietarios contiguos tiene
el derecho de exigir que se quiten
los árboles, arbustos o plantas del
límite que interfieran en el goce de
su predio, pero deben hacerse
cargo de los gastos de quitarlos.

An adjoining owner has the right
to demand the removal of trees,
bushes, or plants on the boundary
that interfere with the enjoyment of
his estate, but he must bear the
expense of removal.
Art. 688. A landowner has the
right to demand that the branches
or roots of a neighbor's trees,
bushes, or plants, that extend over
or into his property be trimmed at
the expense of the neighbor.
A landowner does not have this
right if the roots or branches do not
interfere with the enjoyment of his
property.

Art. 688. El propietario tiene el
derecho de exigir que las ramas o
raíces de los árboles, arbustos o
plantas de un vecino que se
extiendan sobre su inmueble o
dentro de él sean cortados a costa
del vecino.
El propietario no tiene este
derecho si las raíces o ramas no
interfieren en el goce de su
inmueble.

SECTION 3. RIGHT OF
PASSAGE

SECCIÓN 3. DE LA
SERVIDUMBRE DE PASO

Art. 689. The owner of an estate
that has no access to a public road
or utility may claim a right of
passage over neighboring property

Art. 689. El dueño de un
inmueble que no tiene acceso a una
calle pública o a un servicio
público puede reclamar una
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to the nearest public road or utility.
He is bound to compensate his
neighbor for the right of passage
acquired and to indemnify his
neighbor for the damage he may
occasion.
New or additional maintenance
burdens imposed upon the servient
estate or intervening lands
resulting from the utility servitude
shall be the responsibility of the
owner of the dominant estate.
[Acts 2012, No. 739, §1, eff. Aug.
1, 2012.]
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servidumbre de paso al inmueble
vecino hasta el camino público o el
servicio público más cercanos.
Debe compensar al vecino por la
servidumbre de paso adquirida y
debe mantenerlo indemne ante
cualquier daño que ocasione.
Las cargas de mantenimiento
nuevas o adicionales impuestas
sobre el predio sirviente o sobre
predios intermedios resultantes de
la servidumbre de servicio público
también están a cargo del
propietario del predio dominante.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 739 de 2012,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2012].

Art. 690. The right of passage
for the benefit of an enclosed estate
shall be suitable for the kind of
traffic or utility that is reasonably
necessary for the use of that estate.
[Acts 2012, No. 739, §1, eff. Aug.
1, 2012.]

Art. 690. La servidumbre de
paso en beneficio de un predio
cerrado debe ser adecuada al tipo
de tráfico o servicio público que
sea razonablemente necesario para
el uso de ese predio. Sec. 1, ley n.o
739 de 2012, vigente desde el 1 de
agosto de 2012].

Art. 691. The owner of the
enclosed estate may construct on
the right-of-way the type of road,
utility, or railroad reasonably
necessary for the exercise of the
servitude.

Art. 691. El dueño de un predio
cerrado puede construir sobre la
servidumbre de paso el tipo de
camino, servicio público o red
ferroviaria que sea razonablemente
necesario para el ejercicio de la
servidumbre.
El cruce de servicio público
debe construirse de acuerdo con
todas las normas correspondientes
y aplicables federales y estatales a
fin de mitigar todos los peligros
presentados por el paso y las
condiciones particulares del predio
sirviente y de los predios
intermedios. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 739 de

The utility crossing shall be
constructed in compliance with all
appropriate and applicable federal
and state standards so as to
mitigate all hazards posed by the
passage and the particular
conditions of the servient estate
and intervening lands. [Acts 2012,
No. 739, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012.]
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2012, vigente desde el 1 de agosto
de 2012].
Art. 692. The owner of the
enclosed estate may not demand
the right of passage or the right-ofway for the utility anywhere he
chooses. The passage generally
shall be taken along the shortest
route from the enclosed estate to
the public road or utility at the
location least injurious to the
intervening lands.
The location of the utility rightof-way shall coincide with the
location of the servitude of passage
unless an alternate location
providing access to the nearest
utility is least injurious to the
servient estate and intervening
lands.
The court shall evaluate and
determine that the location of the
servitude of passage or utility shall
not affect the safety of the
operations or significantly interfere
with the operations of the owner of
the servient estate or intervening
lands prior to the granting of the
servitude of passage or utility.
[Acts 2012, No. 739, §1, eff. Aug.
1, 2012.]
Art. 693. If an estate becomes
enclosed as a result of a voluntary
act or omission of its owner, the
neighbors are not bound to furnish
a passage to him or his successors.

Art. 692. El dueño del predio
encerrado no puede exigir la
servidumbre de paso para el
servicio público en cualquier lugar
que desee. El paso generalmente se
tomará en la ruta más corta desde
el predio encerrado hasta el
camino público o el servicio
público en la ubicación que menos
afecte los predios intermedios.
La ubicación de la servidumbre
de paso por el servicio público
coincidirá con la de la servidumbre
de paso, a menos que fuera menos
gravosa para el predio sirviente y
los predios intermedios una
ubicación alternativa que brinde
acceso al servicio público más
cercano.
Antes de que se conceda la
servidumbre, el juez debe evaluar y
determinar que su ubicación no
afecte la seguridad de las
operaciones ni interfiera
significativamente con las
operaciones del dueño del predio
sirviente o los predios intermedios.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 739 de 2012,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2012].
Art. 693. Si el predio queda
encerrado a consecuencia de un
acto u omisión voluntarios del
dueño, los vecinos no están
obligados a concederle el paso ni a
él ni a sus sucesores.
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Art. 694. When in the case of
partition, or a voluntary alienation
of an estate or of a part thereof,
property alienated or partitioned
becomes enclosed, passage shall be
furnished gratuitously by the
owner of the land on which the
passage was previously exercised,
even if it is not the shortest route to
the public road or utility, and even
if the act of alienation or partition
does not mention a servitude of
passage. [Acts 2012; No. 739, §1,
eff. Aug. 1, 2012.]

Art. 694. Cuando en el caso de
una partición o de una enajenación
voluntaria de un inmueble o de una
parte de él, el inmueble enajenado
o dividido queda encerrado, el
paso debe ser concedido de
manera gratuita al dueño del
inmueble sobre el que se ejercía
previamente el paso, aun si no es
la ruta más corta para llegar al
camino público o al servicio
público, e incluso si el acto de
enajenación o partición no
menciona la servidumbre de paso.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 739 de 2012,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2012].

Art. 695. The owner of the
enclosed estate has no right to the
relocation of this servitude after it
is fixed. The owner of the servient
estate has the right to demand
relocation of the servitude to a
more convenient place at his own
expense, provided that it affords
the same facility to the owner of
the enclosed estate.

Art. 695. El dueño del predio
encerrado no tiene derecho a
solicitar la reubicación de la
servidumbre después de fijada. El
dueño del predio sirviente tiene el
derecho de exigir la reubicación de
la servidumbre a un lugar más
cómodo a su propio costo, siempre
y cuando ofrezca la misma
funcionalidad al dueño del predio
encerrado.

Art. 696. The right for indemnity
against the owner of the enclosed
estate may be lost by prescription.
The accrual of this prescription has
no effect on the right of passage.

Art. 696. El derecho de
indemnidad contra el dueño del
predio encerrado puede perderse
por prescripción. Esta prescripción
no afecta a la servidumbre de paso.

Art. 696.1. As used in this
Section, a utility is a service such
as electricity, water, sewer, gas,
telephone, cable television, and
other commonly used power and
communication networks required
for the operation of an ordinary

Art. 696.1. Conforme al uso
dado en esta sección, se entienden
comprendidos dentro de los
servicios públicos aquellos tales
como la electricidad, el agua, el
alcantarillado, el gas, el teléfono,
la televisión por cable y cualquier
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household or business. [Acts 2012;
No. 739, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012.]

otro tipo de red de comunicación o
de energía utilizada habitualmente
y necesaria para el funcionamiento
de un comercio u hogar normal.
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 739 de 2012,
vigente desde el 1 de agosto de
2012].

CHAPTER 4. CONVENTIONAL
OR VOLUNTARY SERVITUDES

CAPÍTULO 4. DE LAS
SERVIDUMBRES
CONVENCIONALES O
VOLUNTARIAS

SECTION 1. KINDS OF
CONVENTIONAL SERVITUDES

SECCIÓN 1. DE LOS TIPOS DE
SERVIDUMBRES
CONVENCIONALES

Art. 697. Predial servitudes may
be established by an owner on his
estate or acquired for its benefit.

Art. 697. El propietario puede
crear servidumbres reales sobre su
predio o adquirirlas para su
beneficio.
Su uso y alcance se rigen por el
título mediante el que se crearon y,
en ausencia de tal título, por las
siguientes disposiciones.

The use and extent of such
servitudes are regulated by the title
by which they are created, and, in
the absence of such regulation, by
the following rules.
Art. 698. Predial servitudes are
established on, or for the benefit
of, distinct corporeal immovables.

Art. 698. Las servidumbres
reales se crean sobre bienes
inmuebles corporales
diferenciados o en su beneficio.

Art. 699. The following are
examples of predial servitudes:
Rights of support, projection,
drip, drain, or of preventing drain,
those of view, of light, or of
preventing view or light from
being obstructed, of raising
buildings or walls, or of preventing
them from being raised, of passage,

Art. 699. Los siguientes son
ejemplos de servidumbres reales:
derechos de apoyo, proyección,
goteo, drenado, de evitar el
drenado, de vista, de luz o de evitar
la obstrucción de la vista o de la
luz, de levantar construcciones o
muros, de evitar que se levanten,
de paso, de extracción de agua, de
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of drawing water, of aqueduct, of
watering animals, and of pasturage.

acueducto, de dar agua para
animales y de pastura.

Art. 700. The servitude of
support is the right by which
buildings or other constructions of
the dominant estate are permitted
to rest on a wall of the servient
estate.

Art. 700. La servidumbre de
apoyo es el derecho por el cual las
edificaciones u otras
construcciones del predio
dominante tienen permitido
apoyarse en un muro del predio
sirviente.
A menos que el título disponga
de otro modo, el dueño de un
predio sirviente está obligado a
mantener el muro en condiciones
para el ejercicio de la
servidumbre, pero se puede liberar
de esta carga abandonando el
muro.

Unless the title provides
otherwise, the owner of the
servient estate is bound to keep the
wall fit for the exercise of the
servitude, but he may be relieved
of this charge by abandoning the
wall.
Art. 701. The servitude of view
is the right by which the owner of
the dominant estate enjoys a view;
this includes the right to prevent
the raising of constructions on the
servient estate that would obstruct
the view.

Art. 701. La servidumbre de
vista es el derecho por el que el
dueño de un predio dominante
disfruta de una vista, lo que incluye
el derecho de impedir que se
levanten construcciones en el
predio sirviente que obstruyan la
vista.

Art. 702. The servitude of
prohibition of view is the right of
the owner of the dominant estate to
prevent or limit openings of view
on the servient estate.

Art. 702. La servidumbre de
prohibición de vista es el derecho
del dueño del predio dominante de
evitar o limitar las aberturas con
vista del predio sirviente.

Art. 703. The servitude of light
is the right by which the owner of
the dominant estate is entitled to
make openings in a common wall
for the admission of light; this
includes the right to prevent the
neighbor from making an
obstruction.

Art. 703. La servidumbre de luz
es el derecho por el que el dueño
del predio dominante puede hacer
aberturas en un muro común para
permitir que pase la luz, lo que
incluye el derecho de impedir que
el vecino obstruya el paso de la
luz.
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Art. 704. The servitude of
prohibition of light is the right of
the owner of the dominant estate to
prevent his neighbor from making
an opening in his own wall for the
admission of light or that limits
him to certain lights only.

Art. 704. La servidumbre de
prohibición de luz es el derecho del
dueño del predio dominante de
impedir que su vecino haga una
abertura en su propio muro para
permitir que pase la luz o para
limitarlo a ciertos tipos de luz
solamente.

Art. 705. The servitude of
passage is the right for the benefit
of the dominant estate whereby
persons, animals, utilities, or
vehicles are permitted to pass
through the servient estate. Unless
the title provides otherwise, the
extent of the right and the mode of
its exercise shall be suitable for the
kind of traffic or utility necessary
for the reasonable use of the
dominant estate. [Acts 2012, No.
739, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012.]

Art. 705. La servidumbre de
paso es el derecho en beneficio del
predio dominante por el que tienen
permitido pasar por un predio
sirviente personas, animales,
servicios públicos o vehículos. A
menos que el título disponga de
otro modo, el alcance del derecho
y el modo de su ejercicio debe ser
adecuado en relación con el tipo
de tráfico o servicio público
necesarios para el uso razonable
del predio dominante. [Sec. 1, ley
n.o 739 de 2012, vigente desde el 1
de agosto de 2012].

Art. 706. Predial servitudes are
either affirmative or negative.
Affirmative servitudes are those
that give the right to the owner of
the dominant estate to do a certain
thing on the servient estate. Such
are the servitudes of right of way,
drain, and support.
Negative servitudes are those
that impose on the owner of the
servient estate the duty to abstain
from doing something on his
estate. Such are the servitudes of
prohibition of building and of the
use of an estate as a commercial or
industrial establishment.

Art. 706. Las servidumbres
reales son afirmativas o negativas.
Las servidumbres afirmativas
son aquellas que dan al dueño del
predio dominante el derecho de
hacer algo en el predio sirviente.
Tales son las servidumbres de
paso, de drenado y de apoyo.
Son servidumbres negativas las
que imponen al dueño del predio
sirviente el deber de abstenerse de
hacer algo en su predio. Tales son
las servidumbres de prohibición de
construcción y del uso del predio
como establecimiento comercial o
industrial.
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Art. 707. Predial servitudes are
either apparent or nonapparent.
Apparent servitudes are those that
are perceivable by exterior signs,
works, or constructions; such as a
roadway, a window in a common
wall, or an aqueduct.
Nonapparent servitudes are
those that have no exterior sign of
their existence; such as the
prohibition of building on an estate
or of building above a particular
height.

209

Art. 707. Las servidumbres
reales son aparentes o no
aparentes. Son servidumbres
aparentes las que se puedan
percibir por los signos, trabajos o
construcciones exteriores, tales
como una calle, una ventana en un
muro común o un acueducto.
Las servidumbres no aparentes
son las que no tienen signos
exteriores de su existencia, tales
como la prohibición de construir
en un predio o de hacerlo más allá
de determinada altura.

SECTION 2. ESTABLISHMENT
OF PREDIAL SERVITUDES BY
TITLE

SECCIÓN 2. DE LA
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LAS
SERVIDUMBRES REALES POR
TÍTULO

Art. 708. The establishment of a
predial servitude by title is an
alienation of a part of the property
to which the laws governing
alienation of immovables apply.

Art. 708. La constitución de una
servidumbre real por título es una
enajenación de una parte del
inmueble a la que se aplican las
reglas de la enajenación de
inmuebles.

Art. 709. A mandatary may
establish a predial servitude if he
has an express and special power
to do so.

Art. 709. El mandatario puede
constituir una servidumbre real si
tiene poder expreso y especial para
hacerlo.

Art. 710. The naked owner may
establish a predial servitude that
does not infringe on the rights of
the usufructuary or that is to take
effect at the termination of the
usufruct.
The consent of the usufructuary
is required for the establishment of
any other predial servitude.

Art. 710. El nudo propietario
puede constituir una servidumbre
real que no afecte los derechos del
usufructuario o que comience a
regir cuando finalice el usufructo.
Se necesita el consentimiento del
usufructuario para constituir
cualquier otra servidumbre real.
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Art. 711. The usufructuary may
not establish on the estate of which
he has the usufruct any charges in
the nature of predial servitudes.

Art. 711. El usufructuario no
puede constituir una servidumbre
real en el predio sobre el que tiene
el usufructo.

Art. 712. A person having
ownership subject to a term or the
happening of a condition may
establish a predial servitude, but it
ceases with his right.

Art. 712. La persona que tenga
la propiedad sujeta a plazo o al
acaecimiento de una condición
puede constituir una servidumbre
real, pero se extingue con su
derecho.

Art. 713. A purchaser under a
reserved right of redemption may
establish a predial servitude on the
property, but it ceases if the seller
exercises his right of redemption.

Art. 713. El adquirente conforme
a un derecho reservado de rescate
puede constituir una servidumbre
real sobre el predio, pero se
extingue si el vendedor ejerce el
derecho de rescate.

Art. 714. A predial servitude on
an estate owned in indivision may
be established only with the
consent of all the co-owners.

Art. 714. Solo se puede
constituir una servidumbre real
sobre un predio de propiedad
indivisa con el consentimiento de
todos los copropietarios.
Cuando un copropietario
pretenda constituir una
servidumbre sobre todo el predio,
el contrato no será nulo, sino que
su ejecución quedará suspendida
hasta que se obtenga el
consentimiento de todos los
copropietarios.

When a co-owner purports to
establish a servitude on the entire
estate, the contract is not null; but,
its execution is suspended until the
consent of all co-owners is
obtained.

Art. 715. A co-owner who has
consented to the establishment of a
predial servitude on the entire
estate owned in indivision may not
prevent its exercise on the ground
that the consent of his co-owner
has not been obtained.

Art. 715. El copropietario que
haya consentido la constitución de
una servidumbre real sobre la
totalidad del predio de propiedad
indivisa no podrá impedir su
ejercicio con el argumento de que
no se ha obtenido el
consentimiento del otro
copropietario.
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If he becomes owner of the
whole estate by any means which
terminates the indivision, the
predial servitude to which he has
consented burdens his property.

Si se convierte en el dueño de
todo el predio de tal modo que cesa
la indivisión, la servidumbre real a
la que haya consentido pesa sobre
su predio.

Art. 716. When a co-owner has
consented to the establishment of a
predial servitude on his undivided
part only, the consent of the other
co-owners is not required, but the
exercise of the servitude is
suspended until his divided part is
determined at the termination of
the state of indivision.

Art. 716. Si un copropietario
consiente la constitución de su
porción indivisa solamente, no se
necesita el consentimiento de los
demás copropietarios, pero el
ejercicio de la servidumbre queda
suspendido hasta que se determine
su porción indivisa a la
finalización del estado de
indivisión.

Art. 717. If the estate owned in
indivision is partitioned in kind,
the servitude established by a coowner on his undivided part
burdens only the part allotted to
him.

Art. 717. Si el predio indiviso se
divide en especie, la servidumbre
constituida por un copropietario
sobre su porción indivisa solo
afecta a la parte atribuida a él.

Art. 718. If the estate is
partitioned by licitation and the coowner who consented to the
establishment of the predial
servitude acquires the ownership of
the whole, the servitude burdens
the entire estate as if the co-owner
had always been sole owner. If the
entire estate is adjudicated to any
other person the right granted by
the co-owner is extinguished.

Art. 718. Si el predio se divide
por licitación y el copropietario
que consintió la constitución de la
servidumbre real adquiere la
propiedad de la totalidad, la
servidumbre gravará todo el
predio como si el copropietario
siempre hubiera sido el único
dueño. Si el predio entero se
asigna a otra persona, se extingue
el derecho otorgado por el
copropietario.

Art. 719. Except as provided in
Article 718, the successor of the
co-owner who has consented to the
establishment of a predial
servitude, whether on the entire
estate owned in indivision or on his

Art. 719. Con excepción de lo
dispuesto en el artículo 718, el
sucesor del copropietario que haya
consentido la constitución de la
servidumbre real, ya sea en la
totalidad del predio indiviso o solo
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undivided part only, occupies the
same position as his ancestor. If he
becomes owner of a divided part of
the estate the servitude burdens
that part, and if he becomes owner
of the whole the servitude burdens
the entire estate.

sobre su porción indivisa, ocupa el
mismo lugar que su antecesor. Si
se convierte en dueño de una parte
divisa del predio, la servidumbre
grava esa parte, y si se convierte
en dueño de la totalidad, la
servidumbre grava la totalidad del
predio.

Art. 720. The owner of the
servient estate may establish
thereon additional servitudes,
provided they do not affect
adversely the rights of the owner of
the dominant estate.

Art. 720. El dueño del predio
sirviente puede constituir sobre el
predio otras servidumbres, siempre
y cuando no perjudiquen los
derechos del dueño del predio
dominante.

Art. 721. A predial servitude
may be established on mortgaged
property. If the servitude
diminishes the value of the estate
to the substantial detriment of the
mortgagee, he may demand
immediate payment of the debt.
If there is a sale for the
enforcement of the mortgage the
property is sold free of all
servitudes established after the
mortgage. In such a case, the
acquirer of the servitude has an
action for the restitution of its
value against the owner who
established it.

Art. 721. Puede constituirse una
servidumbre real sobre un bien
hipotecado. Si la servidumbre
reduce el valor del predio en
desmedro sustancial del acreedor
hipotecario, este puede exigir el
pago inmediato de la deuda.
En caso de una venta para
ejecutar la hipoteca, el bien se
vende sin las servidumbres
constituidas después de la
hipoteca. En tal caso, el adquirente
de la servidumbre puede accionar
por la restitución de su valor
contra el dueño que la haya
constituido.

Art. 722. Predial servitudes are
established by all acts by which
immovables may be transferred.
Delivery of the act of transfer or
use of the right by the owner of the
dominant estate constitutes
tradition.

Art. 722. Las servidumbres
reales pueden ser constituidas
mediante todos los actos por los
que se pueden transferir bienes
inmuebles. El otorgamiento del
acto de transferencia o el ejercicio
del derecho por el dueño del
predio dominante constituye
tradición.
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Art. 723. Predial servitudes may
be established on public things,
including property of the state, its
agencies and political subdivisions.

Art. 723. Se pueden constituir
servidumbres reales sobre cosas
públicas, incluidos bienes del
estado, sus organismos y
subdivisiones políticas.

Art. 724. A predial servitude
may be established on several
estates for the benefit of one estate.
One estate may be subjected to a
servitude for the benefit of several
estates.

Art. 724. La servidumbre real
puede gravar varios predios en
beneficio de uno solo. Un predio
puede estar sujeto a una
servidumbre en beneficio de varios
predios.

Art. 725. The title that
establishes a servitude for the
benefit of the dominant estate may
also establish a servitude on the
dominant estate for the benefit of
the servient estate.

Art. 725. El título por el que se
establece una servidumbre en
beneficio del predio dominante
también puede crear una
servidumbre sobre el predio
dominante en beneficio del predio
sirviente.

Art. 726. Parties may agree to
establish a predial servitude on, or
for the benefit of, an estate of
which one is not then the owner. If
the ownership is acquired, the
servitude is established.

Art. 726. Las partes pueden
acordar constituir una servidumbre
real sobre un predio o en beneficio
de un predio del que una de ellas
no tiene la propiedad. Si se
adquiere la propiedad, se
constituye la servidumbre.
Pueden asimismo estipular que
la edificación aún no construida
estará sujeta a una servidumbre o
que tendrá el beneficio de una
servidumbre cuando se construya.

Parties may agree that a building
not yet built will be subjected to a
servitude or that it will have the
benefit of a servitude when it is
built.
Art. 727. A predial servitude
may be established on a certain
part of an estate, if that part is
sufficiently described.

Art. 727. Se puede constituir una
servidumbre real sobre una parte
determinada de un predio si esa
parte está descrita de manera
suficiente.

Art. 728. The use of a predial
servitude may be limited to certain

Art. 728. El uso de la
servidumbre real puede estar
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times. Thus, the rights of drawing
water and of passage may be
confined to designated hours.

limitado a momentos
determinados. Así, los derechos de
extracción de agua y de paso
pueden restringirse a horarios
específicos.

Art. 729. Legal and natural
servitudes may be altered by
agreement of the parties if the
public interest is not affected
adversely.

Art. 729. Las servidumbres
legales y naturales pueden ser
modificadas por acuerdo entre las
partes si no se perjudica el interés
público.

Art. 730. Doubt as to the
existence, extent, or manner of
exercise of a predial servitude shall
be resolved in favor of the servient
estate.

Art. 730. Las dudas respecto de
la existencia, el alcance o el modo
de ejercicio de una servidumbre
real se resolverán a favor del
predio sirviente.

Art. 731. A charge established
on an estate expressly for the
benefit of another estate is a
predial servitude although it is not
so designated.

Art. 731. La carga establecida
expresamente sobre un predio en
beneficio de otro predio es una
servidumbre real aunque no se la
designe así específicamente.

Art. 732. When the act does not
declare expressly that the right
granted is for the benefit of an
estate or for the benefit of a
particular person, the nature of the
right is determined in accordance
with the following rules.

Art. 732. Si el título no indica
expresamente si el derecho
otorgado es en beneficio de un
predio o de una persona en
particular, la naturaleza del
derecho se determina de
conformidad con las siguientes
reglas.

Art. 733. When the right granted
be of a nature to confer an
advantage on an estate, it is
presumed to be a predial servitude.

Art. 733. Cuando el derecho
otorgado es de naturaleza tal que
brinda una ventaja a un predio, se
presume que se trata de una
servidumbre real.

Art. 734. When the right granted
is merely for the convenience of a
person, it is not considered to be a

Art. 734. Cuando el derecho
otorgado es para el mero
aprovechamiento de una persona,
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no se considera una servidumbre
real, a menos que sea adquirida
por una persona como dueña del
predio para sí, sus sucesores y
cesionarios.
SECCIÓN 3. DE LA
ADQUISICIÓN DE LAS
SERVIDUMBRES
CONVENCIONALES A FAVOR
DEL PREDIO DOMINANTE

Art. 735. A predial servitude
may be acquired for the benefit of
the dominant estate by the owner
of that estate or by any other
person acting in his name or in his
behalf.

Art. 735. Puede adquirir una
servidumbre real en beneficio del
predio dominante el dueño de ese
predio o cualquier otra persona
que actúe en su nombre o
representación.

Art. 736. An incompetent may
acquire a predial servitude for the
benefit of his estate without the
assistance of the administrator of
his patrimony or of his tutor or
curator.

Art. 736. El incapaz puede
adquirir una servidumbre real en
beneficio de su predio sin la
asistencia del administrador de su
patrimonio ni de su tutor o
curador.

Art. 737. The owner of the
dominant estate may renounce the
contract by which a predial
servitude was acquired for the
benefit of his estate, if he finds the
contract onerous, and if the
contract was made without his
authority or while he was
incompetent.

Art. 737. El dueño del predio
dominante puede rescindir el
contrato por el que se adquirió una
servidumbre real en beneficio de su
predio si el contrato le resulta
oneroso y fue celebrado sin su
autorización o mientras era
incapaz.

Art. 738. The grantor may not
revoke the servitude on the ground
that the person who acquired it for
the benefit of the dominant estate
was not the owner, that he was
incompetent, or that he lacked
authority.

Art. 738. Quien constituyó la
servidumbre no puede revocarla
con el argumento de que la
persona que la adquirió en
beneficio del predio dominante no
era el dueño, que era incapaz o
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que carecía de autorización para
actuar.
Art. 739. Nonapparent
servitudes may be acquired by title
only, including a declaration of
destination under Article 741.
[Amended by Acts 1978, No. 479,
§1.]

Art. 739. La servidumbre no
aparente solo puede adquirirse
mediante título, incluida la
declaración de destino conforme al
artículo 741. [Modificado por sec.
1, ley n.o 479 de 1978].

Art. 740. Apparent servitudes
may be acquired by title, by
destination of the owner, or by
acquisitive prescription.

Art. 740. La servidumbre
aparente puede adquirirse por
título, por destino dado por el
dueño o por prescripción
adquisitiva.

Art. 741. Destination of the
owner is a relationship established
between two estates owned by the
same owner that would be a predial
servitude if the estates belonged to
different owners.

Art. 741. La servidumbre por el
destino dado por el dueño es la
relación que se establece entre dos
predios pertenecientes al mismo
dueño que sería una servidumbre
real si los predios pertenecieran a
dueños diferentes.
Si los dos predios dejan de
pertenecer al mismo dueño, a
menos que haya disposición
expresa en contrario, se crea de
pleno derecho una servidumbre
aparente; en cambio, surge una
servidumbre no aparente si el
dueño presentó previamente para
su registro una declaración formal
por la que se estableció el destino
en el registro de transferencias de
la parroquia en que se encuentra
ubicado el inmueble. [Modificado
por sec. 1, ley n.o 479 de 1978].

When the two estates cease to
belong to the same owner, unless
there is express provision to the
contrary, an apparent servitude
comes into existence of right and a
nonapparent servitude comes into
existence if the owner has
previously filed for registry in the
conveyance records of the parish in
which the immovable is located a
formal declaration establishing the
destination. [Amended by Acts
1978, No. 479, §1.]
Art. 742. The laws governing
acquisitive prescription of
immovable property apply to
apparent servitudes. An apparent

Art. 742. El régimen de la
prescripción adquisitiva de
inmuebles también se aplica a las
servidumbres aparentes. La
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servitude may be acquired by
peaceable and uninterrupted
possession of the right for ten years
in good faith and by just title; it
may also be acquired by
uninterrupted possession for thirty
years without title or good faith.

servidumbre aparente puede
adquirirse mediante la posesión
pacífica e ininterrumpida del
derecho por diez años de buena fe
y por justo título; también puede
adquirirse por la posesión
ininterrumpida durante treinta
años sin título ni buena fe.

Art. 743. Rights that are
necessary for the use of a servitude
are acquired at the time the
servitude is established. They are
to be exercised in a way least
inconvenient for the servient estate.

Art. 743. Los derechos
necesarios para el uso de la
servidumbre se adquieren cuando
se constituye la servidumbre.
Deben ejercerse de la manera que
menos estorbe al predio sirviente.

SECTION 4. RIGHTS OF THE
OWNER OF THE DOMINANT
ESTATE

SECCIÓN 4. DE LOS DERECHOS
DEL DUEÑO DEL PREDIO
DOMINANTE

Art. 744. The owner of the
dominant estate has the right to
make at his expense all the works
that are necessary for the use and
preservation of the servitude.

Art. 744. El dueño del predio
dominante tiene el derecho de
hacer a su costo todas las obras
que sean necesarias para usar y
conservar la servidumbre.

Art. 745. The owner of the
dominant estate has the right to
enter with his workmen and
equipment into the part of the
servient estate that is needed for
the construction or repair of works
required for the use and
preservation of the servitude. He
may deposit materials to be used
for the works and the debris that
may result, under the obligation of
causing the least possible damage
and of removing them as soon as
possible.

Art. 745. El dueño del predio
dominante tiene derecho a ingresar
con sus trabajadores y equipos a la
parte del predio sirviente que se
necesite para realizar la
construcción o los trabajos de
reparación necesarios a fin de usar
o conservar la servidumbre. Puede
depositar los materiales necesarios
para los trabajos y los escombros
que se generen, con la obligación
de causar el menor daño posible y
de levantarlos lo más rápido
posible.

Art. 746. If the act establishing
the servitude binds the owner of

Art. 746. Si el acto de creación
de la servidumbre obliga al dueño
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the servient estate to make the
necessary works at his own
expense, he may exonerate himself
by abandoning the servient estate
or the part of it on which the
servitude is granted to the owner of
the dominant estate.

del predio sirviente a hacer las
obras necesarias a su propio costo,
puede liberarse abandonando el
predio sirviente o la parte de este
sobre la cual se otorgue la
servidumbre al dueño del predio
dominante.

Art. 747. If the dominant estate
is divided, the servitude remains
due to each part, provided that no
additional burden is imposed on
the servient estate. Thus, in case of
a right of passage, all the owners
are bound to exercise that right
through the same place.

Art. 747. Si el predio dominante
se divide, la servidumbre continúa
beneficiando a ambas partes,
siempre y cuando no se imponga
una carga adicional sobre el
predio sirviente. Así, en el caso de
una servidumbre de paso, todos los
dueños están obligados a ejercer
ese derecho transitando por el
mismo lugar.

Art. 748. The owner of the
servient estate may do nothing
tending to diminish or make more
inconvenient the use of the
servitude.
If the original location has
become more burdensome for the
owner of the servient estate, or if it
prevents him from making useful
improvements on his estate, he
may provide another equally
convenient location for the
exercise of the servitude which the
owner of the dominant estate is
bound to accept. All expenses of
relocation are borne by the owner
of the servient estate.

Art. 748. El dueño del predio
sirviente debe abstenerse de
realizar actos dirigidos a disminuir
o dificultar el uso de la
servidumbre.
Si la ubicación original se volvió
más gravosa para el dueño del
predio sirviente o si no le permite
hacer mejoras útiles en su predio,
puede ofrecer otra ubicación igual
de apropiada para el ejercicio de
la servidumbre, que el dueño del
predio dominante debe aceptar.
Todos los gastos de la reubicación
deben ser cubiertos por el dueño
del predio sirviente.

Art. 749. If the title is silent as to
the extent and manner of use of the
servitude, the intention of the
parties is to be determined in the
light of its purpose.

Art. 749. Si el título no indica
nada respecto de la extensión y el
modo de uso de la servidumbre, la
intención de las partes se
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determinará de acuerdo con el
propósito de aquella.
Art. 750. If the title does not
specify the location of the
servitude, the owner of the servient
estate shall designate the location.

Art. 750. Si el título no
especifica la ubicación de la
servidumbre, la determinará el
dueño del predio sirviente.

SECTION 5. EXTINCTION OF
PREDIAL SERVITUDES

SECCIÓN 5. DE LA EXTINCIÓN
DE LAS SERVIDUMBRES
REALES

Art. 751. A predial servitude is
extinguished by the permanent and
total destruction of the dominant
estate or of the part of the servient
estate burdened with the servitude.

Art. 751. La servidumbre real se
extingue por la destrucción
permanente y total del predio
dominante o de la parte del predio
sirviente gravada con la
servidumbre.

Art. 752. If the exercise of the
servitude becomes impossible
because the things necessary for its
exercise have undergone such a
change that the servitude can no
longer be used, the servitude is not
extinguished; it resumes its effect
when things are reestablished so
that they may again be used, unless
prescription has accrued.

Art. 752. Si el ejercicio de la
servidumbre deviene imposible
porque las cosas necesarias para
su ejercicio han cambiado de tal
manera que la servidumbre ya no
puede usarse, esta no se extingue,
sino que retoma sus efectos al
restablecerse las cosas de modo tal
que puedan volver a usarse, a
menos que haya operado la
prescripción.

Art. 753. A predial servitude is
extinguished by nonuse for ten
years.

Art. 753. La servidumbre real se
extingue por falta de uso a los diez
años.

Art. 754. Prescription of nonuse
begins to run for affirmative
servitudes from the date of their
last use, and for negative
servitudes from the date of the
occurrence of an event contrary to
the servitude.

Art. 754. La prescripción por
falta de uso comienza a
computarse respecto de la
servidumbre afirmativa a partir de
la fecha de su último uso, y
respecto de la servidumbre
negativa, desde la fecha del
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An event contrary to the
servitude is such as the destruction
of works necessary for its exercise
or the construction of works that
prevent its exercise.

acaecimiento de un hecho
contrario a la servidumbre.
Son hechos contrarios a la
servidumbre, por ejemplo, la
destrucción de las obras
necesarias para su ejercicio o la
construcción de obras que impidan
su ejercicio.

Art. 755. If the owner of the
dominant estate is prevented from
using the servitude by an obstacle
that he can neither prevent nor
remove, the prescription of nonuse
is suspended on that account for a
period of up to ten years.

Art. 755. Si el dueño del predio
dominante se ve impedido de usar
la servidumbre por un obstáculo
que no puede evitar ni quitar, se
suspende la prescripción por falta
de uso por esa razón por un
período de hasta diez años.

Art. 756. If the servitude cannot
be exercised on account of the
destruction of a building or other
construction that belongs to the
owner of the dominant estate,
prescription is not suspended. If
the building or other construction
belongs to the owner of the
servient estate, the preceding
article applies.

Art. 756. No se suspende la
prescripción si no se puede utilizar
una servidumbre en razón de la
destrucción de una edificación u
otro tipo de construcción
perteneciente al dueño del predio
dominante. Si la edificación u otro
tipo de construcción es propiedad
del dueño del predio sirviente, se
aplica el artículo anterior.

Art. 757. A predial servitude is
preserved by the use made of it by
anyone, even a stranger, if it is
used as appertaining to the
dominant estate.

Art. 757. La servidumbre real se
conserva por el uso que de ella
haga cualquiera, incluso un
desconocido, si ese uso se
relaciona con el predio dominante.

Art. 758. The prescription of
nonuse does not run against natural
servitudes.

Art. 758. La prescripción por
falta de uso no opera respecto de
las servidumbres naturales.

Art. 759. A partial use of the
servitude constitutes use of the
whole.

Art. 759. El uso parcial de la
servidumbre constituye uso de la
totalidad.
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Art. 760. A more extensive use
of the servitude than that granted
by the title does not result in the
acquisition of additional rights for
the dominant estate unless it be by
acquisitive prescription.

Art. 760. El uso de la
servidumbre de un modo más
amplio que el otorgado por el
título no implica la adquisición de
derechos adicionales a favor del
predio dominante a menos que sea
por prescripción adquisitiva.

Art. 761. The use of a right that
is only accessory to the servitude is
not use of the servitude.

Art. 761. El uso de un derecho
que es solo accesorio a la
servidumbre no es uso de la
servidumbre.

Art. 762. If the dominant estate
is owned in indivision, the use that
a co-owner makes of the servitude
prevents the running of
prescription as to all.

Art. 762. Si la propiedad sobre
el predio dominante es indivisa, el
uso que un copropietario haga de
la servidumbre evitará que
transcurra la prescripción respecto
de los demás.
Si se divide el predio dominante,
el uso de la servidumbre por cada
propietario conserva la
servidumbre solo respecto del
inmueble de cada uno.

If the dominant estate is
partitioned, the use of the servitude
by each owner preserves it for his
estate only.
Art. 763. The prescription of
nonuse is not suspended by the
minority or other disability of the
owner of the dominant estate.

Art. 763. La prescripción por
falta de uso no se suspende por la
minoría de edad u otro tipo de
incapacidad del dueño del predio
dominante.

Art. 764. When the prescription
of nonuse is pleaded, the owner of
the dominant estate has the burden
of proving that he or some other
person has made use of the
servitude as appertaining to his
estate during the period of time
required for the accrual of the
prescription.

Art. 764. Cuando se alega la
prescripción por falta de uso, el
dueño del predio dominante tiene
la carga de probar que él u otra
persona usó la servidumbre como
propia de su inmueble durante el
período necesario para el cómputo
de la prescripción.

Art. 765. A predial servitude is
extinguished when the dominant

Art. 765. La servidumbre real se
extingue cuando los predios
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and the servient estates are
acquired in their entirety by the
same person.

dominante y sirviente son
adquiridos en su totalidad por la
misma persona.

Art. 766. When the union of the
two estates is made under
resolutory condition, or if it cease
by legal eviction, the servitude is
suspended and not extinguished.

Art. 766. Si la unión de los dos
inmuebles se hace conforme a una
condición resolutoria, o si cesa por
evicción legal, la servidumbre no
se extingue, sino que se suspende.

Art. 767. Until a successor has
formally or informally accepted a
succession, confusion does not take
place. If the successor renounces
the succession, the servitudes
continue to exist. [Acts 2001, No.
572, §1.]

Art. 767. No se produce la
confusión hasta que el sucesor
acepta formal o informalmente una
sucesión. Si el sucesor renuncia a
la sucesión, siguen existiendo las
servidumbres. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 572
de 2001].

Art. 768. Confusion does not
take place between separate
property and community property
of the spouses. Thus, if the servient
estate belongs to one of the
spouses and the dominant estate is
acquired as a community asset, the
servitude continues to exist.

Art. 768. No se produce
confusión entre los bienes propios
y los bienes gananciales de los
cónyuges. Así, si el predio sirviente
pertenece a uno de los cónyuges y
se adquiere el predio dominante
como bien ganancial, sigue
existiendo la servidumbre.

Art. 769. A servitude that has
been extinguished by confusion
may be reestablished only in the
manner by which a servitude may
be created.

Art. 769. Puede restablecerse la
servidumbre extinguida por
confusión solo del modo en que se
puede constituir una servidumbre.

Art. 770. A predial servitude is
extinguished by the abandonment
of the servient estate, or of the part
on which the servitude is
exercised. It must be evidenced by
a written act. The owner of the
dominant estate is bound to accept
it and confusion takes place.

Art. 770. La servidumbre real se
extingue por el abandono del
predio sirviente o de la parte sobre
la que se ejerce la servidumbre.
Debe constar en acto por escrito.
El dueño del predio dominante está
obligado a aceptarla, y se produce
la confusión.
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Art. 771. A predial servitude is
extinguished by an express and
written renunciation by the owner
of the dominant estate.

Art. 771. La servidumbre real se
extingue por renuncia expresa y
escrita por parte del dueño del
predio dominante.

Art. 772. A renunciation of a
servitude by a co-owner of the
dominant estate does not discharge
the servient estate, but deprives
him of the right to use the
servitude.

Art. 772. La renuncia de la
servidumbre por parte de un
copropietario del predio dominante
no libera al predio sirviente, sino
que priva a ese copropietario del
derecho de usar la servidumbre.

Art. 773. A predial servitude
established for a term or under a
resolutory condition is
extinguished upon the expiration of
the term or the happening of the
condition.

Art. 773. La servidumbre real
sujeta a plazo o a condición
resolutoria finaliza con la
extinción del plazo o el
acaecimiento de la condición.

Art. 774. A predial servitude is
extinguished by the dissolution of
the right of the person who
established it.

Art. 774. La servidumbre real se
extingue por la disolución del
derecho de la persona que la
constituyó.

TITLE V. BUILDING
RESTRICTIONS
[Acts 1977, No. 170, §1.]

TÍTULO V. DE LAS
RESTRICCIONES
CONSTRUCTIVAS
[Sec. 1, ley n.o 170 de 1977].

Art. 775. Building restrictions
are charges imposed by the owner
of an immovable in pursuance of a
general plan governing building
standards, specified uses, and
improvements. The plan must be
feasible and capable of being
preserved.

Art. 775. Las restricciones de
construcción son cargas impuestas
por el dueño de un inmueble a fin
de implementar un plan general
que rija las normas constructivas,
los usos especificados y las
mejoras. El plan debe ser factible y
tener posibilidades de sostenerse
en el tiempo.

Art. 776. Building restrictions
may be established only by
juridical act executed by the owner
of an immovable or by all the

Art. 776. Las restricciones
constructivas pueden establecerse
solo por acto jurídico celebrado
por el dueño del inmueble o por
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owners of the affected
immovables. Once established,
building restrictions may be
amended or terminated as provided
in this Title. [Acts 1999, No. 309,
§1, eff. June 16, 1999.]

todos los dueños de los inmuebles
afectados. Una vez constituidas,
pueden modificarse o extinguirse
conforme a lo dispuesto en este
Título. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 309 de 1999,
vigente desde el 16 de junio de
1999].

Art. 777. Building restrictions
are incorporeal immovables and
real rights likened to predial
servitudes.

Art. 777. Las restricciones
constructivas son bienes inmuebles
incorporales y derechos reales
equivalentes a las servidumbres
reales.
Se rigen por la aplicación de las
normas de las servidumbres reales
en tanto su aplicación sea
compatible con la naturaleza de las
restricciones constructivas.

They are regulated by
application of the rules governing
predial servitudes to the extent that
their application is compatible with
the nature of building restrictions.
Art. 778. Building restrictions
may impose on owners of
immovables affirmative duties that
are reasonable and necessary for
the maintenance of the general
plan. Building restrictions may not
impose upon the owner of an
immovable or his successors the
obligation to pay a fee or other
charge on the occasion of an
alienation, lease or encumbrance of
the immovable. [Acts 2010, No.
938, §2, eff. July 2, 2010.]

Art. 778. Las restricciones
constructivas pueden imponer a los
dueños de inmuebles las
obligaciones de hacer que sean
razonables y necesarias para el
mantenimiento del plan general.
Las restricciones constructivas no
pueden imponer al dueño del
inmueble o a sus sucesores la
obligación de pagar cargo alguno
en ocasión de la enajenación, el
arrendamiento o el gravamen del
inmueble. [Sec. 2, ley n.o 938 de
2010, vigente desde el 2 de julio de
2010].

Art. 779. Building restrictions
may be enforced by mandatory and
prohibitory injunctions without
regard to the limitations of Article
3601 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

Art. 779. Las restricciones
constructivas se pueden hacer
valer mediante medidas judiciales
de carácter coercitivo o prohibitivo
con prescindencia de las
restricciones del artículo 3601 del
Código Procesal Civil.
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Art. 780. Building restrictions
may be amended, whether such
amendment lessens or increases a
restriction, or may terminate or be
terminated, as provided in the act
that establishes them. In the
absence of such provision, building
restrictions may be amended or
terminated for the whole or a part
of the restricted area by agreement
of owners representing more than
one-half of the land area affected
by the restrictions, excluding
streets and street rights-of-way, if
the restrictions have been in effect
for at least fifteen years, or by
agreement of both owners
representing two-thirds of the land
area affected and two-thirds of the
owners of the land affected by the
restrictions, excluding streets and
street rights-of-way, if the
restrictions have been in effect for
more than ten years. [Amended by
Acts 1980, No. 310, §1. Acts 1983,
No. 129, §1; Acts 1999, No. 309,
§1, eff. June 16, 1999.]

Art. 780. Según lo dispuesto en
el acto por el que se las haya
creado, las restricciones
constructivas pueden modificarse,
ya sea que la modificación reduzca
o intensifique la restricción, y
pueden extinguirse o rescindirse. A
falta de tal disposición, se pueden
modificar o extinguir las
restricciones constructivas
respecto de la totalidad o una
parte del área restringida por
acuerdo de los dueños que
representen más de la mitad del
área afectada por las restricciones,
excluidas las calles y las
servidumbres de paso sobre calles,
si las restricciones estuvieron
vigentes al menos por quince años,
o por acuerdo de ambos dueños
que representen dos tercios del
área afectada y dos tercios de los
dueños del predio afectado por las
restricciones, excluidas las calles y
las servidumbres de paso sobre las
calles, si las restricciones
estuvieron vigentes por más de diez
años. [Modificado por sec. 1, ley
n.o 310 de 1980. Sec. 1, ley n.o 129
de 1983, sec. 1, ley n.o 309 de
1999, vigente desde el 16 de junio
de 1999].

Art. 781. No action for
injunction or for damages on
account of the violation of a
building restriction may be brought
after two years from the
commencement of a noticeable
violation. After the lapse of this
period, the immovable on which
the violation occurred is freed of

Art. 781. No se puede iniciar
una acción tendiente a obtener una
medida judicial ni a obtener una
indemnización a consecuencia del
incumplimiento de una restricción
constructiva después de dos años
desde el inicio de un
incumplimiento notorio.
Transcurrido este plazo, el
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the restriction that has been
violated.

inmueble sobre el que se produjo el
incumplimiento queda liberado de
la restricción incumplida.

Art. 782. Building restrictions
terminate by abandonment of the
whole plan or by a general
abandonment of a particular
restriction. When the entire plan is
abandoned, the affected area is
freed of all restrictions; when a
particular restriction is abandoned,
the affected area is freed of that
restriction only.

Art. 782. Las restricciones
constructivas se extinguen por el
abandono de la totalidad del plan
o por el abandono general de una
restricción en particular. Si se
abandona la totalidad del plan, el
área afectada queda liberada de
todas las restricciones; si se
abandona una restricción en
particular, el área afectada queda
liberada solo de esa restricción.

Art. 783. Doubt as to the
existence, validity, or extent of
building restrictions is resolved in
favor of the unrestricted use of the
immovable. The provisions of the
Louisiana Condominium Act, the
Louisiana Timesharing Act, and
the Louisiana Homeowners
Association Act shall supersede
any and all provisions of this Title
in the event of a conflict. [Acts
1999, No. 309, §1, eff. June 16,
1999.]

Art. 783. La duda respecto de la
existencia, validez o alcance de las
restricciones constructivas se
resuelve a favor del uso irrestricto
del inmueble. En caso de conflicto,
las disposiciones de la Ley de
Propiedad Horizontal de Luisiana,
la Ley de Tiempo Compartido de
Luisiana y la Ley de Consorcio de
Propietarios de Luisiana
reemplazarán todas las de este
Título. [Sec. 1, ley n.o 309 de 1999,
vigente desde el 16 de junio de
1999].

TITLE VI. BOUNDARIES

TÍTULO VI. DE LAS LÍNEAS
DIVISORIAS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CAPÍTULO 1. PRINCIPIOS
GENERALES

[Acts 1977, No. 169, §1.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 169 de 1977].

Art. 784. A boundary is the line
of separation between contiguous
lands. A boundary marker is a

Art. 784. Se considera línea
divisoria la que separa dos predios
contiguos. El marcador de línea
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natural or artificial object that
marks on the ground the line of
separation of contiguous lands.

divisoria es un objeto natural o
artificial que indica en el suelo la
línea divisoria de dos predios
contiguos.

Art. 785. The fixing of the
boundary may involve
determination of the line of
separation between contiguous
lands, if it is uncertain or disputed;
it may also involve the placement
of markers on the ground, if
markers were never placed, were
wrongly placed, or are no longer to
be seen.
The boundary is fixed in
accordance with the following
rules.

Art. 785. La fijación de la línea
divisoria puede implicar la
determinación de la separación
entre dos predios contiguos, si es
incierta o está controvertida;
también puede implicar la
colocación de marcadores en el
suelo, si no se colocaron antes, si
se colocaron en un lugar
incorrecto o si ya no se ven.
La línea divisoria se fija
conforme a las siguientes
disposiciones.

Art. 786. The boundary may be
fixed upon the demand of an owner
or of one who possesses as owner.
It may also be fixed upon the
demand of a usufructuary but it is
not binding upon the naked owner
unless he has been made a party to
the proceeding.

Art. 786. La línea divisoria se
puede fijar a pedido del dueño o de
quien posee como dueño. También
se puede fijar a pedido del
usufructuario, pero no es
vinculante para el nudo
propietario a menos que haya sido
parte del proceso.

Art. 787. When necessary to
protect his interest, a lessee may
compel the lessor to fix the
boundary of the land subject to the
lease.

Art. 787. Cuando sea necesario
para proteger su derecho, el
locatario puede exigir al locador
que fije la línea divisoria del
predio arrendado.

Art. 788. The right to compel the
fixing of the boundary between
contiguous lands is imprescriptible.

Art. 788. Es imprescriptible el
derecho de exigir que se fije línea
divisoria entre predios contiguos.

Art. 789. The boundary may be
fixed judicially or extrajudicially.
It is fixed extrajudicially when the
parties, by written agreement,
determine the line of separation

Art. 789. La línea divisoria
puede fijarse judicialmente o
extrajudicialmente. Se fija
extrajudicialmente cuando las
partes determinan, por acuerdo
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between their lands with or without
reference to markers on the
ground.

escrito, la línea divisoria entre sus
predios con o sin referencia a los
marcadores en el suelo.

Art. 790. When the boundary is
fixed extrajudicially costs are
divided equally between the
adjoining owners in the absence of
contrary agreement. When the
boundary is fixed judicially court
costs are taxed in accordance with
the rules of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Expenses of litigation
not taxed as court costs are borne
by the person who has incurred
them.

Art. 790. Cuando la línea
divisoria se fija extrajudicialmente,
los costos se dividen de manera
equitativa entre los dueños
contiguos salvo acuerdo en
contrario. Cuando la línea
divisoria se fija judicialmente, se
regulan las costas conforme a las
disposiciones del Código Procesal
Civil. Los gastos de litigación que
no se fijen como costas judiciales
están a cargo de la persona que los
contrajo.

Art. 791. When the boundary
has been marked judicially or
extrajudicially, one who removes
boundary markers without court
authority is liable for damages. He
may also be compelled to restore
the markers to their previous
location.

Art. 791. Cuando la línea
divisoria fue marcada judicial o
extrajudicialmente, quien quite los
marcadores de línea divisoria sin
autorización judicial responderá
por daños y perjuicios. También se
le puede exigir que coloque los
marcadores nuevamente en su
posición anterior.

CHAPTER 2. EFFECT OF
TITLES, PRESCRIPTION, OR
POSSESSION

CAPÍTULO 2. DEL EFECTO DE
LOS TÍTULOS, LA
PRESCRIPCIÓN O LA POSESIÓN

Art. 792. The court shall fix the
boundary according to the
ownership of the parties; if neither
party proves ownership, the
boundary shall be fixed according
to limits established by possession.

Art. 792. El juez fija la línea
divisoria según el derecho de
propiedad de las partes; si ninguna
de ellas demuestra su derecho de
propiedad, se fija de acuerdo con
los límites establecidos por la
posesión.

Art. 793. When both parties rely on
titles only, the boundary shall be

Art. 793. Si el derecho de ambas
partes se funda solo en los títulos,
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fixed according to titles. When the
parties trace their titles to a
common author preference shall be
given to the more ancient title.

la línea divisoria se determina
según los títulos. Si los títulos de
las partes se remontan a un autor
común, se da preeminencia al
título más antiguo.

Art. 794. When a party proves
acquisitive prescription, the
boundary shall be fixed according
to limits established by
prescription rather than titles. If a
party and his ancestors in title
possessed for thirty years without
interruption, within visible bounds,
more land than their title called for,
the boundary shall be fixed along
these bounds.

Art. 794. Si una parte prueba la
prescripción adquisitiva, la línea
divisoria se fija conforme a los
límites establecidos por la
prescripción, en vez de por los
títulos. Si una parte y sus
antecesores en el título poseyeron
por más de treinta años sin
interrupción, dentro de límites
visibles, más terreno del que indica
el título, la línea divisoria se fija en
esos límites.

Art. 795. When the boundary is
fixed extrajudicially, the agreement
of the parties has the effect of a
compromise.

Art. 795. Si la línea divisoria se
fija extrajudicialmente, el acuerdo
de las partes surte efectos como
transacción.

Art. 796. When visible markers
have been erroneously placed by
one of the contiguous owners
alone, or not in accordance with a
written agreement fixing the
boundary, the error may be
rectified by the court unless a
contiguous owner has acquired
ownership up to the visible bounds
by thirty years possession.

Art. 796. Cuando solo uno de los
dueños contiguos colocó
marcadores visibles erróneamente
o de manera que no coincide con
un convenio escrito de fijación de
los límites, el juez puede rectificar
el error a menos que el dueño
contiguo haya adquirido la
propiedad hasta los límites visibles
mediante posesión por treinta
años.
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TITLE VII. OWNERSHIP IN
INDIVISION

TÍTULO VII. DE LA PROPIEDAD
EN INDIVISIÓN

[Acts 1990, No. 990, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1991.]

[Sec. 1, ley n.o 990 de 1990,
vigente desde el 1 de enero de
1991].

Art. 797. Ownership of the same
thing by two or more persons is
ownership in indivision. In the
absence of other provisions of law
or juridical act, the shares of all coowners are presumed to be equal.

Art. 797. La propiedad en
indivisión es la propiedad de la
misma cosa por parte de dos o más
personas. A falta de otras
disposiciones legales o
convencionales, se presumen
iguales las partes de todos los
copropietarios.

Art. 798. Co-owners share the
fruits and products of the thing
held in indivision in proportion to
their ownership.

Art. 798. Los copropietarios
comparten los frutos y los
productos de la cosa objeto de la
propiedad indivisa en proporción a
su titularidad.
Cuando los frutos o productos
son producidos por un
copropietario, los demás tienen
derecho a sus partes después de
deducidos los costos de
producción.

When fruits or products are
produced by a co-owner, other coowners are entitled to their shares
of the fruits or products after
deduction of the costs of
production.
Art. 799. A co-owner is liable to
his co-owner for any damage to the
thing held in indivision caused by
his fault.

Art. 799. El copropietario
responde ante los demás por todo
daño sobre la cosa objeto de la
propiedad en indivisión causado
por su culpa.

Art. 800. A co-owner may
without the concurrence of any
other co-owner take necessary
steps for the preservation of the
thing that is held in indivision.

Art. 800. Un copropietario
puede, sin el asentimiento de los
demás, tomar las medidas
necesarias para la preservación de
la cosa en indivisión.

Art. 801. The use and
management of the thing held in

Art. 801. El uso y la
administración de la cosa en
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indivision is determined by
agreement of all the co-owners.

indivisión se determinan por
acuerdo entre todos los
copropietarios.

Art. 802. Except as otherwise
provided in Article 801, a coowner is entitled to use the thing
held in indivision according to its
destination, but he cannot prevent
another co-owner from making
such use of it. As against third
persons, a co-owner has the right to
use and enjoy the thing as if he
were the sole owner.

Art. 802. Con la salvedad de lo
dispuesto en el artículo 801, el
copropietario tiene derecho a usar
la cosa en indivisión según su
destino, pero no puede impedir que
otro copropietario la use de tal
modo. Frente a terceros, el
copropietario tiene el derecho de
usar y disfrutar de la cosa como si
fuera el único dueño.

Art. 803. When the mode of use
and management of the thing held
in indivision is not determined by
an agreement of all the co-owners
and partition is not available, a
court, upon petition by a co-owner,
may determine the use and
management.

Art. 803. Si el modo de uso y
administración de la cosa en
indivisión no se determina por
acuerdo entre todos los
copropietarios y no se puede
dividir, el juez, a pedido de uno de
ellos, puede determinar el uso y
administración.

Art. 804. Substantial alterations
or substantial improvements to the
thing held in indivision may be
undertaken only with the consent
of all the co-owners.
When a co-owner makes
substantial alterations or
substantial improvements
consistent with the use of the
property, though without the
express or implied consent of his
co-owners, the rights of the parties
shall be determined by Article 496.
When a co-owner makes
substantial alterations or
substantial improvements
inconsistent with the use of the
property or in spite of the
objections of his co-owners, the

Art. 804. Las modificaciones o
mejoras sustanciales a la cosa en
indivisión solo pueden realizarse
con el consentimiento de todos los
copropietarios.
Si un copropietario hace
alteraciones o mejoras sustanciales
acordes al uso del bien, aunque sea
sin el consentimiento expreso o
implícito de los demás
copropietarios, los derechos de las
partes se determinan conforme al
artículo 496. Si un copropietario
hace alteraciones o mejoras
sustanciales incompatibles con el
uso del bien o a pesar de las
objeciones de los demás
copropietarios, los derechos de las
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rights of the parties shall be
determined by Article 497.

partes se determinan conforme al
artículo 497.

Art. 805. A co-owner may freely
lease, alienate, or encumber his
share of the thing held in
indivision.
The consent of all the co-owners
is required for the lease, alienation,
or encumbrance of the entire thing
held in indivision.

Art. 805. Un copropietario
puede arrendar, enajenar o gravar
libremente su parte de la cosa en
indivisión.
Se necesita el consentimiento de
todos los copropietarios para
arrendar, enajenar o gravar la
totalidad de la cosa en indivisión.

Art. 806. A co-owner who on
account of the thing held in
indivision has incurred necessary
expenses, expenses for ordinary
maintenance and repairs, or
necessary management expenses
paid to a third person, is entitled to
reimbursement from the other coowners in proportion to their
shares.

Art. 806. El copropietario que,
en relación con la cosa en
indivisión, haya incurrido en
gastos necesarios, gastos para la
conservación y reparaciones
habituales o gastos de
administración necesarios pagados
a un tercero tiene derecho al
reintegro de los demás
copropietarios en proporción a sus
partes.
Si el copropietario que incurrió
en gastos tiene el goce de la cosa
en indivisión, su reintegro se
reduce en proporción al valor de
tal goce.

If the co-owner who incurred the
expenses had the enjoyment of the
thing held in indivision, his
reimbursement shall be reduced in
proportion to the value of the
enjoyment.
Art. 807. No one may be
compelled to hold a thing in
indivision with another unless the
contrary has been provided by law
or juridical act.
Any co-owner has a right to
demand partition of a thing held in
indivision. Partition may be
excluded by agreement for up to
fifteen years, or for such other
period as provided in R.S. 9:1702
or other specific law.

Art. 807. Nadie puede ser
obligado a mantener una cosa en
indivisión con otro a menos que la
ley o un contrato disponga lo
contrario.
Todos los copropietarios tienen
derecho a exigir la división de la
cosa en indivisión. La división
puede ser imposible por acuerdo
de hasta quince años o por otro
período según lo previsto en R.S.
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9:1702 o cualquier otra ley
especial.
Art. 808. Partition of a thing
held in indivision is excluded when
its use is indispensable for the
enjoyment of another thing owned
by one or more of the co-owners.

Art. 808. La división de la cosa
en indivisión no es posible cuando
su uso es indispensable para el
goce de otra cosa propiedad de
uno o más copropietarios.

Art. 809. The mode of partition
may be determined by agreement
of all the co-owners. In the absence
of such an agreement, a co-owner
may demand judicial partition.

Art. 809. El modo de división se
puede determinar por acuerdo de
todos los copropietarios. A falta de
tal acuerdo, un copropietario
puede exigir la división judicial.

Art. 810. The court shall decree
partition in kind when the thing
held in indivision is susceptible to
division into as many lots of nearly
equal value as there are shares and
the aggregate value of all lots is not
significantly lower than the value
of the property in the state of
indivision.

Art. 810. El juez debe ordenar la
división en especie cuando la cosa
en indivisión pueda dividirse en
tantos lotes de valor
aproximadamente equivalente
como partes haya y el valor total
de todos los lotes no sea
sustancialmente inferior al del bien
en indivisión.

Art. 811. When the thing held in
indivision is not susceptible to
partition in kind, the court shall
decree a partition by licitation or
by private sale and the proceeds
shall be distributed to the coowners in proportion to their
shares.

Art. 811. Cuando la cosa en
indivisión no es susceptible de
división en especie, el juez debe
ordenar la división por licitación o
por venta privada, y los fondos se
deben distribuir entre los
copropietarios en proporción a sus
partes.

Art. 812. When a thing held in
indivision is partitioned in kind or
by licitation, a real right burdening
the thing is not affected.

Art. 812. Cuando una cosa en
indivisión se divide en especie o
por licitación, no se afecta el
derecho real que grava la cosa.

Art. 813. When a thing is
partitioned in kind, a real right that
burdens the share of a co-owner

Art. 813. Cuando una cosa se
divide en especie, el derecho real
que grava la parte de un
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attaches to the part of the thing
allotted to him.

copropietario sigue a la parte
asignada a él.

Art. 814. An extrajudicial
partition may be rescinded on
account of lesion if the value of the
part received by a co-owner is less
by more than one-fourth of the fair
market value of the portion he
should have received.

Art. 814. La división
extrajudicial puede anularse por
lesión si el valor de la parte
recibida por el copropietario es
menor por más de un cuarto del
valor de mercado de la parte que
debería haber recibido.

Art. 815. When a thing is
partitioned by licitation, a
mortgage, lien, or privilege that
burdens the share of a co-owner
attaches to his share of the
proceeds of the sale.

Art. 815. Cuando una cosa se
divide por licitación, la hipoteca, el
gravamen o privilegio que afecta la
parte de un copropietario sigue a
su parte de los fondos obtenidos de
la venta.

Art. 816. When a thing is
partitioned in kind, each co-owner
incurs the warranty of a vendor
toward his co-owners to the extent
of his share.

Art. 816. Cuando una cosa se
divide en especie, cada
copropietario asume la garantía de
vendedor frente a sus
copropietarios en la medida de su
parte.

Art. 817. The action for partition
is imprescriptible.

Art. 817. Es imprescriptible la
acción de división.

Art. 818. The provisions
governing co-ownership apply to
other rights held in indivision to
the extent compatible with the
nature of those rights.

Art. 818. Las disposiciones
relativas a la propiedad en
indivisión rigen para otros
derechos que se tengan de forma
indivisa en tanto sean compatibles
con la naturaleza de tales
derechos.

Arts. 819-822. [Repealed. Acts
1977, No. 514, §1.]

Arts. 819-822. [Derogados. Sec.
1, ley n.o 514 de 1977].

Arts. 823-855. [Repealed. Acts
1977, No. 170, §1.]

Arts. 823-855. [Derogados. Sec.
1, ley n.o 170 de 1977].
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Arts. 856-869. [Derogados. Sec.
1, ley n.o 169 de 1977].

INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF NORTH KOREA
Joseph Cho*
Often labeled a “hermit kingdom,”1 many wonder if law and order exists and is in effect in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (“DPRK” or more commonly known as “North Korea”). In
reality, the DPRK is subject to a codified system of law.2 The Civil
Code forms part of such legal system. More specifically, the Civil
Code serves as an integrated body of rules governing private law in
the DPRK.
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA CIVIL CODE
The law of DPRK has evolved over the years in synchronization
with ongoing transformations and developments of the country’s socioeconomic system. On the nature of law, Kim Il-sung, the founder
of the DPRK, once posited, “[t]he law is not something immutable.
Rather it evolves to reflect changes in the underlying socioeconomic
system and also in the state of class conflicts.”3 Following the end
of Japanese colonial rule over Korea in 1945, under the leadership
of Kim, the North Korea regime attempted to purge Japanese colonial practices, while abrogating the vestiges of Japan’s colonial legal
* Doctoral candidate in Civil Law, Seoul National University School of
Law. The author is a corporate lawyer with substantial experience in various industries including the aerospace and defense industry and shipping and logistics.
This manuscript is in loving memory of the author’s late father who enjoyed stimulating conversations on a wide variety of topics including the law.
1. See generally Jihyun Kim, Understanding the Hermit Kingdom as It Is
and as It Is Becoming: The Past, Present and Future of North Korea, 1 J. OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 46 (2016).
2. For an online compilation of North Korean codified enactments in English, see North Korean Law in Translation, Columbia Law School Center for Korean Legal Studies. https://perma.cc/Q4QF-XYCC (Last visited July 15, 2022).
3. See Republic of Korea Ministry of Justice, Bughanminbeob Juseog
(북한민법 주석) [Annotated North Korean Civil Code] 12 (2015) (hereinafter
“Annotation”).
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system.4 Meanwhile, the DPRK leadership embarked on various
legislative initiatives to pursue the People’s Democracy Revolution
(인민민주주의혁명, “PDR”).5
During the PDR phase, for instance, the DPRK enacted the Law
on Land Reformations (토지개혁에 대한 법령) on March 5, 1946
based on a decision of the North Korean Interim People’s Committee (북조선임시인민위원회, “NKIPC”).6 The purpose of this particular piece of legislation was to expropriate, and without any compensation, the lands of Japanese colonialists, pro-Japanese figures,
and landowners in the DPRK and to freely distribute expropriated
lands to farmers with meager land ownership.7 Under this legal
structure, the historical métayage system within the DPRK was permanently abolished.8 Meanwhile, a system of private land ownership for agricultural workers was firmly established, with the State
claiming ownership to some of the lands, forests, and irrigation facilities expropriated, which paved the way for a Socialist state ownership regarding North Korean lands and resources.9
In addition, on August 10, 1946, based on the 58th decision of
the NKIPC, “a law was enacted to nationalize key factories, firms,
mines, power plants, transportation, the postal service, banking,
commerce, and cultural organizations.”10 Under the Law on Nationalization of Industry, Transit, Transportation, Postal Service, Banks
etc. (산업 교통 운수 체신 은행 등의 국유화에 관한 법령), therefore, all key industrial and cultural facilities owned by Japan and
pro-Japanese capitalists were expropriated without any
4. Patricia Goedde, Law “Of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the North Korean Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT. LAW J. 4 (2003), at
1269.
5. Annotation, supra note 3, at 13.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Under the system of métayage, “the cultivator (métayer) uses land
without owning it and pays rent in kind to the owner.” See Métayage Land Ownership, BRITANICA. https://perma.cc/L3NL-E9JT. (Last Visited July 15, 2022).
9. Id., at 14.
10. See Brief History of NK, KBS WORLD RADIO. https://perma.cc/GHG3GWQR (Last Visited July 15, 2022).
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compensation and subsequently nationalized, providing the legal basis for Socialist state ownership over the key industrial facilities.11
Following these transitional legislative measures, which brought
about visible offshoots of the PDR, the DPRK moved on to adopt
more stringent measures to bend the country inexorably toward a
Socialist society.
Following the onset of the Korean War in 1950, there appeared
two draft Civil Code bills. Influenced by the Soviet Union’s Civil
Code, which was enacted in 1922, DPRK’s first draft Civil Code in
1950 consisted of four books including General Principles, Law of
Things, Law of Obligations, and Succession Law.12 This draft was
never passed into law.13 Meanwhile, DPRK’s second draft Civil
Code in 1958 contained six books consisting of General Principles,
Law of Possession, Law of Indebtedness, Copyright Law, Law of
Creative Inventions, and Law of Succession.14 Not unlike its predecessor, this draft was never enacted.15
In the meantime, the DPRK regime steadfastly “moved toward
building an independent and industrialized Socialist nation” based
on the philosophy of Juche or self-reliance and determination.16
Such efforts culminated in the inauguration of the Socialist Constitution in 1972, which replaced the DPRK’s first Constitution promulgated in 1948.17 Under the 1972 Constitution, “private ownership
was totally eliminated, ushering in the completion of the Socialist
central economic planning system.”18 The 1972 Constitution has
been amended and supplemented on eight different occasions.19
11. Annotation, supra note 3, at 14.
12. Id., at 11.
13. Id., at 21.
14. Id., at 20.
15. Id., at 21.
16. Goedde, supra note 4, at 1269.
17. Joseon Minjujuui Inmin Gonghwaguk Sahoejuui Heonbeob
(조선민주주의인민공화국 사회주의헌법) [North Korean Constitution] (1972).
See Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1289 (2003).
18. Id., at 1295.
19. See Constitution of North Korea, WIKIPEDIA. https://perma.cc/C67BDYZX. (Last visited July 15, 2022). See also Juliana Dowling & Dae Un Hong,
The Enshrinement of Nuclear Statehood in North Korean Law: Its Implications
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Against the foregoing backdrop, the Civil Code of the DPRK
(“DPRK Civil Code”) was enacted in 1990.20 Being a relatively new
legislation, it has been amended a total of three times to date.21 The
DPRK Civil Code consists of four parts: General Part (Part 1), Law
of Ownership (Part 2), Law of Obligations (Part 3), and Civil Liability and Prescription (Part 4).
Part 1 of the DPRK Civil Code is divided into three chapters:
Chapter 1 addresses the basics of civil law, while Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 deal with the parties to civil legal relations and with civil
juridical acts, respectively. Part 2 contains the general principles of
ownership (Chapter 1), State ownership (Chapter 2), social cooperative ownership (Chapter 3), and private ownership (Chapter 4). In
addition, Part 3 of the Civil Code consists of the general principles
of obligation (Chapter 1) followed by contracts based on planning
(Chapter 2), contracts not based on planning (Chapter 3), and enrichment without cause (Chapter 4). Lastly, Part 4 includes two
chapters on civil liability (Chapter 1) and civil prescription (Chapter
2), respectively.
In light of how it is structured, the North Korean Civil Code is
considered patterned after the pandekten system originated in Germany, with its own characteristics.22 Initially developed by Georg
Arnold Heise and subsequently theorized and put to pedagogical use
by Frederich Carl Von Savigny, the most salient feature of this German system of codification is placing general provisions of overarching implications at the forefront followed by more specific provisions.23 In this regard, the North Korean Civil Code is similar to

for Future Denuclearization Talks with North Korea, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV.
ONLINE 48 (2021).
20. Joseon
Minjujuui
Inmin
Gonghwaguk
Minbeop
(조선민주주의인민공화국-민법) [Civil Code] (1990).
21. Annotation, supra note 3, at 23-24.
22. Id., at 11-12.
23. See Helge Dedek, Border Control: Some Comparative Remarks on the
Cartography of Obligations, in EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW 25 at 35 (Jason Neyers et al, eds., Hart 2009).
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the Civil Code of South Korea, which has also embraced the pandekten system.24
II. METHODS OF TRANSLATION AND RELEVANCE
The original text of the DPRK Civil Code is available online.25
Based on that text, translating the DPRK Civil Code into English
was a solo project. Throughout the process of crafting a draft translation, the Annotation proved to be an invaluable tool and was consulted to as needed as it helped with understanding the relevant context, syntax, and terminologies of certain clauses reflecting NorthSouth differences in the Korean language including legal language.
Subsequently, during the process of editing, Mariano Vitetta, Research Associate at the Center of Civil Law Studies of Louisiana
State University, gave an expert hand in terms of adapting the text
to civilian language under Professor Olivier Moréteau’s graceful
guidance.
As noted above, from a legal standpoint, private economic activities are considered illegal in the DPRK. Against this backdrop, it
is noteworthy that the purpose of the civil law in the DPRK is to
“strengthen the material and technological bases of the Socialist
economy system based on civil regulation of property relations,
thereby contributing to guarantee the People’s self-reliant and creative lifestyle.” It is hoped that this English translation may help readers understand and appreciate the constitutive elements of the civil
law of the DPRK based on the above purpose and related details.

24. Wu Ying-Chieh, Trust Law in South Korea, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 46 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., Cambridge U.
Press 2013).
25. See Sukjaro Bon Yangsime Ttareun Byeongyeokgeobu [Database on a
Unified Korea’s Legal System], Unification Legal Affairs Division, Ministry of
Justice et. al. (2021). https://perma.cc/5XV2-XWF2 (Last visited July 15, 2022).

BILINGUAL KOREAN-ENGLISH CIVIL CODE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Translated from the Korean into English by
Joseph Cho
조선민주주의인민공화국
민법

THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

제 1 편 일반제도

BOOK 1. GENERAL PART

제 1 장 민법의 기본

CHAPTER 1. THE BASICS OF
THE CIVIL LAW

제 1 조 (민법의 사명)
조선민주주의인민공화국
민법은 재산관계에 대한 민사적
규제를 통하여 사회주의
경제제도와 물질기술적토대를
튼튼히 하며 인민들의
자주적이며 창조적인 생활을
보장하는데 이바지한다.

Article 1. Purpose of the civil law
The civil law of the DPRK
strengthens the material and technological bases of the socialist
economy system based on civil
regulation of property relations,
thereby contributing to guarantee
the People’s self-reliant and creative lifestyle.

제 2 조 (민법의 규제대상)
조선민주주의인민공화국
민법은 기관, 기업소, 단체,
공민사이에 서로 같은 지위에서
이루어지는 재산관계를
규제한다. 국가는 기관, 기업소,
단체와 공민에게
민사법률관계에서

Article 2. Object of the civil law
The civil law of the DPRK regulates property relations formed on
equal footing between institutions,
corporate bodies, organizations,
and citizens. The State guarantees
the autonomous status of parties
to civil legal relations in relation

 Doctoral candidate in Civil Law, Seoul National University School of
Law. The translator is a corporate lawyer with substantial experience in various
industries including the aerospace and defense industry and shipping and logistics. This manuscript is in loving memory of the author’s late father who enjoyed
stimulating conversations on a wide variety of topics including the law.
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당사자로서의 독자적인 지위를
보장한다.

to institutions, corporate bodies,
organizations, and citizens.

제 3 조 (생산수단에 대한
사회주의적소유의 원칙)

Article 3. Principle of socialist
ownership of the means of production
Socialist ownership of the
means of production is what underpins the economy of the DPRK.
In property relations, the State
will continuously strengthen the
socialist economic system by augmenting organized management
and operation of the People’s
economy founded on socialist
ownership.

생산수단에 대한
사회주의적소유는
조선민주주의인민공화국의
경제적 기초이다. 국가는
재산관계에서
사회주의적소유에 기초한
인민경제의 계획적 관리운영을
강화하여 사회주의경제제도를
끊임없이 공고히 하도록 한다.
제 4 조 (계획적인
재산거래원칙)
계획적인 재산거래관계는
인민경제계획에 기초한 계약에
따라 이루어진다. 국가는 기관,
기업소, 단체가 계획과제를
어김없이 수행할 수 있게
재산거래관계를 맺고 실현하
도록 한다.

Article 4. Principle of plannedproperty transactions
Planned-property transactions
will be pursuant to agreements
based on the People’s economic
plans. The State will enter into
property transactions and realize
them so that the participating institutions, corporate bodies, and
organizations can duly perform
the planned projects.

제 5 조 (계약규률의 준수원칙)

Article 5. Principle of observance
of contractual rules
The State will ensure that institutions, corporate bodies, and organizations implement the Taean
Work System,1 which is a type of

국가는 기관, 기업소, 단체가
재산관계를 설정하고 실현하는
데서 사회주의경제관리 형태인

1. Translator’s Note: the Taean Work System was introduced in December
1961 by Kim Il Sung, the DPRK’s founder, on his visit to the Taean Electrical
Appliance Plant. Under the Taean Work System, the ultimate authority and responsibility for managing and operating factories and enterprises belongs to the
party committee at the factory or enterprise. In this centralized approach to economic management with the party committee at its core, higher level officials assist lower-level functionaries and workers in an environment of close comradery
and consultation.
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대안의 사업체계의 요구를
구현하며 계약규률을 엄격히
지키도록 한다.

socialist economy management,
and duly observe contractual rules
while setting up and realizing
property relations.

제 6 조 (인민의 복리증진원칙)

Article 6. Principle of promotion of
the People’s welfare
Taking responsibility and caring
for the People’s lives is a primordial demand of a socialist state.
The State will develop a keen interest in ensuring that policies of
promoting the People’s welfare affect the workers at large in connection with the formation and realization of property relations between, on the one hand, institutions, corporate bodies, or organizations and, on the other hand,
citizens.

인민들의 생활을 책임지고
돌보는 것은 사회주의국가의
본성적요구이다. 국가는 기관,
기업소, 단체가 공민과
재산관계를 설정하고 실현하는
데서 인민들의 복리증진을 위한
시책이 근로자들에게 더 잘
미치도록 하는 데 깊은 관심을
돌린다.

제 7 조 (재산관계자들의
편의보장원칙)
공민이 참가하는 재산관계는
계약을 비롯한 행위와 사건에
따라 이루어진다. 국가는
재산관계에 근로자들이
일상적으로 널리 참가할 수
있도록 온갖 평의와 조건을
보장한다.
제 8 조 (민사관계 당사자들
사이의 협력과 방조원칙)
집단주의는
사회주의사회생활의 기초이다.
국가는 기관, 기업소, 단체와
공민이 서로 협력하고 방조하는
집단주의원칙에서 재산관계를
설 정하고 실현하도록 한다.

Article 7. Principle of guarantee of
convenience of parties to property
relations
Property relations in which citizens participate take place via juridical facts and acts, including
contracts. The State will ensure
that various accommodations and
conditions be met so that the
workers may routinely and widely
participate in property relations.
Article 8. Principle of cooperation
and assistance among parties to
civil relations
Collectivism is what underpins
socialist social life. The State will
ensure that institutions, corporate
bodies, organizations, and citizens
form and realize property relations according to the principle of
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collectivism by which they assist
and cooperate with each other.
제 9 조 (국가, 사회리익의
존중원칙)
국가는 재산관계를 설정하고
실현하는데서 국가와 사회의
리익을 앞세우면서 개별적인
기관, 기업소, 단체나 공민의
리익을 철저히 보장하도록
한다.

Article 9. Principle of respect of
State and social interests
In setting up and realizing property relations, the State will
strictly guarantee the interests of
individual institutions, corporate
bodies, organizations, and citizens, while prioritizing the interests of the State and of society at
large.

제 10 조 (민사관련조약의 효력)
민사활동과 관련하여 우리
나라와 다른 나라사이에 맺은
조약에서 달리 정하였을
경우에는 그에 따른다.

Article 10. Effects of related civil
treaties
In the event of any discrepancy
between this Civil Code and a
treaty between the DPRK and a
foreign state in respect of civil activities, the latter shall be followed.

제 2 장 민사법률관계의 당사자

CHAPTER 2. PARTIES TO CIVIL
LEGAL RELATIONS

제 11 조 (민사법률관계의
당사자)
민사법률관계의 당사자로는
독립적인 경비예산이나
독립채산제로 운영하는 기관,
기업소, 단체와 공민이 된다.
공화국령역안에 창설된 합영,
합작기업 그밖에 법이 인정한
다른 나라의 법인도
민사법률관계의 당사자로 된다.

Article 11. Parties to civil legal relations
The parties to civil legal relations include institutions, corporate bodies, organizations, which
operate with independent expenditure budgets or with a selfsupporting account system, and
citizens. Joint ventures incorporated within the DPRK and foreign corporations recognized by
the law will be parties to civil legal relations.
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제 12 조 (기관, 기업소, 단체의
등록)
조직된 기관, 기업소, 단체는
해당 기관에 등록하여야 창설된
것으로 인정한다. 기관,
기업소, 단체는 해당 기관에
등록된 때부터 민사상 권리를
가지거나 의무를 질 수 있는
민사권리능력과 그것을 자신이
직접 실현할 수 있는
민사행위능력을 가진다.

제 13 조 (기관, 기업소, 단체의
민사권리능력)
기관, 기업소, 단체는 자기의
본신임무에 맞는 범위안에서
민사권리능력을 가진다.
자기의 본신임무를 해당 기관에
등록된 기관, 기업소, 단체는
그것을 마음대로 변경할 수
없다.

제 14 조 (대표자와 대리인에
의한 민사법률행위)
기관, 기업소, 단체의
관리책임자는 그 기관, 기업소,
단체의 대표자이다. 기관,
기업소, 단체는 자기의
대표자나 대표자가 위임하는
대리인을 통하여
민사법률행위를 한다.
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Article 12. Registration of institutions, corporate bodies, and organizations
Organized institutions, corporate bodies, and organizations
will be deemed formed when registered with the applicable authorities. From the time of registration, institutions, corporate
bodies, and organizations will be
entitled to exercise civil rights
and assume obligations with the
legal capacity to enforce such
rights and obligations by themselves.
Article 13. Civil legal capacity of
institutions, corporate bodies,
and organizations
Institutions, corporate bodies,
and organizations will have the
legal capacity that is consistent
with the nature of their respective
tasks. These tasks may not be arbitrarily altered by institutions,
corporate bodies, and organizations registered with the applicable authorities.
Article 14. Civil juridical acts by
representatives and mandataries
The representatives of institutions, corporate bodies, or organizations will be responsible
for their management. Each institution, corporate body, and organization will engage in civil juridical acts through its representative or a mandatary appointed by the representative.
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제 15 조 (기관, 기업소, 단체의
민사책임)
기관, 기업소, 단체는 자기가
관리하고있거나 소유하고있는
재산으로 민사책임을 진다.
제 16 조 (기관, 기업소, 단체의
병합과 분리)
기관, 기업소, 단체가
갈라지거나 합쳐지는 경우 그의
민사상 권리의무도 갈라지거나
합쳐진다. 기관, 기업소, 단체가
폐지되거나 해산을 결정한 경우
그가 가지고 있던 채권채무는
해당 임무를 위임받은 청산인이
처리한다.

[Vol. 14

Article 15. Civil liability of institutions, corporate bodies, and organizations
Institutions, corporate bodies,
and organizations assume civil
liability with the properties they
manage or own.
Article 16. Merger and division
of institutions, corporate bodies,
and organizations
When institutions, corporate
bodies, and organizations are divided or merged, their civil rights
and obligations will be divided
or merged accordingly. When
any institutions, corporate bodies, or organizations are wound
up or a resolution is passed for
their dissolution, their rights and
obligations will be handled by an
authorized liquidator.

제 17 조 (기관, 기업소, 단체의
민사권리능력과 행위능력의
소멸)
기관, 기업소, 단체의
민사권리능력과
민사행위능력은 그 기관,
기업소, 단체의 폐지 또는 해산
이 해당기관에 등록된 때에
없어진다.

Article 17. Extinction of the civil
legal capacity of institutions, corporate bodies, and organizations

제 18 조 (민사법률관계
당사자로서의 국가)
국가는 국가소유관계를
비롯한 일정한 민사법률
관계에서 직접 당사자로 된다.
이 경우 국가는 해당한 권한을
부여한 기관을 통하여
당사자로서의 권리를 행사하며

Article 18. The State as a party to
civil law relations
The State may become a direct
party to certain civil law relationships, including state ownership. In this case, the State will
exercise its rights and perform its
obligations through an organ to

The civil legal capacity and
capacity to act of institutions,
corporate bodies, and organizations will cease to exist when
their dissolution or liquidation is
registered with the applicable authorities.
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의무를 리행한다.

which applicable authority is
delegated.

제 19 조 (공민의 민사권리능력)

Article 19. Citizen’s civil capacity of enjoyment
Citizens have civil legal capacity upon birth, and that capacity ceases upon death. All citizens have equal civil legal capacity. Unless otherwise provided by law, no citizen may restrict the civil legal capacity of
another citizen.

공민의 민사권리능력은
출생과 함께 생기며 사망과
함께 없어진다. 모든 공민은
민사권리능력을 평등하게
가진다. 법이 따로 정하지 않은
한 누구도 공민의 민사권리
능력을 제한할 수 없다.
제 20 조 (공민의
민사행위능력)
공민의 성인나이는
17 살이다. 17 살에 이른 공민은
민사법률행위를 독자적으로
할수 있는 민사행위능력을
가진다. 16 살에 이른자는
자기가 받은 로동보수의
범위안에서 민사법률행위를
독자적으로 할 수 있으며 그
범위를 벗어나는 행위는 부모나
후견인의 동의를 받아야 할 수
있다.

Article 20. Citizen’s civil capacity of exercise
Citizens will come of age upon
turning seventeen. A citizen who
has reached the age of majority
is entitled to independently enter
into civil juridical acts. Upon
reaching the age of sixteen, a
person may independently enter
into civil juridical acts up to the
amount of his or her labor
wages; any act exceeding such
limit may be undertaken only
with parental or a tutor’s consent.

제 21 조 (민사행위무능력자,
신체기능장애자의
민사법률행위)
민사행위무능력자,
신체기능장애자는 부모나
후견인을 통하여
민사법률행위를 한다. 성인의
민사행위무능력자인정은
재판절차로 한다.

Article 21. Civil juridical acts of
the incompetent and the disabled
The incompetent and the disabled make civil juridical acts
through a parent or a legal tutor.
Whether an adult is incompetent
or not is to be determined
through court proceedings.
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제 22 조 (소재불명자, 사망자의
인증)
마지막소식이 있는 때부터
3 년이 지나도록 소식이 없는
공민에 대하여서는
리해관계자의 신청 에 따라
공증기관이 소재불명자로
인증할 수 있다. 소재불명자로
인증된 후 2 년, 소식이 없거나
마지막소식이 있는 때부터 5 년,
생명에 위험을 준 사고가 있은
때부터 1 년이 지나도록 소식이
없는 공민에 대하여서는 앞항과
같은 절차에 따라 사망자로
인증할 수 있다.
제 23 조 (소재불명자,
사망자인증의 취소)
소재불명자 또는 사망자로
인증되었던 공민이 나타났거나
소식을 보내어 거처를 알려온
경우 공증기관은 본인이나
리해관계자의 신청에 따라
해당한 인증을 취소한다. 이
경우 변경된 재산 관계는
취소할 수 있으나 새로 성립된
결혼관계는 취소시킬수 없다.

[Vol. 14

Article 22. Certification of an absent person whose whereabouts
are unknown and of the deceased
A citizen whose whereabouts
have been unknown for three
years from the last contact may
be certified by the public authority as absent at the request of an
interested party. The foregoing
procedure is applicable mutatis
mutandis to the death certification of a citizen who remains certified as absent for two years, has
lost contact for a period of five
years from the very last contact,
or who has had no contact within
one year from a fatal accident.
Article 23. Revocation of certification of an absent or deceased
person
If a person who has been certified as absent or deceased appeared in person or resumed
contact with the news of his or
her whereabouts, the public authority will revoke the certification at the request of an interested party. In the event of such
revocation, any affected property
relations may be rescinded, but a
newly formed marital relationship cannot be dissolved.

제 3 장 민사법률행위

CHAPTER 3. CIVIL JURIDICAL
ACTS

제 24 조 (민사법률행위의 형식)

Article 24. Formalities of civil
juridical acts
A juridical act intended to create, modify, or extinguish a civil
legal relationship may be made

민사법률관계의 성절, 변경,
소멸을 목적으로 하는
법률행위는 의사표시를 말이나
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서면 같은 것으로 할 수 있다.
그러나 법이 요구하는 경우에는
서면으로 하거나 공증을
받는다.

orally or in writing. However, if
so required by law, such act shall
be in writing or notarized.

제 25 조 (민사법률행위의 취소,
변경)
민사법률행위를 한 자는
법에서 허용하거나 상대방이
동의하는 경우에만 자기가 한
행위를 취 소하거나 변경할 수
있다.

Article 25. Revocation and modification of a civil juridical act
Any person who has made a
civil juridical act may only revoke or modify the act subject to
the other party’s consent or to the
extent permitted by law.

제 26 조 (민사법률행위의
유효조건)
민사법률행위는 국가의 법과
사회주의적생활규범에 맞게
하여야 법적 효력을 가진다.
국가의 법과
사회주의적생활규범에
어긋나는 행위, 국가와 사회에
해를 준다는 것을 알면서 하는
행위, 허위적으로 하는 행위,
민사행위능력이 없는 공민이
하는 행위는 효력을 가지지
못한다.

Article 26. Validity of a civil juridical act
A civil juridical act is only legally valid when made in accordance with the laws of the State
and socialist norms of life. An act
violating the laws of the State or
socialist norms of life, any purposeful act harming the State and
society, an act of misrepresentation, and an act by an incompetent citizen shall be null.

제 27 조 (무효한 법률행위의
효과)
민사법률행위의 효력이
없어진 경우 당사자들이 이미
주고받은 돈이나 물건은 서로
상대방에게 돌려준다. 그러나
국가의 법과
사회주의적생활규범에
어긋난다는 것을 알면서 행위를
한 자 에게는 해당 돈이나
물건을 돌려주지 않고 국고에
넣는다.

Article 27. Effects of nullity of a
juridical act
When a juridical act is rendered null, any money or goods
exchanged between the parties
shall be returned to each other.
However, if a party knew that the
act in question might be contrary
to the laws of the State or socialist norms of life, the money or
goods in question shall not be returned but shall be vested with
the State treasury.
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제 28 조 (취소할수 있는
민사법률행위의 형태)
속히워서 한 민사법률행위,
본직적인 내용에 대하여 착오를
범한 민사법률행위, 강요로
본의 아니게 한 민사법률행위,
16 살에 이른자가 부모나
후견인의 동의없이 한
민사법률행위는 취소 할 수
있다. 취소는 2 개월안에 하여야
한다.

[Vol. 14

Article 28. Types of annullable
civil juridical acts
Any civil juridical act that
arises as a result of deceit, a civil
juridical act with an error on the
essential elements thereof, an unintended civil juridical act under
violence, and any civil juridical
act by a person who has turned
sixteen without parental or a tutor’s consent, may be annulled.
The nullity shall be declared
within two months.

제 29 조 (민사법률행위취소의
효과)
민사법률행위가 취소된
경우에 당사자들이 이미
주고받은 돈이나 물건은 서로
상대방에게 돌려준다. 그러나
상대방을 속였거나 강요하여
민사법률행위를 하게 한자의
돈이나 물건은 그에게 돌려주지
않고 국고에 넣는다.

Article 29. Effects of nullification of civil juridical acts
When a civil juridical act is annulled, any money or goods exchanged between the parties shall
be returned to each other. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
money or goods of a party who induced the other party into a civil
juridical act through deceit or violence shall not be returned to such
responsible party, but shall be
vested with the State treasury.

제 30 조 (민사법률행위의 효력)

Article 30. Effect of a civil juridical act
The effect of a civil juridical act
may be subject to the occurrence
of certain conditions. In such a
case, the parties shall not engage
in an act that accelerates or unduly interferes with the occurrence
of those conditions.

민사법률행위의 효력은
일정한 조건의 발생과 결부시킬
수 있다. 이 경우 당사자는
조건의 발생을 앞당기거나
방해하는 행위를 하지 말아야
한다.
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제 31 조 (민사법률행위의 대리)
기관, 기업소, 단체와 공민은
법이 정한 경우나 자신이 직접
수행하여야 할 경우를 내놓고는
대리인을 통하여
민사법률행위를 할 수 있다.

제 32 조 (대리의 종류)
대리에는 법에 의하여 하는
법정대리와 위임에 의하여 하는
위임대리가 있다. 대리인은
반드시 민사행위능력을 가진
공민이어야 한다.
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Article 31. Representation for civil
juridical acts
Institutions, corporate bodies,
organizations, and citizens may
make civil juridical acts through a
representative except when the law
provides otherwise or when making such acts by themselves is required.
Article 32. Types of representation
Representatives may be determined by law or by a contract of
mandate. A representative shall be
a citizen with legal capacity to act.

Article 33. Legal effects of an act
of representation
A representative makes a civil
대리인은 대리를 위임한자의
juridical act in the name of the
이름으로 민사법률행위를 하며
principal with the legal effect of
그 행위의 법적효과는 대리를
such act binding the principal.
위임한자에게 돌아간다. 대리를
The principal shall be responsi위임한자는 대리인과
ble for the consequences of a ju법률행위를 한 제 3 자 앞에
ridical act made by a representa대리권의 범위 안에서 이루어진 tive within the scope of the repre모든 행위의 결과에 대하여
sentation towards the other party
to the act. The consequences of
책임진다. 대리권의 범위를
an act beyond the scope of repre넘는 대리행위의 결과는
sentation shall be borne by the
대리인이 책임진다.
representative.
제 33 조 (대리행위의 법적효과)

제 34 조 (대리의 위임형식)
대리의 위임은 말로 하거나
서면으로 한다. 공민이 대리를
말로 위임할 경우에는 그
사실과 대리권의 범위를
상대방에 알려주어야 한다.
기관, 기업소, 단체는
서면으로만 대리를 위임할 수

Article 34. Means of authorization
An act of authorization may be
done in writing or orally. In the
event of oral authorization by a
citizen, the fact of such authorization, along with the scope of
authority, shall be notified to the
other party. Institutions, corporate bodies, and organizations
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있으며 대리를 위임하는
위임장이나 신임장 에는
대리권의 범위를 명백히 밝혀야
한다.

may appoint representatives only
in writing, and the accompanying
power of attorney or credentials
shall detail the scope of authority.

제 35 조 (대리인의 임무)
대리인은 대리행위를
대리권의 범위안에서 성실하게
하여야 한다. 대리권의
범위에서 대리행위를
불성실하게 하여 생긴 손해에
대하여서는 대리인이 대리권을
위임한자 앞에 책임진다.

Article 35. Obligations of representatives
A representative shall perform
acts of representation in good
faith and within the scope of
mandated authority. A representative shall be responsible to
the principal for damages arising
from the representative’s failure
to perform in good faith and
within the authority of the representative to perform.

제 36 조 (대리권의 소멸)
대리권은 대리를 위임한자나
대리인이 사망한 경우 또는
대리인이 만사행위능력을 잃은
경우에 없어진다. 위임에 의한
대리권은 대리를 위임한자가
대리의 위임을 취소하였거나
대리인이 그 위임을 거절한
경우에도 없어진다. 말로 한
대리의 위임을 취소한 경우에는
그 사실을 상대방에 알려주어야
한다.

Article 36. Extinction of mandate
A mandate will cease to exist
upon the death of either principal
or mandatary or when the mandatary becomes incapacitated. A
mandate by contract will cease to
exist when the principal has terminated the underlying authorization, or the mandatary has
turned down the mandate. When
the principal terminates a mandate authorized orally, such termination must be notified to the
other party.
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제 2 편 소유권제도

BOOK 2. SYSTEMS OF
OWNERSHIP

제 1 장 일반규정

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
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제 37 조 (소유권의 형태)
조선민주주의인민공화국에
서 재산에 대한 소유권은 그
소유형태에 따라 국가소유권,
사회협동 단체소유권,
개인소유권으로 나누어진다.

Article 37. Types of ownership
Depending on the type of ownership, property ownership in the
DPRK is divided into state ownership, social cooperative collective ownership, and private ownership.

제 38 조 (소유권의 발생기초)

Article 38. The foundational basis of ownership
Ownership arises on the basis
of law, contract, and other acts
and facts. Ownership arises in
accordance with the timing prescribed by law, if based on the
law, and when it is based on a
contract, when the contract is
made and the object of contract
is handed over unless agreed
otherwise.

소유권은 법이나 계약 그
밖의 행위와 사건에 기초하여
발생한다. 소유권은 법에
기초하는 경우 법이 정한 때,
계약에 기초하는 경우에는 따로
합의하지 않는 한 계약을 맺고
그 대상을 넘겨받은 때부터
발생된다.

제 39 조 (소유권자의 권한)
소유권을 가진 자는 법이
정한 범위안에서 자기의
소유재산을 점유하거나 리용,
처분할 수 있다. 재산에 대한
처분은 해당 소유권을
가진자만이 할 수 있다.

Article 39. Authority of owner
An owner may occupy, use, or
dispose of his or her own property within legal limitations.
Property may only be disposed of
by the rightful owner.

제 40 조 (비법점유재산의
반환청구)
소유권을 가진자는 자기의
재산을 다른자가 비법적으로
점유하고 있을 경우 그 반환을
요구할 수 있다.

Article 40. Request for return of
unlawfully occupied property
Owners are entitled to demand
the return of their property if a
third party possesses that property illegally.
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제 41 조
(소유권실현방해행위의
배제청구)
소유권을 가진자는
자기소유권의 실현을 방해하는
행위를 하는자에 대하여 그
행위를 그만둘 것을 요구할수
있다.

[Vol. 14

Article 41. Objection to interference with exercise of property
An owner is entitled to make a
person interfering with the
owner’s exercise of ownership
cease to do so.

제 42 조 (공동소유권)
소유권은 여럿이 공동으로
가질 수 있다. 공동소유재산을
점유하거나 리용, 처분하는것은
공동으로 소유권을 가진자들의
합의에 따라 한다.

Article 42. Co-ownership
Ownership can be held jointly.
Possession, use, or disposal of
property held in co-ownership
shall be mutually agreed between
the co-owners.

제 43 조 (공동소유재산의 분할)
공동으로 소유권을
가진자들은 공동소유재산에서
자기의 몴을 갈라 가질 수
있다. 재산을 현물로 가르기
어려울 경우에는 자기 몫에
해당하는 값을 받을 수 있다.
공동으로 소유권을 가진자들의
몫이 명백하지 않은 경우
그들의 몫은 같은 것으로 본다.

Article 43. Division of property
held in co-ownership
Co-owners may receive and
keep their pro-rata shares of interest in property held in co-ownership. When it is difficult to partition property held in co-ownership in kind, each owner may receive a sum corresponding to his
or her pro-rata share. When the
pro-rata shares of interest among
the co-owners are not clearly ascertainable, they are deemed
equal in proportion.

제 2 장 국가소유권

CHAPTER 2. STATE
OWNERSHIP

제 44 조 (국가소유의 성격과
원천)
국가소유는 전체 인민의
소유다. 국가소유는 국유화한
재산, 국가투자로 마련한 재한,

Article 44. Nature and origin of
State ownership
State ownership is the property
of the entire people. State ownership consists of nationalized
property, assets acquired through
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국가기업소의 생산물,
국가기관, 기업소가 산 재산,
국가의 결정에 따라 국가기관,
기업소에 넘어온 재산,
협동단체나 공민이 국가에
바친 재산, 그 밖에 국고에
넣기로 된 재산으로
이루어진다. 국가소유권의
대상에는 제한이 없다.

제 45 조 (국가소유권의 대상)
다음의 재산은 국가만이
소유할 수 있다.
1.
지하자원, 산림자원,
수산자원을 비롯한
나라의 모든 자연부원
2.
철도, 항공운수,
체신기관과 중요 공장,
기업소, 항만, 은행
3.

각급 학교 및 중요
문화보건시설

제 46 조 (국가소유권의 담당자)
국가소유권의 담당자는 전체
인민을 대표하는 국가이다.
국가는 나라의 부강발전과
인민들의 복리향상을 위하여
자기 소유의 재산을 제한없이
점유하 거나 리용, 처분할수
있다.
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state investment, products of
state-owned business entity, assets purchased by state institutions and business entities, any
property passed on to state organizations or entities based on a
governmental decision, properties donated to the State by a social cooperative or a citizen, and
any property to be placed in the
State treasury. There is no limitation as to the object of State ownership.
Article 45. Object of State ownership
The following may only be
owned by the State:
1. All natural resources in the
country including underground resources, forest resources, and fisheries;
2. Railways, means of airfreight,
postal institutions, and main
factories, business entities,
ports, and banks;
3. Schools of all levels and significant cultural and health
facilities.
Article 46. Person in charge of
State ownership
The person in charge of State
ownership is the State representing the entire People. The State
may occupy, use, or dispose of its
own property without any limitations in order to further the country’s wealth and to promote the
overall welfare of the People.
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제 47 조 (국가소유권의 실현)
국가소유권은 국가가 직접
도는 개별적인 국가기관,
기업소를 통하여 실현한다.
국가기관, 기업소는 자기가
맡은 국가소유재산에 대한
경영상 관리권을 가지고 국가의
지도 밑에 그 재산을 자기의
이름으로 점유하거나 리용,
처분할 수 있다.

[Vol. 14

Article 47. Realization of State
ownership
State ownership is realized directly by the State or through individual state agencies and business
entities. State institutions and
business entities have managerial
oversight over the properties entrusted to them and may occupy,
use, or dispose of them in their
own name under the direction of
the State.

제 48 조 (국가소유권과
경영상관리권의 이전)
국가기관, 기업소의 재산이
사회협동단체나 공민에게 공급,
판매되는 경우 국가소유권은 그
사회 협동단체나 공민에게
넘어간다. 그러나 국가기관,
기업소의 재산이 다른
국가기관, 기업소에 공급,
판매되는 경우에는 경영상
관리권만 넘어간다.

Article 48. Transfer of State ownership and managerial oversight

제 49 조 (국가소유의
고정재산리용권)
국가에서 협동농장에
배속시킨 뜨락또르, 모내는
기계, 수확기를 비롯한
현대적농기계, 국가부담으로
협동농장에 마련하여 준
문화시설, 탈곡장, 집짐승우리,
창고 같은 고정재산에 대하여
국가는 자기소유권을 계속
가지고 있으면서 리용권을 해당
협동농장에 넘겨준다.

Article 49. Right to use Stateowned fixed property

If the property of a state institution or business entity is supplied
or sold to a social cooperative or
a citizen, the State’s ownership
therein is transferred to the social
cooperative or the citizen. However, if the property of a state institution or business entity is supplied or sold to another state institution or business entity, only
managerial oversight is transferred thereby.

The State retains ownership of
all modern farm machinery, including tractors, rice transplanters and harvesters, which the
State has collocated to cooperative farms, and of fixed properties
including cultural facilities,
threshing floors, livestock cages,
and warehouses that are funded by
the State for cooperative farms;
the cooperative farm is accorded
the right to use the foregoing
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협동농장은 국가가 지원하여 준
고정재산을 그 사명에 맞게
자기의 재산처럼 리용할 수
있다.

properties. Cooperative farms may
use any fixed property provided by
the State as if it were their own
property in alignment with their
individual objects.

제 50 조 (국가소유재산의
살림집 리용권)
국가는 살림집을 지어 그
리용권을 로동자, 사무원,
협동농민에게 넘겨주며 그
리용권을 법적으로 보호한다.
인민정권기관은 리혼당사자들
사이에 국가소유의
살림집리용권과 관련한 분쟁이
제기될 경우 해당 재판소의
판결서등본에 기초하여
살림집리용권자를 새로
정해주어야 한다.

Article 50. Right to use family residences owned by the State

제 51 조 (국가소유재산의
반환청구)
국가기관, 기업소는 자기
재산이 권한없는자로부터
사회협동단체나 공민에게 넘어간
경우에 그 반환을 요구할 수 있다.

Article 51. Request for return of
State-owned property

제 52 조 (임자없는 물건의
소유권)
임자없는 물건은 국가소유로
한다. 임자없는 물건에는
소유권을 가진 자가 없거나
소유권을 가진 자를 알 수 없는
물건이 속한다.

Article 52. Ownership of things
without an owner

The State builds family residences and transfers the right to
use them to workers, clerks and
cooperative farmers, while legally
protecting said right. If a dispute
arises as to who has the right to
use a state-owned family residence
in the context of a divorce, the
People’s Government Agency will
determine the rightful user pursuant to a certified copy of a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction.

State agencies and business entities may request the return of
their property when the property is
transferred to social cooperatives
or citizens by a person lacking
rights to convey the property.

Things without an owner are
owned by the State. Things without an owner include things with
no ownership or whose owner
cannot be ascertained.
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제 3 장 사회협동단체소유권

CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL
COOPERATIVE OWNERSHIP

제 53 조 (사회협동단체소유의
성격과 원천)
사회협동단체소유는
사회협동단체에 들어있는
근로자들의 집단적소유이다.
사회협동단체소유는
사회협동단체성원들이
들여놓은 재산, 사회협동단체의
자체 투자에 의하여 마련한
재산, 사회협동단체의 생산물,
사회협동단체가 산 재산,
국가에서 사회협동단체에 소유
권을 넘겨준 재산으로
이루어진다.

Article 53. Nature and origin of
social cooperative ownership
Social cooperative ownership is
the collective ownership of workers belonging to a social cooperative. Ownership of a social cooperative consists of the property acquired by members of the social
cooperative, any property selffunded by the social cooperative,
products of the social cooperative,
property purchased by the social
cooperative, and the property the
ownership of which is transferred
by the State to the social cooperative.

제 54 조
(사회협동단체소유권의 대상)
사회협동단체는 토지와
농기계, 배, 중소공장, 기업소
그밖에 경영활동에 필요한
대상들을 소유 할 수 있다.

Article 54. Object of social cooperative ownership
Social cooperatives can own
land, agricultural equipment,
ships, small and medium-sized
factories, business entities, and
other property necessary for their
business activities.

제 55 조
(사회협동단체소유권의
담당자와 그 권한)
사회협동단체소유권의
담당자는 개별적인
사회협동단체이다.
사회협동단체는 자기 소유의
재산을 그 성원들의 의사에
따라 민주주의원칙에서
점유하거나 리용, 처분할 수
있다. 그러나 토지에 대한
처분은 법이 정한데 따라 한다.

Article 55. Person in charge of social cooperative ownership and
their authority
The person in charge of the
ownership of social cooperative is
each individual social cooperative. Social cooperatives may occupy, use, or dispose of their property according to the manifested
intent of their constitutive members under the principles of democracy. Disposal of land, however, shall be in accordance with
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what the law dictates.
제 56 조
(사회협동단체소유권의 이전)
사회협동단체가 생산한
제품이 국가기관, 기업소 또는
다른 사회협동단체나 공민에게
공급, 판매되는 경우에 그에
대한 소유권은 상대방에
넘어간다.

Article 56. Transfer of social cooperative ownership
When a product produced by a
social cooperative is supplied and
sold to a national institution, business entity, or other social cooperative or citizen, ownership of the
product is thereby conveyed to the
other party.

제 57 조(사회협동단체소유재산
의 반환청구)
사회협동단체는 자기 소유의
재산이 권한없는자로부터 다른
사회협동단체나 공민에게
넘어간 경우 그 반환을 요구할
수 있다.

Article 57. Request for return of
social cooperative-owned property
A social cooperative may request the return of its property if
the property is transferred by
somebody lacking the right to convey to another social cooperative
organization or citizen.

제 4 장 개인소유권

CHAPTER 4. PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP

제 58 조 (개인소유의 성격과
원천)
개인소유는 근로자들의
개인적이며 소비적인 목적을
위한 소유이다. 개인소유는
로동에 의한 사회주의 분배,
국가 및 사회의 추가적 혜택,
터밭경리를 비롯한 개인
부업경에서 나오는 생산물,
공민이 샀거나 상속, 증여받은
재산 그 밖의 법적 근거에
의하여 생겨난 재산으로
이루어진다.

Article 58. Nature and origin of
private ownership
Private ownership is reserved
for workers’ personal and consumption purposes. Private ownership covers any property resulting from the socialist distribution
of labor, additional benefits of the
State and society, products of
workers’ side jobs, including those
from private gardens, any property
bought, donated to or inherited by
citizens, and property based on
other legal grounds.
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제 59 조 (개인소유권의 대상)
공민은 살림집과 가정생활에
필요한 여러 가지 가정용품,
문화용품, 그밖의 생활용품과
승용차 같은 기재를 소유할 수
있다.
제 60 조 (개인소유권의
담당자와 그 권한)
개인소유권의 담당자는
개별적공민이다. 공민은 자기
소유의 재산을
사회주의적생활규범과 소비적
목적에 맞게 자유로이
점유하거나 리용, 처분할 수
있다.

[Vol. 14

Article 59. Subject of private ownership
Citizens may own various
household items necessary for
their residence and home life, cultural products, and any other
property, including household
goods and passenger vehicles.
Article 60. Person in charge of private ownership and his or her authority
The person in charge of private
ownership is each individual citizen. Citizens are free to possess,
use, and dispose of their own
property in accordance with socialist norms and consumption
purposes.

제 61 조 (가정재산에 대한
공동소유권)
가정성원으로 된 공민은
가정의 재산에 대한 소유권을
공동으로 가진다.

Article 61. Co-ownership of community property
Citizens who are members of
the same household hold community property in co-ownership.

제 62 조 (개인소유재산의
반환청구)
공민은 자기 소유의 재산을
권한없는 자에게서
넘겨받는다는 것을 알면서 가진
공민을 상대로 그 반환을
요구할 수 있다. 잃어버린
물건에 대하여서는 그 사실을
모르고 가진 경우에도 반환을
요구할 수 있다.

Article 62. Request for return of
private property
A citizen can demand return of
his or her property from another
citizen who knowingly took over
the property from someone who
had no right to convey title
thereto. Regarding lost property,
its return may be requested even
from the one who took possession
of the property unknowingly.

제 63 조 (상속권)
국가는 개인소유재산에 대한

Article 63. Inheritance rights
The State guarantees inheritance rights over privately-owned
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상속권을 보장한다. 공민의
개인소유재산은 법에 따라
상속된다. 공민은 유언에
의하여서도 자기 소유의 재산을
가정성원이나 그 밖의 공민
또는 기관, 기업소, 단체에
넘겨줄 수 있다.

property. A citizen’s private property is inherited pursuant to law.
Citizens may, by testament, transfer any private property to their
family members or other citizens,
institutions, business entities, or
organizations.

제 3 편 채권채무제도

BOOK 3. SYSTEM OF RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS

제 1 장 일반규정

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

제 64 조(채권자와 채무자의
지위)
채권자는 일정한 재산상
행위를 수행할 것을 요구할 수
있는 권리를 가지며 채무자는
일정한 재산상 행위를 수행하여
야 할 의무를 가진다.

Article 64. Status of creditors and
debtors
A creditor has the right to demand fulfillment of a certain obligation, while a debtor has an obligation to perform a certain obligation.

제 65 조(채권자와
채무자사이의 권리의무)
채권채무관계에서 채권자와
채무자는 권리를 가지면서 그에
대응한 의무를 함께 가질 수도
있고 권리나 의무의 하나만을
가질 수도 있다.

Article 65. Rights and obligations
between creditor and debtor
In a relationship involving obligations, the creditor and the
debtor may have rights and corresponding obligations or have either a right or an obligation.

제 66 조(채권채무관계의
발생기초)
채권채무관계는
인민경제계획을 비롯한
국가의 행정문건이나 계약 그
밖의 행위와 사건에 기초하여
설정된다.

Article 66. Doctrinal foundation of
obligations
Obligations result from the
State’s administrative documentation, including the People’s Economic Plan, contracts, or other juridical acts and facts.
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제 67 조(채무이행의 방조)
채권자는 채무자의
채무리행에 응당한 방조를
주어야 한다. 이 의무를 어기여
채무리행에 지장을 준 채권자는
채권
에 제한을 받거나 해당한
책임을 진다.

[Vol. 14

Article 67. Assistance in the performance of obligations
A creditor shall provide any relevant assistance to the debtor in
the performance of the obligation.
A creditor who has adversely affected the debtor’s performance in
violation of this obligation cannot
exercise his or her right in full or
assume appropriate liability.

제 68 조(채무위반으로 생기는
손해방지)
채권자는 채무자가 채무를
어기
여 생긴 손해가 커지는 것을
막기 위한 대책을 세워야 한다.
이 의무
를 어기여 손해가 커진 경우에
보상을 요구할 채권자의 권리는
그만큼
제한된다.

Article 68. Mitigation of damage
resulting from default
A creditor shall devise a plan to
mitigate any damage resulting
from the debtor’s default. When
this obligation is violated and results in additional damage or loss,
the creditor’s right to seek damages shall be reduced proportionately.

제 69 조(채권채무관계에서의
값)
채권채무관계에서 값은
국가가 정하였거나
평가한 값 또는 당사자들이
합의한 값으로 정하고
계산한다.

Article 69. Values in an obligation

제 70 조(여러 당사자들 사이의
채권채무)
채권채무관계에서 채권자나
채무자가 여럿인 경우에 각자는
채권이나 채무의 몫을 분할하여
가질 수도 있고 련대적으로
가질 수도 있다.

Article 70. Obligations with multiple parties
In an obligation involving multiple creditors or debtors, the
creditors and debtors may have
the right or obligation proportionately or solidarily.

A value or price in an obligation will be determined and computed by what the State has determined or assessed or based on
what the parties have agreed
upon.
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제 71 조(분할채권채무자의
권리의무)
분할채권자들은 자기 몫의
리행만을
요구할 권리를 가지며
분할채무자들은 자기 몫의
채무만을 리행할 의무를 진다.
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Article 71. Rights and obligations
of a creditor and debtor to a divisible obligation
The creditor of a divisible obligation is only entitled to demand
performance of the creditor’s
share of the obligation, while a
debtor of a divisible obligation is
obligated to perform the debtor’s
share of the obligation.

제 72 조(몫이 명백치 않은
분할채권의무)
분할채권자들이 가지는
청구의 몫이나 분할채무자들이
지는 의무의 몫이 다르다는
것이 명백하지 않은 경우에 그
몫은 같은 것으로 본다.

Article 72. Divisible obligations
without defined prestations
In a divisible obligation in
which it is not feasible to ascertain whether the prestations
among the creditors or debtors are
unequal, such prestations will be
presumed equal.

제 73 조(련대채권채무의 의무)
련대채권자들은 저마다
채무의 전부 리행
을 요구할 권리를 가지며
련대채무자들은 저마다 채무를
전부 리행할 의무를 진다.

Article 73. Solidary obligations
Solidary creditors are each entitled to demand performance of the
entire obligation, while solidary
debtors are each obligated to perform the entire obligation.

제 74 조(련대채권자,
채무자들사이의 관계)
채무를 전부 리행한
련대채무자는 다른
련대채무자들에게 그들 각자가
부담하여야 할 몫을 보상하도록
요구할 권리를 가지며 채무를
전부 리행받은 련대채권자는
다른 련대채권자들에게 해당한
몫을 나누어줄 의무를 진다.

Article 74. Relationship among
solidary creditors and debtors
A solidary debtor who has rendered the whole prestation is entitled to demand performance from
the remaining debtors their individual shares, while a solidary
creditor who has received the
whole prestation is obligated to
distribute such prestation on a
pro-rata basis to the other creditors.
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제 75 조 (련대채권자의
청구권행사제한)
련대채권자는 자기의
청구권을 행사하는데서 다른
련대채권자의 리익을 침범하지
말아야 한다. 한 련대채권자가
자기의 청구권을 포기한 경우에
그것은 다른 련대채권자에게
영향을 주지 않 는다.

Article 75. Restriction on a solidary creditor’s right to claim
In exercising their right to
claim, a solidary creditor shall not
affect the rights of the remaining
solidary creditors. If a solidary
creditor waives his or her right to
claim, such waiver shall not affect
the remaining joint creditors.

제 76 조 (련대채무의 면제)

Article 76. Waiver of a solidary
obligation
When a creditor waives the obligation of a solidary debtor, the
shares of remaining debtors will
diminish in proportion to the obligation waived.

채권자가 한 련대채무자의
채무를 면제시킨 경우 그가
부담하기로 되었던 몫만큼 다른
련대채무자의 몫은 적어진다.
제 77 조 (채권채무의 양도)
채권자나 채무자는 자기의
채권이나 채무를 제 3 자에게
넘겨줄수 있다.
채권을 제 3 자에게
넘겨주려는 채권자는 그에
대하여 채무자에게 알려야 하며
채무를 제 3 자에게 넘겨주려는
채무자는 채권자의 동의를 미리
받아야 한다.
제 78 조 (제 3 자의 허물로 생긴
채무)
제 3 자의 허물로 생긴 채무를
채권자앞에 리행한 당사자는
제 3 자에게 해당한 보상을
요구할 권리를 가진다.

Article 77. Transfer of rights and
obligations
A creditor or a debtor may
transfer or assign their rights or
obligations to a third party. In
such event, the creditor must inform the debtor regarding the
transfer or assignment, and the
debtor must obtain the creditor’s
prior consent.

Article 78. Obligations resulting
from the fault of a third party
A party who has performed in
favor of a creditor an obligation
resulting from the fault of a third
party is entitled to a relevant compensation from the third party.
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제 79 조 (채무리행당사자)
채무자는 채무를 자기가 직접
리행하여야 한다. 채무자가
직접 리행하지 않아도 될
채무는 제 3 자에게 위임하여
리행하게 할수 있따. 이 경우
채무자는 제 3 자의 채무리행에
대하여 채권자 앞에 책임진다.

제 80 조 (채무리행기간의 준수)
채무자는 채무를 정해진
기간안에 리행하여야 한다.
채무리행을 지연시키거나
채무리행의 접수를 지연시킨
당사자는 그에 대한 책임을
진다.
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Article 79. Party responsible for
performance
A debtor is personally liable for
an obligation. Regarding an obligation for which personal performance by the debtor is not required, the debtor may authorize a
third party to perform instead. In
this case, the debtor will remain
responsible to the creditor for the
third party’s performance of the
obligation.
Article 80. Performance within
term
An obligor must perform an obligation within the term agreed
upon. The party that has delayed
performance of an obligation or
acceptance of what has been performed will be liable for such delay.

제 81 조 (채무리행방법)
법이나 계약에서 달리 정하지
않은 한 채무는 한번에
리행하여야 하며 채무를 나누어
리행하는 경우 채권자는 그
리행의 접수를 거절할 수 있다.

Article 81. Means of performance
Unless otherwise established by
the law or a contract, an obligation will be performed on a singleperformance basis. When an obligation is performed in installments, the creditor is entitled to
refuse such performance.

제 82 조 (채무리행에서 물건의
질)
징표가 같은 종류의 물건으로
유상으로 넘겨주는
채권채무관계에서 채무자는
질이 가장 좋은 물건을
넘겨주어야 한다. 물건을
무상으로 넘겨주기로 되어있을
경우에는 중간정도의 질을 가진
물건을 넘겨줄수 있다.

Article 82. The quality of goods in
performing an obligation
In an obligation involving paid
transfer of things designated in
species, the debtor will hand over
a thing of the best available quality. When an obligation involves a
gratuitous transfer of things, the
obligor may hand over a thing of
medium quality.
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제 83 조 (특정물이 없어졌거나
쓸 수 없게 된 경우의 채권채무)
징표가 다른 특정된 물건을
대상으로 하는
채권채무관계에서 그 물건이
없어졌거나 쓸수 없게된 경우
해당 채권채무관계는 없어진다.
그러나 손해에 대하여서는
허물있는자가 보상할 책임을
진다. 징표가 같은 종류의
물건을 넘겨주기로 한
채권채무관계에서 물건이
없어졌거나 손상되면 채무자는
같은 종류의 다른 물건을
넘겨주어야 한다.

[Vol. 14

Article 83. An obligation when a
specific thing is lost or rendered
obsolete
In an obligation involving a
specific thing, when such thing is
lost or its use is rendered obsolete,
the obligation is extinguished. Regarding any resulting loss, however, the party at fault will assume
liability therefor. In an obligation
involving transfer of generic
things, when such a thing is lost or
damaged, the debtor is obliged to
provide for another thing of the
same species.

제 84 조 (종류물의
특정물에로의 전환)
징표가 같은 종류의
물건가운데서 채권채무의
대상이 개별적으로 정하여진
그때로부터 그 대상물은 징표가
다른 특정된 물건으로 된다.

Article 84. Conversion of generic
things into specific things
As soon as the object of an obligation is specifically identified
among generic things, the object
will turn into a specific thing.

제 85 조 (종속재산의 인도)

Article 85. Transfer of component
parts
In an obligation involving
transfer of property, any component parts annexed thereto should
be transferred as well.

재산을 넘겨주는
채권채무관계에서는 넘겨주는
재산과 함께 그에 종속된
재산도 넘겨주어야 한다.
제 86 조 (채무리행장소)
채무는 법이나 계약이
정한곳에서 리행하여야 한다.
법이나 계약에서 정하지 않은
경우 돈으로 물어야 할 채무는
채권자의 주소지나

Article 86. Place of performance
An obligation will be performed
at the place designated by law or
contract. When such place is not
otherwise designated, an obligation involving payment of money
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거래은행에서, 부동산으로
넘겨주어야 할 채무는 부동산
소재지에서 그 밖의 채무는
채무자의 소재지 또는
주소지에서 리행하여 한다.

will be performed at the creditor’s
address or trading bank, an obligation involving transfer of an immovable at the location of the immovable, and all other obligations
will be performed at the debtor’s
fixed residence or address.

제 87 조 (보상한 파손물의
소유권)
채무의 대상으로 된 물건을
심히 손상시킨 경우에 그 값의
전부를 보상한자는 해당 물건에
대한 소유권을 가진다.

Article 87. Title to a destroyed
thing for which payment is made
If a thing that has become the
object of an obligation is damaged
beyond economic repair, the person who has paid in full therefor
will acquire title over the thing.

제 88 조 (채권채무관계에서
선택권)
채권채무관계에서 당사자는
여러 행위들 가운데서 어느
하나를 선택하여 수행하는
것으로 정할 수 있다. 법이나
계약에서 행위의 선택권을
가지는 자를 정하지 않은 경우
선택권은 채무자에게 있다.

Article 88. Right to choose in an
obligation
The parties to an obligation
may choose to perform one of
multiple performance options. Unless otherwise prescribed by law
or contract, the right to choose the
performance option lies with the
debtor.

제 89 조 (선택권행사의 지연)

Article 89. Delay in the exercise
of choice
When the party with the right to
choose fails to make a choice until
the period of performance elapses,
the right of choice will shift over
to the other party.

선택권을 가진 자가
채무리행기간이 되도록 행위를
선택하지 않으면 선택권은
상대방에 넘어간다.
제 90 조 (계약의 체결)
계약은 한편 당사자의 제의와
상대편 당사자의 승낙에 의하여
이루어진다. 제의를 한
당사자는 상대방이 그 제외를
접수한 때로부터 해당 제의를
일방적으로 취소할 수 없다.

Article 90. Formation of contract
A contract is made by a party’s
offer and the other party’s acceptance thereof. The party making an offer cannot unilaterally
cancel the offer after the other
party has received such offer.
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제 91 조 (계약의 합의조건)
계약당사자는 계약대상,
리행기간, 값 같은
본질적조건에 대하여 합의를
보아야 한다. 공민에게
불로소득을 가져다주는
계약내용은 설정할 수 없다.

Article 91. Terms of contract
Contracting parties must agree
on the essential terms of a contract such as its object, period of
performance, and price. It is forbidden to enter into any contracts
that result in unearned income to
a citizen.2

제 92 조 (계약체결방식)
계약은 유상으로 맺을수도
있고 무상으로 맺을수도 있다.
기관, 기업소, 단체가 참가하는
계약은 유상으로 맺는다.

Article 92. Types of contracts
Contracts may be gratuitous or
onerous. Contracts to which institutions, business entities, and organizations are parties are onerous.

제 93 조 (계약의 형식)
기관, 기업소, 단체 사이의
계약은 서면으로 맺는다. 말로
계약을 맺는 경우에는 그
사실이 증명되어야 한다. 기관,
기업소, 단체와 공민사이,
공민사이의 계약은 법을 달리
정하지 않은 한 말로 맺을 수
있다. 계약의 체결과 내용에
대하여 분쟁이 생긴 경우
서면으로 맺은 계약은 재판이나
중재에서 우선적으로
인정받는다.

Article 93. Contract formalities
Contracts between institutions,
business entities, and organizations shall be in writing. When entered into orally, the contract has
to be proven. Contracts between
an institution, business entity, or
organization, on the one hand,
and a citizen, on the other hand,
or a contract between citizens may
be entered into orally unless the
law prescribes otherwise. In the
event of a dispute over the formation and terms of a contract, a
written contract prevails in court
or arbitration proceedings.

2. Translator’s note: In relation to overarching prohibition on unearned income under this article, as further set forth in Article 221 of the DPRK Civil Code,
while lending and borrowing money or goods between citizens is permitted, all
private loan agreements in the DPRK shall be gratuitous. Hence, entering into a
loan agreement with interest or equivalent charges is prohibited in principle.
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제 94 조 (부동산거래계약)
부동산거래를 내용으로 하는
계약은 서면으로 맺고 공증을
받아야 효력을 가진다.
제 95 조 (계약의 동시리행)
두 당사자들이 다같이 의무를
지는 계약은 서로 동시에
리행하는것을 원칙으로 한다.
한편 당사자가 자기의 의무를
리행하지 않은 경우 상대편
당사자는 자기의 의무리행을
보류할 수 있다. 채권자는
채무자가 정해진 기간에 의무를
리행하지 않을 경우 채권대상을
잡아둘수 있다.
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Article 94. Immovable sale contract
A contract dealing with the sale
of an immovable is not valid unless it is executed in writing and
notarized.
Article 95. Concurrent performance of contract
In principle, a bilateral contract
between two parties, in which both
sides undertake obligations, is to
be performed concurrently. But if
a party has failed to perform that
party’s obligations, the other party
may suspend the performance of
that other party’s obligations. A
creditor may put the object of obligation on hold if the debtor fails to
perform the obligations within the
prescribed period.

제 96 조 (계약의 취소)
한편 당사자가 정해진
기간안에 계약을 리행하지 않을
경우 상대편 당사자는 계약을
취소할 수 있으며 그것으로
하여 입은 손해를 보상받을 수
있다.

Article 96. Termination of contract
If a party does not perform a
contract within the period agreed
upon, the other party may terminate the contract and receive compensation for any damage resulting from the termination.

제 97 조 (계약대상의 검사)

Article 97. Inspection of the object
of the contract
The party that has received the
object of the contract must inspect
it in a timely fashion and notify the
other party of any manifest defect.
The party who is at fault for the
defect must fix it, offer a replacement for the defective object, or
lower its value.

계약대상을 접수한자는
그것을 제때에 검사하고 나타난
결함을 상대방에 알려야 한다.
계약대상의 결함에 대하여
허물있는자는 결함을
고쳐주거나 대상을 다른 것으로
바꾸어주거나 그 값을 낮추어야
한다.
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제 98 조 (계약대상의 숨은
결함에 대한 책임)
계약대상을 접수한자는 숨은
결함을 상대방에 알려 책임을
물을수 있다. 숨은 결함에 대한
책임은 정해진 기간안에 물어야
한다.

Article 98. Liability for latent defects
The party who has received the
object of the contract is entitled to
hold the other party liable for a
latent defect therein upon notification of the defect. Liability for
redhibitory defects must be
claimed within a prescribed period.

제 99 조 (계약대상이
없어졌거나 손상된데 대한
책임)
계약대상을 점유하고
있는자는 그것이 없어졌거나
손상된데 대하여 책임져야
한다. 그러나 계약 당사자에게
허물이 없거나 자연재해 같이
어찌할 수 없는 사유로
계약대상이 없어졌거나
손상된데 대하여서는 책임지지
않는다.

Article 99. Liability for the loss or
destruction of the object of the
contract

제 100 조 (제 3 자를 위한 계약)
계약은 제 3 자를 위하여 맺을
수 있다. 이 경우에 계약의
효력은 계약을 맺은자와 함께
제 3 자에게도 발생한다.

Article 100. Contract for thirdparty beneficiaries
Contracts can be entered into
for the benefit of a third party. In
this case, the effect of such a contract is extended not only to the
contracting parties, but also to the
third-party beneficiary.

제 2 장 계획에 기초하는 계약

CHAPTER 2. CONTRACTS
BASED ON PLANNING

제 101 조 (계획에 기초하는
계약의 목적)
계획에 기초하는 계약은
인민경제계획을 실행하며

A party who possesses the object of contract is liable for any
loss or damage of the object. Despite the foregoing, the party in
possession is not liable for the loss
or damage for which that party is
not at fault or otherwise caused by
inevitable reasons, including fortuitous events.

Article 101. Purpose of contracts
based on planning
A contract based on planning
will be entered into pursuant to
the People’s Economic Plan to
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경제관리에서 독립채산재를
정확히 실시하기 위하여
인민경제계획에 기초하여
맺는다.

implement the plan and to accurately enforce an independent settlement system in the context of
economic management.

제 102 조 (계획에 기초하는
계약의 설정)
계약당사자는
인민경제계획을 가장 정확히
합리적으로 수행할 수 있도록
계약내용을 정하여 한다. 기관,
기업소, 단체는 계획에 명백히
부족점이 있다고 인정되는 경우
그에 대하여 계획기관에 제때에
알려야 한다.

Article 102. Terms of a contract
based on planning
Contracting parties are obligated to determine the terms of
contract so that the People’s Economic Plan can be implemented in
the most accurate and reasonable
fashion. Institutions, business entities, and organizations should inform the planning agency in a
timely manner if the Plan is
deemed to contain obvious shortcomings.

제 103 조 (계약의 성립시기)
계약은 법이 정한 모든
사항들에 대하여 합의가
이루어진 때에 맺어진다.
계약을 맺는데서 의견상이는
중재절차로 해결한다.

Article 103. Contract formation
A contract is entered into when
agreement is reached on all matters prescribed by law. Any dispute relating to contract formation
will be resolved by arbitration.

제 104 조 (계획에 기초하는
계약의 변경)
계약은 인민경제계획이
추가되거나 조절되면 그에 따라
변경된다. 계약의 변경은
계획의 추가, 조절에 관한
통지를 한편 당사자가
상대방으로부터 받았거나 계약
쌍방이 권한있는
국가기관으로부터 받은 때에
이루어진다.

Article 104. Amendment to contract based on planning
A contract will be modified accordingly when the People’s Economic Plan is supplemented or adjusted. Amendments to a contract
will occur when a party receives a
notice of supplementation or adjustment to the Plan from the other
party or when both parties receive
such a notice from a competent
State agency.
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제 105 조 (자재공급계약의
체결)
기관, 기업소, 단체가 국가의
자재공급계획에 기초하여
자재를 주고받는 행위는
자재공급계약에 따라한다.
자재공급계약은 대안의
사업체계의 요구와 자재를
주고받는데서 상업적형태를
리용한테 대한 국가적요구에
맞게 맺고 리행하여야 한다.

Article 105. Formation of a material-supply contract
The act of exchanging supplies
by institutions, business entities,
and organizations under the
State’s material-supply plan will
be pursuant to a material-supply
contract. Material-supply contracts must be entered into and
performed in accordance with demands of the Taean3 business system and of the State in exchanging
materials by utilizing the medium
of commerce.

제 106 조 (자재공급계약의
당사자)
자재공급계약의 당사자로는
국가의 자재공급세부계획에
따라 자재를 주고받는 기관,
기업소, 단체가 된다.
자재공급계약에 의하여
공급자는 계획에 예견된 자재를
수요자에게 넘겨줄 의무를 지며
수요자는 그것을 넘겨받고
해당한 값을 몰 의무를 진다.

Article 106. Parties to a materialsupply contract
Parties to a material-supply
contract are institutions, business
entities, and organizations that exchange materials according to the
State’s detailed material-supply
plan. Under a material-supply
contract, a supplier is obligated to
deliver the materials stated in the
Plan to the consumer, and the consumer is obligated to accept them
and pay the corresponding value.

제 107 조 (자재공급계약의
합의조건)
자재공급계약의 당사자는
공급할 자재의 이름, 규격, 질,
공급기간, 수량, 값과 그것을
주고받는 방법, 포장하는 방법,
거래은행 같은 조건에 대하여
합의를 보아야 한다.

Article 107. Terms of a materialsupply contract
The parties to a material-supply
contract must agree on its terms,
including the name, specifications,
quality, supply period, quantity
and value of the goods to be supplied, means of exchanging and
packing the goods, and trading
bank.

3. See supra note 1.
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제 108 조 (자재공급방법)
공급자는 자재를 제때에
운수기관을 통하여
실어보내주거나 자기 창고에서
수요자에게 내주어 야 한다.
운수기관을 통한 수송조직에
대하여서는 공급자가 책임지며
여기에 드는 수송비는 수
용자가 부담한다.
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Article 108. Method of supplying
materials
A supplier must deliver materials on time through carriers or
hand them over directly to the customer from the supplier’s own
warehouse. When delivering
goods through a carrier, the supplier is responsible for the overall
scheme of logistics and for the
costs of transportation incurred
thereby.

공급된 자재의 검수는
수요자가 한다. 수요자는
자재에 사고가 있으면 공급자를
립회시키고 그로부터
사고조서를 받을 수 있다.
정당한 리유없이 사고확인을
지연시키거나 거절한 당사자는
수요자가 작성한 사고조서에
근거하여 책임진다.

Article 109. Inspection of materials supplied
A consumer is responsible for
inspecting any materials supplied.
In the event of an incident relating
to supplied materials, the consumer is entitled to an incident report from the supplier in the presence of the supplier. The party
who delays or refuses to confirm
the occurrence of an incident
without justifiable grounds is liable on the basis of an incident report drawn up by the consumer.

제 110 조 (공급된 자재의 숨은
결함처리)
공급된 자재의 숨은 결함을
발견한 수요자는 공급자에게
알리고 그로부터 사고조서를
받아야 한다. 긴급하거나
사고의 원인과 내용에 대하여
분쟁이 있을 경우에는 해당
감독기관의 참가 밑에
사고조서를 작성할 수 있다.
숨은 결함에 대하여 수요자는
자재를 넘겨받은 때로부터
3 개월 안에, 기계설비인

Article 110. Curing redhibitory
vices in the materials supplied
Upon discovery of redhibitory
vices in the materials supplied, the
consumer must inform the supplier
and receive an incident report
from the supplier. In the event of
an emergency or a dispute over
the cause and particulars of an incident, an incident report may be
drawn up in the presence of supervisory authority. For redhibitory
vices, the consumer can hold the
supplier accountable within three
months from the delivery of

제 109 조 (공급된 자재의 검수)
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경우에는 시 운전이 끝날
때까지 공급자에게 책임을 물을
수 있다.

materials or, in the case of machinery, until the trial run is complete.

제 111 조 (계약된 자재의
공급조절)
수요자가 공급받은 자재를
사장랑비하여 지불능력을 잃은
경우 공급자는 계약된 자재의
공급을 조절할 수 있다.

Article 111. Control of the supply
of contracted materials
If the consumer becomes incapable to make payments by wasting or squandering supplied materials, the supplier can control the
supply of contracted materials.

제 112 조 (자재값의 청산)
수요자는 자재를 넘겨받은
다음에 값을 제때에 물어야
한다. 자재의 품종, 규격, 질
값이 계약조건과 맞지 않을
경우 수요자는 값을 물지 않고
자재를 공급 자에게 돌려보낼
수 있다. 그러나 변질될 수
있거나 긴급한 대책을 요구하는
자재는 돌려보내지 않고 값만
낮출 수 있다.

Article 112. Settlement of the
price of materials
Upon receipt of materials, the
consumer will make timely payments. If a specific material’s type,
specifications, or quality values do
not conform to the terms of contract, the consumer can return the
non-conforming material to the
supplier without payment. However, for any material that may deteriorate or requires urgent countermeasures, the customer may
keep them with a proportionate reduction in price.

제 113 조 (상품공급계약의
체결)
기관, 기업소, 단체들이
국가의 상품공급계획에
기초하여 상품을 주고받는
행위는 상품공급 계 약에
따라한다. 상품공급계약은
주문제에 의하여 생산과 소비를
옳게 련결시키며 인민들의
물질문화적수요를 충족시킬데
대한 국가적요구에 맞게 맺고
리행하여야 한다.

Article 113. Formation of productsupply contracts
Any act of exchanging goods by
institutions, business entities, and
organizations pursuant to the
State product-supply plan will be
subject to product-supply contracts. A product-supply contract
will properly interconnect production and consumption based on
bespoke order system, meet the requirements of the State in furtherance of the material and cultural
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demands of the People, and be
performed accordingly.
제 114 조
(상품공급계약당사자의 의무)
상품공급계약에 의하여
공급자는 계획에 예견된
인민소비품을 수요자에게
넘겨줄 의무를 지며 수요자는
그것을 넘겨받고 해당한 값을
물 의무를 진다.

Article 114. Obligations of the
parties to a product-supply contract
Under the terms of a productsupply contract, the supplier is obligated to deliver consumables as
established in the Plan to the consumer, and the consumer is obligated to receive them and to pay a
corresponding price.

제 115 조 (상품공급계약의
당사자)
상품공급계약의 당사자로는
국가의 상품배정계획에 따라
상품을 주고받는 기업소와
도매상업 기업소,
소매상업기업소가 된다.
기업소의 제품판매를 담당한
상사, 협동농장도 계약당사자로
될 수 있다.

Article 115. Parties to a productsupply contract
The parties to a product-supply
contract include any business entity that exchanges products according to the State’s product allocation plan as well as wholesale
and retail business entities. A
trading entity or cooperative farm
responsible for product sales on
behalf of the supplier may also
qualify as a contracting party.

제 116 조 (상품공급계약의
합의조건)
상품공급계약의 당사자는
이번 제 107 조에서 규정하고
있는 조건에 대하여 합의를
보아야 한다.

Article 116. Contractual terms relating to a product-supply contract
The parties to a product-supply
contract must agree on its terms
and conditions as set forth in Article 107 above.

제 117 조 (상품공급방법)

Article 117. Method of delivery of
products
A supplier must deliver contracted products on time through a
carrier or deliver them directly to
the consumer’s warehouse. In
each case, the product must be accompanied by a written statement

공급자는 상품을 제때에
운수기관을 통하여
실어보내거나 수요자의
창고까지 날라다주어야 한다.
이 경우에 상품과 함께 그
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명세서를 수요자에게
보내주어야 한다.

of supply addressed to the consumer.

제 118 조 (공급된 상품의 검수)

Article 118. Inspection of supplied
products
The consumer is responsible for
inspection of the supplied products, and curing any vices that are
discovered in the process is subject to Article 109(2) of this Code.

공급된 상품의 검수는
수요자가 하며 그 과정에
나타난 결함에 대한 사고처리는
이 법 제 109 조 2 항의 규정에
따라 한다.
제 119 조 (공급된 상품의 숨은
결함처리)
공급된 상품의 숨은 결함에
대한 사고처리는 이 법 제 110 조
제 1 항의 규정에 따라 한다.
신용보증기간이 정하여지지
않은 상품의 숨은 결함에
대하여서는 상품을 넘겨받은
때부터 3 개 월안에 책임을 물을
수 있다.

Article 119. Curing redhibitory
vices in supplied goods
Redhibitory vices in supplied
products shall be cured in accordance with Article 110(1) of this
Code. Regarding any product
redhibitory vices for which a contractual warranty is unavailable,
those vices can be claimed within
three months from delivery of the
product.

제 120 조
(농업생산물수매계약의 체결)
수매기관이 국가의
수매계획에 기초하여 농산물을
사들이는 행위는
농업생산물수매계약에 따라
한다. 농업생산물수매계약은
량곡과 원료를 계획적으로
동원하며 농장원들의
생산의욕을 높일데 대한 국가적
요구에 맞게 맺고 리행하여야
한다.

Article 120. Formation of an agricultural produce purchase contract
The act of buying agricultural
products by purchasing agencies
based on the State’s purchasing
plan is subject to the terms of an
agricultural produce purchase
contract. Agricultural produce
purchase contracts should be executed and carried out in accordance with national demands for
planned mobilization of mass
crops and raw materials, with a
view to incentivizing farmers’ crop
production.
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제 121 조(농업생산물수매계약
당사자의
의무)
농업생산물수매계약에
의하여 생산자는 합의한
농산물을 생산하여 수매기관에
넘겨줄 의무를 지며 수매기관은
그것을 넘겨받고 해당한 값을
물 의무를 진다.

Article 121. Obligations of parties
to an agricultural produce purchase contract

제 122 조(농업생산물수매계약
의 합의조건)
농업생산물수매계약의
당사자들은 수매품의 수매기간,
수량, 값, 질, 규격과 보관,
수송방법 같은 조건에 대하여
합의를 보아야 한다.

Article 122. The terms of an agricultural produce purchase contract
The parties to a contract for the
purchase of agricultural produce
must agree on its terms and conditions, such as the period of purchase, quantity, value, quality,
specifications, storage, and means
of transportation in relation to the
produce being purchased.

제 123 조(수매품의 질과 규격)
수매품의 질과 규격은 국가의
수매계획에 따라 정한다.
국가의 수매계획에 지적하지
않은 경우에는 당사자들이
합의하여 정한다.

Article 123. Quality and specifications of purchased goods
The quality and specifications
of purchased goods are determined based on the State purchasing plan. The parties must agree
on those terms separately and decide on them, if they are not already indicated on the State purchasing plan.

제 124 조(수매품의 포장재와
용기)
수매품의 포장재와 용기는
수매기관이 보장한다.
생산자가 마련하게 된 포장재와
용기는 생산자가 보장한다. 이

Article 124. Packaging and containers of purchased goods
The packaging and containers
of purchased goods are warranted
by the purchasing agency. The
packaging and containers

Under a contract for the purchase of agricultural produce, the
producer is obligated to produce
the agricultural produce agreed
upon and deliver such produce
over to the purchasing agency,
and the purchasing agency is responsible for receiving the produce and making a corresponding
payment.
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경우 그 값은 수매기관이 부담
한다.

provided by the producer are warranted by the producer, in which
case the value of such packaging
and containers shall be borne by
the purchasing agency.

제 125 조(수매기간)
계약당사자는 수매기간을
지켜야 한다. 수매기관은
계약한 기간 안에 농산물을
수매하지 못하였을 경우에
생산자가 입은 손해를
보상하여야 한다.

Article 125. Term of purchase
Contracting parties must observe the period of purchase. The
purchasing agency must pay damages to the producer damages if
the agency fails to purchase the
agricultural produce within the
period established in the contract.

제 126 조(수매할 농산물의
검사)
수매기관은 농산물의 질을
정확히 검사하고 그 량을
계량하여 수매하여야 한다.
농산물은 창자나 창고에 넣어
용적을 계산하는 방법으로
수매할 수 없다.

Article 126. Inspection of produce
to be purchased
Purchasing agencies must purchase agricultural produce by accurately inspecting the quality of
produce and measuring its quantity. Agricultural produce cannot
be purchased in the form of measuring their volumes by placing
them in storages or warehouses.

제 127 조(수매한 농산물의
보관)
생산자의 창고나 현지에서
수매한 농산물을 가져가거나
보관할 책임은 수매기관이
진다. 그러나 포장하지 않고
수매한 량곡과 부피가 큰
수매품은 수매기관의 책임밑에
생산자에게 보관시 킬수 있다.

Article 127. Storage of purchased
agricultural produce
It is the purchasing agency’s responsibility to take away or store
agricultural produce purchased at
the producer’s warehouse or otherwise locally purchased. However, any grains purchased without packaging or bulky items may
be stored at the producer’s premises under the responsibility of the
purchasing agency.
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제 128 조(기본건설시공계약의
체결)
기관, 기업소, 단체가 국가의
기본건설계획에 기초하여
기본건설을 위탁하는 행위는
기본건설 시공계약에 따라
한다. 기본건설시공계약은
건설을 집중화하며 건설원가를
낮추고 건설물의 질을 높일데
대한 국가적 요구에 맞게 맺고
리행하여야 한다.

Article 128. Formation of a basic
construction contract
The act of entrusting basic construction by institutions, business
entities, and organizations based
on the State basic construction
plan is subject to the terms of a
basic construction contract. Basic
construction contracts must be executed and performed in accordance with national demands for
centralizing construction, lowering construction costs, and improving the overall quality of nationwide constructions.

제 129 조(기본건설시공계약
당사자의 의무)
기본건설시공계약에 의하여
시공주는 건설대상을 완공하여
건설주에게 넘겨줄 의무를 지며
건설주는 정해진 건설조건을
보장하고 완공된 건설물을
제때에 넘겨받을 의무를 진다.

Article 129. Obligations of parties
to a basic construction contract
Under a basic construction contract, a contractor is obligated to
complete the object of construction and transfer it to the owner
upon completion. The owner is obligated to guarantee the specified
terms of construction and to accept the completed object of construction on time.

제 130 조(기본건설시공계약의
합의조건)
기본건설시공계약의
당사자들은 건설대상과 규모,
건설대상의 착공, 완공날자와
당사자들이 지 켜야 할 사항
같은 조건에 대하여 합의를
보아야 한다.
기본건설시공계약은
계획년도를 기준으로 하여
건설대상별로 맺는다.

Article 130. Terms of a basic construction contract
The parties to a basic construction contract must agree on the
terms and conditions of construction, including the object of construction and its size, the respective dates of construction commencement and completion, and
any other conditions that the parties must comply with. Basic construction contracts are entered
into for each object of construction based on the annual period of
planning.
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제 131 조(건설조건의 보장)
건설주는 공사에 지장이
없도록 건설부지와 설계를
보장하여야 한다.
건설부지안의 건설과
시설물을 옮기는 작업은
건설주의 위탁에 의하여
시공주가 할 수 있다.
제 132 조(건설대상의 착공 및
완공날자와 조업기일준수)
시공주는 건설대상의 착공 및
완공날자와 조업기일을 지켜야
하며 설계와 기술문건대로
공사의 질을 보장하여야 한다.

제 133 조(공사실적의 확인)
건설주는 건설공사에 지장이
없도록 시공주의 공사실적을
제때에 확인해 주어야 한다.

제 134 조(건설물의 인계인수)
시공주와 건설주는
준공검사에서 합격된
건설물만을 넘겨주고 받을 수
있다. 준공검사는 계약된
공사가 끝나고 조업능력에
해당한 부하시운전이
진행되었을 경우에 한다.

[Vol. 14

Article 131. Guarantee of the
terms of construction
The owner must arrange the site
of construction and design so that
the underlying construction is not
unduly interfered with. At the entrustment of the owner, the contractor may carry out work at the
site of construction, while relocating related facilities.
Article 132. Observance of the
dates of commencement and completion of construction and of
work milestones
A contractor must duly observe
the agreed dates of commencement and completion of construction as well as work milestones
and also ensure the quality of construction according to relevant design and technical documentation.
Article 133. Confirmation on the
progress of construction
The owner should check on the
progress of construction in a
timely manner so that the underlying construction is not unduly interfered with.
Article 134. Delivery and acceptance of construction deliverables
The contractor may only deliver, and the owner may accept,
the deliverables of construction
that have passed the completion
inspection. A completion inspection may be conducted if, upon
completion of the contracted construction, the load test run
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corresponding to the operational
capacity is in progress.
제 135 조(건설물의 보증)
시공주는 건설물을
건설주에게 넘겨준 때부터
1 년안에 나타난 결함에 대하여
고쳐줄 의무를 진다. 이 경우
드는 비용은 허물있는자가
부담한다.
제 136 조(화물수송계약의 체결)
국가의 수송계획에 맞물린
짐을 운수기관을 통하여 나르는
행위는 화물수송계약에
따라한다. 화물수송계약은
수송조직을 합리적으로 하여
화물수송계획을 질량적으로
수행할 데 대한 국가적 요구에
맞게 맺고 리행하여야 한다.

Article 135. Guarantee on construction
The contractor is obligated to
correct defects appearing within
one year from the final delivery of
the construction to the owner. In
this case, the cost of correction is
borne by the party at fault.
Article 136. Formation of cargo
transportation contracts
Carrying of cargoes through a
carrier in accordance with the
State transport plan is subject to
the terms of a cargo transportation contract. The cargo transportation contract must be executed
and performed in accordance with
the requirements of the State for
rationalizing the system of
transport to implement cargo
transport plans both qualitatively
and quantitatively.

제 137 조(화물수송계약당사자
의 의무)
화물수송계약에 의하여
짐보내는자는 짐을 운수기관에
넘겨주고 운임을 물 의무를
지며 운수 기관은 그 짐을
운반하여 짐받을자에게 넘겨줄
의무를 진다.

Article 137. Obligations of parties
to a cargo transportation contract
Under a cargo transportation
contract, the consignor is obligated to hand the cargo over to
the carrier and to pay for the
freight, and the carrier is obligated to ship the cargo out to the
consignee.

제 138 조(화물수송계약의
합의조건)
화물수송계약의 당사자는
짐의 이름, 수송량, 보내는 곳과
닿는 곳, 짐을 싣고부리는

Article 138. Terms of agreement
in a cargo transportation contract
The parties to a cargo transportation contract shall agree on its
terms and conditions including the
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방법과 보내는자, 받을자의
이름 같은 조건에 대하여
합의를 보아야 한다.

nomenclature of cargo, volume of
shipment, shipping point and destination point, the means of loading and unloading cargoes, and
the names of shipper and consignee, respectively.

제 139 조(짐과 운수수단의
보장)
짐보내는 자는 계약된 짐을
정해진 규격대로 운수기관에
제때에 넘겨주어야 하며
운수기관은 그 짐의 성격에
맞는 운수수단을 배정하여야
한다.

Article 139. Guarantee of cargoes
and means of transportation
A consignor must timely hand
over the contracted cargo to the
carrier, and the carrier must designate the means of transportation
suitable for the nature of the
cargo.

제 140 조(짐을 싣고부리는
작업)
짐을 싣고부리는 작업은 달리
합의된것이 없는 한 짐임자가
한다. 짐을 싣고부리는 작업을
맡은 당사자는 정해진
작업기간을 지켜야 한다.

Article 140. The work of loading
and unloading cargoes
Unless agreed otherwise, the
cargo owner is responsible for the
loading and unloading of cargoes.
The party responsible for the task
of loading and unloading must observe the specified period of work.

제 141 조(짐의 보관관리)

Article 141. The safekeeping of
cargoes
A carrier is responsible for
safekeeping the cargo until it is
handed over to the consignee.
Carriers shall neither make arbitrary use of the cargo being carried nor hand any cargo over to a
third party.

운수기관은 짐받을자에게
짐을 넘겨줄 때까지 잘
보관관리하여야 한다.
운수기관은 나르는 짐을
마음대로 쓰거나 남에게
넘겨주지 말아야 한다.
제 142 조(수송기간의 준수)
운수기관은 가장 합리적인
수송로를 거쳐 정한 기간안에
짐을 목적지까지 실어날라야
한다. 이 의무를 어긴 경우

Article 142. Observance of the
transportation period
A carrier must carry all cargoes
to their destination points within
the period agreed upon via the
most reasonable route of
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짐임자는 더 든 운임의 지불을
거절할수 있으며 늦게 도착한
짐에 대한 연 착보상금을 받을
수 있다.

shipment. If this obligation is violated, the cargo owner may refuse
to pay additional fares thereby incurred and be entitled to moratory
damages for any late deliveries.

제 143 조(도착짐의 통지)

Article 143. Notification of cargo
arrival
A carrier must timely inform the
consignee upon arrival of the
cargo at the point of destination.
The consignee must claim the
cargo within the specified period.
If this obligation is violated, the
consignee will be charged for storage fees or their equivalent. Storage charges or penalties for cargoes carried in the form of joint
shipment are calculated based on
the ratios set and applied by the
cargo carrier.

운수기관은 짐이 도착하면
제때에 짐받을자에게 알려야
한다. 짐받은자는 도착한 짐을
정한 기간안에 찾아가야 한다.
이 의무를 어기면 보관료나
해당한 료금을 물어야 한다.
련대수송으로 나른 짐에 대한
보관료나 제재금은 짐을
넘겨주는 운수기관이 적용하는
비률에 따라 계산한다.

제 144 조(도착짐의 검사)
짐받는자는 짐을 검사하고
사고가 있으면
운수기관으로부터 사고조서를
받고 해당한 손해보상을 청구할
수 있다. 정당한 리유없이
사고조서작성을 거절한
운수기관은 그 사고에 대하여
책임진다.
제 145 조(인민경제계획에
맞물리지 않은 화물의 수송)
기관, 기업소, 단체와 공민이
인민경제계획에 맞물리지 않은
짐을 운수기관을 통하여 나르는
것은 화물수송계약질서에
따른다.

Article 144. Inspection of cargos
arrived
Upon inspection of the cargo
arrived, the consignee may receive
an incident report from the carrier
in the event of an incident and
claim damages relating to the incident. A carrier that refuses to
draw up an incident report without justifiable grounds is held liable for the incident.
Article 145. Transportation of cargos not related to the People’s
Economic Plan
Transportation of cargos that
are not related to the People’s
Economic Plan, by institutions,
business entities, organizations, or
citizens through carriers is subject
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to the rules of the cargo carriage
contract.
제 3 장 계획에 기초하지 않는
계약

CHAPTER 3. CONTRACTS NOT
BASED ON PLANNING

제 146 조(계획에 기초하지 않는
계약의 목적)
계획에 기초하지 않는 계약은
국가의 인민적인 시책이
공민들에게 더 잘 미치도록
하며 기관, 기업소, 단체의
정상적인 경영활동을 보장하기
위하여 맺는다.

Article 146. Purpose of contracts
not based on planning
Contracts that are not based on
planning are entered into to ensure that the State’s people-oriented policies better reach out to
the citizens and also to guarantee
the normal management activities
of institutions, business entities,
and organizations.

제 147 조(계약을 체결할 수
없는 대상)
국가의 승인밑에서만 가질 수
있는 물건이나 희유금속, 그
밖의 국가통제품은 계약의
대상으로 될 수 없다.

Article 147. Objects that cannot be
subject to contracting
Any objects, rare metals, or
other state-controlled products
that can only be owned under national approval cannot form the
object of contract.

제 148 조(팔고사기계약의 체결)

Article 148. Formation of a purchase and sale contract
The act of selling and buying
items among retail business entities, purchasing agencies and citizens or between citizens shall be
in accordance with the terms of a
purchase and sale contract. Purchase and sale contracts will be
executed and performed to adequately ensure the People’s consumption demands.

소매상업기업소, 수매기관과
공민사이 또는 공민사이에
물건을 팔고사는 행위는
팔고사기계약에 따라 한다.
팔고사기계약은 인민들의
소비적수요를 원만히 보장할 수
있게 맺고 리행하여야 한다.
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제 149 조(팔고사기계약당사자
의 의무)
팔고사기계약에 의하여
파는자는 물건을 사는자에게
소유권을 넘겨줄 의무를 지며
사는자는 물건을 넘겨받고 값을
물 의무를 진다. 물건을 파는
것은 그에 대한 처분권이
있는자만이 할 수 있다.
처분권이 없는자가 물건을
판다는것을 알면서 맺은
팔고사기계약은 효력을 가지지
못한다.

제 150 조(소매계약당사자)
기업소가 생산하여 공급한
상품에 대한 팔고사기계약에서
파는자로는 소매상업기업소가
된다. 소매상업기업소는
주민들의 수요에 맞게
상품주문서를 만들고 상품을
제때에 확보하여 팔아주 어야
한다.
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Article 149. Obligations of the
parties to a purchase and sale contract
Under a purchase and sale contract, the seller is obligated to
hand over the ownership of the
goods being purchased to the
buyer, and the buyer is obligated
to accept said goods and pay the
purchase price. Selling goods may
only be done by those who have
the right to dispose of them. A purchase and sale contract entered
into with the knowledge that the
contemplated sale is by a person
without the right to sell or dispose
of the property is null.
Article 150. Parties to retail contracts
In a purchase and sale contract
related to goods produced and
supplied by a corporate body, the
seller is a retail business entity.
Retail business entities must prepare product orders meeting the
needs of citizens, while securing
and selling the products ordered
on time.

제 151 조(보증기간에 나타난
결함)
신용보증기간이 정해진
상품을 산자는 그 기간안에
나타난 결함에 대하여 상품을
판자에게 그 책임을 물을 수
있다.

Article 151. Defects manifested
during the warranty period
A buyer who purchases a product with a fixed period of warranty
can hold the seller liable for any
defects arising in the warranty period.

제 152 조(수매계약대상과
당사자)
국가계획에 있는 농산물,
회유금속과 국가통제품을

Article 152. Parties to a purchase
contract
With regards to agricultural
produce, rare metals and state-
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제외한 농축산물과 토산물,
원료와 자재, 일반용품을
사들이는 당사자로는
수매기관이 된다. 수매기관은
기본수매품종의 등급기준과
값을 공시하고 그에 따라
수매품을 사들여야 한다.

controlled goods under the State
plan, the purchasing agency becomes a party to the acquisition of
agricultural produce, local products, raw materials, and equipment and other general goods.
The purchasing agency must disclose the rating standards and values of basic varieties to be purchased and acquire them accordingly.

제 153 조(수매계약기간의 준수)

Article 153. Observance of the
contracted period of purchase
The purchasing agency must
buy the contracted items within a
set period. If this obligation is violated, the seller may sell the item
to another purchasing agency and
be compensated for the resulting
damages.

수매기관은 계약된 물건을
정해진 기간안에 사들여야
한다. 이 의무를 어긴 경우
수매시키는자는 해당 물건을
다른 수매기관에 팔 수 있으며
생긴 손해를 보상받을 수 있다.

Article 154. Transportation of purchased items
The seller is responsible for
수매품을 수매장소까지
carrying
purchased items to the
나르는 일은 수매시키는자가
location
of
sale, and the purchas하며 수매장소로부터 다른
ing agency is responsible for car장소로 나르는 일은 수매기관이
rying them therefrom to a different
한다.
location. If the carriage of the
수매품의 나르는 일은 앞 항과 item being purchased is arranged
다르게 계약한 경우 운반을
in a different manner than the
담당한자는 해당 운임을
foregoing, the party in charge of
the carriage may receive the cor상대방으로부터 받을 수 있다.
responding fares from the other
party.
제 154 조(수매품의 수송)

제 155 조(시장에서
팔고사기계약)
공민이 생산한 농부업
생산물은 농민시장에서만
생산자와 소비자 사이에 합의된

Article 155. Purchase and sale
contracts in the market
Agricultural produce produced
by citizens can be sold and bought
on farmers’ markets at prices
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값으로 팔고 살수 있다. 산
물건을 더 비싸게 되거리하는
행위는 할 수 없다.
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agreed upon between the producer
and the consumer. Resale of what
has been bought at a higher price
is prohibited.

Article 156. Formation of a work
service contract
The act by citizens of making,
공민이 물건을 만들거나 수리,
repairing,
or processing things
가공하거나 그 밖의 일을
맡기는 행위는 작업봉사계약에 and entrusting related matters is
subject to the terms of a work ser따라 한다. 작업봉사계약은
vice contract. The work service
근로자들에 대한 편의봉사를
contract is executed and per잘할 수 있게 맺고 리행하여야
formed to facilitate quality ser한다.
vices for workers.
제 156 조(작업봉사계약의 체결)

제 157 조(작업봉사계약당사자
의 의무)
작업봉사 계약에 의하여
작업하는 자는 주문받은 일을
하고 그 결과를 작업맡긴자에게
넘겨줄 의무를 지며
작업맡긴자는 작업결과를
넘겨받고 해당한 봉사료를 물
의무를 진다.

Article 157. Obligations of parties
to a work service contract
Under a work service contract,
the contractor is obligated to perform the work ordered and deliver
the result to the hiring party, and
the hiring party is obligated to accept the deliverables and pay out
the corresponding service
charges.

제 158 조(작업봉사계약의
체결시기)
작업봉사 계약은 당사자들이
말로 합의하고 일감을 주고받은
때에 맺어진다.

Article 158. Timing of a work service contract formation
A work service contract is made
when the parties exchange work
following oral agreement.

제 159 조(작업맡기는자의 의무)

Article 159. Obligations of the hiring party
The hiring party should provide
technical data together with specifications when commissioning
work. If this obligation is violated,
the contractor may proportionately extend the period of work or
modify the schedule of deliveries.

작업맡기는자는 일감을
넘겨줄 때에 요구조건을
알려주면서 기술자료를 함께
주어야 한다. 이 의무를 어긴
경우 작업하는자는 작업기간을
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그만큼 연장하거나 작업순차를
뒤로 미룰수 있다.
제 160 조(작업에 필요한 자재,
부속품의 보장)
작업하는 자는 계약에서 따로
정하지 않은 한 자재나
부속품을 자기가 부담하여야
한다. 작업맡기는자가 자재나
부속품을 부담하기로 정한 경우
작업하는자는 그것을 검사하고
결함이 있으면 상대방에 제때에
알려야 한다.
제 161 조(작업대상물의 취급)
작업하는자는
작업맡기는자가 낸 작업대상을
소중히 다루고 자재, 부속품을
소비기준과 기술규정의 요구에
맞게 써야 한다. 쓰고 남은
자재와 부속품은 작업결과와
함께 작업맡긴자에게
돌려주어야 한다.

제 162 조(작업대상의
구조변경금지)
작업하는 자는 작업대상의
구조를 마음대로 변경시키거나
작업맡긴 자가 낸
작업대상에서 부분품을
뜯어내거나 자재와 부속품을
바꾸어쓰지 말아야 한다.

Article 160. Guarantee of materials and accessories needed for
work
The contractor is responsible
for arranging necessary materials
and accessories unless the contract specifies otherwise. If the
hiring party is obligated to secure
such materials or accessories, the
hiring party must inspect them and
inform the contractor of any defects.
Article 161. Handling of the object of work
The contractor must handle the
objects of work provided by the
hiring party with care and use any
materials and accessories in accordance with the standards of
consumption and technical regulations. Any unused materials and
accessories must be returned to
the hiring party in addition to the
deliverables of work.
Article 162. No structural modification of the object of work
The contractor shall not arbitrarily alter the structure of the
object of work at will nor remove
any parts from such object or replace any materials and accessories contained therein.
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제 163 조(작업기간의 준수)
작업하는자는 작업기간을
지켜야 한다. 작업맡긴자는
정해진 기간까지 작업하는자가
작업을 끝내지 못할것이 명백한
경우 계약을 취소하고 입은
손해를 보상받을 수 있다.
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Article 163. Observance of work
period
The contractor must observe the
work period. The hiring party may
terminate the contract and be
compensated for damages incurred if it is clear that the worker
will be unable to finish the work
on time.

작업하는자는 작업결과의
질을 보장하여야 한다.
작업한자는 보증기간이 정해진
경우 그 기간안에 나타난
결함에 대하여 남의 허물이
아닌 한 자기가 책임진다.

Article 164. Quality assurance of
work
The contractor must ensure the
quality of the deliverables. If a
warranty period is in place, the
contractor is responsible for any
defects arising within that period,
unless any such defect is attributable to a third party.

제 165 조(작업결과를 넘겨받을
의무)
작업맡긴자는 작업결과를
제때에 넘겨받아야 한다. 이
의무를 어긴 경우에 작업한자는
정해진 보관료를 받을 수 있다.

Article 165. Obligation to receive
the deliverables
The hiring party must accept
deliverables on time. If this obligation is violated, the contractor
may receive a fixed storage fee.

제 166 조(보관계약의 체결)
물건을 맡기고 보관하는
행위는 보관계약에 따라 한다.
보관계약은 기관, 기업소,
단체의 경영상 편리와 인민들의
생활상 편의를 보장할수 있게
맺고 리행한다.

Article 166. Formation of a contract of deposit
Things are entrusted and stored
under a deposit contract. Deposit
contracts are entered into and performed to ensure the managerial
convenience of institutions, business entities, and organizations, as
well as increased convenience in
life of the People.

제 167 조(보관계약당사자의
의무)
보관계약에 의하여 물건을
보관하는자는 그 물건을

Article 167. Obligations of parties
to a contract of deposit
Under a deposit contract, the
depositary is obligated to keep the

제 164 조(작업의 질보장)
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보관하였다가 보관시킨자에게
돌려줄 의무를 지며 물건을
보관시킨자는 그것을 찾고
해당한 보관료를 물 의무를
진다.

item deposited and return it to the
depositor, while the depositor is
obligated to retrieve the item and
to pay applicable storage fees.

제 168 조(보관계약의 체결시기)

Article 168. Timing of formation
of a contract of deposit
A contract of deposit is made
when, following the parties’ oral
agreement, the thing deposited is
delivered to the depositary or
when the depositary issues a note
of receipt to the depositor. A contract of deposit may be made with
or without a fixed period of deposit.

보관계약은 당사자들사이에
말로 합의하고 물건을
보관하는자에게 넘겨주거나
보관하는자가 물건을 넘겨받고
해당한 표식물을 상대방에 내준
때에 맺어진다.
보관계약은 기간을 정하고
맺을수도 있고 기간을 정하지
않고 맺을수도 있다.
제 169 조(물건을
보관시키는자의 의무)
물건을 보관시키는자는 그
물건을 보관하는데서
주의하여야 할 점을
보관하는자에게 알려주어야
한다. 이 의무를 어겨 보관물에
생긴 손해와 보관하는자에게 준
손해는 물건을 보관시킨자가
책임진다.

Article 169. Obligations of the depositor
The depositor must inform the
depositary of any precautions in
safekeeping the items deposited. In
case of failure to perform this obligation, the depositor will be liable for any resulting damage to
the things deposited or to the depositary.

제 170 조(물건을 보관하는자의
의무)
보관하는자는 계약대로
물건을 보관하여야 한다.
성질상 관리를 필요로 하는
물건은 성실히 보관관리하여야
한다. 보관하는자는 보관물을
관리하는데 들인 비용을

Article 170. Obligations of the depositary
The depositary must protect the
things deposited according to the
terms of the contract. Any items
deposited which by nature require
management must be kept safe in
good faith. The depositary may recover from the depositor the cost
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보관시킨자로부터 보상받을수
있다.

of safekeeping the things deposited.

제 171 조(업무수행과 관련한
물건의 보관)
려관, 극장, 회관같이
업무수행과 관련하여 물건을
맡아 보관하는 기관은 보관한
물건이 없어 졌거나 손상된데
대하여 책임진다. 그러나
보관시킨자가 따로 보관한
물건에 대하여서는 책임 지지
않는다.

Article 171. Deposit of goods in
the ordinary course of business
Any entities that take goods on
deposit in the ordinary course of
business such as inns, theatres, or
halls, are responsible for any loss
or damage to the items deposited.
However, the depositary is not responsible for any items stored separately by the depositor.

제 172 조(보관물을 찾을 의무)

Article 172. Obligation to retrieve
goods deposited
A depositor is obligated to retrieve the goods deposited on time.
The depositary is entitled to
charge higher storage fees if the
depositor has failed to retrieve the
property deposited after the period
of deposit.

보관시킨자는 보관물을
제때에 찾아가야 한다.
보관하는자는 보관기간이
지나도록 보관시킨자가
보관물을 찾아가지 않은 경우
더 높게 정해진 보관료를 받을
수 있다.

보관하는자는 보관물을
보관시킨자에게 원상대로
돌려주어야 한다. 봉인하였거나
포장한 물건을 맡았을 경우에는
그대로 돌려주며 내용을
확인하고 물건을 받았을
경우에는 내용을 다시 확인하고
돌려주어야 한다.

Article 173. Obligation to restore
goods deposited to original condition
The depositary must return the
things deposited to the depositor
in the original condition. When
taking in a sealed or packaged
item, the depositary must return it
as is. When taking in an item after
checking its contents, the depositary should re-check the contents
before returning the item.

제 174 조(보관물을 정확히
돌려줄 의무)
보관하는자는 보관물을
보관시킨 본인에게 정확히

Article 174. Obligation to return
property deposited
The depositary must return the
property deposited to the

제 173 조(보관물을 원상태로
돌려줄 의무)
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돌려주어야 한다. 물건을 받고
표식물을 내준 경우에는 해당
표식물을 내놓는자에게 물건을
돌려주면 보관의무는 없어진다.

depositor with due care and preciseness. When a note of receipt is
issued, the depositary’s obligation
to store the property deposited extinguishes upon returning the
property to a person presenting
the note.

제 175 조(법적의무 없이 하는
재산의 보관관리)

Article 175. Management of property without being obligated to do
so
A citizen may keep and manage
the property of another citizen or
a national social cooperative
without being bound to do so. In
this case, the person who keeps
and manages the property must
notify the owner regarding such
property management, store and
manage the property as if it were
his or her own, and is entitled to
recover the costs of storage and
management from the owner.

공민은 법적의무없이도 다른
공민이나 국가사회협동단체의
재산을 보관관리할 수 있다. 이
경우 재산을 보관관리하는 자는
해당 사실을 재산임자에게
알리고 자기 재산처럼
보관관리하여야 하며 그것을
보관관리하는데 들인 비용을
재산임자에게서 보상받을 수
있다.
제 176 조(법적의무 없이
보관관리하는 재산의 처리)
법적의무없이 남의 재산을
보관관리하는자는 불가피하게
그 재산을 처분한 경우
받은값만큼 재산임자에게
돌려주어야 한다.
제 177 조(빌리기계약의 체결)
공민의 도서, 생활용품이나
문화오락기구, 체육기자재 같은
것을 빌리는 행위는
빌리기계약에 따라 한다.
빌리기계약은 인민들의 다양한
물질문화적수요를 원만히

Article 176. Handling of property
being managed with no legal obligation
A person who stores and manages another person’s property
without being bound to do so must
return any proceeds received to
the owner.
Article 177. Formation of a loan
The act of lending things such
as citizens’ books, household
goods, cultural entertainment
tools, and sports equipment is subject to the terms of a loan. The
loan must be entered into and performed to adequately ensure the
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보장할 수 있게 맺고
리행하여야 한다.

People’s diverse material and cultural needs.

제 178 조(빌리기계약당사자의
의무)
빌리기계약에 의하여 물건을
빌려주는자는 빌리는자가
그것을 일정한 기간 리용하도록
넘겨줄 의무를 지며 빌리는자는
사용료를 물고 해당 물건을
리용한 다음 빌려준자에게
돌려줄 의무를 진다.

Article 178. Obligations of parties
to a loan
Under a loan, the lender is obligated to deliver the item lent to the
borrower for a certain period,
while the borrower is obliged to
pay borrowing fees, use the object
lent and return the lent object after use to the owner.

제 179 조(빌리기계약의 형식)
공민이 도서, 특허물, 록음물,
록화물 같은 자료를
해당기관으로부터 빌리는
계약은 무상 또는 유상으로
맺는다.

Article 179. Formalities of loan
When a citizen borrows things
such as books, patents, recordings,
or videos from applicable institutions, the underlying contract may
be onerous or gratuitous.

제 180 조(쓸 수 있는 상태의
물건을 빌려줄 의무)
빌려주는자는 물건을 그
본성에 맞게 쓸 수 있는
상태에서 넘겨주어야 하며
결함이 있는 물건을 빌려주는
경우 그 사실을 빌리는자에게
알려주어야 한다. 이 의무를
어겨 빌린자에게 준 손 해는
보상하여야 한다.

Article 180. Obligation to lend
things in usable condition
The owner must hand over the
lent property in a usable condition
according to its nature, and when
a defective item is lent, the borrower must be informed. When
this duty is violated resulting in
damage to the borrower, such loss
shall be compensated.

제 181 조(빌린 물건을
계약조건과 용도에 맞게 쓸
의무)

Article 181. Obligation to use the
lent item in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the contract
The borrower must use the lent
things according to the terms and
conditions of the contract and
should not change the design of
the tings at will. Before modifying

빌리는자는 빌린 물건을
계약조건과 용도에 맞게 쓰며
그 구조를 마음대로 변경시키지
말아야 한다. 빌리는자가 빌린
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물건의 구조를 변경시키려고 할
경우에는 빌려준자의 동의를
받아야 한다.

the structure of the lent item, the
owner’s consent must be obtained.

제 182 조(빌린 물건의 수리)
빌린 물건의 대수리는
빌려주는자가 하며 중수리는
계약에서 정한자가 하고
소수리는 빌리는 자가 한다.
중수리나 소수리를 맡은자가
수리를 제때에 하지 않아 빌린
물건이 심히 손상된 경우
상대방은 계약을 취소할 수
있다.

Article 182. Repair of lent items
Any large-scale repairs of a
borrowed item will be done by the
owner, medium-scale repairs are
allocated according to the terms
of the contract, and any smallscale repairs will be undertaken
by the borrower. If the party in
charge of medium or small-scale
repairs should fail to perform
timely repairs resulting in severe
damages to the borrowed item, the
other party may rescind the contract.

제 183 조(빌린 물건의 다시
빌려주기)
빌리기계약에서 빌리는자는
빌린 물건을 빌려준자의
동의밑에 제 3 자에게 다시
빌려줄수 있다. 이 경우에
빌리는자는 계약의무의 리행에
대하여 빌려준자 앞에
책임진다.

Article 183. Sub-lending of lent
property
Under a loan, the borrower can
sub-lend the lent item to a third
party with the consent of the
owner. In this case, the borrower
remains responsible to the owner
for the performance of the contractual obligations.

제 184 조(보증금을 설정한
빌리기계약)
보증금을 설정하고 맺은
빌리기계약에서 빌려준자는
빌려준 물건을 반환받을 때까지
보증금을 돌려주지 않을수
있다.

Article 184. Contract of loan with
a deposit
Under a contract of loan with a
deposit, the owner may refuse to
return the deposit until the lent
property is returned to the owner.
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제 185 조(위탁계약의 체결)
기관, 기업소, 단체가 판매,
수매나 그 밖의 재산거래를
다른 기관이나 공민에게
위탁하는 행위는 위탁계약에
따라 한다. 위탁계약은 적은
로력과 자금으로 온갖
경제적예비와 잠재력을 동원
리용할 수 있게 맺고 리행
하여야 한다.
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Article 185. Formation of consignment contracts
The act of consigning by an institution, business entity, or organization of sales, purchases, or
other property transactions to another institution or citizen is subject to a consignment contract.
Consignment contracts must be
made and performed in a way that
mobilizes a variety of economic
reserves and potentials with minimal efforts and funds.

제 186 조(위탁계약당사자의
의무)
위탁계약에 의하여
위탁받는자는
위탁하는자로부터 위탁받은
재산거래행위를 위탁하는자의
부담으로 수행할 의무를 지며
위탁하는자는 그 결과를
넘겨받고 해당한 보수를 지불할
의무를 진다. 위탁계약은
서면으로 맺어야 한다.

Article 186. Obligations of parties
to a consignment contract
Under a consignment contract,
the consignee is obligated to carry
out the act of property transaction
entrusted by t
he consignor at the expense of
the consignor, while the consignor
is obligated to accept the outcome
of consignment and pay the corresponding compensation. Consignment contracts must be made in
writing.

제 187 조(위탁받은 행위수행에
필요한 조건의 보장)

Article 187. Guarantee of conditions necessary for performing
what has been consigned
The consignor must first deliver
to the consignee any money or
things necessary to perform what
has been consigned.

위탁하는자는 위탁받은
행위를 하는데 필요한 돈이나
물건을 먼저 상대방에
넘겨주어야 한다.
제 188 조(위탁받은자의 의무)
위탁받은자는 계약조건에
맞게 위탁받은 행위를 하여야
한다. 위탁받은자가 계약조건의
범위를 벗어나는 행위를 하려

Article 188. Obligations of the
consignee
A consignee must perform the
entrusted act in accordance with
the terms of contract. Before the
consignee acts outside the scope
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할 경우에는 위탁한자의 동의를
받아 야 한다.

of contract, the consignor’s consent must be obtained.

제 189 조(위탁받은자에 대한
제 3 자의 청구권)
위탁계약과 관계없이
위탁받은자에게 청구권을
가지고 있는 제 3 자는
위탁행위를 위하여 받았거나
위탁한자에게 넘겨주기로 된
돈이나 물건에서 청구권을
실현할 수 없다.

Article 189. A third party claim
against the consignee
Regardless of the existence of a
consignment contract, a third
party with a claim against the
consignee cannot enforce his or
her claim on the money or goods
that are received for consignment
or are otherwise to be consigned
to the consignor.

제 190 조(유리한 행위결과의
처리)
위탁받은자는 위탁한자가
요구한것보다 더 유리하게 한
행위의 결과도 다 위탁한자에게
넘겨 주어야 한다.

Article 190. Treatment of favorable results
The consignee should hand over
to the consignor the results of consignment, even when they are on
more favorable terms than those
initially requested by the consignor.

제 191 조(위탁행위결과에 대한
보수와 비용의 지불)

Article 191. Remuneration on the
outcome of consignment and payment of fees
The consignor must take in the
results of what the consignee has
performed on time and pay the
corresponding remuneration and
fees incurred.

위탁한자는
위탁받은자로부터 행위결과를
제때에 넘겨받고 해당한 보수와
그가 들인 비용을 지불하여야
한다.
제 192 조(기관, 기업소,
단체사이의 재산거래에서
계약규범의 적용)
이법에서 규정한 팔고사기
계약, 작업봉사 계약, 보관계약,
빌리기 계약, 위탁계약은 기관,
기업 소, 단체사이에

Article 192. Application of contractual rules to transaction between institutions, business entities, and organizations
The provisions herein relating
to purchase and sale contracts,
work service contracts, contract of
deposit, contract of lease, and
consignment contract shall apply
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이루어지는 재산거래관계에도
해당하게 적용된다.

mutatis mutandis to property
transactions between institutions,
business entities, and organizations.

제 193 조(려객수송계약의 체결)

Article 193. Formation of a passenger transportation contract
Any act of travel by citizens using means of transportation, including trains, cars, ships, and
airplanes, is subject to the terms
of a passenger transportation contract. Passenger transportation
contracts must be executed and
performed to ensure the safety and
convenience of the People while
travelling.

공민이 기차, 자동차, 배,
비행기를 비롯한 운수수단을
리용하여 하는 려행은
려행수송계약에 따라 한다.
려객수송계약은 인민들의
려행상 안전과 편리를 보장할수
있게 맺고 리행하여야 한다.

제 194 조(려객수송계약당사자
의 의무)
려객수송계약에 의하여
손님은 운수기관에 해당 값을
물 의무를 지며 운수기관은
손님을 려행 목적지까지 태워갈
의무를 진다. 려객수송계약은
운수기관이 표에 의하여 해당
운수수단의 리용을 승인해준
때에 맺어진다.

제 195 조(려행조건의 보장)
운수기관은 운수수단을
리용하는 손님들에게 의료봉사,
도중식사를 비롯하여 려행에
필요한 조 건과 시설들을 잘
보장해주어야 한다.

Article 194. Obligations of parties
to a passenger transportation contract
Under a passenger transportation contract, the passenger is obligated to pay the fare, and the
transportation agency is obliged
to transport the passenger to the
point of destination. A passenger
transportation contract is entered
into when the transport agency
approves a passenger’s use of the
mode of transportation in question
by issuing tickets.
Article 195. Guarantee of the
terms of travel
The transportation agency must
ensure the provision of conditions
and facilities necessary for travel
including the provision of medical
services and meals to the passengers.
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제 196 조(손님을 목적지까지
태워보낼 의무)
운수기관은 손님을
려행목적지까지 태워나르지
못하게 된 경우에 손님에게
다른 운수수단을 리용할수
있도록 보장해주어야 한다.
제 197 조(표값반환 및
표사용기간의 연장)
운수기관은 손님이 표값을
정한 기간안에 물리려 하거나
그를 태워갈 수 없게 된 경우
해당 표 값의 전부 또는 일부를
손님에게 돌려주거나 표의
사용기간을 늘여주어야 한다.
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Article 196. Obligation to
transport passengers to their points
of destination
When unable to transport a passenger to the point of destination,
the transportation agency must
ensure an alternative mode of
transportation is provided.
Article 197. Refund of ticket price
and extension of its validity period
The transportation agency must
refund all or part of the fare or extend the validity period of the
ticket if a passenger demands a refund within prescribed period or
when the agency becomes incapable of transporting the passenger.

제 198 조(려행자의 권리)
려행하는 손님은
학령전어린이를 표없이 데리고
갈수 있으며 정해진 범위안의
짐을 가지고 해당 운수수단에
오를수 있다.

Article 198. Rights of passengers
Passengers may accompany
pre-school children without a
ticket and may use the mode of
transportation in question with
permitted baggage allowance.

제 199 조(려행질서의 준수)

Article 199. Observance of the order of travel
During the process of travel,
passengers must use the mode of
transportation chosen, facilities,
and equipment with care and observe established travel order. If
this obligation is violated, the
transportation agency may seek
compensation from the unruly passenger or force the passenger to
disimbark.

손님은 려행과정에
운수수단과 시설, 비품을
애호하고 제정된 려행질서를
지켜야 한다. 이 의 무를 어긴
경우 운수기관은 해당 손님에게
손해를 보상시키거나
운수수단에서 내릴 것을 요구할
수 있다.
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제 200 조(저금계약의 체결)
공민이 저금기관에 돈을
저축하는 행위는 저금계약에
따라 한다. 저금계약은
놀고있는 돈을 경제건설에
효과있게 리용하며 인민들의
생활향상을 도모할 수 있게
맺고 리행하여야 한다.
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Article 200. Formation of a savings contract
The act of saving money by citizens at savings institutions is subject to the terms of a savings contract. A savings contract is executed and performed so that any
excess monies can be used efficiently to develop the economy
and to improve the People’s lives
in general.

제 201 조(저금계약당사자의
의무)
저금계약에 의하여 저금하는
공민이 저금기관에 돈을 맡기면
저금기관은 그것을
저금하였다가 저금한 공민의
요구에 따라 내줄 의무를 진다.
저금계약은 저금기관이 돈을
받고 저금하는 공민에게
저금증서를 내준 때에
맺어진다.

Article 201. Formation of a savings contract
When a citizen makes a deposit
under a savings contract with a
banking institution, the institution
is obligated to save the amount
deposited and to allow that such
amount be withdrawn at the request of the citizen. A savings contract is entered into when the savings agency receives money and
issues a certificate of savings to
the depositor citizen.

제 202 조(저금하는 공민의
권리)
저금계약에서 저금하는
공민은 저금의 종류와 액수를
마음대로 정할 수 있다.
저금기관은 저금한 공민의
요구에 따라 이미 받은 저금을
다른 종류의 저금으로 바꾸거나
다른 저금기관에 옮겨주어야
한다.

Article 202. Rights of a depositor
citizen
Citizens making a deposit under
a savings contract can freely
choose the type and amount of
savings. At the request of the depositor citizen, the banking institution must transfer the existing deposit to another type of account or
to another banking institution.

제 203 조(저금하는 돈을 받거나
저금한 돈을 내줄 의무)
저금기관은 공민이 요구하면
어느때든지 저금하는 돈을

Article 203. Obligation to take and
return deposits
At the request of a citizen, a
banking institution must take or
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맡거나 저금한 돈을 내주어야
한다. 저금기관은 상대방을
정확히 확인하지 않고 돈을
잘못 내준 경우 그에 대한
책임을 진다.

return a deposit. The banking institution will be held accountable
when it authorizes a wrongful
withdrawal as a result of not accurately checking the identity of the
withdrawer.

제 204 조(저금의 비밀준수)
저금기관은 저금의 비밀을
지켜고 저금내용에 대하여
공개하지 말아야 한다.

Article 204. Confidentiality
Banking institutions should
maintain savings confidential and
not disclose any details.

Article 205. Formation of insurance contracts
An insurance contract covers
공민이 생명, 건강이나 재산에
any
act whereby a citizen takes in대하여 보험에 드는 행위는
surance
to protect life, health, or
보험계약에 따라 한다.
property. An insurance contract is
보험계약은 뜻하지 않은
executed and performed to protect
재해로 인한 손해로부터
the people from any damage
인민들을 보호하며 놀고 있는
caused by unforeseen disasters
돈을 동원 리용할수 있게 맺고
and to mobilize use of idle monies.
리행하여야 한다.
제 205 조(보험계약의 체결)

제 206 조(보험계약당사자의
의무)
보험계약에 의하여 보험에 든
공민은 보험기관에 보험료를 물
의무를 지며 보험기관은
보험사고가 나면 보험금 또는
보험보상금을 해당 공민에게
내줄 의무를 진다. 보험계약은
보험기관이 보험에 든 공민에게
보험증권을 내준 때에
맺어진다.

Article 206. Obligations of parties
to an insurance contract
Under an insurance contract,
the insured is obligated to pay insurance premiums to the insurer,
and the insurer is obligated to pay
out insurance proceeds or indemnity to the beneficiary in the event
of an insured loss. An insurance
contract is entered into when the
insurer issues an insurance policy
to the insured.

제 207 조(고의적인 보험사고)

Article 207. An intentional act or
loss
If a third party who has a relationship with the insured or otherwise has an interest in securing

보험에 든 공민이나 보험금
또는 보험보상금을 받는데
리해관계가 있는 제 3 자가
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고의적으로 보험사고를 일으킨
경우에는 보험금이나
보험보상금을 주지 않는다.

insurance proceeds or indemnity
intentionally causes a loss, insurance proceeds or indemnity will
not be paid out.

제 208 조(허물있는 제 3 자에
대한 보상청구)
제 3 자의 허물로 일어난
사고에 대하여 보험보상금을
내준 보험기관은 그에 대한
보상을 제 3 자에게 요구할 수
있다. 제 3 자가 보험사고를
일으킨 경우 보험에 든 공민은
그 사고결과를 고착시켜야
한다. 이 의무를 어기면
보험보상금을 적게 받거나 전혀
받지 못할 수 있다.

Article 208. Right to subrogation

제 209 조(인체보험료의 납부)

Article 209. Payment of life insurance premiums
Citizens who are parties to an
insurance contract of human lives,
such as life insurance, insurance
for minors, and accident insurance, are required to regularly pay
premiums on or before each due
date. If such premiums are not
paid timely, the effect of insurance
will be lost until the premiums due
are paid.

생명보험, 어린이보험,
재해보험 같은 인체보험계약을
맺은 공민은 정해진 기간안에
정기적으로 보험료를 물어야
한다. 인체보험에 든 공민이
정해진 기간까지 보험료를 물지
않으면 보험효력이 없어지며
보험료를 물면 그때부터
보험효력이 다시 생긴다.
제 210 조(인체보험금의 지불)
보험기관은 인체보험에 든
공민이 사망하였거나
로동능력을 잃었을 경우 해당한
보험금을 내 주어야 한다.
생명보험과 어린이보험에서는
보험기간이 되고 보험에 든
공민이 보험료를 다 물면
만기보험금을 내준다.

When an insurer pays out insurance proceeds for a loss caused by
the fault of a third party, the insurer is entitled to recover against
the third party. If a third party has
caused a loss, the insured must
mitigate the outcome of the loss.
When this obligation is not performed, the insured may receive
less or no insurance proceeds.

Article 210. Payment of insurance
proceeds
An insurer must pay the appropriate insurance proceeds if the
insured under a human life insurance policy has died or lost his or
her ability to work. In the context
of life insurance and insurance for
minors, when the term of insurance has lapsed and the insured
has paid off all outstanding
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premiums, matured endowments
are to be paid.
제 211 조(재산보험료의 납부)
재산보험에 든 공민은 정해진
기간안에 보험료를 물어야
한다. 보험사고가 없이
계약기간이 지난 경우 지불된
보험료는 보험기관의 수입으로
한다.
제 212 조(재산보험사고의 통보)
재산보험에 든 공민은
보험사고가 일어났을 경우 곧
보험기관에 알리고 손실을 덜기
위한 대책을 세워야 한다. 이
의무를 어긴 경우에는
보험보상금을 적게 받거나 전혀
받지 못할 수 있다.
제 213 조(위임계약의 체결)
재산거래와 그 밖의
법률적의의를 가지는 행위를
남에게 위임하는 행위는 다른
법적근거가 없는 한 위임계약에
따라 한다.
제 214 조(위임계약당사자의
의무)
위임계약에 의하여
위임받는자는 위임받는 행위를
위임하는자의 이름과 부담으로
수행할 의무를 지며
위임하는자는 위임받은자가
위임받은 범위에서 한 행위의
결과를 넘겨받을 의무를 진다.

Article 211. Payment of property
insurance premiums
A citizen under a property insurance policy must pay premiums
within a prescribed period. If the
term of contract lapses without the
occurrence of a covered loss, the
premium paid will remain the insurer’s income.
Article 212. Notification of a covered property loss
A citizen under a property insurance policy must immediately
notify the insurer when a covered
loss occurs and must take
measures to mitigate loss. If this
obligation is not honored, the insured may receive less or no insurance proceeds.
Article 213. Formation of a contract of mandate
Delegation of property transactions and other acts of legal significance to a third party is subject
to a contract of mandate in the absence of any other legal basis.
Article 214. Obligations of the
parties to a contract of mandate
Under a contract of mandate, a
mandatary is obliged to carry out
the mandated act under the name
and burden of the principal, and
the principal is obliged to accept
the results of the acts performed
by the mandatary.
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제 215 조(위임할수 없는 행위)
양자관계나 유언같이
본인자신의 직접적인
의사표시를 필요로 하는 행위는
위임할 수 없다.
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Article 215. Acts which cannot be
delegated
Any act that requires the principal’s direct communication of intent, such as adoption and wills,
cannot be delegated.

제 216 조(위임받은 범위의
준수)
위임받은자는 위임받은
범위안에서 행위를 하여야
한다. 위임받은 행위를 원만히
수행하기 위하여 불가피한
경우에는 그 범위를 벗어나는
행위를 할 수 있다.

Article 216. Observance of the
scope of mandate
A mandatary must act within
the scope of the mandate. The
mandatary may act outside the
scope of authority if such act is inevitable to perform the mandated
act.

제 217 조(위임받은
행위과정에서 생긴 손해의
책임)
위임받은자는 위임받은
행위를 하는 과정에 자신의
허물로 일으킨 손해에 대하여
위임한자앞에 책임진다. 그러나
어느 당사자의 허물도 없이
생긴 손해에 대하여서는
위임한자가 책임진다.

Article 217. Liability for damage
incurred while performing a mandate

제 218 조(위임수행정형의 통보)
위임받은자는 위임한자의
요구에 따라 위임받은 행위의
수행정형을 그에게 알려주어야
한다.

Article 218. Status report
At the principal’s request, the
mandatary must inform the principal on the status of his or her performance of the mandate.

A mandatary is liable to the
principal for any damage caused
by the mandatary’s own fault
while performing the mandated
act. However, the principal is liable for any damage occurred without the fault of either party.
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제 219 조(위임행위에 들인
비용의 보상)
위임한자는 계약조건에 맞게
위임받은자가 한 행위의 결과를
제때에 접수하고 그가 들인
비용을 보상하여야 한다.
위임한자는 자기의 허물로
위임받은자가 위임받은 행위를
하는 과정에 입은 손해에
대하여 보 상할 책임을 진다.

제 220 조(위임계약의 취소)
위임계약의 당사자는
위임계약을 어느때든지
취소할수 있다. 계약을 취소한
당사자는 그것으로 하여
상대방이 입은 손해를 보상할
책임을 진다.

[Vol. 14

Article 219. Reimbursement of
fees incurred during the course of
a mandate
A principal must timely accept
the results of the acts performed
by the mandatary in accordance
with the terms of the contract and
compensate for the fees incurred
by the mandatary. The principal is
responsible for compensating any
damage suffered by the mandatary
in the course of performing a
mandated act, whenever the damage is attributable to the principal.
Article 220. Termination of a contract of mandate
A party to a contract of mandate may terminate the agreement
at any time. The terminating party
is responsible for compensating
the damage suffered by the other
party as a result of the termination.

공민들 사이에 돈이나 물건을
꾸어주고 꾸는 행위는
꾸기계약에 따라 한다.
꾸기계약은 무상으로 맺는다.
리자 또는 리자 형태의 물건을
주고받는 꾸기계약은 맺을 수
없다.

Article 221. Formation of a loan
for consumption
The act of lending and borrowing money or goods between citizens is subject to a contract of
loan for consumption. These contracts are gratuitous. Entering
into a loan for consumption with
interest or any goods in lieu of interest is prohibited.

제 222 조(꾸기계약당사자의
의무)
꾸기계약에 의하여 꾸어주는
공민이 돈이나 물건을 꾸는
공민에게 넘겨주는 경우 꾼

Article 222. Obligations of parties
to a loan for consumption
Under a loan for consumption,
when the lender lends money or
things to a borrower, the borrower

제 221 조(꾸기계약의 체결)
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공민은 꾸어준 공민이게 액수가
같은 돈이나 종류와 량이 같은
물건을 갚을 의무를 진다.
꾸기계약은 꾸어주는 공민이
돈이나 물건을 상대방에 넘겨준
때에 맺어진다.

is obligated to pay back the identical sum of money or to return the
same amount of things of the same
kind. A loan for consumption is
made when the lender hands over
money or things to be lended to
the borrower.

제 223 조(꾸기계약 리행기간)

Article 223. Period of performance in a loan for consumption
Under a fixed-term loan for
consumption, the lender cannot
demand the repayment of the
money or things borrowed until
the term elapses, while the borrower is free to pay back the same
before the due date.

기간을 정하고 꾸기계약을
맺은 경우 꾸어준 공민은
기간이 되어야 꾸어준 돈이나
물건을 갚을 것을 요구할 수
있으며 꾼 공민은 기간이
되기전이라도 그것을 갚을 수
있다.

Article 224. The object of performance in a loan for consumption
The borrower must repay the
공민은 꾼 돈이나 물건은 정한
borrowed
money or things within
기간안에 갚아야 한다. 같은
물건이 없는 경우에는 상대방과 a fixed period of time. If what has
been borrowed is no longer avail합의하고 다른 물건으로 갚을
able, the borrower may repay with
수 있다.
a different item subject to mutual
agreement with the lender.
제 224 조(꾸기계약의 리행대상)

제 225 조(은행대부계약의 체결)
은행기관이 기관, 기업소,
단체에 돈을 꾸어주는 행위는
은행대부계약에 따라 한다.
은행대부계약은 재정규률을
강화화며 화페자금을 아껴쓰고
그 회전을 촉진시킬수 있게
맺고 리행하여야 한다.

Article 225. Formation of a bank
loan contract
An act by a banking entity of
lending money to institutions,
business entities, and organizations shall be governed by a bank
loan contract. Bank loan contracts
shall be executed and performed
to strengthen financial oversight,
effect frugal use of monetary
funds, and to facilitate the flow of
funds.

308

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

제 226 조(은행대부계약당사자
의 의무)
은행대부계약에 의하여
은행기관은 대부받는 기관,
기업소, 단체와 화페자금을
넘겨줄 의무를 지며
대부받는자는 그 자금을
리용하고 원금과 리자를
은행기관에 물 의무를 진다.
은행 대부계약은 은행기관이
대부받는자의 신청을 승인하고
대부금을 넘겨준 때에
맺어진다.

Article 226. Obligations of parties
to a bank loan contract
Under a bank loan contract, the
banking institution is obligated to
hand over a loan to the borrower
institution, business entity, or organization, and the borrower is
obligated to use the loan and pay
back the principal with interest to
the lender. A bank loan contract is
made when the banking institution
approves the loan application of a
borrower and thereby delivers the
money.

제 227 조(대부의 반환원천담보)

Article 227. Security for loan repayment
A bank loan contract is made on
the condition that repayment of
the loan is secured. A prospective
borrower shall guarantee his or
her ability to repay the loan in
writing.

은행 대부계약은 대부의
반환원천이 담보되는 조건에서
맺는다. 대부를 받으려는자는
문건으로 자기의
대부금반환능력을 은행기관에
담보하여야 한다.
제 228 조(대부금을 지정된
항목에 쓸 의무)
대부받은자는 대부금을
류용하거나 사장랑비하지 말고
지정된 항목에 써야 한다. 이
의무를 어긴 경우 은행기관은
대부금을 기간 전에 회수하거나
다음번 대부를 중지할수 있다.

Article 228. Obligation to use the
loan for designated items
A borrower shall not misuse or
squander the loan received but use
it for the designated purpose. If
this obligation is violated, the
banking institution may accelerate
the repayment of the loan or suspend the next loan.

제 229 조(대부금의 반환)
대부받은자는 원금과 리자를
정해진 기간안에 은행기관에
물어야 한다. 이 의무를 어긴
경우에는 기간이 지난날부터 더
높은 률의 리자를 물어야 한다.

Article 229. Loan repayment
The borrower is obligated to repay the principal with interest to
the banking institution within a
fixed period. In case of nonperformance of this obligation, a higher

2021-2022]

CIVIL CODE OF THE DPRK

309

rate of interest shall be charged
after the due date.
제 230 조(합동작업계약의 체결)
기관, 기업소, 단체가
국가자금으로 살림집이나
시설물 같은 것을 건설하는
작업을 같이 하고 그에 대한
리용권을 나누는 행위는
합동작업 계약에 따라 한다.
합동작업계약은 예비와
가능성을 동원하여 건설물의
수요를 보장할수 있게 맺고
리행하여야 한다.

Article 230. Formation of a joint
work contract
An act by institutions, business
entities, and organizations of constructing home residences or facilities with state funds and apportioning the right to use them shall
be governed by a joint work contract. Joint work contracts shall
be concluded and executed to meet
the increasing demand for construction works by mobilizing reserved resources.

제 231 조(합동작업계약당사자
의 의무)
합동작업계약의 당사자는
공동작업에 참가할 의무를 지며
작업참가정도에 따라
작업결과물의 리용권을 나누어
가진다.
합동작업계약은 서면으로
맺고 공증을 받아야 한다.

Article 231. Obligations of parties
to a joint work contract
The parties to a joint work contract have an obligation to participate in the joint work and share
the right to use deliverables in
proportion to their participation in
the work. A joint work contract
must be in writing and notarized.

제 232 조(합동작업계약의
합의조건)
합동작업계약의 당사자는
작업대상, 기간, 작업실적의
계산방법, 작업결과물을 나누는
원칙, 합동작업대표의 권한같은
조건에 대하여 합의를 보아야
한다.

Article 232. Terms of joint work
contract
The parties to a joint work contract shall agree on any applicable conditions, such as the object
of work, the work period, the
method of calculating work results, how to distribute work results, and the authority of the joint
work representative.
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제 233 조(합동작업대표의 선출)
계약당사자들은 계약을
원만히 리행하기 위하여
합동작업대표를 선출한다.
합동작업대표는
계약당사자들의 대표로서
합동작업에 대하여 책임진다.
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Article 233. Appointment of joint
work representative
The contracting parties choose
a joint work representative to perform the contract in an agreeable
manner. In the capacity of representing the contracting parties, the
joint work representative is responsible for the overall joint
work.

제 234 조(합동작업결과물의
분할)
합동작업대표는 작업이
끝나면 계약당사자들에게
작업실적에 따라 작업결과물을
나누어 리용할데 대하여 해당
기관에 제기하여야 한다.

Article 234. Division of joint work
deliverables
When the work is completed,
the joint work representative will
address the relevant agency regarding where the contracting
parties will use distributed deliverables according to the output of
work

제 4 장 부당리득행위

CHAPTER 4. ENRICHMENT
WITHOUT CAUSE

제 235 조(부당리득의 반환의무)

Article 235. Obligation to return
anything obtained via enrichment
without cause
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person shall return the gain to that person.

법적근거없이 남의 손실밑에
부당하게 리득을 얻은자는 그
부당리득으로 하여 손해를
입은자에게 해당리득을
돌려주어야 한다.
제 236 조(부당리득의 반환시기)
부당리득자는 리득이
부당하다는 것을 안 때로부터
그 리득에서 생긴 재산을
손해를 본자에게 돌려주어야
한다.

Article 236. When to return the
gain
The person enriched without
cause must return to the impoverished person any gains resulting
from the enrichment without cause
from the time the enriched person
became aware of the enrichment
being without cause.
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제 237 조(부당리득의 반환원칙)
부당리득과 그로부터 생긴
재산은 현물로 돌려주는 것을
원칙으로 하며 현물로 돌려줄수
없는 경우에는 그 값을 물어야
한다.
제 238 조(부당리득재산의
보관관리)
부당리득과 그로부터 생긴
재산을 돌려준자는 그것을
보관관리하고 돌려주는데 들인
비용을 보상받을 수 있다.
제 239 조(돌려받을자를 알 수
없는 부당리득의 처리)
부당리득을 돌려받을자를
알수 없는 경우에 부당리득자는
그 리득을 해당 기관에 바쳐야
한다.
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Article 237. Principle of returning
anything obtained via enrichment
without cause
In principle, anything obtained
via enrichment without cause shall
be returned in kind, and if such return is not feasible, a corresponding amount shall be paid.
Article 238. Management of the
property obtained via enrichment
without cause
Anyone who returns anything
obtained via enrichment without
cause can be compensated for the
expenses incurred in keeping and
returning such things.
Article 239. Enrichment without
cause when the recipient is unknown
If the person entitled to enrichment without cause cannot be ascertained, the person enriched
without cause will donate the enrichment without case to the relevant institutions.

제 4 편 민사책임과
민사시효제도

BOOK 4. CIVIL LIABILITY AND
PRESCRIPTION

제 1 장 민사책임

CHAPTER 1. CIVIL LIABILITY

제 240 조(민사책임조건)

Article 240. Conditions of civil liability
Institutions, business entities,
organizations, and citizens incur
civil liability when they violate
other persons’ civil rights or their
own civil obligations. However,
even when institutions, business
entities, and organizations are

기관, 기업소, 단체와 공민은
남의 민사상 권리를
침해하였거나 자기의 민사상
의무를 위반하였을 경우
민사책임을 진다. 그러나 같은
소유의 기관, 기업소, 단체라
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하더라도 그 소유에 속하는
다른 기관, 기업소, 단체의
허물에 대하여서는 민사책임을
지지 않는다.

under common control, they shall
not be liable for the fault of other
institution, business entity, or organization under the same ownership.

제 241 조(허물에 의한
민사책임)
민사책임은 법이 달리 정하지
않은 한 허물이 있는 자가 진다.
계약 또는 법을 어긴자가
자기에게 허물이 없다는 것을
증명하지 못하면 허물은 그에게
있는것으로 본다.

Article 241. Fault-based civil liability
A person who is at fault incurs
civil liability, unless otherwise
provided by law. If a person who
fails to perform a contract or violates the law fails to prove the absence of fault, he or she will be
deemed to be at fault.

제 242 조(민사책임의 형태)
민사책임은 재산의 반환,
원상복구, 손해보상과 위약금,
연체료 같은 제재금의 지불,
청구권의 제한 또는 상실의
형태로 지운다. 이 경우 서로
다른 민사책임형태를 병합하여
지울 수 있다.

Article 242. Types of civil liability
The remedies for civil liability
are restitution or restoration of
property, payment of damages and
monetary penalties, payment of
other surcharges including late
charges, and restriction on or loss
of claims. In this case, multiple
civil remedies may be applicable
at the same time.

제 243 조(행위무능력자의
위법행위에 대한 책임)
민사행위능력이 없는 자가
남의 민사상 권리를 침해하였을
경우에는 부모 또는 후견인에게
민사책임을 지운다. 부모나
후견인의 통제에서 벗어나 있는
기간에 침해행위를 하였을
경우에는 그를 통제할 의무
를 진 자에게 민사책임을
지운다.

Article 243. Liability for tortious
conduct of the incompetent
When an incompetent person violates a person’s civil rights, civil
liability therefor will rest on a parent or a tutor. When a violation
occurs during a period outside the
control of a parent or tutor, civil
liability will be imposed on the
person who is responsible for
overseeing the incompetent.
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제 244 조(부분적행위능력자의
위법행위에 대한 책임)
16 살에 이른
부분적행위능력자가 남의
민사상 권리를 침해하여 손해를
일으킨 경우 자기 지불 능력의
범위를 벗어나는 부분은 그의
부모나 후견인이 민사책임을
진다.

Article 244. Liability for tortious
conduct of the partially competent
If a partially competent person
who has reached the age of 16
causes damages by infringing on
another person’s civil rights, the
partially competent person’s parent or tutor will assume civil liability for what lies beyond the
scope of the partially incompetent
person’s ability to pay.

제 245 조(기관, 기업소,
단체성원의 위법행위에 대한
책임)

Article 245. Responsibility for tortious conduct of members of an
institution, business entity, or organization
When a member of an institution, business entity, or organization has harmed another’s property or body in the course of performing the member’s duties, the
institution, business entity, or organization will assume civil liability for such harm.

기관, 기업소, 단체의 성원이
직무수행과정에 남이 재산이나
인체에 해를 준 경우에는 그
기관, 기업소, 단체가
민사책임을 진다.

제 246 조(비법점유재산의 반환)
남의 건물을 비롯한 재산을
비법적으로 점유한 기관,
기업소, 단체와 공민은 그것을
임자에게 돌려주어야 한다.
재산을 현물로 돌려줄 수 없을
경우에는 해당한 값을 물어야
한다.
제 247 조(재산비법침해의 책임)
남의 재산에 손해를 준 기관,
기업소, 단체와 공민은 그
재산을 원상대로 복구하여야
한다. 재산의 원상복구가

Article 246. Return of unlawfully
possessed property
Institutions, business entities,
organizations, and citizens that
unlawfully possess another person’s property, including a building, shall return such property to
the owner. If return in kind is not
feasible, damages will be paid instead.
Article 247. Restitutionary responsibility
Institutions, business entities,
organizations, and citizens who
have caused loss to others’ property shall restore the property to
its original state. When restoring
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다른 물건을 주거나 그 값을
물어야 한다.
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the property to its original state is
not feasible, other goods of the
same kind or a corresponding
money value will be offered instead.

Article 248. Payment of damages
for bodily harm
Institutions, business entities,
사람이 건강과 생명에 해를 준
organizations, and citizens that
기관, 기업소, 단체와 공민은
have harmed a person’s health
해당한 손해를 보상하여야
and life shall compensate for such
한다. 사람의 존엄과 명예를
harm. Whoever seriously damages
심히 훼손시켜 그의 신체와
a person’s dignity and honor, leav인격에 지울 수 없는 손상을
ing indelible harm on the victim’s
남긴 자는 시효에 관계없이
body and character, shall compen피해자에게 보상하여야 한다.
sate the victim regardless of the
period of prescription.
제 248 조(인신침해의 손해배상)

제 249 조(관리하고있는 짐승이
남에게 준 손해의 보상)
관리하고있는 짐승이 남의
재산이나 인체에 해를 준 경우
짐승의 임자나 관리자는 그
손해를 보상하여야 한다.
그러나 피해자에게 허물이 있을
경우에는 보상책임이
덜어지거나 면제된다.
제 250 조(국토환경보호법규위
반에 의한 손해의 보상)
국토와 자원을 보호하고
자연환경을 보존, 조성하며
환경오염을 방지할데 대한
국가의 법을 어기여 남의
재산에 손해를 준 기관, 기업소,
단체와 공민은 해당한 손해를
보상하여야 한다.

Article 249. Compensation of
damage caused by domesticated
animals
When a domesticated animal
harms a person’s property or
body, the owner or manager of the
animal shall compensate for the
harm. However, if the victim is at
fault, the owner or manager’s liability will be reduced proportionately or be exempted.
Article 250. Payment of damages
for violation of laws on protection
of national environment
Institutions, business entities,
organizations, and citizens that
have damaged another person’s
property in violation of applicable
laws for the protection of the national territory and resources and
for the conservation and creation
of natural environments or for the
prevention of environmental
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pollution shall compensate for any
damage incurred.
제 251 조(공동침해행위의
련대적책임)
여럿이 공동으로 남이
재산이나 인체에 해를 준
경우에는 련대적으로
민사책임을 진다.

Article 251. Solidary liability for
joint tortious conduct
When multiple persons jointly
harm a person’s property or body,
they shall be solidarily liable.

제 252 조(계약위반의 책임)
계획에 기초하는 계약을
어긴자는 위약금이나 연체료를
물어 법이 따로 정하지 않은 한
생긴 손해를 보상할 책임을
진다.
계획에 기초하지 않는 계약을
어긴자는 손해를 보상할 책임을
진다.

Article 252. Liability for default
Unless otherwise prescribed by
law, a person who fails to perform
a contract based on a plan shall
be liable to compensate for any
damage incurred by paying a
monetary penalty or moratory
damages compensating loss
caused by delay in performance.
Any person who fails to perform a
contract not based on a plan shall
compensate the resulting damage.

제 253 조(계약을 량편
당사자들이 위반한 책임)
계약당사자들이 다같이 맺은
계약을 위반하였을 경우에는
각자가 해당한 민사책임을
진다.

Article 253. Liability for a mutual
breach of contract
If the parties to a contract mutually violate the terms of contract, each party will assume proportionate civil liability.

제 254 조(계약의 변경, 취소 시
손해보상)

Article 254. Damages in the event
of contract amendment or termination
Any amendment to or termination of a contract shall not affect a
party’s right to claim damages.

계약의 변경 또는 취소는
손해보상을 요구한 당사자의
권리에 영향을 주지 않는다.
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제 255 조(주위환경에 큰 위험을
줄 수 있는 대상에 의하여 끼친
손해의 책임)
기관, 기업소, 단체는
주위환경에 큰 위험을 줄 수
있는 대상을 다루거나 작업을
하는 과정에 남의 재산이나
인체에 해를 준 경우 허물이
없어도 민사책임을 진다.
그러나 피해자에게 중대한
과실이 있는 경우에는 책임을
지지 않는다.

Article 255. Liability for damage
by ultrahazardous objects

제 256 조(정당방위와 긴급피난
시 책임면제)

Article 256. Exemption of liability
in the context of self-defense and
necessity
A citizen will incur no civil liability when he or she inevitably
harms another person’s property
or body to the extent necessary for
self-defense or for protecting the
interests of the State and society
from natural disasters or unlawful
infringement.

공민이 정당방위를 위하여
또는 자연재해나
비법침해로부터 국가와 사회의
리익을 보호하기 위하여 필요한
정도를 넘지 않는 범위에서
불가피하게 남의 재산이나
인체에 해를 준 경우에는
민사책임을 지지 않는다.

Institutions, business entities,
and organizations shall assume
strict civil liability in the event of
causing damage to another person’s property or body while dealing with ultrahazardous objects or
engaging in ultrahazardous activities. However, such liability will
not be incurred when the victim
has been grossly negligent.

제 257 조(긴급피난으로 발생한
손해의 보상)
국가와 사회의 리익을 위하여
불가피하게 남의 재산에 손해를
준 경우 그것으로 하여 구원된
재산의 임자는 해를 입은자의
손해를 보상하여야 한다.

Article 257. Compensation of loss
from an act of necessity
When the property of a person
is inevitably damaged for the benefit of the State and society, the
owner of the property thus salvaged shall compensate for the
loss of the person harmed.

제 258 조(민사책임과 행정적,
형사적책임의 관계)

Article 258. Relationship between
civil liability and administrative
and criminal liability
Civil liability does not exclude
administrative and criminal liability for tortious conduct.

민사책임은 위법행위에 대한
행정적, 형사적책임을 배제하지
않는다.
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PART 2. PERIODS OF CIVIL
PRESCRIPTION

Article 259. Application of civil
prescription periods
A suit or an arbitration to en민사상 권리의 실현을
force
civil rights must be filed
보장받기 위한 재판이나 중재의
within
the time for prescription.
제기는 민사시효 기간안에
Any exercise of rights in violation
하여야 한다.
of the foregoing will be precluded
이를 어기면 재판, 중재절차에 from proceeding under court and
의한 권리의 실현을 보장받지
arbitral proceedings. Civil pre못한다.
scription periods shall not be ap국가소유 재산의 반환청구에 plicable to any and all claims for
return of State-owned property.
대하여서는 민사시효가
적용되지 않는다.

제 259 조(민사시효의 적용)

제 260 조(공민이 당사자로
나서는 민사시효기간)
기관, 기업소, 단체와
공민사이 또는 공민사이의
민사시효기간은 1 년으로 한다.

제 261 조(기관, 기업소,
단체사이의 민사시효기간)
기관, 기업소, 단체사이의
민사시효기간은 다음과 같다.
1. 제품의 대금청구와
보증금반환청구, 공급한 제품의
규격, 완비성 및 견본의 위반과
파손, 부패변질, 수량부족,
그밖의 계약조건위반으로 하여
발생한 손해보상청구와 위약금,
연체료의 지불청구 및 운수,

Article 260. Civil prescription periods for citizens to become parties
The period of civil prescription
among institutions, business entities, organizations, and citizens,
or between citizens shall be one
year.
Article 261. Civil prescription between institutions, business entities, and organizations
The periods of civil prescription
among institutions, business entities, and organizations are as follows.
1. Three months in relation to
claims for outstanding product
payments and return of a deposit,
claims for damages, civil penalties, and liquidated damages arising out of the specifications and
completeness of supplied products,
their corruption and deterioration,
lack of quantity, and other
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체신업무와 관련하여 발생한
청구에 대하여서는 3 개월
2. 앞호 이외의 청구에
대하여서는 6 개월
3. 대외민사거래와 관련한
청구에 대하여서는 조약에서
달리 정하지 않는 한 2 년
(1990 년 구법 제 261 조 3.
외국으로부터 직접 인수한
수입품의 사고와 관련한
보상청구, 국제련락운수 및
국제통신과 관련한 청구에
대하여서는 해당 협정에 의한
기간)

제 262 조(예산제기관, 기업소의
채권에 대한 민사시효기간)
예산제기관, 기업소의 청구에
대하여서는 민사시효기간이
되기전이라도 그 청구권이
발생한 예산년도가 지나면
시효기간이 지난 것으로 본다.

제 263 조(민사시효기간이 지난
재산의 처리)
민사시효기간이 지난 재산은
임자 없는 재산으로 된다.
기관, 기업소, 단체는
민사시효기간이 지난 재산을
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contractual breaches, and to
claims arising in connection with
transportation and postal services;
2. Six months in relation to all
other claims;
3. Two years in relation to
claims arising from offshore civil
transactions unless prescribed
otherwise under the relevant
treaty;
(Article 261.3 of the Civil Code
of 1990. Applicable periods under
each pertinent treaty in relation to
claims for damages in connection
with any incident involving directly imported and accepted
goods and to claims in connection
with international carriage transportations and transnational telecommunications).
Article 262. Period of civil prescription in relation to claims by
publicly funded entities and business entities
In relation to claims by publicly
funded entities and corporations,
the period of civil prescription
shall be deemed expired if the
budgetary year in which a claim
arose has lapsed, even when the
period of prescription is yet to run
out.
Article 263. Property after the period of civil prescription
Any property with an extinguished prescription period will
become ownerless property. Institutions, business entities, and organizations shall timely surrender
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법이 정한 절차에 따라 제때에
해당 기관에 바쳐야 한다.

such property to applicable authorities pursuant to the procedures established by law.

제 264 조(민사시효기간이 지난
다음 민사상의무의 자발적
리행)
민사시효기간이 지난 다음
자기의 민사상 의무를
자발적으로 리행한자는
시효기간이 경과한 사실을
몰랐다 하더라도 그 반환을
요구할 수 없다.

Article 264. Voluntary discharge
of a civil obligation after a civil
prescription period

제 265 조(민사시효기간의 정지)

Article 265. Suspension of prescription periods
When a claim cannot be exercised within the last three months
of a prescription period due to an
excusable cause such as a fortuitous event, calculation of the period of prescription will be suspended provided that it will resume when the cause ceases to exist When the remaining period of
prescription is less than three
months, it will be extended by
three months.

민사시효기간의 마지막
3 개월안에 자연재해같이
어찌할 수 없는 사유로
청구권을 행사할 수 없었을
경우에 시효기간의 계산은
정지되며 그 사유가 없어지면
기간의 계산은 계속된다.
나머지
시효기간이 3 개월이 못될
경우에는 3 개월까지 연장한다.
제 266 조(민사시효기간의 중단)
다음과 같은 경우
민사시효기간의 계산은
중단된다.
1. 채권자가 재판 또는 중재를
제기하였을 경우
2. 은행기관을 통한
지불청구에 대하여 채무자가
채무를 확인하였을 경우

One who voluntarily performs
one’s own civil obligation after the
expiry of prescription period cannot reclaim whatever has been
performed, even if that person was
not aware that the prescription period had run out.

Article 266. Interruption of civil
prescription periods
The calculation of civil prescription periods will be interrupted in the following cases:
1. When a creditor has filed suit
or initiated an arbitration;
2. When the debtor has confirmed the existence of an obligation in response to a demand for
payment by a banking institution;
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3. 공민호상간 또는 기관,
기업소, 단체와 공민사이 혹은
기관, 기업소, 단체사이의
계획에 기초하지 않는
일반계약분쟁사건에서
채무자가 채무를 승인하였을
경우

시효기간이 중단되면
그때부터 시효기간을 새롭게
계산된다.
제 267 조(민사시효기간의 연장)
재판기관이나 중재기관은
청구권을 가진자가
민사시효기간안에 재판 또는
중재를 제기하지 못한 데
대하여 불가피한 리유가 있다고
인정되는 경우 시효기간을
연장하여 줄 수 있다.
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3. When a debtor has acknowledged an obligation in an ordinary contract dispute, not based
on a planned contract, to which
multiple citizens, or institutions,
business entities, organizations,
on the one hand, and citizens, on
the other hand, or institutions,
business entities, and organizations are party.
When a period of prescription is
interrupted, it will be calculated
anew from the point of interruption.
Article 267. Extension of prescription periods
Where it is determined that a
plaintiff has an excusable reason
not to commence a suit or arbitration within a period of prescription, the adjudicating court or arbitration tribunal may extend the
period of prescription.

제 268 조(민사시효의
의무적적용)
재판기관이나 중재기관은
당사자가 민사시효의 리익을
주장하지 않아도 시효를
적용하여야 한다.

Article 268. Mandatory application of civil prescription periods
Courts and arbitration tribunals
shall apply civil prescription periods even if no party to the proceedings alleges prescription.

제 269 조(민사시효기간의 시작)

Article 269. Commencement of
civil prescription periods
A civil prescription period shall
commence from each of the following:
1. When the period of performance has arrived in relation to
an obligation with a fixed period
for performance;

민사시효기간은 다음과 같은
때부터 시작된다.
1. 리행기간이 지정된 채무에
대하여서는 그 기간이 된 때
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2. 리행기간이 지정되지 않은
채무에 대하여서는 채무가 생긴
때
3. 기관, 기업소, 단체사이에
공급한 제품의 규격, 완비성 및
견본의 위반과 파손, 부패변질,
수량부족, 그밖의
계약조건위반으로 하여 발생한
손해보상청구는 그에 대한
사고조서를 작성하였거나
작성하기로 된 때
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2. When an obligation has been
created in relation to any obligation without a fixed period of performance;
3. In relation to products supplied between institutions, business entities, and organizations,
when an incident report is drawn
up or such report is due in relation
to a claim of damages arising out
of breaches pertaining to the specifications and completeness of
supplied products, their corruption and deterioration, lack of
quantity, or from other contractual
breaches.

제 270 조(민사시효기간의
시작날자)
민사시효기간은 일간, 월간,
년간으로 정하며 그 계산은
시효기간을 계산하여야 할
사유가 생긴 다음날부터
시작한다.

Article 270. Starting date of a civil
prescription period
Civil prescription periods shall
be fixed on daily, monthly, and
yearly bases. Their calculation
shall start the day after a cause to
calculate the period of prescription arises.

제 271 조(민사시효기간이
끝나는 날)
민사시효기간은 시효기간을
계산하여야 할 사유가 생긴
날자와 같은 날이 지나면
끝나며 같은 날자가 없을
경우에는 그 달의 마지막날이
지나면 끝난다.
시효기간의 마지막날이
일요일, 명절일이거나 국가에서
정한 휴식일인 경우에는 그
다음 첫 로동일을 시효기간의
마지막날로 한다.

Article 271. End date of a civil
prescription period
A civil prescription period ends
when the same day as the date on
which the reason for calculating
the prescription period arises,
lapses, and if there is no such
date, it ends after the last day of
that month. If the last day of a
civil prescription period falls on a
Sunday, a traditional or statutory
holiday, the prescription period
shall end on the next business day.
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At the end of the article, the existing problems of the civil legislation
of the Republic of Azerbaijan are discussed and a number of suggestions are put forward as solutions.
Keywords: Azerbaijan, Civil law, private law, codification, normative legal act, Civil Code, pandect system, legal reforms
I. INTRODUCTION
Codification is the combination of normative legal acts into a single normative legal act by reworking them in terms of form and content.1 The codification of a legislation envisages a critical review of
the existing normative legal acts in the field of certain relations, raising the quality of the legislation to a higher level and ensuring its
compactness. The codification aims to eliminate contradictions, inconsistencies between normative legal acts, as well as norms, duplications, obsolete provisions, and gaps that have not been justified
over the years. In the process of codification, the developers try to
consolidate and systematize the existing norms, as well as to revise
their content and sequence and to ensure the maximum completeness of the legal regulation of the relevant area of relations. In addition to generalizing existing legislation, the codification envisages
the creation of new norms that reflect the urgent needs of social
practice.
The result of the codification is a new consolidated legislative act
(code, statute, charter, etc.) with a stable content, replacing the existing normative legal acts in the specific field of law. The simplification and updating of legislation as the most important feature of
codification allows it to be accepted as the most perfect and highest
form of legislative activity.
The Civil Code is the second most important legal act in the country after the Constitution, and the first in terms of volume. Due to its
importance in the lives of citizens, the Civil Code is informally
1. Constitutional Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Normative Legal
Acts, article 1, December 21, 2010.
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called the “Economic Constitution.” The Constitutional Law of the
Republic of Azerbaijan “On Normative Legal Acts” adopted on December 21, 2010, gives the Civil Code a higher status than other
laws and codes, as article 2.5 of the law states that in case of conflict
between the Civil Code of the Azerbaijan Republic and other codes
and laws, the Civil Code shall prevail.
In countries with a civil law system, the Civil Code is the main
document that sets the rules for a market economy and covers important areas such as property, transactions, compensation, and unjust enrichment. For some of these countries, the Civil Code separately regulates business entities, the legal capacity of individuals,
guardianship, family relationships, inheritance, and even private international law.
To date, there are not many books and scientific works on codification in the legal world. The fundamental work of French professor Rémy Cabrillac on the codification of law is particularly noteworthy.2 In this work, he analyzes the main legislative codes implemented in the world. It turns out that the first set of laws in the world
is not, as many believe, the Hammurabi code of laws adopted in ancient Babylon in 1780 BC, but in fact, the Code of Ur-Nammu that
was drafted around 2100-2050 BC by the Sumerian king UrNammu, founder of the Third Dynasty of Ur.
In modern history, there are three civil codes that could be considered as the most crucial ones in terms of quality and impact on
other countries’ civil law codification: (1) the French Civil Code of
1804 (Napoleonic Code); (2) the German Civil Code of 1896 (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch); (3) the Swiss Civil Code of 1907. The
French Civil Code of 1804 is distinguished by its simple language.
The language of the German Civil Code of 1896 is not simple, and
it is often argued that this legal act is intended not for the general
public, but rather for professional lawyers. Nevertheless, the German Civil Code is characterized by its refined legislative technique.
2. R. CABRILLAC, LES CODIFICATIONS 10 (Presses universitaires de France
2002).
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In 1907, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted by the amalgamation of
the simple language of the French Civil Code and the high legislative technique of the German Civil Code. Civil codes adopted in
many countries in the twentieth century were drafted on the basis of
these three codes.
Throughout history, the ancient states of Azerbaijan have had a
rich tradition of civil law, and during different periods, law statutes
and codes were compiled through the codification of laws in the
field of civil law. Examples of this are the Avesta, the primary collection of sacred books of Zoroastrianism created during the Atropatene period, the Aguen Collection of Laws adopted by Vachagan
III during the Caucasus Albania, the Matikan e Hazar Datastan
adopted during the Sassanid Empire, the Code of Uzun Hasan compiled by the head of the Aghgoyunlu state Uzun Hasan, the Dasturul-Amal adopted by Shah Tahmasib I and the collection of decrees
Jameyi-Abbas adopted by Shah Abbas I during the Safavid Empire,
the Jar-Tala Code of the khanate period, etc.
This article mainly provides information on the codification activities carried out in the field of civil legislation in Azerbaijan over
the last 100 years. During the twentieth century, Azerbaijan adopted
three civil codes: two during the Soviet Union, in 1923 and 1964,
and the present one in 1999, under the modern Republic of Azerbaijan, which proclaimed its independence in 1991.
II. THE AZERBAIJAN SSR CIVIL CODE OF 1923
The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) was proclaimed on
May 28, 1918, but due to the tense political and social conditions,
the ADR only existed for 23 months. Although short-lived, the ADR
had a wide range of legislative activities in various fields of law but
did not manage to adopt the Constitution and the Civil Code in such
a short time span.
On April 28, 1920, the Bolshevik Russia occupied Azerbaijan
and established the Soviet Socialist Republic in Azerbaijan instead

2021-2022]

AZERBAIJAN

327

of a democratic republic. After the collapse of the ADR, the Azerbaijan Interim Revolutionary Committee became the de facto supreme body of state power, exercising the highest legislative and
executive power in Azerbaijan. One of the first measures of this
Committee in the field of civil law was the abolition of private ownership of land in the country. According to the decree issued on May
5, 1920, the mulkadar (landowner), khan and bey lands, as well as
the lands of mosques, churches, monasteries, and their property
were confiscated and given to the working class.3 Thus, the people
of Azerbaijan were stripped of their freedom and right to own properties that were confiscated as all wealth was now under the state.
Under the Soviet regime, Azerbaijan witnessed great changes in
the legal system initially established by the ADR, by fully adopting
the Russian socialist legal system. The civil law system was completely replaced by the socialist law of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR). During the Soviet period, the civil legislation of Azerbaijan did not significantly differ from the civil legislation of other socialist republics of the Soviet Union, with some
exceptions. However, in the 1920s, some features of traditional law
and customary law in the field of family, marriage and inheritance
were still preserved in the country.
On May 6, 1921, the First All-Azerbaijani Congress of Soviets
began its activities, and as a result, Azerbaijan became a completely
Soviet socialist country. On May 19 of the same year, the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijan SSR) adopted its first Constitution.
In the early years of the Soviet Union, civil legislation in Azerbaijan was committed to Lenin’s motto: “We do not recognize anything ‘private.’ For us everything in the field of economy means
public, and not private.”4 When the Bolsheviks came to power, there
3. R. ƏKBƏROV, S. SƏLİMOV, AZƏRBAYCANIN DÖVLƏT VƏ HÜQUQ TARİXİ
388 (Qanun nəşriyyatı, Bakı, 2003), (R. AKBAROV & S. SALİMOV, HİSTORY OF
STATE AND LAW OF AZERBAİJAN 388 (Baku 2003)).
4. В. И. Ленин, О задачах Наркомюста в условиях новой экономической политики: Письмо Д. И. Курскому, 44 ПОЛНОЕ СОБРАНИЕ СОЧИНЕНИЙ
389 (Москва, 1964), (V. I. Lenin, On the Tasks of the People’s Commissariat of
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were plans to abolish civil law altogether, since all social and legal
relations in the country that were to be established would be public.
For this reason, some Soviet lawyers suggested the adoption of an
economic or a social code rather than a civil code. However, the
deep economic crisis highlighted the need to attract private investment, including foreign capital. The New Economic Policy (NEP),
proposed by Lenin in 1921, could only succeed with the support of
the new civil law system. Thus, on October 31, 1922, the Civil Code
of the RSFSR was adopted, and then, under the instructions of the
Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, the People’s
Commissariat of Justice began to prepare a new Civil Code on the
basis of Russian legislation.
On June 16, 1923, at the third session of the second convocation
of the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, the first
Civil Code of the Azerbaijan SSR (hereinafter referred to as “the
Civil Code of 1923”) was adopted and came into force on the day of
its publication. On September 8 of the same year, the Civil Code
was published in the journal Bakinskiy Rabochiy (Baku Worker).
Unlike the Civil Codes of other Soviet republics, the Azerbaijan
SSR Civil Code of 1923 was unique for it included sections covering
the rights of marriage, family, and guardianship. In other Soviet republics, these relations were regulated by separate codes and laws.
The decision of the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan
SSR on this Civil Code stated that disputes in civil law relations that
existed from April 28, 1920, to the date of entry into force of the
Civil Code of 1923 were to be regulated by the legislation which
was in force at the time. However, due to gaps existing in the legislation in force at the time, the use of the new Civil Code was recommended. For earlier disputes, the Civil Code of 1923 was applied
only in cases where it was used in favor of the Soviet state, and this

Justice under the New Economic Policy: A Letter to D. I. Kursky, in 44 LENİN
COLLECTED WORKS 389 (Moscow 1964).
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Code was not allowed to be interpreted in favor of the overthrown
ADR government.5
This legislative act became the first Civil Code in the history of
Azerbaijan. At the same time, it was one of the first civil codes in
the world to belong to a socialist state. With the entry into force of
this Code, the formation of Soviet civil law in Azerbaijan was formalized by summarizing less than two years of experience in the
development of civil law institutions in the context of the NEP.
The Civil Code of 1923 included many issues related to the nature and rules of implementation of the NEP. This Civil Code consisted of 8 sections (general provisions, property law, law of obligations, copyright law, law of inheritance, marriage law, family law,
guardianship law) and 524 articles (only 83 of them had been commented).
There were 51 articles and 5 chapters in the general provisions
section. It contained the main provisions, norms on legal subjects
(persons), legal objects (property), agreements and the statute of
limitations. The main provisions stated that civil rights that did not
contradict social and economic purposes were protected by law (article 1) and that civil law disputes should be settled in court (article
2). The second chapter, which defined the norms for legal entities
(persons), consisted of 16 articles and was divided into two groups:
individuals (articles 4-12) and legal entities (articles 13-20). Article
5 reflected the scope of the legal capacity of individuals. An interesting point was that the Civil Code of 1923 did not specify the moment of formation of an individual’s legal capacity. There were two
juvenile periods: under 14 and between 14 and 18. The Code stipulated that every citizen of Azerbaijan has the right to move freely
throughout the territory of the Republic, to acquire or transfer property, to establish industrial and commercial enterprises, to choose
professions not prohibited by law, and to conclude agreements. Article 8 set out the grounds for termination of legal capacity. According to the Code, associations, departments, or organizations of
5. AKBAROV & SALİMOV, supra note 3, at 389.
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persons capable of acquiring property, acting on obligations, filing
lawsuits, and responding were considered legal entities. The third
chapter, covering six articles, regulated issues related to legal objects, i.e., property (articles 20-25). Any property for which civil
turnover was not prohibited by law could act as a civilian object.
Property withdrawn from civil circulation could be the object of
civil law only to the extent specified in the law. Land was considered
state property and could not be the subject of special turnover. Land
acquisition could only take the form of a right of use. The fourth
chapter of the Code, which regulated agreements, consisted of 18
articles (articles 26-43). Article 27 dealt with the forms of agreements. The fifth chapter of the Code was called the “the statute of
limitations” and consisted of eight articles (articles 44-51). It defined the statute of limitations, the rules of commencement, suspension, and resumption of the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations was 3 years.
The second section of the Code was called “property law.” This
section consisted of three chapters (property rights, construction
rights, property mortgages). The Civil Code of 1923 established
three forms of ownership: state property (nationalized and municipalized), cooperative property, and private property. Non-municipal
constructions, trade enterprises with hired workers not exceeding
the amount provided by special laws, industrial enterprises, production tools and means, money, securities, and other valuables, including gold and silver coins, foreign currency, household appliances,
household and personal use processed goods, goods the sale of
which is not prohibited by law, and any property not excluded from
private circulation could be the subject of private property. Confiscation of property was allowed only as a punishment in special cases
provided by law. State property was preferred as the main form of
property. Land, subsoil resources, forests, water, public railways,
and their mobile equipment could only be state property. The second
and third chapters were devoted to construction rights and issues of
mortgaging property, respectively.
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The third section of the Code was called the “law of obligations.” This included general provisions and obligations arising
from agreements, in particular liabilities such as property leases,
sales, exchanges, donations, contracts, orders, purchases, storage,
and partnerships. This section also covered liability for damages.
The fourth section of the Code was called “copyright law.” It
should be noted that among the republics of the Soviet Union, only
the Civil Code of Azerbaijan included a section on copyright law. In
other republics, this field of law was regulated by separate legislative acts.6
The fifth section of the Code was called “inheritance law.” This
section covered the forms of inheritance, the circle of heirs, the mass
of the inherited property, the rules of inheritance, intestate succession, and testamentary succession. According to the law, the circle
of persons called to inherit by law and testament included those who
were related by kinship in a direct descending line (children, grandchildren, and descendants), those who have been adopted (including
their kinship in a direct descending line), as well as the poor and
incapacitated people who were completely dependent on the testator
for at least one year before his (her) death.
Finally, the last three sections of the Code were devoted to the
laws of marriage, family, and guardianship. The marriage had to be
registered with special state bodies in accordance with the law. According to article 442 of the Code, a marriage could be declared invalid by the People’s Court only in cases strictly provided by law.
The death of one of the spouses was also considered a ground for
divorce. Marriages concluded on the basis of religious rites and with
the help of clergy were not the same as marriages registered by the
Civil Registry Office and did not create any rights or obligations for
those entering into such marriages. However, religious and ecclesiastical marriages concluded before the date of publication of the
Code in accordance with the conditions and forms provided for in
6. А.Л. МАКОВСКИЙ, О КОДИФИКАЦИИ ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ПРАВА (19222006) 35 (Статут, Москва, 2010), (A. L. MAKOVSKY, ON THE CODİFİCATİON OF
CİVİL LAW (1922-2006) 35 (Moscow 2010).
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the laws previously in force had the force of a registered marriage.
One of the most important conditions for marriage was the consent
of the couple. The age of marriage was set at 16 for women and 18
for men. Children born out of wedlock were considered as children
born to parents who were lawfully married. Refusal to appoint a
guardian or trustee was not allowed. The Code set out a list of requirements for appointed guardians or trustees. According to article
492, guardianship was imposed on minors, the mentally ill, the
wasteful, and those whose characteristics were found to be dangerous or impossible to leave without social protection.
In connection with the adoption of the Code of the Azerbaijani
SSR on acts of marriage, family, guardianship, and civil status in
1928, sections on the laws of marriage, family and guardianship
were removed from the Civil Code of 1923.
Over the years, the articles of the Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of
1923 became more difficult both in terms of content and interpretation. Moreover, with the strengthening of socialist principles and the
introduction of planning elements in civil law, the number of imperative legal norms increased.
Although the Civil Code of 1923 was based on the German experience, it was very incomplete, as the Code mainly regulated the
relations between socialist organizations arising from administrative
normative legal acts and life relations between citizens.
Since the adoption of the civil codes of the republics of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, they have been regarded by USSR legal
experts as temporary legislative acts of transition. Alexander
Goykhbarg, a social democrat and Bolshevik professor of law who
led the drafting of these civil codes, spoke of the civil codes of the
transition period as a protection of the interests of the state from individual entrepreneurs.7

7. А.Г. Гойхбарг, Ленин и советское право, in 2 СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 5-6
(1924), (A.G. Goykhbarg, Lenin and Soviet Law, in 2 SOVİET LAW 5-6 (1924)).
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The Civil Code of 1923 emphasizes the socio-legal nature of the
restriction of private property and the regulation of property relations, i.e., in order to ensure the protection of the interests of the
socialist state from individuals, public law prevails over private law.
article 6 of the Civil Code of 1923 dealt with the possibility of restricting civil rights not only by a court decision, but also by other
cases and rules established by law. For example, people declared
illegitimate did not have civil legal capacity because the law did not
protect them. Additionally, taking into account the course taken for
the development of market relations, the legal regulation of the activities of individual entrepreneurs was defined as one of the objectives of the Civil Code of 1923. In addition to the norms inherent in
the Soviet state, the Code also contained the rules of law inherent in
the market economy, which formed the basis of the law of capitalist
countries. The norms of the Code legally defined the framework in
which the state allowed the activities of capitalist elements, and established a system of measures against the abuse of the NEP. In the
Civil Code of 1923, there were harmonious norms of law of both
bourgeois and Soviet nature. The main reason for this was the introduction of the NEP, which was the main factor that prompted the
codification of Soviet law.
The Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of 1923, which adjusted the new
types of economic relations, regulated property relations in the
country in accordance with the interests of socialist construction.
Some provisions of the Code were declarative and contradictory.
The Civil Code of 1923 became a strong and flexible tool for regulating property relations in Soviet Azerbaijan for over 40 years.
III. THE AZERBAIJAN SSR CIVIL CODE OF 1964
The development of the USSR after World War II was characterized by significant economic growth and social reforms that required new civil legislation. In the 1960s, the USSR saw the need to
develop a new civil code, as in the sessions of the Central Executive
Committee and in the intersessional period, the Presidium of the
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Central Election Commission applied numerous amendments and
adjustments to the Civil Code of the 1920s, which was outdated and
no longer met the requirements of the time. With the adoption of the
Law of the USSR of February 11, 1957, “On Reliability of the Legislation on the Organization of Courts of the Union Republics, the
Adoption of Civil, Criminal and Procedural Codes,” Azerbaijan was
officially allowed to adopt a new civil code.8
On December 8, 1961, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted
the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union
Republics, which entered into force on May 1, 1962. This Law was
a codified legislative act of the USSR uniting the main provisions of
civil law.9 These Fundamentals consisted of a preamble and 8 sections (129 articles in total): (1) General provisions; (2) Law of property; (3) Law of obligations; (4) Copyright law; (5) Law of discovery; (6) Law of invention; (7) Law of succession; (8) Legal capacity
of aliens and stateless persons and application of foreign civil laws,
international treaties and agreements. With the adoption of this legislative act, the work on drafting a new civil code was accelerated.
While considering the drafts of the civil codes of the Union republics, special attention was paid to the issues of defining the scope
of relations and the boundaries of civil code, which should be regulated by civil laws. Much attention was paid to the problem of the
relationship between the civil legislation of the USSR and the Union
Republics, the system of civil codes, the content of civil law institutions (collective farm property, damages, acquisition period, inheritance, etc.) and legislative techniques. Many of the proposals put
forward by the republics for the adoption of new civil codes were
not accepted by the central leadership due to their all-union significance. At the same time, the exchange of experience between legal
8. Law of the USSR dated February 11, 1957 “On the assignment to the
jurisdiction of the union republics of legislation on the organization of the courts
of the union republics, the adoption of civil, criminal and procedural codes.”
9. Law of the USSR dated December 8, 1961 “On approval of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics.”
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experts from different republics was of great importance during this
period.
Thus, in accordance with the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation
drafted in 1961 within the framework of the Second All-Union Codification in the USSR, on September 11, 1964, the Supreme Soviet
of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted the second Civil Code of the Azerbaijan SSR (hereinafter referred to as “the Civil Code of 1964”),
which entered into force on March 1, 1965. The Civil Code of 1964,
again, in essence, did not differ much from the Civil Code of the
RSFR, adopted the same year. The new Civil Code consisted of 9
sections and 574 articles: (1) General provisions; (2) Agency and
power of attorney; (3) Law of ownership; (4) Law of obligations;
(5) Copyright and related rights; (6) Law of discovery; (7) Law of
invention, rationalization proposal and industrial design; (8) Law of
inheritance; (9) Legal capacity of aliens and stateless persons and
application of foreign civil laws, international treaties, and agreements. As can be seen, the Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of 1964 included new sections on copyright and related rights, law of discovery, law of invention and international law.
The Civil Code of 1964 began with a preamble, more like a political declaration or a constitutional provision. The preamble proclaimed that the Soviet Union had achieved the complete and decisive victory of socialism and had begun to build a broad communist
society. By creating such semi-constitutional provisions in the preamble of the Civil Code of 1964, Soviet lawyers described the goals
of communism at this stage, the socialist economy, and its future.
According to the preamble, the main purpose of Soviet civil law was
to remain steadfast in upholding the communist ideology. It should
be noted that even the Civil Code of 1923 was not so attached to
political ideology as the Civil Code of 1964.
It should also be noted that the provisions of the Civil Code of
1964 show a significant evolution in the understanding of the social
function of civil law in the USSR. In the 1920s, civil law was seen
as a “narrow horizon of bourgeois law” that would disappear in
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communist society, but in the 1960s, civil law was already seen as a
means of contributing to the building of communist society.10
Compared to the Civil Code of 1923, the Civil Code of 1964
demonstrated better structural and legislative techniques. This Code
contained separate sections on intellectual property and private international law and provided for a broader system of liability law.
The Civil Code of 1964 recognized only one real right: the right
to property. There were only two types of property: socialist property and private property. Apart from the property rights of socialist
enterprises, the Civil Code of 1964, unlike the Civil Code of 1923,
did not recognize limited property rights (for example, the right to
construction). Prominent Russian jurist Yevgeny Sukhanov believes
that the main reason for the removal of limited property rights from
the civil codes of the Union Republics in the 1960s was the “de
facto” exclusivity of state land rights and the exclusion of other limited rights, including servitudes (the right to use someone else’s
property).11
The first paragraph of article 89, which deals with state property,
explicitly allows tautology: “The state is the sole owner of all state
property.” However, in the author’s opinion, this provision was purposefully drafted in this form, because such a formulation would
nullify any attempt of socialist enterprises to present their property
as property rights. The second paragraph of this article clearly defines the real rights of socialist enterprises over their property:
State property transferred to state organizations is under the
practical management of these organizations, these organizations shall exercise the right to own, use and dispose of
property within the limits established by law in accordance
with the purposes of their activities, planned tasks and the
purpose of the property.

10. V. GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THEIR
BACKGROUND UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME 576 (Ann Arbor 1949).
11. Y. Sukhanov, The Concept of Ownership in Current Russian Law, 6 L.
REV. U. TARTU 104 (2001).
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At that time, the legal nature of this concept of “practical management” provoked heated debates among Soviet civilists. Some
fundamental researchers of civil law think that the creation of such
a real law is perhaps the most notable contribution of Soviet lawyers
to the science of law. In fact, the concept of “practical management”
was not a novelty of the Civil Code of 1964. It already existed in
1921 at the time of the introduction of the NEP and was recognized
by the Soviet legal doctrine, but it was simply not formally included
in the Civil Code of 1923. That is why the nature of the property
rights of Soviet enterprises was the subject of scientific controversy
in the 1920s.
According to Boris Martynov – a professor at the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations – in Soviet civil law the relationship between the state and enterprises is similar to the concept of
“fiducia” in Roman law and “trust” in general law. Martynov also
uses the “divided theory of property” of the medieval feudal period
to explain the division of property rights between the Soviet state
and socialist enterprises. On this basis, he attributes the concept of
dominium directum (direct property) in Roman law to the state, and
the concept of dominium utile (dependent property) to enterprises.12
However, Martynov’s theory ignores the substantive differences between the concepts of fiducia, divided property, and trust. Thus, although in the concept of fiducia the fiduciary is not the owner of the
property, in matters of trust and divided property, several persons
are considered to be the owners of the property as the property is
divided between them.
In order to avoid any reference to the “divided theory of property” of the feudal era, Soviet scholars began to insist that the real
owner of property was the state only. According to them, the right
of enterprises to property is not a property right and should not be
classified using traditional concepts of property. Thus, a new real
law that combined the components of administrative and civil law –
12. O. S. IOFFE, DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW THINKING IN THE USSR 211212 (Giuffrè 1989).
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the law of “practical management” emerged.13 The Soviet doctrine
of civil law accepted the right of “practical management” as a kind
of limited real law. Although enterprises could exercise all the rights
(possession, use, and disposition) of the owner, the state retained the
right to increase the property (accession), and this was a decisive
factor in determining the true owner of the property (i.e., the state).
The Civil Code of 1964 declared that private property originated
from socialist property and was a means of meeting the needs of
citizens. Unlike the Civil Code of 1923, the Civil Code of 1964 recognized only two types of property: socialist property (state or nationwide property, property of collective farms, other cooperative
organizations and their associations) and private property (one of the
means of meeting the needs of citizens). Private property was a substitute for special property.
The peculiarity of the Civil Code of 1964 was that it regulated
property relations in a society where there was no private ownership
of the means of production and land. Private property was not encouraged and was subjected to various restrictions. In fact, by its
legal nature, private property in the Soviet civil law doctrine was
nothing more than limited special property. Private property – limited to certain objects of a certain size – could only be owned by an
individual and was ultimately intended to meet the material and
moral needs of the owner. It was emphasized that it was illegal for
citizens to receive “effortless income” from private property.14 Article 101 of the Civil Code of 1964 stated that a citizen may personally own one house (or part of a house). The maximum size of a
house or part (parts) of a house belonging to a citizen by right of
personal ownership may not exceed 60 square meters of living
space. Private property could be inherited from one owner to another. If a citizen acquired a second home through a donation or inheritance, he had to sell, donate, or otherwise alienate any of those
13. Id. at 215-221.
14. The Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of 1964, article 88.
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homes at his own discretion within a year. If it was not possible to
sell the house within a year, the state organized a forced sale. In
cases where it was not possible to sell the house compulsorily due
to the lack of a buyer, the house was transferred to state ownership
free of charge.15 In such cases, a citizen’s right to property depended
on his luck: if there was a buyer, the owner could exercise his right
of ownership, and if there was no buyer, the house was confiscated
by the state. In other words, the state deprived the citizen of property.
Despite all these restrictions, private property could be considered special property, as the owner was given the right to own, use
and dispose of the property. It is impossible to disagree with the
opinion of the Soviet scientist Vladimir Gsovsky that “Soviet property rights showed that even in a socialist state, even a small amount
of private property is inevitable.”16
The Civil Code of 1964 defined two types of agreements: oral
agreements and written agreements. The first refers to agreements
that could be concluded orally for transactions up to 100 rubles, as
well as for immediate transactions. Written agreements were of two
types: simple agreements and agreements that had to be notarized.
Simple written agreements were to be concluded during transactions
of the state, cooperatives, public organizations, and citizens in excess of 100 rubles, as well as transactions required by law in writing.
For example, a loan agreement of more than 50 rubles had to be
concluded in simple written form. Types of transactions, such as
home sales, donations, and wills, had to be notarized.17
For the first time, the Civil Code of 1964 regulated the relations
arising from the contracting of agricultural products, i.e., the conclusion of a contract for the purchase by the state. The contract regulated the relations between the collective farms, state farms and
other farms that cultivate and produce agricultural products and the
socialist organizations that receive these products. Despite the
15. The Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of 1964, article 104.
16. GSOVSKI, supra note 10, at 576.
17. The Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of 1964, article 39-41.
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existence of a contract of deposit in economic practice, the Civil
Code of 1923 did not mention this. New articles (articles 421-432)
on the contract of deposit were added to the Civil Code of 1964.
According to the contract of deposit the depositary undertakes to
safeguard property transferred to him by another party, and to return
such property in good condition.
The Civil Code of 1964 also determined state compensation with
regards to protecting socialist property. During the Soviet people
struggle against Nazi Germany, many citizens were injured in
bombings and other hostile operations while heroically rescuing socialist property. Due to the lack of relevant provisions in the Civil
Code of 1923, the courts had difficulty determining the compensation to be paid by the state. The Civil Code of 1964 embodied this
practice, as the article included the compensation for injury caused
by the rescue of socialist property. Injury sustained by a citizen in
rescuing socialist property from a danger threatening it must be
compensated for by the organization whose property the injured
party has rescued.18
For the first time, an article on protection of honor and dignity
was created in the Civil Code of 1964. The foundations of civil law
defined litigation as the primary method of protecting civil rights.
According to the Civil Code of 1964, there were courts of general
jurisdiction, arbitrations, arbitral tribunals, and comrade judgement
courts in Azerbaijan.
The predominance of socialist property and the degradation of
private property created negative trends in the USSR’s economy and
society. In the late 1980s, the inefficiency of the socialist economy
was already an indisputable and accepted fact. To alleviate the difficulties, the Gorbachev government introduced perestroika (reconstructing) and a series of unprecedented political and economic reforms. However, these reforms were ineffective, and on December
26, 1991, the USSR collapsed.
18. The Azerbaijan SSR Civil Code of 1964, article 468.
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IV. THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC CIVIL CODE OF 1999
The end of the twentieth century is considered a period of renaissance in civil law and is often associated with reforms in postcommunist countries, including the need to build a market economy
and a free society, as Soviet legal doctrine denied the division of law
into public and private.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the old system of public relations, and changes to the socio-political context in
Azerbaijan. These changes would later pave the way for the implementation of necessary political, legal, and economic reforms, as
well as the development of a market-oriented economy and the rule
of law. For this to happen, it was necessary to adopt the basic law of
the country – the Constitution. A commission of 33 people was established in 1994 under the chairmanship of national leader Heydar
Aliyev to prepare the draft Constitution of the independent Republic
of Azerbaijan. The yearlong nationwide discussion resulted in a referendum held on November 12, 1995, that adopted the draft Constitution, which entered into force on November 27 of that year.
The new Constitution defined the foundations of modern society
and the state, of political institutions and the basic principles of
building the Azerbaijani economy. The adopted new basic law was
an impetus for the beginning and implementation of reforms in various spheres of life in the Republic of Azerbaijan. It also marked an
important step in terms of proclaiming equality of rights and protection of human rights in the country. Thus, with the adoption of the
new Constitution, Azerbaijan was heading toward a new direction
of building the Rule of Law of the country.
This historical period prompted three major changes in the country: (1) a new phase for the country’s economy; (2) a strengthening
of the principle of freedom of contract and the right to private property; (3) the administration of a stable and predictable legal environment for entrepreneurial activity. Economic relations in Azerbaijan
had to be modernized on the basis of market principles, and public
administration had to move from an administrative-command
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system to a democratic system. Existing laws in the Soviet era were
based on the concepts of state property and public administration in
the economy, and the hastily drafted new laws on property after independence did not meet the requirements of the time. This situation
made it necessary to prepare and adopt a new, fundamental legal
document – the Civil Code, which was supposed to adapt civil law
relations to the new political and economic realities. The deep and
rapid social reforms carried out in the Republic of Azerbaijan in the
1990s also warrant the adoption of a new civil code as soon as possible. The civil legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan had to be
created from scratch, as the legislation of the former Soviet era
served the interests of a centrally regulated economy and was by no
means suitable to build a market economy.
Azerbaijan’s experience in the field of civil law was insufficient,
as there were not enough local specialists in this field. During the
Soviet period, the creation of the country’s legislation was largely
under the hands of Russian legal experts. As a result, in the first 8
years of independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan was unable to
adopt a new civil code and had to make do by amending the Civil
Code of 1964. Thus, the young Republic was faced with the task of
creating a modern civil legislation that would represent a complex
and consistent system of interrelated, complementary legal norms.
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy
involved a profound transformation process. This transformation
process included extensive legislative reforms based on the Western
model. The role of German lawyers in the preparation of the draft of
the new civil code should be especially noted. Based on the Agreement signed between the Governments of Azerbaijan and Germany
on December 8, 1997, the lawyers of the German Technical Cooperation Society (GTZ) began to provide full support to legal reforms
in Azerbaijan within the project “Legal Reforms in Transition”.19
19. On January 1, 2011, through the merger of three German international
development organizations, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) and the
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GTZ implemented the project on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The project’s head for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was
Rolf Knieper, a GTZ lawyer and professor at the University of Bremen.
A question may be asked: why is it that the United States, usually very active in contributing toward the legal reform of other
countries, did not play any role in Azerbaijan? The main reason for
this was section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, adopted by the US
Congress in 1992 at the initiative of the Armenian lobby and prohibiting direct US aid to Azerbaijan government.
One of the first projects of German legal experts in Azerbaijan
was a seminar in the Milli Majlis (National Assembly, the legislative
branch of government in Azerbaijan) held by Rolf Knieper on the
methods of drafting legislation for members of parliament. During
the Soviet era, laws were drafted mainly in Moscow, not in Baku,
which was why in the first few years of independence, there were
very few local legal specialists in the field of drafting laws. It should
be noted that GTZ, along with Azerbaijan, also provided assistance
in drafting civil codes in Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Mongolia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
In the drafting process of the new Civil Code, the German legal
experts were mainly involved in the development of legal norms that
play an important role in the daily lives of citizens, including lease,
property, and land contracts. They did not participate in the development of norms in areas such as inheritance and family law, because these areas had the characteristics and traditions of the Azerbaijani people. Thus, it would not be appropriate for foreign experts
to develop norms in this area. In other words, the German legal experts were mainly active in drafting provisions that played a major
role in economic development.

Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (InWEnt), the German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH (GIZ) was established.
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Finally, 8 years after gaining the independence, with the support
of German legal experts, the Azerbaijan Republic Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as “the Civil Code of 1999”) was adopted on December 28, 1999 and came into force on September 1, 2000. An interesting point is that although the Civil Code of 1999 was originally
planned to come into force on June 1, 2000, it was postponed for 3
months.
The Civil Code of 1999, which is currently in force, is the largest
legal act in the national legislative system of Azerbaijan. Its structure is divided into general and special parts, consisting of 10 sections, 74 chapters and 1,325 articles.
The first section of the Civil Code of 1999 contains introduction
provisions (legislation in the area of civil law, civil rights and obligations and their protection), the second section is about persons
(natural persons and legal entities), the third section deals with the
rights on property and articles, the fourth section is about agreements, the fifth section introduces periods (period of limitation), the
sixth section consists of the general part of the law of obligations,
the seventh section covers the obligations arising from agreements,
the eighth section involves the obligations arising out of law, the
ninth section deals with the obligations arising from the violation of
civil rights (delicts), and the tenth section is about inheritance law.
The General part of the Civil Code of 1999 states that the purpose of the Code is to secure the freedom of civil relationships based
upon the equality of the parties without prejudice to the rights of
other persons. Unlike the civil codes of the Azerbaijan SSR, the new
Code proclaims the equality of the subjects of civil law, the free will
of the subjects of civil law, the independence of the participants of
civil relationships with respect to their property, as well as the inviolability of property and freedom of contract.
In the Special part, the relations arising mainly from the right of
obligation and the right of inheritance are regulated. According to
the Code, obligations arising from agreement, law and violation of
civil rights (delicts) are different. The Code regulates the
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distribution of inheritance by law and will (intestate succession and
testamentary succession).
Azerbaijan’s civil legislation is based on the principles of freedom of contract, inviolability of property, non-interference in private affairs, renunciation of previous norms inherent in the administrative-command system of economic planning. These principles
are heavily based on the pandectist system of the German Civil Code
of 1896 (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and the latest features of the
Dutch Civil code. The essence of the systematization of civil law
norms in the pandect system is to divide the norms of the civil code
into general and special parts. Azerbaijan’s civil legislation has features such as the division of the Civil Code into general and special
parts, and the clear division of material and procedural norms. The
codification of civil law in Azerbaijan is based on the theory of monism of private law, as civil and commercial relations are regulated
by only one code. Therefore, the Civil Code of 1999 regulates economic relations of natural persons and legal entities, as well as the
status and legal relations of commercial organizations.
Compared to the civil codes of most other CIS countries, the
Azerbaijan Republic Civil Code of 1999 is more influenced by German civil law, treating ownership, pledge, mortgage, easement, and
usufruct as independent property rights. Even some articles of the
Civil Code of 1999 are taken directly from the German Civil Code
BGB of 1896. For example, article 439.2 of the Civil Code of 1999
on the performance of monetary obligations, which is very relevant
nowadays, is drafted on the basis of paragraph 244.2 of the German
Civil Code BGB of 1896.
At the same time, some chapters and articles of the Civil Code
of 1999 are directly influenced by the Model Civil Code of the CIS
and the Russian Federation Civil Code. Although the Model Civil
Code of the CIS is adopted as the basis for the national civil codes
of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Armenia, the legislators from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova,
and Turkmenistan have chosen their own path in the development
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of national civil codes, with only partial harmonization with the
Model Civil Code of the CIS.20
An example of the direct influence of the Model Civil Code of
the CIS and the Russian Federation Civil Code is in article 10 of the
Civil Code of 1999 on the customs of business activity. The list of
sources of civil law in the theory of Russian civil law also includes
business customs. Article 5 of the current Civil Code of the Russian
Federation, called “The Customs of the Business Turnover,” states
that the custom of the business turnover shall be recognized as the
rule of behavior, which has taken shape and is widely applied in a
certain sphere of business activities, and which has not been stipulated by legislation, regardless of whether it has or has not been fixed
in any one document. The customs of the business turnover, contradicting the provisions of legislation or to the agreement, obligatory
for the participant in the given relationship, shall not be applied. The
content of this article is exactly the same as article 5 of the Model
Civil Code for the CIS, called “business practices.” A comparative
analysis shows that the content of article 10 of the current Civil Code
of 1999, called “The customs of business activity,” is completely
taken from these two codes. In the Special Part of the Civil Code of
1999, most of the provisions in Section 7, “The obligations arising
from agreement,” including the types of agreements, are taken from
the Section 4 “Particular Kinds of Obligations” of the second part of
the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. Another feature of the
codification of civil law in Azerbaijan is the formation of a separate
Family Code in accordance with the Russian model, taking the
norms of family law beyond the scope of civil law regulation.
However, there are many differences between the Azerbaijan
Republic Civil Code of 1999 and the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, especially in terms of structure. For example, unlike the
20. А.А. Богустов, Проблемы взаимодействия модельного и
национального гражданского законодательства стран СНГ, in 3 РОС.
ЮСТИЦИЯ 21-24 (2012), (A.A. Bogustov, Problems of Interaction of Model and
National Civil Legislation of the CIS Countries, in 3 RUSSIAN JUSTICE 21-24
(2012)).
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Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the Azerbaijan Republic Civil
Code of 1999 does not contain separate sections on intellectual property and private international law. Relations arising from intellectual
property rights in Azerbaijan, along with the Civil Code, are mainly
regulated by separate legal acts.
The preparation of a civil code is a long and arduous process.
For instance, it took a full 66 years to draft the Civil Code of the
People’s Republic of China, adopted in 2020 and considered the
“Civil Code of the XXI Century,” as the first draft was prepared
back in 1954. Over the years, extensive and detailed discussions
have been held among legal experts on the drafts, scrutinizing every
section, chapter, article, sentence, and even every word.
As aforementioned, in the first few years of independence, Azerbaijan did not do much to draft new civil legislation and codify civil
law due to the lack of local legal experts in the field of codification
of civil law in the country. Although at first glance it seems that it
took 8 years to adopt the Civil Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
this document was in fact prepared in a very short time and its draft
was not published in advance for public discussions.
The practice of applying the Civil Code in independent Azerbaijan for almost 21 years showed that further improvements are
needed. Numerous, or more precisely, 107 amendments made to the
Code and 40 articles removed from the Code from 1999-2020 confirms this opinion. Some of these amendments indirectly
acknowledge the poor quality of some provisions of the Code, which
include the rewriting of various articles of the Civil Code, discussions of new drafts of Chapter 4 on legal entities, as well as articles
on limited liability companies and cooperatives, and the renaming
of Chapter 50 on insurance contracts and Chapter 54 on securities.
Unlike the French Civil Code, the language of the Azerbaijan
Civil Code is quite complex, with many abstract sentences and expressions that are incomprehensible to ordinary citizens. The main
purpose of the adoption of the Civil Code should be to protect the
rights of ordinary citizens, and to meet their current interests and
needs. Thus, in order to meet this purpose, the Civil Code should be
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edited in a manner that is easily understood and interpreted by the
citizens.
The Azerbaijan Republic Civil Code of 1999, which was prepared in a short period of time and adopted without public discussions, has its shortcomings such as inconsistencies, mixed provisions, weak legal technique, and a large number of imperative
norms. In some cases, the failure to write the provisions of the Civil
Code in plain language creates difficulties in interpreting individual
articles, which directly affects the correct interpretation and application of the law. Several provisions of the Russian Civil Code and
the German Civil Code have been systematically and mechanically
incorporated into Azerbaijani Civil Code without in-depth analysis.
Despite these shortcomings, the Azerbaijani society has a relatively
more promising regulator in the Civil Code of 1999 compared to the
Civil Codes of the Soviet era.
V. CURRENT SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
The history of the codification of civil law in Azerbaijan shows
that all three civil codes adopted during the twentieth century are
based on the traditions of civil law and, in most cases, include some
provisions from the civil codes of other European countries. At the
same time, it should be noted that the main role in the formation of
civil law in Azerbaijan was played not by the classic pandect or institutional codes (German Civil Code and French Civil Code, respectively), but primarily by the soviet-style Civil Code of 1922. As
a result of differences in economy, politics and lifestyle, Azerbaijan’s civil legislation has always had its own peculiarities. The existence of specific features of Azerbaijani civil law does not mean a
departure from civil traditions, and in many cases can be compared
with the provisions of civil law in countries belonging to the romano-germanic tradition of law. In this sense, the Civil Code,
adopted in 1999, has a special and important meaning in terms of
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harmonizing the civil law of Azerbaijan with the civil law of European countries.
In general, the current civil law system in Azerbaijan can be
characterized as transformed from a socialist to a romano-germanic
legal system and oriented to a market economy. The civil legislation
of Azerbaijan demonstrates certain features that reflect the national
and common Islamic traditions. The way of life, thinking, and traditions of the nation have had a significant impact on the evolution
and development of the national legal system.
Almost 30 years have passed since Azerbaijan gained independence. The country emerged from the severe crisis of the early 1990s,
built an independent economy, and became one of the leaders
among the countries of the South Caucasus and the CIS. During
these years, the Republic of Azerbaijan has implemented fundamental economic reforms that ensure the transition from a centralized
economy to a market economy and a society that develops through
the rule of law. Economic reforms are not possible without legal reforms that form the basis of the development of the state and society.
Civil law plays a key role in building the market foundations of the
economy. The poor quality of the Civil Code directly affects the development of Azerbaijan’s economy, including non-oil sector and
entrepreneurship.
As Azerbaijan has reached a new level of economic development, there is a need and ground for the country’s civil law to enter
a new stage of development. Although Azerbaijan has been building
a national legal system for almost 30 years, significant progress has
been made only in the field of public law. More successful legal acts
in terms of legal language and legal techniques have been adopted
in the areas of constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law
and other public law. The Azerbaijan Republic Civil Code of 1999,
which is the basis of private law and contains the provisions of civil
law, is still far from perfect. After the reforms in the civil legislation,
many shortcomings were identified in the application of the norms
reflected in the Civil Code of 1999, and these shortcomings can be
eliminated only through the further development of civil legislation.
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Public law can be developed on the basis of a deductive method,
and sometimes even most of the foreign law can be completely copied and applied in the country. In private law, this is not possible, as
the inductive method must be applied to the development of special
legal norms, including in-depth study, analysis and discussion of the
experience and needs of society. The experience of developed countries once again shows that the national legal system is developing
mainly on the basis of scientific discussions in the field of private
law. For the development and proper application of Azerbaijan's legislation, the country needs real and effective scientific discussions,
not simulations. Existing laws should be constantly reviewed and
criticized, and suggestions for their improvement should be made
regularly.
Legislative activity in Azerbaijan is carried out almost exclusively by members of the Milli Majlis, the country’s legislature. It is
impossible to carry out proper legislative activity without taking into
account the views of judges, lawyers, legal experts, scientists and
civil society groups in the field of lawmaking. Transparency of lawmaking should be increased in Azerbaijan. To do this, scientific and
practical conferences on civil law should be held in the country on
a regular basis with the involvement of legal experts and public activists. In order to properly understand and legally apply legal
norms, it is very important to clearly interpret their scientific understanding and rules of practical application. Discussions held at such
conferences can contribute to improving the quality of legislative
work, increasing the legal culture of the population, increasing the
authority of law and the state.
Evaluating the results of the civil legislation adopted since the
country’s independence, it can be said that although most issues related to the establishment and development of the civil law system
have been resolved, there is a great need for reform and re-regulation
of the civil legislation. Thus, the emergence of new public relations
is inevitable, and in this regard, as a dynamically developing country, Azerbaijan must move toward the improvement of civil
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legislation in order for the legislation to meet new requirements and
keep pace with the times. In other words, it is very important to improve the existing civil legislation in Azerbaijan in line with the pace
of development of public relations. The rapidly developing and
changing public relations in the country give special urgency to the
search for ways to optimize the practical application of the law.
Although the Civil Code is the main legislative act for the formation and development of market relations in the country, its effective implementation in the daily life of society remains an unresolved problem. To this end, the legislature, the courts and lawyers
must work together to continuously improve the Civil Code. In order
to study international experience in the field of civil law, it is necessary to regularly exchange views and apply the practices that are
considered successful in the context of public relations in the country.
One of the main objectives of legislative activity is to ensure the
principle of legal certainty in public relations. The principle of legal
certainty, as one of the key aspects of the rule of law, requires the
absence of “gray zones” that are not regulated by law, both among
citizens and between citizens and the state.
The language of the Civil Code must be clear, fluent, and understandable to ordinary citizens, and the definition of the objects and
subjects of civil law relations in the provisions of the Code must be
precise and detailed, taking into account specific issues. Uncertainties in the Civil Code should not be allowed so that the parties do
not implement these provisions in their own way.
At present, the issue of completing the legal system, ensuring its
structuring, eliminating the contradictions and gaps adopted in previous years is urgent. Thus, the author makes the following proposals for the optimization of civil law in Azerbaijan:
1. Revision of all civil legislation, elimination of contradictions
and re-codification of laws;
2. Inclusion in the Civil Code of norms regulating new public
relations and reliably protecting the rights of citizens;
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3. Further improvement of the basic principles of the civil
legislation of Azerbaijan in accordance with the new level of
development of market relations;
4. The practice of law enforcement and interpretation of laws
should be reflected in the Civil Code;
5. Improving the norms on protection of property rights,
healthy competition, implementation of agreements and
anti-monopoly activities;
6. Use of the latest successful experience of civil codes of a
number of European (Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Belgium) and Asian (China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore)
countries in the modernization of civil legislation of
Azerbaijan;
7. More active involvement of foreign scientists and experts in
the preparation of draft proposals on amendments and
additions to the Civil Code;
8. Elimination of flawed language style and weak legislative
techniques of the Civil Code, as well as making the language
of the Code simpler and more understandable for citizens;
9. Improving the effectiveness of law enforcement practices;
10. Awareness of judges and lawyers through trainings;
11. Developing the legal awareness of citizens through mass
media;
12. Public discussion of the adoption of new laws and
amendments to conflicting laws that meet modern
challenges with the participation of scholars and experts in
the field of private law.
No country in the world has a perfect, flawless legislative and
legal system. Legislation is in the process of ongoing reforms, and
it is important that these reforms are in line with the dynamics of
social development.
The need for reform in the civil legislation of Azerbaijan in the
1990s stemmed primarily from the desire to eliminate all norms that
embodied the administrative and planned regulation of property
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relations. Today, in contrast to the reforms of the 1990s, the need
for modernization and reform of civil legislation arose primarily
from the need to ensure the stability of civil law and civil turnover.
This, in turn, undoubtedly requires a more precise regulation of the
norms on sources of civil legislation as a basis for future legal reforms.
Summarizing the above proposals, it can be said that the concept
of development and reform of civil legislation in Azerbaijan should
be transformed into a single strategy aimed at more effective regulation of market relations in country, gradually eliminating the “transitional” nature of market relations.
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ABSTRACT
Neuro-law and neuro-rights are emerging legal fields in the intersection of law, ethics, and technology. The aim of this study is to
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I. INTRODUCTION
When McCullach and Pitts, in their 1943 paper, established the
neurons as the elemental unit of computation of the brain,1 they did
not imagine the practical importance that such a discovery would
eventually have in the future of information technologies. At the

* Full professor of Private law, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
1. Warren McCullach & Walter Pitts, A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity, 52 BULLETIN OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY 99-115
(1990).
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time, there were no digital computers,2 no information theory,3 and
Turing’s machine was nothing but a trivial mathematical pursuit.
Based on the ideas of Norbert Wiener’s school of Cybernetics,4
Warren McCullach, a neurology researcher, had the intuition that
the brain was fundamentally a universal Turing machine.5 The idea,
in its most basic elements, is quite simple. At the time, it was well
known that neurons communicated with each other through electrical signals, action potentials, which originated in one neuron and
were transmitted, either electrically or chemically, to other neurons
through synapses.6 The signal was always the same, although it
could be modulated through neurotransmitters and could have the
effect of inhibiting or activating other neurons. These synapses
formed networks and, through a process that was not quite clear
then, these networks became thoughts and ideas.7 He wondered, if
the neurons could either fire or be in repose, did they behave as a
digital model of thought? Could these neurons be represented as
2. In 1943, the most widely known computer was Vannevar Bush’s Differential Analyzer, which was built in the 1920s. See FLO CONWAY & JIM
SIEGELMAN, THE DARK HERO OF INFORMATION AGE. IN SEARCH OF NORBERT
WIENER THE FATHER OF CYBERNETICS 76 (Basic Books 2005). Although the Nazis had built a kind of programable computer, the Z2, and the British had constructed the Colossus as a digital device that could make fast calculations, the
knowledge of the very existence of such machines was secret and a matter of national security.
3. Shannon’s Information Theory did not appear until his 1948 paper, which
brought about the first mathematical theory of communication. See Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 THE BELL SYSTEMS
TECHNICAL JOURNAL 379 (1948).
4. For the impact of McCullach and Pitts theories on Cybernetics, see
NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION: IN THE
ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE 66 (MIT Press 2019).
5. See FLO CONWAY & JIM SIEGELMAN, THE DARK HERO OF INFORMATION
AGE. IN SEARCH OF NORBERT WIENER THE FATHER OF CYBERNETICS 136 (Basic
Books 2005).
6. This process was discovered by the Spanish neurologist Ramón y Cajal.
For a brief history of his discoveries, see PETER ROBIN HIESINGER, THE SELFASSEMBLING BRAIN. HOW NEURAL NETWORKS GROW SMARTER 36 (Princeton U.
Press 2021) and MICHAEL O’SHEA, THE BRAIN. A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 18
(Oxford U. Press 2005).
7. For a simple description of the idea, see MICHAEL AIRBIB & JAMES
BONIAUTO, FROM NEURON TO COGNITION VIA COMPUTATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE
(M.A Airbib and J.J. Boniauto eds., MIT Press 2016).
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numbers 0 and 1, in a sort of Boolean8 system that computes a result
through a network of synaptic connections?9 The idea seemed fascinating, but he lacked the mathematical knowledge to prove it, and
so entered the genitor in the equation. Did I write genitor? Of course.
Walter Pitts was a young man who, as a child, became a run-away
kid in the streets of Chicago. He taught himself logic and mathematics and worked as a janitor in the Chicago University, to be able to
discretely attend classes.10 He eventually met McCulloch and was
able to give a formal coherence to his intuitions. The paper they
wrote together, titled “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in
Nervous Activity,” was one of the most groundbreaking pieces ever
written either in mathematics or neurology, for it modelled a way in
which a set of neurons could process information, and in practical
terms, a brain could work. Eventually McCulloch and Pitts’ neuron
model became the basis of modern computational neurology.

8. The binary number system is usually referred to as Boolean numbers in
honor of George Boole. In 1847, he postulated the possibility of reducing the logical system to a formal representation similar to arithmetical calculus. To do so,
he suggested the use of a number system of zeros and ones, where zero would
represent falsehood, while one would stand for truth value. On the matter he
stated: “I purpose to establish the Calculus of Logic, and that I claim for it a place
among the acknowledged forms of Mathematical Analysis, regardless that in its
object and in its instruments it must at present stand alone.” See GEORGE BOOLE,
THE MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF LOGIC 4 (Henderson & Spalding 1847). Nevertheless, these ideas had been previously proposed by Lebniz, including the usage of a binary number system. See GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ, DISSERTATIO DE ARTE
COMBINATORIA 6-7 (Lipsiae 1666).
9. The idea is implied in the Turing-Church thesis. Both Alan Turing and
Alonzo Church reached the same conclusion through different roads. Turing made
a thought experiment in his famous 1937 article: Alan Turing, On Computable
Numbers, With an Application to Entsscheidungsproblem, 42:2 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE LONDON MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY 230 (1937). He designed a theoretical machine, known as a Turing Machine, that could, in principle mechanically make
any calculation conceivable if it was properly instructed through an infinite paper
tape which would only include zeros and ones. If any calculation is reducible to a
mechanical procedure, provided it is sufficiently described, and any logical procedure could be reduced to an arithmetical formulation, then all logic and all mathematic can be operated mechanically. Church’s lambda argument is more difficult
to grasp, but essentially gets to a similar conclusion. See Alonzo Church, The
Calculi of Lambda-conversion, ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STUDIES (1941).
10. See FLO CONWAY & JIM SIEGELMAN, THE DARK HERO OF INFORMATION
AGE. IN SEARCH OF NORBERT WIENER THE FATHER OF CYBERNETICS 137 (Basic
Books 2005).
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Although incomplete, as the brain is more complex than what the
paper suggested, it remains foundational.
Nevertheless, although the brain does not work exactly as the
model suggested, it eventually became apparent that a machine
could be built to behave as an artificial neuronal network.11 This idea
was put forward by Frank Rosenblatt in his 1957 paper,12 which argued that a machine that imitated the mathematical workings of
McCullach and Pitts’model could learn from examples and become
“intelligent.” The “perceptron,” the first artificial neural network,
was the result of this inquiry, and the research on machine learning
seemed promising. Although the project of building artificial neural
networks was eventually abandoned during the 1970s due to a theoretical critique made by Minsky and Papert13 and the lack of practical results in an age where computing power and data accumulation
was negligible, its reemergence, thanks to the work of Hinton and
LeCun, brought amazing results to the field of Artificial Intelligence.14 Modern artificial intelligence is based on the construction
11. On the matter, it has been said that “while the McCulloch–Pitts neuron
no longer plays an active part in computational neuroscience, it is still widely used
in neural computing, the technological application of networks of adaptive artificial neurons”. See Airbib & Boniauto, supra note 7.
12. Frank Rosenblatt, The Perceptron. A Perceiving and Recognizing Automaton, CORNELL AERONAUTICAL LABORATORY (1957).
13. Marvin Minsky initially worked in the early 1950s on artificial neural
networks. In fact, his doctoral work was on the matter (MARVIN MINSKY, THEORY
OF NEURAL-ANALOG REINFORCEMENT SYSTEMS AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
BRAIN MODEL PROBLEM (Princeton U. Press 1954)). However, he rapidly became
disabused of the notion. Eventually, his theories on Artificial Intelligence led him
in the very opposite direction, towards the so-called symbolist school of thought.
In 1970 he published, together with Seymour Papert, a mathematical refutation of
the Perceptron. See MARVIN MINSKY, & SEYMOUR PAPERT, PERCEPTRONS. AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL GEOMETRY (MIT Press 1970). It basically
asserted a mathematical proof of the impossibility of implementing a NOR function in a perceptron. This is quite important, for the absence of this particular
function would mean that a perceptron is not a universal Turing machine, and
therefore, unable to perform every computation. To make things worse, Rosenblatt never got to defend his perceptron. He died in an accident soon after the
publication of the book.
14. Essentially, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the work on artificial neural networks became an underground matter. In fact, the most important papers
on the matter were not published in computer science journals, but in cognitive
psychology ones. During the early 1980s, there were two major breakthroughs on
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and training of neural networks, which are rapidly gaining more
general capabilities in the last few months, as larger models which
incorporate attention mechanisms are implemented.15 Just to give a
glimpse of the status of these models, GTP-3 writes more words
every day than all the comments made on Twitter during the same
timeframe. In a sense, it can be said that language is becoming a
region dominated by machines. Artificial neural networks have put
artificial intelligence at the center of legal and economic debate, to
regulate such entities and their activities. The hazards that can
emerge from its use have become evident in the last decade and different perspectives on their regulation have emerged quite recently.
Nevertheless, the construction and use of artificial agents is not the
only possibility that neural networks offer. One of the most interesting and powerful possibilities open to technology is the interconnection between natural neural networks and artificial ones.

the matter: (1) Rumelhart and Hinton invented a new algorithm that automatized
weight correction in artificial neural networks, known as backpropagation (David
Rumelhart, Geoffry Hinton & Ronald Williams, Learning Representations by
Back-Propagating Errors, 323 NATURE (1986)) and (2) introducing more layers
to the neural network. Perceptron only had two layers, an input layer that received
information from the environment and sent it to an output layer through an axon
which formed a synapse. To overcome the limitation of the absence of a NOR
function, they introduced new layers between the input and the output layers,
which came to be known as hidden layers. In the interplay of these different layers, the NOR function could be implemented, which allowed the Minsky-Papert
objection to be overcome. In the 2000s, neural networks finally became mainstream again. The Internet made possible the accumulation of massive amounts
of data that were needed to train them. One of the first important neural networks
came into commercial use to identify handwritten digits in bank checks. See Yann
LeCun, Leon Bottou, Yoshua Bengio, Patrick Haffner, Gradient-based Learning
Applied to Document Recognition, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE (1998).
15. Attention is a proper mechanism applied to language models. It was first
suggested in 2017, and basically treats language as a prediction problem, making
a neural network guess the next word considering or attending to the previous
words that were put forward. See Ashish Vaswani et al., Attention is All You Need,
in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS (I. Guyon, U. Von
Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, R. Garnett eds.,
2017). For a detailed analysis see STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE. A MODERN APPROACH 868 (Pearson 2020).
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II. BRAIN MACHINE INTERFACES
One of the most interesting technologies that have emerged from
the convergence of artificial and natural neural networks is to build
means of communication between both kinds of information systems, which are usually called Brain Machine or Computer Interfaces (BMI or BCI). Both terms are popular. These can have different purposes, such as restoring functionality to senses, as cochlear16
and retinal implants,17 restoring motor capabilities,18 regulating
brain activity19 or simply facilitating the interaction between machines and human beings. These technologies can literally make the
blind see, the deaf hear and the paralytic walk, with the potential to
have profound social and economic effects in our society.
The devices measure neural activity and then process the information obtained to understand and interpret it. Some of these devices are designed to be invasive, being implanted inside a person’s
skull, but most have a non-invasive nature, measuring the nervous
system’s activity from outside the user’s body. Most of these
16. Retinal prostheses are currently being developed and aim to restore vision
in patients. See Eberhart Zrener, Will Retinal Implants Restore Vision?, 295
SCIENCE 1022 (2002); J.O. Mills, A. Jalil & P.E. Stanga, Electronic Retinal Implants and Artificial Vision: Journey and Present, 31 Eye 1383 (2017); Krishna
Shenoy & Byron Yu, Brain-Machine Interfaces, in PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL
SCIENCE 953 (E. R. Kandel, J. D. Koester, S. H. Mack, S. A. Siegelbaum, eds.,
McGraw-Hill 2021).
17. Cochlear implants, although originally developed in the 1950s, have significantly improved in complexity and precision since the development of multichannel implants, which directly stimulate the nervous system. See James Naples
& Michael Ruckenstein, Cochlear Implant, 53 OTOLARYNGOLOGIC CLINICS OF
NORTH AMERICA 87 (2020); Shenoy & Yu, supra note 16, at 953.
18. These technologies are currently being used to assist amputees and paralyzed people to restore some motor capabilities. See Shenoy & Yu, supra note 16,
at 954.
19. When patients of the Parkinson disease become resistant to pharmacological treatment, namely levodopa, they sometimes receive a deep brain stimulator
to help them regulate their neural activity. These devices deliver electrical impulses inside the brain, specifically through electrodes implanted in the thalamic
nuclei to help the patient control dysfunctional activity. The first trail was made
in 1997, and it has since then evolved into an important therapeutical technique.
See Alim Louis Benabid, Deep Brain Stimulation for Parkinson’s Disease, in 13
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 696 (2003); Shenoy & Yu, supra note 16,
at 955.
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devices can only read the nervous system’s activity, though some
can also write in it, through different mechanisms. To measure the
nervous system’s activation, there is a range of possibilities. One of
the most popular options is that of electroencephalograms (EEGs),
which is a technology that has been in use since the 1920s.20 Usually, they are deployed in a non-invasive fashion, to measure the
electrical activity inside the brain and grossly determine which areas
of the brain are active and how active they are, by reading the brain’s
activity as waves. Although they can only express a general picture
of the nervous system, they are relatively cheap and are being used
in different contexts, for instance to develop mind control robots and
toys,21 to determine levels of concentration in students,22 and other
various possibilities. These devices are on sale at different marketplaces and can even be 3-D printed at home.23 Until recently, Meta
was working to make these interfaces commercially viable, by

20. Activity in the nervous system can be measured and analyzed through the
registration of the electrical impulses that are produced by the neurons when activating their action potentials. It is an old technique with almost a hundred years
of medical practice. It was first applied to humans in 1924 by the German physician Hans Berger. See James L. Stone & John R. Hughes, Early History of Electroencephalography and Establishment of the American Clinical Neurophysiology Society, 30 CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 28 (2013). The procedure is performed by registering the electrical activity in the brain through electrodes positioned over the skull. It is a non-invasive technology and there is an on-going
effort to miniaturize this technology to make it easily available. One can find
many BMIs on the market which are basically EEGs. See Marcello Ienca and
Roberto Andorno, Towards New Human Rights In the Age of Neuroscience and
Neurotechnology 13 LIFE SCIENCES, SOCIETY AND POLICY 2 (2017); See also
Marcello Ienca, Committee on Bioethics, Council of Europe, Common Human
Rights Challenges Raised by Different Applications of Neurotechnologies in the
Biomedical FieldS 11 (2021), https://perma.cc/LVU9-8Y3H.
21. Presently, there is quite a number of toys available in marketplaces such
as Amazon based on these technologies. One of the coolest examples is the Star
Wars Science Force Trainer, which consists of a headband which contains a basic
EEG used to control the holographic image of an X-Wing fighter. The EEG reads
the brain waves of the user and moves the image accordingly. It costs about a
hundred US dollars.
22. According to The Guardian, primary schools in China experimented with
headbands containing EEGs to supervise the level of concentration of students.
See Michael Standaert, Chinese Primary School Halts Trial of Device that Monitors Pupils' Brainwaves, THE GUARDIAN (November 1, 2019),
23. There are literally hundreds of models to download. See Yeggi, Search
Engine for 3D printable Models, https://perma.cc/297W-HZZJ.

362

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

replacing or complementing more traditional ways to interact with
computers, such as keyboards.24
Another possibility is to use EEGs intracranially, that is to say,
to install electrodes inside the skull and to connect them directly to
the brain, which is usually known as iEEG. This technology provides some important risks and features. To install them, a surgery
is needed, and eventually there is a need to charge them, as their
batteries are depleted. There is also a risk of infection or even brain
damage as parts of the device decay. These devices also hold additional capabilities, for they cannot only read more accurately neuronal activity, but can also send electric signals to activate certain
zones of the nervous systems.25 Nowadays, they are used to give
deep brain stimulation to Parkison’s disease patients,26 but some
companies, most famously Neuralink, intend to use them as a communication device to connect the nervous system to the Internet.
One other option is to use functional magnetic field imaging
(fMRI) to measure neuronal activity.27 FMRIs give a precise image
of the brain’s activity, including cell activation, but the cost is rather
high, and the machines do not seem suitable for miniaturization,
therefore they only seem fit for non-invasive research and clinical
purposes at the moment.
There are other technologies that could eventually be used to facilitate communication between nervous system and artificial
24. Apparently, on July 2021 Meta cancelled this program. See David Heaney, Facebook Cancels Head-Mounted BCI Research, Will Focus on Wrist,
UPLOAD (July 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/C86B-CLW4.
25. On the matter, see Ienca & Andorno, supra note 20.
26. On the matter, see Joseph Parvizi & Sabine Kastner, Human Intracranial
EEG: Promises and Limitations, 21 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 474 (2018).
27. Functional MRIs are an image technology based on measuring the magnetic field created by the concentration of oxygen in blood. As blood uses iron to
carry oxygen, and iron generates a magnetic field, this can be used to establish the
neural activity in the brain. The first images ever captured by this technique were
published in Nature in the 1970s. See Paul C. Lauterbur, Image Formation by
Induced Local Interactions: Examples Employing Nuclear Magnetic Resonance,
242 NATURE 190 (1973). However, it was not used on humans until 1982. For a
detailed explanation, see Dafne Shohamy & Nick Turk-Browne, Imaging and Behavior, in PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 111 (Eric Kandel, John D. Koester,
Sarah H. Mack, Steven A. Siegelbaum eds., McGraw-Hill 2021).
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agents, such as optogenetics,28 but the aforementioned options seem
to be the most viable possibilities.
Considering these technological possibilities, the Chilean Senate, with the collaboration of academics from different disciplines
such as Rafael Yuste, who championed the idea, promoted a constitutional reform of the Constitution and a bill to regulate these technical possibilities.
III. LAW AND REGULATION
The idea of using neurorights has only been evoked recently.
The seminal works of Andorno and Ienca are fairly recent (2017),29
although a more general neuro-ethics perspective can be traced back
to the 1990s.30 Anyhow, until recently, no positive law system had
adopted a perspective regarding neuronal activity as a protected legal interest. On October 7, 2020, two proposals were put forward in
the Chilean Senate by the Comisión de Futuro (Commission for the
Future) presided by senator Girardi: one to reform Chile’s Constitution to include the protection of neuronal activity, and a bill proposal
to regulate neuro-technologies.31 Several academics were called
upon to participate both in the Constitutional reform and the bill proposal, among which the author of this article.

28. Optogenetics consist in genetically modifying neurons to make them sensible to light. This is nowadays only used on animals, and there are important
ethical issues to consider before applying them to humans, but the technology is
quite interesting. It consists in inserting part of the genetic information from photosensitive algae into the neurons. See Larry Abbott, Attila Losonczy, & Nathaniel
Sawtell, The Computational Bases of Neural Circuits that Mediate Behavior, in
PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 99 (Eric Kandel, John D. Koester, Sarah H.
Mack, Steven A. Siegelbaum eds., McGraw-Hill 2021).
29. See Ienca & Andorno, supra note 20.
30. See Christoph Bublitz, My Mind is Mine!? Cognitive Liberty as a Legal
Concept, in COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
233 (E. Hildt, AG Franke eds., Springer 2013).
31. Its official name is: “Sobre protección de los neuroderechos y la integridad mental, y el desarrollo de la investigación y las neurotecnologías” (On
the Protection of Neurorights and Mental Integrity, and the Development of Research and Neuro-technologies), and it is processed at Boletín Nº 13828-19. See
the web page of the Senate of Chile, Tramitación de proyectos,
https://perma.cc/TYX7-KB7S (last visited January 1, 2022).
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The Constitutional reform was finally approved unanimously by
Congress on October 25, 2021, adding a new paragraph to article
19N°1 of the Constitution to protect brain activity and the information collected from it. Meanwhile, the bill proposal has also been
unanimously approved by the Senate on December 7, 2021 and is
currently being discussed by the House of Representatives, where a
swift approval is expected.
The basic aim of the bill proposal is not to regulate the technologies in themselves, but some of its applications that can be questionable. Ingenuity is one of the most precious attributes of the human mind, and it should be properly endorsed, rather than limited.
In this spirit, the bill distinguishes between research, medical applications, and plain commercial uses.32 For each purpose, there is a
distinct set of rules that applies regarding the particularities of these
fields, but any deployment of a neurotechnology must comply with
the fundamental rights established in the law and the Constitution,
which are the framework for the deployment of any information
technology.33
Any neurotechnology that intends to be deployed in Chile must
follow a simple registration mechanism analogous to the framework
given to any medical device.34 In this sense, the law takes a medical
standpoint and demands of non-clinical devices a compliance to the
32. Although neuro-technologies are an emergent phenomenon, plenty of
commercial uses are being implemented and even new fields are coming into
scene. One of the most popular is neuromarketing, “not only to infer mental preferences, but also to prime, imprint or trigger those preferences” (See Ienca & Andorno, supra note 20, at 4) and many others are emerging.
33. Proyecto de ley de neuroderechos sobre protección de los neuroderechos
y la integridad mental, y el desarrollo de la investigación y las neurotecnologías,
Bulletin 13.828-19, art. 4:
Las personas son libres de utilizar cualquier tipo de neurotecnología permitida. No obstante, para intervenir a otros a través de ellas, se deberá contar
con su consentimiento libre, previo e informado, el cual deberá entregarse
de forma expresa, explícita, específica o, en su defecto, con el de quien deba
suplir su voluntad de conformidad a la ley. El consentimiento deberá constar
por escrito y será esencialmente revocable.
34. Id. art. 7:
Las neurotecnologías deberán ser previamente registradas por el Instituto de
Salud Pública para su uso en las personas.
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rules of therapeutic instruments so that their quality and security can
be verified. In this process, the intended uses of the technology must
be stated.35 The bill declares certain uses as explicitly prohibited,
such as aiming to influence human conduct without the user’s consent, exploiting weaknesses of certain vulnerable groups, extracting
data without the user’s explicit consent, or affecting the neuroplasticity of vulnerable groups, children, and young adults. Some of
these prohibitions were inspired by the European Proposal of Harmonized Rules on Artificial Intelligence,36 while others, such as the
one regarding neuroplasticity, refer to a specific problem of neurotechnologies.37 These prohibitions are intended to protect the privacy of neuronal data, which is declared sensitive by the bill proposal, and its cognitive liberty.38
Regarding consent, the bill proposal keeps the general dispositions regarding scientific research and therapeutical applications,
which are already regulated by recently approved bills.39 However,
for commercial applications, consent is especially regulated
35. Id. art. 8:
Por resolución fundada, la autoridad sanitaria podrá restringir o prohibir el
uso de neurotecnologías, en razón de afectar indebidamente derechos fundamentales, en casos tales como:
a) aquéllos que influencian la conducta de la persona, sin su consentimiento;
b) aquéllos que explotan las debilidades de grupos específicos;
c) aquellos que extraen datos de manera no autorizada o sin el consentimiento de su titular;
d) aquellos que afectan negativamente la neuroplasticidad, especialmente,
de niños, niñas y adolescentes;
36. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council: Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts,
2021/0106 (2021), https://perma.cc/6AZL-5JFB.
37. Missing these critical periods for neurodevelopment is crucial because
the faculties and capabilities that are missed cannot be later acquired. Classical
experiments on the matter go back to the 1940s, when René Spitz “provided more
systematic evidence that early interactions with other humans are essential for
normal social development” (Joshua Sanes, Experience and the Refinement of
Synaptic Connections, in PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 1230 (Eric Kandel,
John D. Koester, Sarah H. Mack, Steven A. Siegelbaum eds., McGraw-Hill
2021)).
38. On the matter, see Christoph Bublitz, My Mind is Mine!? Cognitive Liberty as a Legal Concept, in COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE 233 (E. Hildt, AG Franke eds., Springer 2013).
39. These matters are regulated by the recently approved bills, Ley 20.584 on
rights and duties of patients and Ley 20.120 on scientist research on human beings.
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requiring it to be free, informed, and specific, given in a written
form, establishing possible negative consequences and the privacy
of the data. Another important matter is that any application of
neuro-technologies, besides medical uses, must be reversible, meaning that it should be possible to put an end to the use of neuro-technologies without any detectable negative effects. Regarding liability, the project opted for a strict regime in the case of commercial
applications, to favor the position of the consumer regarding possible tort claims.
All these regulations seem simple, do not threaten the development
of neuro-technologies, but rather give a clear framework to develop
the field while respecting the autonomy and dignity of the user.
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ABSTRACT
The South African Constitution of 1996 has had a significant impact on all the branches of South African law, including its succession laws. The Constitution has transformatively reshaped important aspects of South Africa's succession laws over the past twoand-a-half decades. This Article surveys the reshaping of two such
aspects critically, namely (i) the extension of spousal inheritance
under the Intestate Succession Act of 1987 and the Wills Act of 1953
as well as the extension of parental inheritance under the former
statute; and (ii) the limitation of testamentary freedom. The aforementioned developments occurred by and large at the hands of the
South African courts under the influence of constitutional and public
policy imperatives regarding equality and non-discrimination. The
Article shows that many of these developments are positive and worthy of emulation, but that a handful of the judgments in which these
developments occurred, are open to criticism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
South Africa’s succession laws determine which assets pass by
inheritance to a deceased person’s successors (or beneficiaries).1
Succession in South Africa occurs principally in accordance with
the deceased’s valid will or, in the absence of a valid will, through
intestate succession.2 The Wills Act3 regulates aspects of the former,
whilst the latter is by and large governed by the Intestate Succession
Act.4 The South African law of testate succession is a mixture of
Roman-Dutch law and English law,5 whereas the origins of its common law of intestate succession6 date back to the Schependomsrecht,
one of the intestate succession systems in operation in the Dutch
province of Holland during the sixteenth century.7 The law of succession resorts under the broader category of South African private
law.8
The South African Constitution9 and its Bill of Rights10 in particular impact all branches of South African law, including its

1. JUANITA JAMNECK & CHRISTA RAUTENBACH (eds.), THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (3rd ed., Oxford U. Press 2017); M. DE WAAL & M.
SCHOEMAN-MALAN, LAW OF SUCCESSION 1 (5th ed., Juta 2015).
2. JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 1; DE WAAL & SCHOEMANMALAN, supra note 1, at 2–3.
3. Wills Act 7 of 1953 (S. Afr.).
4. Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (S. Afr.).
5. François du Toit, Succession Law in South Africa – a Historical Perspective, in EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION – STUDIES NATIONAL, HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE 67 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh U. Press 2007).
6. South Africa also recognizes the customary laws of intestate succession
of its Black people: see JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 4–5. This
branch of intestate succession laws falls outside this Article’s scope.
7. JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 3; DE WAAL & SCHOEMANMALAN, supra note 1, at 14–15.
8. JAMNECK & RAUTENBACH, supra note 1, at 3.
9. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
10. Id. at Ch. 2.
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private law and thus also its succession laws.11 It is unsurprising that
South African courts, when adjudicating on constitutional challenges to South Africa’s succession laws, have reshaped these laws
in consonance with constitutional imperatives in general and the
prescripts of the Bill of Rights in particular. This constitutional reshaping occurred regarding South Africa’s testate as well as its intestate succession laws. Two aspects of the constitutional reshaping
of South Africa’s succession laws are surveyed in this Article: (i)
the extension of inheritance in terms of the Intestate Succession Act
and Wills Act to persons not traditionally recognized as a deceased’s
surviving spouse or parent and (ii) the limitation of testamentary
freedom beyond the instances in which South African law traditionally restricted testators when disposing of their property by last will
and testament. These two aspects provide ample evidence of the
transformative effect of the Constitution regarding South Africa’s
succession laws. However, the manner in and the extent to which
South African courts have undertaken the reshaping of these laws
are not beyond reproach, and the Article also touches on criticism of
aspects of the courts’ constitutionally transformative methodologies
in this regard.
II. THE EXTENSION OF SPOUSAL AND PARENTAL
INHERITANCE
The Intestate Succession Act as well as the Wills Act provide
for the devolution of assets to a deceased person’s surviving spouse
in certain instances. The Intestate Succession Act designates the surviving spouse as a deceased’s sole intestate heir if the deceased is
not survived by descendants,12 and as a co-heir in the event that the
deceased is survived by a spouse as well as descendants.13 The Wills
11. § 2 of the Constitution states that the Constitution is South Africa’s supreme law and that all law or conduct inconsistent therewith is invalid; § 8(1) of
the Constitution determines that the Bill of Rights applies to the entirety of South
African law; § 8(2) of the Constitution renders the Bill of Rights binding on all
natural and juristic persons.
12. Intestate Succession Act, supra note 4, at § 1(1)(a).
13. Id. at § 1(1)(c).
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Act permits the accrual of testamentary benefits in favor of a testator’s surviving spouse when a descendant of that testator renounced
(rejected) those benefits.14 However, neither statute contains a definition of “spouse” or “surviving spouse” for purposes of the operation of the aforementioned provisions. The traditional meaning attributed to “spouse” or “surviving spouse” in the above contexts is
of a person to whom the deceased was married (at the time of the
deceased’s death) in a valid civil marriage solemnized in accordance
with the Marriage Act.15 Writing in 1983 (during the pre-constitutional era), Erasmus et al note the following distinguishing features
of such a valid civil marriage:
-

a civil marriage is a voluntary, life-long union of one
man and one woman;
persons of the same sex cannot enter into a civil marriage;
a civil marriage is a monogamous union; and
a civil marriage must be solemnized by a competent
marriage officer in accordance with the provisions of
the Marriage Act.16

The foregoing points to the limited meaning traditionally ascribed to “spouse” or “surviving spouse” for purposes of the directives in the Intestate Succession Act and Wills Act that appertain to
these persons. South African courts have, during the post-constitutional era, extended inheritance rights under both statutes to persons
who do not fall within the confines of this limited meaning. The
courts did so with firm reliance on constitutional rights and norms,
in particular those regarding equality and non-discrimination as well
as human dignity. A similar development occurred regarding the Intestate Succession Act’s engagement with parental inheritance. The
Act designates a deceased’s parent or parents as an intestate heir or
14. Wills Act, supra note 3, at § 2C (1).
15. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (S. Afr.). See Daniels v Campbell 2003 (9)
BCLR 969 (C) 985H, 988F.
16. H. ERASMUS, C.G. VAN DER MERWE & A.H. VAN WYK, FAMILY, THINGS
AND SUCCESSION 14–17 (2d ed., Butterworths 1983).
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heirs when the deceased is not survived by a spouse or descendants.17 Parentage in this regard traditionally carries the limited
meaning of single-generational blood relationship in the case of a
biological child (i.e., the child’s biological father or mother) or, alternatively, parenthood established through a legally valid adoption
in the case of an adopted child (i.e., the child’s adoptive father or
mother).18 These points are considered the “traditional objectively
determinable criteria of who a ‘parent’ is.”19 However, a South African court departed from this traditional meaning of “parent”, for
purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, by relying on constitutional rights and norms.
The specific instances in which South African courts undertook
the broadening of the traditional spousal and parental concepts will
now be considered in greater detail.
A. Muslim and Hindu Marriages
In Daniels v Campbell,20 the Constitutional Court decided that
“spouse” for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act includes a
party to a monogamous Muslim marriage. Such a party does not
qualify in terms of the spousal concept’s abovementioned traditional
limited meaning because a marriage concluded in accordance with
Muslim rites is typically not solemnized by a marriage officer appointed in terms of the Marriage Act, and such a marriage is thus
also not registered in accordance with the Marriage Act’s prescripts.21 The Constitutional Court opined in Daniels that the limited
meaning traditionally ascribed to “spouse” is unfairly discriminatory in its intent and impact, because it exalts a particular conceptualization of marriage to which Muslim marriages do not conform.22
17. Intestate Succession Act, supra note 4, at § 1(1)(d).
18. MJ de Waal & L Mills, What it Means to be a Parent: Implications for
Family Law and the Law of Intestate Succession: Wilsnach NO v M 2021 1 All
SA 600 (GP), 2021 3 SA 568 (GP), J. S. AFR. L. 562 (2021) 562–563, 568.
19. Id. at 568.
20. 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC).
21. Id. at para. 3.
22. Id. at para. 19.
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The Court thus declared that the constitutional values of equality,
tolerance and respect for diversity justify ascribing a broad and inclusive meaning to the word “spouse” for purposes of the Intestate
Succession Act.23 In the result, the Court ruled that the term
“spouse” in the Intestate Succession Act must be interpreted to include a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage and, therefore, that
such a spouse is capable of inheriting in terms of that Act. 24 The
position of a party to a monogamous Hindu marriage is akin to that
of a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage insofar as a Hindu
marriage is typically not solemnized by a duly appointed marriage
officer and is therefore not registered under the Marriage Act.25 It
therefore came as no surprise when the erstwhile Durban and Coast
Local Division of the Supreme Court (now known as the KwaZuluNatal High Court, Durban), bound by the precedent set by the Constitutional Court in Daniels, subsequently ruled in Govender v Ragavayah that the Intestate Succession Act must be interpreted to include a party to a monogamous Hindu marriage as a spouse who can
inherit in terms of that Act.26
Another reason for the exclusion of a party to a Muslim marriage
from the spousal concept’s traditional limited meaning is the potentially polygynous nature of such a marriage. In Hassam v Jacobs,27
the Constitutional Court had to determine whether or not a surviving
spouse to a polygynous Muslim marriage can inherit in terms of the
Intestate Succession Act. The Court decided that a failure to broaden
the Intestate Succession Act’s spousal concept to include widows of
polygynous Muslim marriages will occasion material disadvantage
for such widows to which their counterparts in otherwise valid civil
marriages or monogamous Muslim marriages are not exposed;28
moreover, that the resultant discrimination against widows of
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 37.
Govender v Ragavayah 2009 (3) SA 179 (D) at para. 12 (S. Afr.).
Id. at para. 42.
2009 (5) SA 572 (CC).
Id. at para. 34.
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polygynous Muslim marriages conflicts with the constitutional principle of gender equality.29 However, the Constitutional Court in
Hassam was unable to follow an approach similar to that adopted in
Daniels and thus to interpret “spouse” for purposes of the Intestate
Succession Act to include all the parties to a polygynous Muslim
marriage. This is because the Act uses “spouse” in the singular only:
reading this word to include multiple spouses in a polygynous Muslim marriage would, in the opinion of the Court in Hassam, unduly
strain the Act’s language insofar as it would bring about a significant
departure from the commonly-understood meaning of the word
“spouse”, as it appears in the singular in the Intestate Succession
Act.30 The Court therefore utilized the so-called “reading-in remedy” to cure the Intestate Succession Act’s unconstitutionality on
point: it ordered that the Act must be read as if the words “or
spouses” appear after the word “spouse” wherever the latter word is
used in the Act.31 Hassam’s effect is therefore that the distribution
of an intestate estate must always take account of the polygynous
nature of the Muslim marriage(s) to which the deceased was a party
and that all the surviving spouses of such a marriage(s) are capable
of inheriting from the deceased’s estate in terms of the Intestate Succession Act.
The Constitutional Court echoed the above approaches to the
broadening of the spousal concept when it ruled on the Wills Act’s
provision that permits accrual in favor of a surviving spouse. In
Moosa v Minister of Justice,32 the Court held that confining the
meaning of “surviving spouse” in the Act’s accrual provision to monogamous unions violates the equality rights of the parties to a polygynous Muslim marriage.33 The Court again cured the resultant
constitutional invalidity of the accrual provision by employing the
reading-in remedy and it ordered that the accrual provision must be

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at para. 37.
Id. at para. 48.
Id. at para. 57.
2018 (5) SA 13 (CC).
Id. at para. 12.
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read as if the following words appear therein: “For the purposes of
this subsection, a ‘surviving spouse’ includes every husband and
wife of a monogamous and polygamous Muslim marriage solemnized under the religion of Islam.”34
B. Same-Sex Life Partnerships
The spousal concept’s traditional limited meaning precludes
persons of the same sex from entering into a civil marriage. In the
result, the surviving partner to a permanent same-sex life partnership
did not qualify as a spouse for purposes of the Intestate Succession
Act. In Gory v Kolver (Starke and Others Intervening),35 the Constitutional Court ruled that any differentiation regarding the intestate
succession rights of opposite-sex spouses (who can inherit on intestacy) and permanent same-sex life partners (who cannot inherit on
intestacy) amounts to unfair discrimination against the latter; moreover, that the Intestate Succession Act’s failure to include surviving
partners to permanent same-sex life partnerships within its regulatory ambit is inconsistent with the constitutional rights to equality
and human dignity.36 The Court consequently ordered that the Intestate Succession Act must be read as though the following words are
included after the word “spouse” wherever this word appears in the
Act: “[O]r partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership in
which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support.”37
Gory therefore renders a surviving partner to a permanent same-sex
life partnership a competent intestate heir in respect of the deceased
partner’s estate.

34. Id. at para. 21. Note that the court used the generic term “polygamous” in
the reading-in order, but that “polygynous” would have been preferred because a
Muslim husband is permitted to marry more than one wife whereas the converse
–polyandry– is not permitted under Islamic law.
35. 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC).
36. Id. at para. 19.
37. Id. at para. 66.
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The Gory judgment was handed down shortly before the commencement of the Civil Union Act.38 This Act enables any two competent persons to conclude a civil union, either in the form of a marriage or as a civil partnership.39 Parties of the same sex as well as
those of the opposite sex can enter into a civil union.40 The Civil
Union Act states pertinently that the word “spouse” in any law includes a civil union partner.41 Pursuant to the Civil Union Act, a
spouse for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act thus also encompasses a civil union partner, thereby rendering a surviving civil union partner a competent intestate heir of the first-dying partner. This
statutory development raised the question of whether or not the Constitutional Court’s abovementioned order in Gory endured in the aftermath of the Civil Union Act: in light of the fact that the Constitutional Court made that order in Gory at a time when the formalization of same-sex relationships was legally impermissible – which
impermissibility the Civil Union Act eradicated – can same-sex life
partners who have not formalized their relationship in terms of the
Civil Union Act still avail themselves of the protection afforded by
the Gory order? The Constitutional Court answered this question in
the affirmative in Laubscher v Duplan.42
In Laubscher, the Constitutional Court opined that same-sex
partners who formalized their relationship in terms of the Civil Union Act constitute a new category of intestate heirs for purposes of
the Intestate Succession Act; however, this new category excludes
the category of intestate heirs yielded by Gory. For purposes of intestate inheritance, the parties to a civil union are, according to
Laubscher, therefore clearly distinguishable from same-sex life partners who have not formalized their relationship in terms of the Civil
Union Act. In the result, the Court held that same-sex life partners
38. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). The Civil Union Act commenced
on November 30, 2006 and the Gory judgment was handed down a week prior to
this commencement date.
39. Id. at § 1.
40. KOS v Minister of Home Affairs 2017 (6) SA 588 (WCC) at para. 23 (S.
Afr.).
41. Civil Union Act, supra note 38, at § 13(2)(b).
42. 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC).
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(or cohabitants) who meet the requirement of mutual support laid
down in Gory continue to enjoy intestate succession rights (as per
the Gory order) until such time as the Legislature amends the Intestate Succession Act to align it with the effects of the Civil Union
Act.43 One may be forgiven for thinking that Laubscher produced
somewhat of an anomaly insofar as the decision to keep the Gory
order in effect in the Civil Union Act’s aftermath created inequality
between opposite-sex life partners who chose not to marry or enter
into a civil union (which choice negated – at least at the time when
Laubscher was decided44 – intestate inheritance on the death of the
first-dying partner) and same-sex life partners who chose not to enter into a civil union (which choice does not negate intestate inheritance on the death of the first-dying partner). Indeed, the Constitutional Court admitted as much in Laubscher45 but because this issue
was not pertinent before the Court in Laubscher, it was not called
upon to engage with the inequality conundrum.46 Instead, the Constitutional Court reasoned in Laubscher that it is best left to the Legislature to address any equality-related inconsistencies between the
Gory order’s continued operation on the one hand, and the effects of
the Civil Union Act’s operation on the other hand.47
It is instructive to note that the Constitutional Court first
acknowledged the choice principle mentioned in the previous paragraph when it handed down its judgment in Volks v Robinson.48 In
this decision, the majority of the Constitutional Court denied a surviving opposite-sex life partner’s claim for spousal maintenance on
the death of the first-dying partner. The choice principle (or argument) advanced by the majority of the Court in Volks prescribes in
broad terms that parties who can legally enter into a civil marriage
(or conclude a civil union) but chose not to do so, ought, by reason
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at para. 55.
See II. C. below.
Laubscher, supra note 42, at para. 31.
Id. at para. 52.
Id. at para. 32.
2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
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of their choice, not to receive any of the benefits (such as spousal
maintenance claims or intestate succession rights) yielded by a civil
marriage (or a civil union).49 This principle therefore precludes, at
least prima facie, intestate succession on the death of a same-sex or
opposite-sex life partner where the cohabitating partners could have
legally formalized their relationship but chose, for whatever reason,
not to do so. The choice principle is not uncontroversial in South
African jurisprudence and has elicited criticism from some academic commentators.50 It is therefore regrettable that Laubscher’s
circumstances did not require the Constitutional Court to engage
substantively with this principle. The Constitutional Court’s subsequent judgment on intestate succession between opposite-sex life
partners called for a fundamental engagement with the choice principle but as is shown next, the controversy regarding this principle
persisted even in this judgment.
C. Opposite-Sex Life Partnerships
Predictably, it was simply a matter of time before a surviving
opposite-sex life partner would challenge the Intestate Succession
Act’s constitutionality on the basis that the extension of intestate
succession rights to permanent same-sex life partners who have not
formalized their relationship (as per Gory and Laubscher), whilst
withholding those rights from similarly situated opposite-sex life
partners, occasions unfair discrimination against the latter category
of persons. Such a challenge came before the Western Cape High
Court, Cape Town in Bwanya v The Master.51 The Court held that
no constitutionally-justifiable reason exists why surviving partners
to permanent opposite-sex life partnerships are excluded from the
spousal concept for purposes of intestate inheritance under the
49. Id. at para. 92.
50. See, e.g., Anita Cooke, Choice, Heterosexual Life Partnerships, Death
and Poverty, 122 SALJ 542 (2005); Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley, Intestate
Succession and the Survivor of an Unformalised Same-Sex Conjugal Relationship: Laubscher NO v Duplan 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC), 39 OBITER 276 (2018).
51. 2021 (1) SA 138 (WCC).
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Intestate Succession Act.52 It therefore ordered that, whenever the
Intestate Succession Act’s spousal concept applied, the Act must be
read to include a partner in a permanent opposite-sex life partnership
in which the partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support.53
Some academic commentators welcomed the High Court’s decision
in Bwanya.54 The Constitutional Court55 handed down the confirmation judgment in Bwanya little over a year later.56
The Constitutional Court delivered three separate judgments in
its decision in Bwanya. Two of these judgments are pertinent to the
present discussion. The majority of the Court expressly rejected the
abovementioned choice principle enunciated in Volks. The majority
opined that Volks was wrongly decided; however, not to the extent
that it could summarily break with the precedent set by Volks. The
majority therefore identified two considerations that distinguished
Bwanya from Volks and thus permitted the majority not to follow
Volks.57 The first consideration rested on the evidence presented to
the Court in Bwanya (evidence that was not considered in Volks)
that showed that many women in opposite-sex relationships have no
real or realistic choice regarding whether or not to marry. The reasons in this regard include women’s lack of “bargaining power” in
relationships; the dependence of women and children, if there are
any, on the financial strength of the men in the relationships; and the
mistaken belief by one or both partners in a permanent life

52. Id. at para. 190.
53. Id. at para. 233.
54. See, e.g., Koshesayi Madzika, Dawn of a New Era for Permanent Life
Partners: from Volks v Robinson to Bwanya v Master of the High Court, 53 DE
JURE 393 (2020) (S. Afr.); Fatima Osman, Splitting Hairs? Bwanya v The Master
of the High Court, 138 SALJ 521 (2021).
55. Bwanya v The Master of the High Court 2022 (3) SA 250 (CC) (S. Afr.).
56. The Constitution, § 167(5) states that the Constitutional Court makes the
final decision regarding whether an Act of Parliament, among others, is unconstitutional or not: once a High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, or a court of
similar status has issued an order of constitutional invalidity of any such Act, the
Constitutional Court must, in a subsequent hearing, confirm such an order before
it has any force.
57. Bwanya, supra note 55, at para. 47.
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partnership that they are in a legally binding “common law marriage.”58 In light of these reasons, the majority dismissed the choice
principle insofar as it prohibits extending intestate succession rights
to surviving permanent opposite-sex life partners.59 The majority
emphasized, secondly, that the “choice question” posed in Volks is
in fact the wrong question for purposes of the matter before the
Court in Bwanya: the more fundamental question is whether or not
permanent life partnerships deserve constitutional and legal protection in and of themselves.60 The majority answered this question in
the affirmative, whilst acknowledging that proving the existence of
a life partnership may at times be difficult. The majority nevertheless argued that probative challenges are no bar for identifying and
extending legal recognition and protection to such a partnership.61
In light of the foregoing, the majority held that excluding surviving
permanent opposite-sex life partners from enjoying benefits under
the Intestate Succession Act amounts to constitutionally prohibited
discrimination. In the result, the majority ordered that the omission
from the Intestate Succession Act of the words “or partner in a permanent life partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” after the word “spouse” wherever this word
appears in the Act, is unconstitutional and invalid. In order to remedy this invalidity, the majority ordered that the Intestate Succession
Act must be read as though the words “or partner in a permanent life
partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties
of support” appear after the word “spouse” wherever this word appears in the Act. However, the majority suspended this order for a
period of eighteen months from the date of the judgment to enable
the South African Parliament to take legislative steps to cure the
constitutional defects identified in Bwanya.62

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at para. 62.
Id. at para. 66.
Id. at para. 68.
Id. at paras. 75–78.
Id. at para. 95.
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The first dissenting judgment in Bwanya is also instructive for
purposes of this Article.63 This judgment focused, among others, on
the marked differences between a marriage (or a civil union) and a
life partnership, in particular regarding the legal certainty yielded by
the former as opposed to the uncertainty regarding the existence (or
not) of the latter.64 It is submitted that Bwanya’s facts underscore
the first dissenting judgment’s stance in this regard. The Western
Cape High Court found quite readily that the applicant (the surviving partner) and the deceased were indeed permanent life partners
who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support.65 The facts on
which the Court based this finding were the following: the relationship between the applicant and the deceased existed from early 2014
until the deceased’s death in early 2016 – little more than two
years;66 the applicant and the deceased moved in together, but the
applicant retained a separate abode for work purposes;67 the applicant averred that she and the deceased intended to start a domestic
cleaning business together (no evidence was advanced that this anticipated venture came to fruition) as well as that the deceased assisted her in obtaining a driver’s license and that he was going to
pay for her driving lessons and also buy her a car for use in the
cleaning business.68 The applicant alleged furthermore that she and
the deceased contemplated having a child together;69 the applicant
admitted that the deceased paid all the household and other expenses
and that her contribution to the relationship occurred by way of
“love, care, emotional support and companionship”;70 and the applicant averred that the deceased asked her to marry him71 but that the
63. The second dissenting judgment in Bwanya held that Volks was not
clearly wrongly decided and thus constitutes binding legal precedent: id. at para.
197.
64. Id. at paras. 98 and 111–118.
65. Bwanya, supra note 51, at paras. 141–142.
66. Id. at paras. 5 and 25.9.
67. Id. at paras. 7–8.
68. Id. at paras. 13–14.
69. Id. at para. 16.
70. Id. at para. 19.
71. Id. at para. 23.
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preparations for the marriage were yet to be finalized pending arrangements to be made with the applicant’s family in Zimbabwe.72
The first dissenting judgment in the Constitutional Court’s decision
in Bwanya remarked that many of these actions are found, to varying
degrees, in many relationships, ranging from high school sweethearts to adult lovers, but that this does not establish the existence
of a permanent life partnership that yields rights and obligations
similar to those that attach to a marriage (or a civil union).73 Secondly, the first dissenting judgment was not convinced by the majority’s stance on the incorrectness of the choice principle: the first
dissenting judgment opined that the choice whether or not to enter
into marriage may at times be a difficult one, but it remains a real
choice and not merely an illusionary one (as the majority suggested).
The first dissenting judgment was consequently unpersuaded that
women are “helplessly trapped in some of these relationships” due
to the reasons advanced in the majority judgment to support its
stance that many women in opposite-sex relationships have no real
or realistic choice regarding whether or not to marry.74
The Constitutional Court’s judgments in Bwanya highlight the
challenges, difficulties and tensions associated with extending intestate succession rights beyond legally formalized relationships.
Given that legal certainty is a particularly potent arrow in any private lawyer’s quiver, the reasoning advanced in the first dissenting
judgment in this case is, it is submitted, indeed persuasive. This is
not to say, of course, that intestate succession rights should not be
granted to permanent opposite-sex life partners who have undertaken reciprocal duties of support. How this must occur and the extent to which it must happen are matters best left to the Legislature
rather than the courts –a fact on which both dissenting judgments in
Bwanya concurred.75 In this light, the majority of the Constitutional
Court’s temporary suspension of its orders in Bwanya to allow the
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at para. 25.8.
Bwanya, supra note 55, at para. 117.
Id. at para. 126.
Id. at paras. 149, 195.
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South African Parliament to enact appropriate legislation regarding,
among others, the intestate succession rights of permanent oppositesex life partners appears extremely prudent and sensible.
D. Parentage in Extended-Family Households
In Wilsnach v TM,76 a decision of the Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, the Court had to adjudicate on intestate succession rights in an
extended-family household where one of the deceased’s biological
parents assumed no parental role whatsoever and was effectively replaced in this role by the deceased’s grandmother. The deceased
whose estate was at issue in this case was a severely disabled person
by reason of complications at birth. A claim for the medical negligence that caused the deceased’s disabilities was settled out of court
and, when the deceased died aged five, his estate comprised the sizeable remainder of the settlement amount. The deceased’s biological
parents (the first and second respondents in the matter) survived
him77 and would have been the deceased’s sole intestate heirs in
terms of the Intestate Succession Act.78 However, these parents provided little by way of parental care during the deceased’s short life.
In fact, the deceased’s father did not care for the deceased at all and
played no role in the deceased’s life.79 The deceased and his mother
resided with the deceased’s maternal grandmother (the third respondent in the matter) and they thus formed a so-called “extendedfamily household.”80 The deceased’s grandmother was his primary
caregiver and was granted full parental rights and responsibilities
regarding his guardianship.81 This factual matrix prompted the

76. 2021 (3) SA568 (GP).
77. Id. at paras. 6–7.
78. See II. above.
79. Wilsnach, supra note 76, at para. 12.
80. Id. at par. 13. See LF and Another v TV 2020 (2) SA 546 (GJ) at para. 41
(S. Afr.) where the Court expressly included grandparents as members of a child’s
extended family.
81. Wilsnach, supra note 76, at para. 8.
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executor of the deceased’s estate to request a declaratory order on
exactly who the deceased’s intestate heirs were.
The Court opined that the declaratory order called for a determination of the meaning of the word “parent” for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act. The Court noted that the Act contains no
definition in this regard and therefore proffered that the matter
turned on the word’s proper interpretation.82 It then looked at the
broad meaning ascribed to “parent” for purposes of the Children’s
Act83 and concluded that the word should be interpreted widely, also
for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, to include someone
who, although not a biological parent, fulfilled parental duties and
functions, and thus essentially played the role of a parent, in a
child’s life.84 In light of this interpretation, the Court held that it
would “offend the entire constitutional scheme and the values it is
founded upon” if the deceased’s absent father was to be regarded as
a parent (and thus an heir) for purposes of the Intestate Succession
Act merely on the strength of his biological connectedness to the
deceased.85 The Court ruled that the deceased’s mother, despite not
providing continuous care to the deceased, could still properly be
considered the deceased’s parent for purposes of the Intestate Succession Act.86 Significantly, the Court ruled furthermore that the deceased’s grandmother, who primarily and substantially carried the
burden of caring for the deceased,87 was “entitled to be called a parent in truth, in reality and in law.”88 In the opinion of the Court, such
a conclusion is consistent with the grandmother’s relationship with
the deceased and, moreover, aligned to the objectives of both the
Children’s Act and the Constitution insofar as advancing the best
interests of the child is concerned.89 The Court thus found that the
deceased’s grandmother was his parent for purposes of the Intestate
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at paras. 35, 37, 48.
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (S. Afr.).
Wilsnach, supra note 76, at paras. 42, 58.
Id. at paras. 65–66, 68.
Id. at paras. 70, 76.
Id. at para. 77.
Id. at para. 81.
Id. at para. 76.
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Succession Act and that she and the deceased’s mother were the deceased’s sole intestate heirs.90
Wilsnachs outcome can certainly be regarded as just and equitable; however, the manner in which the Court achieved this outcome,
in particular its interpretative reliance on the Children’s Act, is criticizable. This is so because the legislative histories and contexts of
the Intestate Succession Act and the Children’s Act are quite different: the former lays down succession rules based on a strictly generational approach to blood relationship—an approach that can be
traced back to the old Schependomsrecht—whereas the latter sets
out contemporary principles regarding the care and protection of
children and, moreover, defines parental responsibilities and rights
vis-à-vis those children. The Court’s reliance in Wilsnach on the
meaning of “parent” in a statute that has little, if anything, in common with the Intestate Succession Act is thus historically and contextually highly suspect.91 It is therefore submitted that the parental
concept in the Intestate Succession Act must retain its limited meaning of single-generational biological connectedness or parenthood
through a valid adoption. Doing so, even in respect of the abhorrent
conduct of the deceased’s father and the laudable actions of the deceased’s grandmother in Wilsnach, need not contravene the Constitution and its underlying values as the Court in this case would have
one believe: Wilsnach’s outcome could have been achieved without
any judicial tampering with the meaning of “parent” for purposes of
the Intestate Succession Act. De Waal and Mills92 as well as Van
Vuren93 correctly point out that the same result could probably have
been achieved if the deceased’s grandmother had instituted a claim
against the deceased estate for the expenses she incurred in caring
90. Id. at paras. 83, 93.
91. See, e.g., De Waal & Mills, supra note 18, at 569: the co-authors regard
the Court in Wilsnach’s incorporation of the Children’s Act’s definition of “parent” into the Intestate Succession Act as “problematic.”
92. De Waal & Mills, supra note 18, at 570–571.
93. Louis van Vuren, From What Constitutes a Parent, to Soundness of Mind:
Three Fiduciary-Related Court Case Summaries by FISA, WITHOUT PREJUDICE
(Quarter 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/5PZK-2A7P.
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for the deceased, coupled with an application to have the deceased’s
father declared unworthy to inherit based on his total neglect of his
son. Such a course of action would have secured ample compensation for the deceased’s grandmother and would have bestowed an
intestate inheritance on the deceased’s mother to the exclusion of his
father. Unfortunately, the Court in Wilsnach was ostensibly persuaded by the particularly disconcerting facts of the case to follow a
different and rather dubious interpretative approach to resolving the
matter: Wilsnach is therefore a hard case that made bad law or, as
De Waal and Mills contend, a case that “raises more questions than
it provides answers.”94 In light of the private lawyer’s need for legal
certainty referred to earlier, this can never be a satisfactory outcome.
III. THE LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF TESTATION
Freedom of testation is a cornerstone of South Africa’s testate
succession laws.95 Many of Civil Law’s typical limitations on testamentary freedom, such as forced heirship and mandatory asset
claims, cannot be obtained in South Africa. One limitation on testamentary freedom that South Africa shares with its civilian counterparts, is that effect is not given to testamentary provisions that are
contra bonos mores or, in contemporary phraseology, that violate
public policy. South African courts have traditionally applied the
public policy limitation on freedom of testation with circumspection
and restraint. Some patently untenable testamentary provisions, for
example, those aimed at the destruction of existing marriages, have
consistently been adjudged as offending public policy.96 These provisions that are clearly in contravention of public policy aside, South
African courts have traditionally refrained from invoking public policy to intrude on testators’ dispositive choices, in particular their
choices in respect of instituting and excluding beneficiaries under
94. De Waal & Mills, supra note 18, at 571.
95. In re BOE Trust Ltd 2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA) at paras. 26–27 (S. Afr.).
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Swanevelder 1949 (1) SA 733 (O) (S. Afr.); Ex parte
Isaacs 1964 (4) SA 606 (GW) (S. Afr.); Oosthuizen v Bank Windhoek Ltd 1991
(1) SA 849 (Nm) (S. Afr.).
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testamentary gifts. In Campbell v Daly,97 the erstwhile Transvaal
Local Division of the Supreme Court stated its position as follows:
The mere fact that the dispositions in a will may appear to
be unreasonable, unfair, capricious, or otherwise unacceptable does not empower a Court to depart therefrom. The testator is at liberty to be as generous or restrictive in his bequests as he pleases.98
South African courts have, during the post-constitutional era,
used public policy to an ever-greater extent to limit testamentary
freedom, even in instances that were earlier regarded as beyond reproach pursuant to the legal position stated in Campbell. This has
principally occurred in respect of testators’ choices to include some
and to exclude others from benefitting under testamentary gifts. The
courts did so with firm reliance on constitutional rights and norms,
in particular those regarding equality and non-discrimination. In
Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd,99 it was said in this regard
that contemporary South African public policy is rooted in the Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines. When, therefore,
a court must adjudicate on a policy-based challenge to a restricted
testamentary gift, it must be guided by “the founding constitutional
values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and nonsexism.”100 Proceeding from this point of departure, South African
courts have used public policy progressively to undo what they
deemed the constitutionally-untenable consequences of restricted
testamentary gifts. A dual distinction can broadly be drawn in this
regard, namely between courts’ engagement with testamentary charitable trusts on the one hand, and their engagement with non-charitable (or private) testamentary bequests on the other hand.

97.
98
.
99.
100.

1988 (4) SA 714 (T).
Id. at 720H.
2006 (4) SA 205 (C).
Id. at para. 24.
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A. Charitable Trusts
In Syfrets Trust, the erstwhile Cape Provincial Division of the
High Court ruled that a testator’s exclusion of non-White, female,
and Jewish students at a public university from benefitting under a
testamentary bursary trust fell afoul of constitutionally founded public policy. The Court held that limiting bursary eligibility to White
students only occasioned indirect discrimination on the grounds of
race and/or color; moreover, that the exclusion of female and Jewish
students from bursary eligibility constituted direct discrimination on
the grounds of gender and religion.101 The Court therefore ordered
that the restrictions in respect of bursary eligibility must be struck
from the testator’s will.102 The Supreme Court of Appeal followed
suit in Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of
KwaZulu-Natal103 when it dismissed an appeal against the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban’s order to strike a racial restriction
on eligibility under a testamentary bursary trust from the testator’s
will.104 In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal
remarked that “racially discriminatory testamentary dispositions
will not pass constitutional muster”105 and that “[t]he constitutional
imperative to remove racially restrictive clauses that conflict with
public policy from the conditions of an educational trust...must
surely take precedence over freedom of testation, particularly given
the fundamental values of our Constitution.”106 The Western Cape
High Court, Cape Town subsequently produced a similar outcome
in In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust107 when it ordered the excision of racial and gender eligibility restrictions from three separate
testamentary bursary trusts. The Court also ordered the variation of
these trusts’ provisions to make the bursaries available to students

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at para. 33.
Id. at paras. 47, 49.
2010 (6) SA 518 (SCA).
Id. at para. 50.
Id. at para. 38.
Id. at para. 42.
2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC).
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of all races and genders.108 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
observed that “the impugned conditions . . . constitute unfair discrimination on grounds of gender and race and are in conflict with s
9(4) of the Constitution109 and the public interest.”110
The decisions above can be supported insofar as they dealt with
testamentary charitable trusts. These trusts possess a distinct public
dimension by reason of their defining characteristic, namely that
they operate for the public benefit. In this light, a charitable trust can
rightly be regarded as a “public trust” that must comply with the
demands of public law norms.111 In Ex parte Henderson112 it was
said that “public benefit” in the context of a charitable trust does not
necessarily denote benefitting the public at large, but that it also encompasses the bestowal of benefits on sections of society. However,
in such a case, the particular section or group must be sufficiently
large and representative; moreover, the bequest to that section or
group must advance the public interest.113 The public benefit characteristic of a charitable trust thus generally engages the size of the
beneficiary class, the extent to which that class represents society at
large, and the advancement of the public interest. In the case of a
testamentary charitable bursary trust bequest to students, or a designated group of students, at a public school or university, the public
benefit characteristic usually demands that the beneficiary class
must constitute a sufficiently large and representative cross-section
of society; additionally, that the bequest to this class must serve
some public interest (for example, the educational advancement of
108. Id. at para. 23.
109. § 9 is the Constitution’s equality clause.
110. Heydenrych, supra note 107, at para. 20.
111. See, e.g., J Phillips, Case Comment: Anti-Discrimination, Freedom of
Property Disposition, and the Public Policy of Charitable Educational Trusts: A
Comment on Re Canada Trust Company and Ontario Human Rights Commission,
9 THE PHILANTHROPIST J., July 1 1990, at 25, https://perma.cc/Z3AV-FKNN
(Last accessed: 27 May 2022) ; JW Colliton, Race and Sex Discrimination in
Charitable Trusts, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 275, 293 (2003)
https://perma.cc/8JBR-K2LJ (Last accessed: 27 May 2022).
112. 1971 (4) SA 549 (D).
113. Id. at 554A.
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financially disadvantaged students).114 The judicial striking-out of
the ineligibility criteria in Syfrets Trust, Emma Smith and Heydenrych therefore broadened the relevant beneficiary classes to include
students at the respective universities or schools, regardless of these
students’ race or color, gender, or religion. In the result, the excision
of the ineligibility criteria in these cases ensured that the bursary
gifts complied fully with the public benefit characteristic of charitable trusts. As such, the striking-out of the ineligibility criteria in
these cases conformed to contemporary South African public policy
as informed by public law norms on equality and non-discrimination, thereby rendering the judicial variation of the wills at issue a
justifiable limitation on the respective testators’ freedom of testation.115
B. Private Bequests
In King v De Jager,116 the Constitutional Court ruled that the
exclusion of two co-testators’ female descendants as fideicommissary heirs under a testamentary fideicommissum over certain immovable property occasioned unfair gender-based discrimination.
The Court reasoned that, in the majority judgment in particular, that
unfairly discriminatory disinheritances in private bequests are ipso
jure in violation of public policy and thus unenforceable in terms of
the common law boni mores (or public policy) rule.117 The Court
also found that the gender-based discrimination wrought by the disinheritance in this case conflicts with the Constitution’s equality directive118 which, in conjunction with its violation of public policy,
rendered the impugned clause governing the fideicommissum unenforceable.119 The Court finally ruled that the offending clause also
fell afoul of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Harvey v Crawford 2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA) at para. 60 (S. Afr.).
Wilkinson v Crawford 2021 (4) SA 323 (CC) at para. 127 (S. Afr.).
2021 (4) SA 1 (CC).
Id. at para. 96.
Id. at para. 130.
Id. at para. 158.
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Discrimination Act120 and that it was unenforceable on this ground
as well.121
The King judgment is contentious, because it concerned a private bequest and not a charitable (and thus public) gift such as those
at issue in the cases discussed in the preceding part. One is reminded
of Lord Wilberforce’s famous statement in Blathwayt v Baron Cawley,122 namely that the choice of beneficiaries, if it is made in a testator’s limited and private sphere, is not tantamount to discrimination because it does not operate over a larger and more impersonal
(read: public) field.123 It is therefore difficult to conceive how the
co-testators’ female descendants in King, who had no legal entitlement to the specific testamentary gifts bestowed under the private
fideicommissum, nor indeed any right at all to inherit from the cotestators, could successfully claim that the testators’ private choice
to institute others and not them as fideicommissary heirs occasioned
unfair discrimination, even if the testators’ choice involved one or
more of the non-discrimination grounds listed in the Constitution’s
equality clause.124 This is not to say that public policy has no role
whatsoever to play in regard to private testamentary bequests. It is
submitted, however, that public policy’s role in this regard is to prohibit a testator from visiting substantially incontestable harm (to
borrow from Robins JA in Canada Trust Co v Ontario Human
Rights Commission125) on a beneficiary when making such a bequest. In King, the Constitutional Court advanced neither any cogent
reason why the female descendants’ disinheritance was substantially
and incontestably harmful to them specifically, nor any explanation
of exactly what manner of actual harm befell each of these descendants by reason of their disinheritance.
120. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000 (S. Afr.).
121. King, supra note 116, at para. 163.
122. [1975] 3 All ER 625 (HL).
123. Id. at 636.
124. See Harvey, supra note 114, at para. 64; Wilkinson, supra note 115, at
para. 131.
125. 69 DLR (4th) 321 at para. 36.
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It is therefore submitted that a private testamentary gift and the
institution and disinheritance of beneficiaries under such a gift in
particular must be adjudged primarily in regard to its private consequences which, if not substantially and incontestably harmful to
those excluded as heirs, should not be disturbed by a Court. The
Constitutional Court’s judgment in King is thus open to criticism
insofar as the Court bridged the public/private divide in the law of
gifts far too readily and, in doing so, intruded unduly on the testators’ freedom of testation.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
South African courts have, since the advent of the country’s current constitutional dispensation, reshaped its succession laws to conform to the founding constitutional values of human dignity, equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism,
and non-sexism. In the vast majority of cases, this reshaping is to be
welcomed, in particular when it occasioned an expansion of succession rights to parties to whom the law theretofore afforded no rights
to inherit either on intestacy or in terms of a will. South African
courts’ methodologies in this regard can serve as a guide to courts
and/or legislatures in other jurisdictions grappling with similar challenges. In a few cases, however, the courts handed down dubious
judgments based on questionable reasoning – ostensibly to achieve
outcomes they perceived as equitable and just but, nevertheless, outcomes that do not accord with the basic tenets of South Africa’s succession laws. These judgments created considerable legal uncertainty and will hopefully be revisited by the appropriate courts in the
future.
The constitutional reshaping of South Africa’s succession laws
brings the intersection of private law and public law generally, and
in the law of gifts and trusts specifically, to the fore. The manner in
and the extent to which courts ought to engage with this intersection
is a contentious and challenging issue on which individual judges
and academic commentators often disagree. As long as this
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intersection and the attendant constitutional reshaping of succession
laws rest on objective (or objectively determinable) criteria (such as
the existence of a religious union when broadening intestate succession rights or compliance with the requirements set for a particular
testamentary institution when altering the provisions of a will),
courts can generally venture sure-footedly into the constitutional reshaping of succession laws. However, when courts discard such criteria and, moreover, derogate from the existing succession rights of
others in attempts to arrive at just and equitable outcomes in succession cases, they find themselves on thin ice where they should proceed with the utmost caution and restraint in order not to open the
cracks (or chasms) of legal uncertainty. The Legislature is certainly
better placed to undertake law reform in these contentious cases.

SUCCESSIONS OF TONEY AND THE FORMAL
REQUIREMENTS OF NOTARIAL TESTAMENTS
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I. Background ..............................................................................393
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Successions of Toney presents a rich debate over the requirements
of form mandated for notarial testaments in the Louisiana Civil
Code. The case lays bare the encroachment of common law testaments into Louisiana courts and the possible erosion of the civil law
emphasis on adherence to legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Ronnie Robert Toney passed away on January 19, 2015.1 He
was predeceased by his wife, Jeanette Rena Toney. Both died testate, with both leaving their entire estates to Mrs. Toney’s brother,
Richie Glenn Gerding, in the event one predeceased the other. On
April 13, 2015, Mr. Gerding sought to file and probate both testaments.
*
J.D./D.C.L. (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth R. Carter for her
help with research and editing.
1. Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397, 399 (La. 2017).
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Mr. Toney’s testament, dated August 2, 2014, consisted of three
numbered pages, to which an affidavit was attached. The first two
pages of the will were initialed in print by Mr. Toney in the bottom
left corner. The third page consisted of the testator’s signature and a
clause in which three witnesses certified that the testator signed the
will and declared it his last will and testament. The affixed affidavit
included a similar clause by which the testator verified that, in the
presence of witnesses, he signed and executed the testament freely
as his last will and testament. Following a similar clause by the witnesses is a certification by the notary that the testator “signed, swore
to and acknowledged” and the witnesses “subscribed and sworn to”
the affidavit. Notably, the affidavit included a space to mark the
“county” in which the testament was executed.2
On May 6, 2015, John Huey Pierce Jenkins, Mr. Toney’s uncle,
filed a petition to annul Mr. Toney’s testament, alleging that the notarial testament failed to comply with the requirements prescribed
by Louisiana Civil Code article 1577. In seeking to annul the testament, Mr. Jenkins alleged several deficiencies in the form of Mr.
Toney’s notarial testament. First, the testament lacked Mr. Toney’s
signature on each separate page. Rather, the first two pages were
initialed in print, a departure from article 1577(1)’s requirements.3
Further, the code-mandated attestation clause was in a form inconsistent with article 1577(2).4 The final deficiency alleged was that
the notary, witnesses, and testator were not in each other’s presence
at the time the testament was executed.5
Upon review of the testament, the trial court judge found the testament to be absolutely null for want of form for the reasons alleged
by Mr. Jenkins. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
Upon application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, Mr. Gerding
2. Id. at 399-400. The affidavit seems to have been of a standard form common in other states.
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577(1) (2018) (“the testator . . . shall sign his
name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page”).
4. Id. at art. 1577(2).
5. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 399.
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argued that the deficiencies found in Mr. Toney’s testament were
minor and that the testament was overall sufficiently compliant with
the formal requirements prescribed by the Civil Code.6
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the prior
courts, holding that the testament significantly and materially deviated from the formal requirements set forth in the Civil Code.7 While
acknowledging that there is normally a general presumption in favor
of the validity of testaments and substantial burden of proof to rebut
it, the court adheres to the mandatory language contained in article
1573.8 The court found that the printed initials at the bottom of the
first two pages of the document did not satisfy article 1577’s requirements. As to the attestation clause, the court found that, even
taking all the various clauses found in the testament and affidavit in
aggregate, there was nothing substantially similar to the attestation
clause in article 1577 sufficient to find one present in the testament.
This case included two dissents and a concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Johnson argued that the strict adherence to the codal requirements constitutes an elevation of form over function. In her view, in
the absence of an allegation of fraud, Mr. Toney’s intent should have
prevailed, and the attestation clause was sufficient for formal purposes.9 Justice Weimer also criticized the elevation of form over
substance, arguing that the majority ignored the clear testamentary
intent by refusing to piece together the elements of a valid attestation
clause. The court also ignored long-standing lower court decisions
in finding the initialing of the first two pages of the testament to be
a significant deviation from form.10 Justice Crichton concurred in
6. Id. at 401.
7. Id. at 407.
8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1573 (2018) (“The formalities prescribed for
the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely
null.”).
9. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 409.
10. Id. at 410-411.
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the majority opinion but wrote to express his concern over the “proliferation of widely available and generic legal templates” that present major deviation from codal form requirements. He stated that it
is the court’s duty to uphold the law as it is absent legislative change
in order to prevent the “metastization” of legal error in codal interpretation.11
III. COMMENTARY
This commentary aims to address several issues raised in Succession of Toney. First, consideration is given to the dissent’s argument
that an allegation of fraud or something similar is necessary to
properly consider formal deficiencies in notarial testaments. Next
under consideration is the issue of “substantial compliance” with article 1577’s attestation clause requirement and recent developments
on the issue. Then, Justice Crichton’s concurrence will be further
addressed. Finally, a proposal will be made for a path to avoid absolute nullity by formal deficiency, based on trends in other civil
and mixed-law jurisdictions.
A. The Necessity of Alleging Fraud to Raise Issues of Form
In this case, both the appellate and Supreme Court decisions carried dissents arguing that, because no fraud was pled, the intent of
the testator should have prevailed over the formal deficiencies.12
While the desire to adhere to testamentary intent is a proper goal,
the willingness to ignore multiple formal deficiencies in the absence
of alleged fraud defeats the purpose of the code articles governing
notarial testaments.
It is accepted that the articulated purpose of testamentary formalities is to safeguard against, among other things, fraud and undue
influence.13 If this is the purpose, it follows necessarily that
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 411-412.
Id. at 401, 409.
KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
SERIES: SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 12.1 (2d ed., West 2009).
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deviation from these formal requirements is a threshold indicator of
fraud or something similar. As it relates to the actual testament, a
fault in form that materially deviates from those formal requirements laid out in the code articles necessarily indicates potential
fraud without the need for pleading it or providing evidence to support it. While this may be a somewhat strict interpretation of legislative intent, it is compatible with the language of the relevant articles.
As a practical matter, the parties challenging a facially deficient
testament may benefit from not having to allege fraud or similar
vices. Such allegations can cause a tremendous amount of family
conflict and lead to expensive, drawn-out litigation. Nullifying the
deficient testament based on form prevents any inquiry into issues
of potential fraud and allows a certain measure of judicial efficiency.
Based on these considerations, the majority in Toney ruled correctly
in affirming the decisions of the lower courts.
It is important to remember that, where a testament may fail as a
notarial form, it may still be upheld if it meets the formal requirements of another testamentary form.14 Given that Louisiana only allows for olographic and notarial testaments, a notarial testament that
deviates from the necessary form may still be upheld if it satisfies
the requirements for an olographic will as laid out in article 1575,15
which is not the case here.
B. Substantial Similarity in Art. 1577’s Attestation Clause Requirement
Louisiana Civil Code article 1577(2) provides a sample of a
proper attestation clause. This, however, is not required. Rather, an
attestation clause is accepted so long as it is “substantially similar”
to the form provided.16 In Toney, the court looks favorably upon the

14.
15.
16.

Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1575 (2018).
Id. at art. 1577(2).
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summary provided by the First Circuit in Succession of Brown,
which listed three necessary elements in an attestation clause:
(1) the testator signed the will at its end and on each separate
page, (2) the testator declared in the presence of the notary
and witnesses that it (the instrument) was his will, and (3) in
the presence of the testator and each other, they (the notary
and witnesses) signed their names on a specific date.17
So long as these elements are satisfied, the attestation clause is
substantially similar so as to withstand scrutiny under the article. In
approving this list of elements, the Supreme Court upholds the “substantially similar” language of article 1577 and rejects a strict adherence standard found in prior jurisprudence.
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued two decisions regarding “substantial similarity” in article 1577. In Succession of
Bruce, the testament at issue contained an attestation clause that
failed to state that the testament was signed by the testator “at the
end;” rather, it only stated that the testator signed “on each page.”18
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lack of the phrase
“at the end” in the attestation clause constituted a material deviation
sufficient to nullify the testament based on “strict adherence.”19 In
so doing, the lower courts accepted the argument that an attestation
clause must strictly adhere to the language provided in article
1577(2).
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the strict adherence argument, finding that strict adherence is in direct conflict with
1577(2)’s “substantial similarity” language. Noting that the only defect in the attestation clause at issue was the lack of “at the end,” the
court looked to the legislative history of article 1577 and its statutory
predecessor, La. R.S. 9:2442. Prior to the codification of 1577, an
iteration of La. R.S. 9:2442 included sample attestation clause language stating that the will was signed “on each page,” rather than
17. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 405.
18. Succession of Bruce, No. 2020-C-00239, 315 So. 3d 193, 2021 WL
266390 (La. 2021).
19. Succession of Bruce, 289 So. 3d 121 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2020).
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“on each page and at the end.” The latter phrasing was added in 1980
as a matter of semantics rather than substantive change.20Accordingly, the court found that “on each page” necessarily indicated that
the testament was signed at the end and was therefore substantially
similar to the sample clause provided in article 1577(2).21
In Succession of Liner, issued on the same day as Bruce, the court
ruled that an attestation clause stating that the testator “signed” was
not substantially similar to the sample clause found in article
1579(2),22 invalidating the testament at issue. The court found that
“signed” “did not establish that the testament was signed at the end
and on every page” of the testament at issue, instead only certifying
that the will was signed at least once.23
These cases add some nuance to the Toney decision by delving
further into what constitutes “substantial similarity” to the codal requirements for the attestation clause. As the cases indicate, it is sufficient to state that the testament is signed on each page, as that inherently indicates the final page is signed at the end. However, it is
not enough to simply say that the testament is signed, as that only
guarantees that the document is signed at least once, be it on the final
page or any other page. These decisions also serve to rebut the contention that strict adherence is required in attestation clauses. Such
an interpretation of article 1577(2) goes directly against the “substantially similar” language found in the article. In ruling as it did in
these cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court upholds 1577(2)’s more
permissive “substantial similarity” requirement as opposed to a fundamentally incompatible strict adherence standard.

20. Succession of Bruce, 2021 WL 266390 at *3.
21. Id. at *4.
22. This article dictates the requirements for a notarial testament where the
testator is unable to read. Section 2 of this article provides for an attestation clause
similar to that found in art. 1577.
23. Succession of Liner, No. 2019-C-02011, 2021 WL 266394 (La. 2021).
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C. The “Metastization” of Legal Error in Notarial Testaments
As mentioned above, Justice Crichton concurred in the opinion
to raise the issue of the proliferation of generic testament formats
that, while permissible in common law jurisdictions, fail in light of
Louisiana’s formal requirements. This was plainly the case in
Toney, as the record supports that the testament in question followed
a common law format. As this issue is unlikely to go away any time
soon, it is worth further discussing the problems this issue presents.
Louisiana, like every civil law jurisdiction, recognizes legislation
and custom as the sources of law.24 As legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will,25 it follows that legislation should be
followed above all else. Articles 1573 and 1577 are such expressions
of legislative will and must be adhered to in the absence of other
legislation to the contrary. Accordingly, any notarial testaments that
materially deviate from article 1577 will be absolutely null in light
of 1573. To grant validity to deficient common law testamentary
formats is to undermine the civilian nature of Louisiana law by allowing judicial fiat to validate codal noncompliance.
To avoid such issues, perhaps further legislation is necessary. At
the very least, there needs to be a clear indication (beyond codification) to the public that Louisiana has specific formal requirements
in the preparation of notarial testaments. It is almost certain that one
is able to find a Louisiana-compliant testament format online.
The prevalence of this issue regarding attestation clauses also
speaks to a concerning trend among Louisiana attorneys and notaries. Article 1577 has been codified in the Louisiana Civil Code
since 1997; prior to that, it had existed as a creature of statute since
1952. The language has changed very little over its life, with only
small semantic alterations conducted when changes were made.
This article provides clear, unambiguous wording and a sample
clause. With such a clear requirement, usable language, and the
24.
25.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2018).
Id. at art. 2.
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penalty of absolute nullity for deviation, there is no valid reason for
the exclusion of a compliant attestation clause. The fact that this issue keeps coming up speaks to a lack of basic diligence in the drafting and notarizing of notarial testaments that rises to the level of
legal malpractice or notarial liability. Those parties to a testament
found null on these grounds should have a clear cause of action
against these attorneys or notaries who fail to comply with clear codal mandate.
D. Comparing Approaches to Formal Deficiency: Louisiana and
Quebec
In a recent Louisiana Law Review article, Professor Ronald J.
Scalise, Jr. noted that many civil law and mixed-law jurisdictions
are moving away from strict formalism in testamentary form.26 Specifically, many of these jurisdictions have been trending away from
absolute nullity as a consequence of deviation. While it is unnecessary to go into the weeds on the trend, it would be beneficial to compare Louisiana’s approach with that of Quebec, a similarly situated
mixed-law jurisdiction.
Article 1573 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as already observed,
requires that formal requirements must be satisfied on pain of absolute nullity. Quebec Civil Code article 713, an equivalent to article
1573, is similar to the extent that formal requirements must be satisfied; however, it does not have absolute nullity as the consequence
for failure to meet requirements.27 Rather, article 714 allows for a
testament to survive formal deficiency if it meets the essential requirements of the given form and if it “unquestionably and unequivocally contains the last wishes of the deceased.”28 By this article, a
notarial testament that fails for certain flaws in form can otherwise
be valid if 1) the essential aspects of the form are observed, and 2)
26. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Will Formalities in Louisiana: Yesterday, Today,
and Tomorrow, 80 LA. L. REV. 1331, 1352-56 (2020).
27. QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 713.
28. Id. at art. 714.
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it can be demonstrated that the testament indisputably contains the
testator’s intent.
As can be seen, the Quebec approach is more permissive than
Louisiana’s. It leaves a certain amount of discretion to judges in determining the validity of a testament and strikes a seemingly fair
balance between requiring legal form requirements and upholding
the testamentary intent of the testator. What remains unclear from
article 714 is what is defined as an “essential requirement.” The lack
of absolute nullity is certainly more forgiving than Louisiana’s near
“all-or-nothing,” strict formal requirements.
The comparison between the approaches of Quebec and Louisiana is drawn in order to demonstrate a possible path forward for a
more forgiving Louisiana law on notarial testament form requirements. Such an approach may be to the benefit of Louisiana testators. It is unclear how exactly article 714’s standards would deal
with attestation clauses but, as a purely scholarly matter, Louisiana
may wish to consider such an approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A reading of the Louisiana Civil Code shows that Louisiana law
does not differ from major civil law jurisdictions when it comes to
define usufruct and the distribution of rights and obligations between usufructuaries and naked owners.1 A full owner who reserves
for herself a lifetime usufruct over a property she donates has the
right to enjoy the property as she pleases. As such, the naked owner
is under an obligation not to interfere with that enjoyment.2 However, in Cole v. Thomas, the First Circuit Court of Appeal limited
the right of the usufructuary when it held that the usufructuary could

* J.D., D.C.L. (May 2022) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. I would like to thank Professor John Randall Trahan for his guidance
throughout the writing process. An earlier draft of this comment was published
by LLR Lagniappe: https://perma.cc/QE9Q-P7VX.
1. See generally LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. arts. 550–606 (2022). Full ownership
grants a person the right to use, enjoy, and alienate the thing. Full ownership may
be divided into a usufruct and naked ownership. A usufructuary has the right to
use and enjoy the property for a certain amount of time. When a usufructuary
retains that right, the remaining right in the thing is called naked ownership.
Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., Inc., 625 So. 2d 477, 484 n.13 (La. 1993);
JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY: A PRÉCIS 184 (2012).
2. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. arts. 539, 605 (2022).
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not evict the naked owner solely on the basis that the usufructuary
no longer desired the naked owner to live on the property.3
II. BACKGROUND
In 2005, Mrs. Cole donated the disputed land to Ms. Thomas, her
granddaughter.4 The act of donation transferred the naked ownership of the property to the granddaughter, but the grandmother reserved the usufruct of the property for life.5 The granddaughter
placed a mobile home on the donated property behind the grandmother’s residence and moved onto the property.6 In 2007, the
granddaughter executed an affidavit to immobilize the mobile
home.7 The affidavit declared that the “mobile home shall be permanently attached to” the donated property.8 The grandmother
signed the affidavit as a witness.9
In 2014, the grandmother brought an action against her granddaughter, seeking to dissolve the donation inter vivos pursuant to
article 1562 of the Louisiana Civil Code, “which provides for the
dissolution of a donation subject to a suspensive condition when the
condition can no longer be fulfilled.”10 The grandmother alleged that
the donation was given with the understanding that her granddaughter would care for her and further alleged that the granddaughter
failed to fulfill that obligation, thus failing to fulfill the suspensive
condition.11 Accordingly, the grandmother asked that the court invalidate the donation and evict the granddaughter, taking into account that the grandmother had a lifetime usufruct over the property
and that she no longer desired her granddaughter to remain on the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Cole v. Thomas, 247 So. 3d 957, 963 (La. Ct. 1st App. 2018).
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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property.12 This gave rise to the issue as to whether or not the usufructuary of the property has a legal right to evict the naked owner
from the property simply because she no longer desires for the naked
owner to live on the property.13
The trial court held a bench trial and denied the grandmother's
request to invalidate the act of donation.14 Based on the four corners
of the document, the trial court found no legal basis to revoke the
donation and therefore ruled that the granddaughter maintained naked ownership of the property.15 In other words, the donation was
free of suspensive condition. However, the trial court granted the
grandmother’s request to evict the granddaughter from the property.16 Since the grandmother reserved the usufruct of the property
for life and did not want her granddaughter on the property while
the grandmother was alive, the trial court concluded that the latter,
as the usufructuary, had the right to evict the granddaughter.17 The
granddaughter appealed.18
On appeal, the granddaughter alleged that the grandmother was
not entitled to a judgment of eviction.19 The First Circuit Court of
Appeal agreed, holding that the grandmother, as usufructuary, was
not entitled to a judgment of eviction under the provisions of article
4702 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.20 The court noted
that:
Eviction is a proper remedy for an owner of immovable
property, who wishes to evict a lessee or “occupant” therefrom, after the purpose of the occupancy has ceased. . . . It is
well settled that an eviction proceeding is not the appropriate
remedy to determine real rights to immovable property.21
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 963.
Id.
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For these reasons, the court found that the grandmother was not
the owner of the property on which the granddaughter resided, and
therefore, did not have a right to bring an eviction proceeding under
the provisions of article 4702 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.22
The granddaughter also argued that “the proper procedural vehicle for the resolution of an alleged disturbance of the usufructuary’s
use and enjoyment of the property is a possessory action,” and that
the grandmother “failed to prove the elements required to prevail in
a possessory action.”23 Again, the court agreed, noting that a usufruct is a real right which, on immovable property, is protected only
by a possessory action.24 Accordingly, the grandmother, as the usufructuary, failed to institute any of the appropriate real actions available to her that would have allowed her to protect her right to possession and enjoyment of the disputed property.25
Even if the grandmother had brought a possessory action, the
court explained that she “would have been required to demonstrate
that there had been an eviction or some other physical disturbance
preventing her from enjoying her possession of the property” in order to prevail.26 According to the court, a usufructuary’s desire to no
longer have the naked owner living on the property was insufficient
grounds for eviction.27 Therefore, the First Circuit Court of Appeal
found that the trial court erred in concluding that the grandmother
established legal grounds to evict her granddaughter and reversed
the trial court’s judgment.28

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id.
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III. COMMENTARY
In Cole v. Thomas, the First Circuit Court of Appeal improperly
limited the rights of a usufructuary when it held that the usufructuary
could not evict the naked owner solely on the basis that the usufructuary no longer desired the naked owner to live on the property.29
To understand the issues with the First Circuit’s analysis, it is imperative to compare the rights of a full owner to the rights of a usufructary and a naked owner.30 There are three elements to ownership: usus, fructus, and abusus.31 Usus is the right to use the thing;
fructus is the right to derive income from the thing; and abusus is
the right to alienate the thing.32 Satisfaction of these three elements,
known as full ownership, creates a right to “direct, immediate, and
exclusive authority over a thing,” thus allowing the owner to use,
enjoy, and dispose of the property as permitted by law.33
On the contrary, “[a] usufruct is a real right of limited duration
on the property of another.”34 A real right, in turn, grants direct and
immediate authority over a thing.35 In the act of donation in Cole v.
Thomas, the grandmother reserved the usufruct for life and donated
the naked ownership to her granddaughter.36 As the usufructuary,
the grandmother was entitled to the usus and fructus of the property
until her death.37 The remaining right in the thing is called naked
ownership.38 Because the grandmother reserved the usus and fructus
for herself, the act of donation merely transferred naked ownership

29. Id.
30. See generally id.
31. Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., Inc., 625 So. 2d 477, 484 n.13 (La.
1993).
32. Id.
33. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 477 (2022).
34. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 535 (2022).
35. Id. at art. 476 cmt. (b) (citing YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§
87, 90, 97 (1966)).
36. Cole, 247 So. 3d at 958.
37. Id.
38. JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY: A PRÉCIS 184
(2012).
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to the granddaughter.39 Neither the grandmother nor the granddaughter retained full ownership of the disputed property.40
The usufructuary and the naked owner have different rights in
the property and owe different obligations to one another.41 The usufructuary is entitled to the usus and fructus of the property, whereas
the naked owner is entitled to the abusus of the property. 42 Because
naked ownership is subject to the usus and fructus of another, the
naked owner may only dispose of her naked ownership; the alienation or encumbrance of the property cannot affect the usufruct.43
Furthermore, the naked owner is under an obligation not to interfere
with the rights of the usufructuary.44
It should be accepted that the usufructuary’s right to use the thing
is as extensive as an owner’s right.45 In other civil law jurisdictions,
the usufructuary generally enjoys all of the rights that the owner enjoys.46 The right of full ownership is “exclusive,”47 meaning that the
right to the enjoyment of a thing is attributed to a certain person, to
the exclusion of all others.48 “The owner has the power to exclude
all third persons from any use, enjoyment or disposal of his property,”49 even if the exclusion causes a third party to suffer some
harm.50 Since the usufructuary’s right of usus and fructus should be
as extensive as an owner’s right, the court in Cole v. Thomas should
have held that the grandmother, as the usufructuary, had the right to
exclude the granddaughter from the use or enjoyment of her
39. Cole, 247 So. 3d at 958.
40. Id.
41. See generally LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. arts. 550–606 (2022).
42. Campbell, 625 So. 2d at 484 n.13.
43. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 603 (2022).
44. Id. art. 605.
45. 3 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §
2.2 (5th ed. 2020).
46. Id.
47. TRAHAN, supra note 1, at 118.
48. 3 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE ET THEORIQUE: LES BIENS 220–21, at par. 212 (2d ed. 1952).
49. AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS: PROPERTY § 191,
176, at par. 143 (7th ed. 1961), in 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS (La. St. L. Inst.
1966).
50. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 48.
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property solely on the basis that the grandmother no longer desired
the granddaughter to live on the property. Nevertheless, the court
found that the usufructuary lacked the right to obtain the eviction of
the naked owner both procedurally and substantively.51
A. The First Circuit’s Procedural Analysis

Procedurally, the First Circuit held that the usufructuary was not
entitled to bring an eviction proceeding under article 4702 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.52 Article 4702 provides that “an
owner of [an] immovable property” can evict an “occupant” from
the property once the purpose of the occupancy has ended.53 The
owner must deliver a written notice to vacate to the occupant, and
the occupant has five days from its delivery to vacate the premises.54
An owner is defined to include a lessee, and an occupant is defined
to include “a sharecropper; half hand; day laborer; former owner;
and any person occupying immovable property by permission or accommodation of the owner, former owner, or another occupant, except a mineral lessee, owner of a mineral servitude, or a lessee of the
owner.”55
The Cole v. Thomas ruling strictly construed the language
“owner of immovable property,” to exclude usufructuaries.56 The
court noted, “It is well settled that an eviction proceeding is not the
appropriate remedy to determine real rights to immovable property.”57 Although the court cited jurisprudence to support this

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Cole, 247 So. 3d at 963.
See id.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4702 (2022).
Id.
Id. art. 4704.
Cole, 247 So. 3d at 963.
Id.
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assertion,58 these cases did not clearly articulate the strict construction of the phrase “owner of immovable property.”59
In Millaud v. Millaud, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal addressed a similar issue relating to article 4702.60 The Millauds, a
husband and wife, each owned a one-half interest in the disputed
property.61 As a result of the judgment of possession in the wife’s
succession, the husband became the usufructuary of the entire property.62 Each of the Millauds’ two children inherited a one-third interest in their mother’s one-half share of the property.63 The father
filed a claim to evict his children under article 4702.64 The Millaud
court noted that the relationship between a usufructuary and a naked
owner is not of the same nature as that between a lessor and a lessee.65 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a naked owner is not
an occupant envisioned by the eviction articles, and therefore, that
eviction was not the proper remedy.66
However, one dissenting judge argued that the father clearly
qualified as an owner, while the children, as the partial naked owners, qualified as occupants within the meaning of the eviction articles.67 The eviction articles were designed to give owners the right
to expel “illegal tenants or occupants without the burdensome expense and delay of a petitory action.”68 The dissenting judge
58. See id. (first citing Champagne v. Broussard, 401 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (La.
Ct. App. 3d 1981); and then citing Tartan Transp. & Constr., Ltd. v. McDonald,
436 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1983)).
59. Id.
60. Millaud v. Millaud, 761 So. 2d 44, 46–47 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2000).
61. Id. at 44–45.
62. Id.
63. Id. According to the judgment, the two children and the husband were
“each naked owners of an undivided one-third interest in their mother’s half ownership of the property.” Id. at 45 n.3.
64. Id. at 46.
65. Id. at 45–46 (distinguishing that the naked owner has a third party vested
with a real right before him, not a creditor. The usufructuary can ask no more of
him than could any other third party. As long as the naked owner does not diminish nor disturb the usufructuary’s enjoyment, he is free of all responsibility towards the usufructuary).
66. Id. at 46.
67. Id. at 47 (Landrieu, J., dissenting).
68. Id.; Skannal v. Jones, 384 So. 2d 494, 495 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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concluded that the term occupant should not be given a restrictive
interpretation.69 Rather, occupant should be broad enough to include
anyone occupying the property without a legal right to do so.70
Therefore, the partial naked owners did not have the right to continue to occupy the property over the objection of the usufructuary.71
As the Civil Code makes clear, laws are to be applied as written
if they are clear and unambiguous and do not lead to absurd consequences.72 If the legislative language is susceptible of different
meanings, then it must be interpreted as conveying the meaning that
best conforms to the law’s purpose.73 The purpose of the eviction
articles is to give owners the right to expel “illegal tenants or occupants” in a quicker and less expensive way than a petitory action.74
However, the ruling from Cole does not conform to that purpose.
Rather, that ruling indicates that when full ownership has been separated between a usufructuary and a naked owner, the quick and less
expensive eviction procedure can never be used to evict an invader.
According to the First Circuit, the usufructuary does not have the
right to evict the naked owner from the property because the usufructuary is not the “owner of immovable property” as required by
the eviction articles.75 Therefore, the usufructuary cannot use the
eviction articles against any person, even if that person has no right
to be on the property. Considering that the usufructuary’s right to
use the thing should be as extensive as an owner’s right and that the
legislature intended for owners to use these eviction articles as a
quick solution for owners, the First Circuit erred procedurally when
it denied the usufructuary the right to evict the naked owner under
article 4702 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
at 495.
75.

Millaud, 761 So. 2d at 47 (Landrieu, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 9 (2022).
Id. art. 10.
Millaud, 761 So. 2d at 47 (Landrieu, J., dissenting); Skannal, 384 So. 2d
Cole, 247 So. 3d at 963.
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B. The First Circuit’s Substantive Analysis

Regarding the substance of the matter, the First Circuit held that
the usufructuary cannot evict the naked owner solely on the basis
that the usufructuary no longer desired the naked owner to live on
property.76 The court correctly noted that the usufruct of immovable
property is protected by the possessory action.77 However, the court
incorrectly held that she “failed to prove the elements required to
prevail in a possessory action.”78
To maintain a possessory action, the possessor must allege and
prove that (1) she had a real right at the time the disturbance occurred; (2) she had possession quietly and without interruption for
more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance; (3) the disturbance was one in fact or law; and (4) the possessory action was
instituted within a year of the disturbance.79 The Cole court failed to
consider whether the grandmother properly alleged a disturbance in
fact.80
Satisfying a disturbance-in-fact element is simple. A disturbance
in fact is any physical act that prevents the possessor of a real right
from enjoying her possession quietly or that throws any obstacle in
the way of that enjoyment.81 The usufructuary has the right to enjoy
the property, and the naked owner has the obligation not to interfere
with the rights of the usufructuary.82 The grandmother suffered a
disturbance in fact when the granddaughter refused to leave the
property after the grandmother told her to, as there was no contractual right, such as a lease, to allow the granddaughter to stay.83 The
refusal to leave the property is enough to satisfy a disturbance in fact
because it is a physical act that throws an obstacle in the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
See id. at 961.
Id.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3658 (2022).
See Cole, 247 So. 3d at 962.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3659 (2022).
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. arts. 539, 605 (2022).
See generally Cole, 247 So. 3d 957.
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grandmother’s unfettered right of using the land as she pleases and
enjoying her possession quietly. Thus, the usufructuary asserting
that she had the legal right to evict the naked owner solely because
she no longer desired the naked owner to live on the property is
enough to satisfy that she suffered a disturbance in fact.84 The First
Circuit erred substantively when it held that the grandmother failed
to prove the elements required to prevail in a possessory action.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Cole v. Thomas, the First Circuit Court of Appeal strictly construed the provisions of article 4702 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure and held that article 4702 cannot be used for an eviction
proceeding by a usufructuary.85 The First Circuit failed to accept
that the usufructuary’s right to use the thing is as extensive as an
owner’s right.86 Rather, the First Circuit limited the rights of the
usufructuary by holding that the fact that the usufructuary no longer
desiring the naked owner to live on the property was not sufficient
to justify eviction. The Louisiana civil law grants the usufructuary
broad rights to enjoy the property, and, in the absence of contractual
arrangements, any interference by the naked owner presents a disturbance in fact.87 Therefore, the holding in Cole v. Thomas contradicts those laws. The grandmother, as the usufructuary, had the legal
right to evict the granddaughter, as the naked owner. The First Circuit erred procedurally and substantively in its interpretation of the
case.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 963.
See id.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. arts. 539, 605 (2022).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This case raises a simple but important practical question: does
the fact by the debtor of listing a debt when filing for bankruptcy
constitute an acknowledgment of the debt that would interrupt prescription? Typically, a bank will institute a lawsuit when a person
stops making payments towards the reimbursement of a mortgage
loan. However, the case of Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat'l Ass'n
v. Holoway1 illustrates three important aspects of bankruptcy and
acknowledgement of a debt. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeals tackles if an acknowledgment of a debt is enough to interrupt prescription when a borrower in a bankruptcy proceeding
acknowledged the debt in his Amended Chapter 13 plan. Bankruptcy procedures require that a debtor list all creditors asserting

* J.D./D.C.L. (May 2022) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Olivier
Moréteau for his guidance throughout the writing of this case note.
1. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat'l Ass'n v. Holoway, 2018-1340 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 5/24/19); 277 So. 3d 800
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claims against him and put together a plan to repay them. Section
101 of bankruptcy code makes clear that the term “claim” may include a claim that is disputed by the person filing for bankruptcy.2
Second, it determines if a bankruptcy trustee has the authority to
acknowledge the mortgage debt on the borrower’s behalf. Finally,
the court had to decide whether the entire loan should be cancelled
if it prescribes or only the defaulted monthly mortgage payments
that were due more than five years before the filing of the instant
foreclosure suit were prescribed.
II. BACKGROUND
In Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat'l Ass'n v. Holoway, the
plaintiff, Wells Fargo, sued to enforce a promissory note and mortgage. In December 1999, Defendant Michael E. Holoway executed
a promissory note secured by an act of mortgage for land and improvements in Mandeville Louisiana.3 The defendant failed to pay
monthly installments on the loan in September of 2002.4 The loan
was acquired by Provident Bank, subsequent to the defendant’s default. Provident gave Holoway notice of default in accordance with
the terms of loan in a letter dated June 11, 2003 and Provident then
filed suit to foreclose on the property on August 28, 2003.5 In December 2003, Holoway filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. On August 16, 2004, the automatic stay in the
matter was lifted by the court which enabled Provident to continue
the foreclosure proceedings. The first bankruptcy suit was dismissed
by the court on January 14, 2005. In March of 2007, Holoway filed
a second petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and it was converted
to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, filed a claim
in the suit regarding the note on behalf of Wells Fargo. On
2.
3.
4.
5.

1 U.S.C.A. §101(5).
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
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September 12, 2008, an “Order of Abandonment” signed by the
bankruptcy court removed the property from the bankruptcy estate.6
The second bankruptcy suit was discharged on November 3, 2008.
On June 16, 2009, Wells Fargo filed the instant action seeking to
enforce the loan. However, the original foreclosure suit was dismissed on grounds of abandonment pursuant to Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure Art 561 on December 6, 2017.7 On January 24,
2018, Holoway filed a peremptory exception of prescription. On
May 3, 2018, the trial court granted the exception of prescription
and ordered Holoway to submit a written judgment. On June 8,
2018, a judgment was signed granting the exception of prescription,
dismissing Wells Fargo’s suit, and ordering the cancellation of the
inscription of the mortgage in the St. Tammany Parish records.8 After the judgment was rendered, Wells Fargo filed an appeal and presented three issues for the First Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana
to examine.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found that it would be unjust
to rule that a debtor has acknowledged his debt under Louisiana
Civil Code article 3436 merely because the debtor properly identified the existence of a claim in bankruptcy filings in compliance
with bankruptcy laws.9 The First Circuit Court found that the defendant did nothing more than identifying an alleged debt and that
it was not enough to constitute an acknowledgement as contemplated in Louisiana Civil Code article 3436. Louisiana Civil Code
article 3464 provides that prescription is interrupted when the debtor
acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribed.10 The defendant did not undertake any act of
6. Id.
7. Id. at 804.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 807.
10. Id. at 805-06 citing Titus v. IHOP Rest., Inc., 2009-951 (La. 12/1/09); 25
So.3d 761, 764-765.

418

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 14

reparation or indemnity, he did not make an unconditional offer or
payments, and he did not make any action which could reasonably
be found to have lulled Wells Fargo into believing that he would not
contest liability. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007 requires a debtor to list all creditors asserting claims against him.11
“Claim” is defined in Section 101 of bankruptcy codes as “right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”12 On the
second issue, a bankruptcy filing creates an estate, which is comprised of the property of the debtor and other property as defined in
11 U.S.C.A. § 541.13 One may note that ‘estate’ is a common law
concept not to be found in the Louisiana Civil Code. It designates
the aggregate of the debtor’s assets. The trustee is the representative
of the estate, not of the debtor. Louisiana Civil Code article 2997
says a principal may authorize a mandatary to acknowledge his debt,
but only if the authority is given expressly.14 The defendant did not
expressly grant authority to the bankruptcy trustee to acknowledge
the debt on the defendant’s behalf, and there is no other mechanism
under Louisiana law by which to grant authority to acknowledge
debt. After reviewing those articles, the court found no merit in this
assignment of error.
On the third issue, the Court held that prescription begins to run
with respect to each installment at the time the installment becomes
due, unless the creditor accelerates the debt by declaring the whole
indebtedness due, in which chase prescription runs from the date of
acceleration.15 Louisiana Civil Code article 3463 states that interruption of prescription is considered never to have occurred if a case
11.
12.
13.
14.
(3)].
15.
45.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007.
11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West).
11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West).
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. Art. 2997 (2020) [quote beginning of article plus
Harrison v. Smith, 2001-0458 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/02); 814 So. 2d 42,
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is later abandoned.16 The court finds authority from Harrison.17 The
court finds that Civil Code article 3463 provides for the effect of
both abandonment and voluntary dismissal and does not distinguish
between the two in any way. The court finds it appropriate to apply
the same logic employed in Harrison. The court found no legal basis
to construe the resulting erasure of the interruption of prescription
to mean that the loan was somehow un-accelerated. The challenged
judgment was affirmed.
IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary will first discuss the basis of prescription,
where it comes from in the Civil Code and the prescription period
in mortgage cases. Next, it will walk through the mechanics of mortgage prescription and how a single monthly payment or the entire
mortgage can prescribe. Third, it will an look at examples acknowledgment in the civil code and interpretations in Louisiana cases.
A. Basis and Mechanism of Prescription
Prescription was codified in Book III, Title XXIV, of the Civil
Code. As article 3498 indicates, negotiable and nonnegotiable instruments have a prescriptive period. In addition, article 3498 establishes a five-year prescription period on promissory notes and explains the time frame by stating that, “prescription commences to
run from the day payment is exigible.”18 The five year liberative
prescription period is further defined in article 3447. The article
states that inaction for a period of time will bar any future actions.19
Mortgage loans create successive obligations. Though the full
balance of the loan is due from the moment the capital is disbursed,
the obligation to repay is suspended by a succession of monthly
terms. However, companies stipulate acceleration clauses into
16.
17.
18.
19.

LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. Art. 3463 (2020).
Harrison v. Smith, 2001-0458 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/02).
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. Art. 3498 (2020).
Id. at art. 3447.
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contracts. If multiple payments are missed, a mortgage company can
accelerate the loan, meaning that the entire unpaid balance is due at
once. The date of acceleration in this case was August 28, 2003. On
this date, the company who acquired the rights on the loan filed a
suit to foreclose on the property.20 This is what caused the acceleration to occur. According to article 3498, the prescription clock
starts running then regarding the payment of the balance of the loan.
The prescription period will run until August 28, 2008, unless there
is interruption of prescription.
The First Circuit correctly calculated the prescriptive period on
the mortgage loan, in accordance with the Civil Code. The fact that
the loan was accelerated was not disputed and there was evidence
that no claim was ever filed during the five-year period. At the outset, the length of time for prescription argued for by Wells Fargo
appears to be contrary to the requirements in article 3498. The claim
prescribes exactly five years from the date unless prescription is interrupted. In such situations, creditors typically interrupt the prescription by filing claims and refiling those as time flows. The claim
will only prescribe if the bank has been idle for five years. Any act
on behalf of the bank showing they did not abandon the action typically interrupts prescription, unless there is a clear acknowledgment
of debt by the debtor, because such an acknowledgement interrupts
prescription.
B. Acknowledgement of Debt
Under Louisiana law, prescription is interrupted by the acknowledgment of the right of the other party.
Louisiana Civil Code article 3464 states: “Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom
he had commenced to prescribe.” What constitutes an acknowledgment is defined in the Civil Code under “Reconnaissance.”
20. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, Nat'l Ass'n v. Holoway, 277 So. 3d 800.
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“Reconnaissance de dette” … Black’s law dictionary defines acknowledgment as, “a formal declaration made in the presence of an
authorized officer, such as a notary public, by someone who signs a
document and confirms that the signature is authentic.”21 It also defines it as “an acceptance of responsibility.”22 Merriam Webster defines acknowledgment as, “a declaration or avowal of one's act or
of a fact to give it legal validity.”23 The word is used elsewhere in
the Civil Code, such as in article 196 establishing the paternity of a
man by acknowledging a child.24 Though this article does not give
a definition, it sets formalities for the acknowledgment of a child to
be valid, detail not to be found in article 3464. A look at Louisiana
cases will give some context on acknowledgement.
In this context. when a person is lent money and does not pay it
back in time in some fashion the lender will try to get the person to
acknowledge his debt. In this case, Holoway listed the mortgage
debt as one of the debts to be cleared in the bankruptcy proceedings.
The question becomes whether Holoway acknowledged that debt
when he listed the mortgage on his bankruptcy proceedings. He
listed it as “disputed mortgage.” By doing this, he did not express
any unequivocal intent to recognize that he was obligated to pay that
claim. Louisiana has established jurisprudence in cases dealing with
acknowledgement. In Coleman, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal of
Louisiana held that, recognizing the obligation or creditor’s rights
halts prescription before it runs its course.25 In Bank of New York,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana held “that acknowledgment is the recognition of the creditor’s right or obligation that
halts the progress of prescription before it has run its course; acknowledgment acts to interrupt the prescriptive period before it has

21. Acknowledgment, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). See LA. CIV.
CODE. ANN. Art. 1836 (2020).
22. Acknowledgment, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
23. Acknowledgment, Merriam Webster Dictionary (2020).
24. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. Art. 196 (2020).
25. Coleman v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 19-305 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/27/19); 284 So. 3d 1262.
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expired.”26 Jurisprudence does not seem to give real guidance for
this specific case because the question still is: does putting disputed
mortgage on bankruptcy proceedings qualify as acknowledgement
of a debt?
While Louisiana has provided some guidance as to acknowledgment, the current case gives additional guidance on the term. The
First Circuit held that prescription is interrupted when the debtor
acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe. The acknowledgement can come in any form.
It is not subject to any particular formality. However, this case continues Louisiana’s jurisprudence on the undefined term of acknowledgement. Ruling that putting a disputed mortgage on a bankruptcy
claim is not enough to interrupt prescription. There is a need to balance the interest of both parties here. On one hand protecting the
interest of a person declaring debt is important so they can prepare
their repayment plan. At the same time, they should not be punished
for being honest about disputed debts. A requirement that putting a
disputed mortgage on a bankruptcy claim acknowledges debt and
interrupts prescription will likely not have the results desired. People would likely just not list those disputed debts and try to hide
them during proceedings. This does not seem like a viable option.
Bankruptcy proceedings and repayment plans will lose value if people are being dishonest about debts.
Finally, the case also held that acknowledgment cannot be done
by a trustee in bankruptcy. As said above, the trustee is not an agent
for debtor but is an agent for all creditors. The trustee does not have
any authority to make an acknowledgment on behalf of the debtor.
The job of the trustee is to speak on behalf of the estate but not of
the debtor. According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2997, authority must be given expressly to acknowledge a debt. No such express
authority was ever given by the debtor to the trustee.
26. Bank of New York Mellon v. Oldemeyer, 2019-348 (La. App. 3 Cir.
10/9/19); 282 So. 3d 1098, reh'g denied (Dec. 18, 2019).
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The court has interpreted acknowledgment in Louisiana law.
The court developed understanding and interpretation by overlooking cases on bankruptcy proceedings. They have concluded that
when a trustee puts a disputed mortgage in a bankruptcy plan, it does
not qualify as acknowledgment.

LETTER BY JOHN H. TUCKER, JR. ON THE 1969 REPRINT
OF THE DE LA VERGNE VOLUME
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The letter we publish in our Rediscovered Treasures of Louisiana
Law section was written by Colonel John H. Tucker, jr. (18911984)1 and dated December 20, 1969. The letter was identified on
September 23, 2020, in the Rare-Book Room and Archives of the
Law Library of the Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law
Center (LSU Law), by Seth S. Brostoff, at that time Foreign, Comparative & International Law Librarian.
Colonel Tucker was a fine jurisconsult and ardent supporter of
the civil law tradition of Louisiana, who fathered the Louisiana State
Law Institute. The author of the letter thanks the three recipients for
having sent a copy of the 1969 reprint of the de la Vergne Volume
of the Digest of 1808,2 with handwritten notes attributed to one of
the drafters of that important corpus of the law, namely Louis Moreau-Lislet.3 A new reprint of the de la Vergne Volume was made in
2008, this time under the direction of the Center of Civil Law Studies (CCLS) of LSU Law, to commemorate the bicentennial of that
Digest of Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans. That
very same year, and as part of the bicentennial celebrations,4 the
CCLS published the de la Vergne Volume on a dedicated website,
with images of the manuscript notes and a typed transcription of the
notes pertaining to the Preliminary Title and Book 1 of the Digest
1. On the life and work of Colonel John H. Tucker, jr., see the memorial
papers published in 45 LA L. REV. 997-1031 (1985), particularly A.N. Yiannopoulos, John H. Tucker, Jr, The Jurisconsult, at 1011.
2. See generally A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO
ITS PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (Bradford & Anderson 1808).
3. On the life and work of Louis Moreau-Lislet, see ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR,
LOUIS CASIMIR ELISABETH MOREAU-LISLET: FOSTER FATHER OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW (1996).
4. Olivier Moréteau and Agustín Parise, The Bicentennial of the Louisiana
Civil Code (1808-2008), 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195 (2009).
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of 1808.5 That online resource made the text of the Digest of 1808
available in open access to scholars from across the globe.6
The letter is much more than a thank you note to Paul M. Hebert
(1907-1977), then Dean of the LSU School of Law;7 Joseph M.
Sweeney (1920-2000), then Dean of the Tulane University School
of Law; and Louis V. de la Vergne (1938-2017), a New Orleans
lawyer whose family treasured the manuscript that was eventually
donated to the Tulane University School of Law.8 The letter offers
valuable and well researched insights of the significance of the de la
Vergne Volume of the Digest of 1808 and of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825.
A Tournament of Scholars–in words of Sweeney–took the stage
a few years after the letter was drafted.9 It was ignited in 1971, it
dealt with the sources of the Digest of 1808, and it involved Rodolfo
Batiza (1917-2007)10 and Robert A. Pascal (1915-2018).11 The

5. Center of Civil Law Studies, Digest of 1808 Online, available at
https://perma.cc/B6U2-DM6F.
6. Agustín Parise, The Digest Online Project: A Resource to Disseminate
the Legal Heritage of Louisiana, 12 J. CIV. L. STUD. 283 (2019).
7. On the life and work of Paul M. Hebert, see the supplement prepared by
Robert A. Pascal to 37 LA. LAW REV. (1977), particularly Francis C. Sullivan,
Paul Macarius Hebert, at i.
8. On the life and work of Louis V. de la Vergne, see Agustín Parise, Louis
Victor de la Vergne (1938-2017), 10 J. CIV. L. STUD. 3 (2017). The CCLS is indebted to Louis de la Vergne for the following publications: Digest of 1808
Online; Thomas J. Semmes, History of the Laws of Louisiana and of the Civil
Law, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 313 (2012), which inaugurated our Rediscovered Treasures feature; Kjell A. Modeer, Transatlantic Intercultural Legal Communication
in the 19th Century: K.J.A. Mittermaier and the Schmidt Brothers, Carl and Gustavus, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 409 (2015).
9. Joseph Modeste Sweeney, Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Tournament of
Scholars Over the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1972).
10. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971).
On the life and work of Rodolfo Batiza, see the contributions to issue 2 of 56
TUL. L. REV. (1982), particularly Paul R.Verkuil, Rodolfo Batiza: Scholar and
Gentleman, at 457.
11. Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972).
On the life and work of Robert A. Pascal, see ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL: A
PRIEST OF RIGHT ORDER (Olivier Moréteau ed, 2018).
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Tournament of Scholars alerterd readers that whether French, Spanish, or Roman, the laws were mainly taken from the continental European system, and that the Digest of 1808 was not a mere copy of
the Code Napoléon or of a single text.12 Above all, the Tournament
showed that the inhabitants of Louisiana were, in 1808, able to protect their civil-law heritage from the incursions of the common
law.13
The letter by Colonel Tucker may be read in the light of the Tournament that followed. It speaks for itself and is published as is, with
minimal formatting. It will no doubt feed academic efforts to commemorate the forthcoming bicentennial of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825.

Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise

12. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY FOR
THE UNITED STATES 32 (1993).

13. Agustín Parise, A Constant Give and Take: Tracing Legal Borrowings in
the Louisiana Civil Law Experience, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 14 (2010). See
also JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS AND HISTORY: LAW
REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866) (2015).
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John H. Tucker, Jr.
1300 Beck Building
Shreveport, Louisiana
20 December 1969
Paul M. Hebert, Esquire
Louisiana State University
Law School
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803
Joseph M. Sweeney, Esquire
Tulane University
Law School
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118
Louis V. de la Vergne, Esquire
Maritime Building
203 Carondelet
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Gentlemen:
I thank you very much for sending me the 1814 reprint of Moreau
Lislet’s copy of “A Digest of Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans, Containing Manuscript References to its Sources
and Other Civil Laws on the Same Subjects.” This will be a valuable
tool for historical research in Louisiana law. Perhaps there are extant
other notes, studies or reports made or participated in by Moreau,
relating to the Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825, that have not yet come
to light.
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I am inclined to the belief that the proper place to be assigned to
these annotations of Moreau’s should be determined by the circumstances at the time, and what Moreau himself said at other times and
places about them.
The territorial resolution of June 7, 1806, appointed “James
Brown and Moreau Lislet, lawyers… to compile and prepare,
jointly, a Civil Code for the use of the territory… (and to) make the
civil law by which this territory is now governed, the ground work
of said code.”
For this work these commissioners undoubtedly relied overwhelmingly on the Code Napoleon, adopted in France March 21,
1804, because:
(a) There was some confusion about the laws in force in
Louisiana resulting from the changes of sovereign in a
short space of time.
(b) The Spanish laws were contained in a multiplicity of ancient codes or enactments, the relative precedence of
which were sometimes in question. The principal codification of Spanish law was written in the thirteenth century and established in the fourteenth century.
(c) The antecedents, culture, customs and aspirations of the
great majority of Louisiana residents derived out of their
French ancestry and inheritance. French was their language, and not many were conversant with Spanish.
(d) There was a scarcity of the works of foreign jurists (see
Preface to 1 Mart. O.S.), particularly Spanish (Bernard’s
Heirs v. Goldenbow, 18 La. 95, 96).
(e) It was generally believed that there was little difference
between French and Spanish law because of their common origins, namely Roman law and the customs. This
was particularly so where the common source was Roman law (Bernard’s Heirs v. Goldenbow, 18 La. 95). In
that case the court did not hesitate to quote approvingly
from French jurists, although the disposition in a will had
become operative while Spanish law prevailed.
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(f) Although ante-code law in France was a jurisdictional
crazy-quilt, originating in the early theory of the personality of laws (i.e., that a man was regulated by the laws
of the country of his origin), and depended upon its historical origins in Roman and customary laws, France had
a wealth of legal literature dealing with both Roman law
and the customs. By its charters Louisiana, as a French
colony, was regulated by the customs of Paris until revoked by O’Reilly, Spanish governor, in 1769.
On the other hand, there were few commentaries in Spain on either great division of Spanish law; perhaps because of the coalescence of these two systems of law, first in the primitive Forum Judicum, sometimes called Fuero Juzgo, (Scott’s translation is called
Visigothic Code). This related principally to the Theodosian Code
of Imperial Decrees for Roman law and the Code of Euric, or Codex
de Tolsa, for the law of the Visigoths. The Forum Judicum was the
forerunner of Las Siete Partidas, into which was infused a considerable body of Roman law from the Justinian Digest.
I feel sure Moreau thought the antiquity of these Spanish codes
prevented their adoption to nineteenth century Louisiana without extensive and thorough research and discussion. The fact that the Civil
Code of 1825 was ordered about two years after publication of the
translation of Las Siete Partidas would indicate as much.
The so-called Civil Code of 1808 was actually entitled “A Digest
of the Civil Laws now in Force in the Territory of Orleans.”
Concerning this code, Moreau, himself, said: “But it is easy to
perceive, that a work of that nature, however excellent it may be,
can only contain general rules and abstract maxims, still leaving
many points doubtful in the application of the law; hence the necessity of going back to the original source, in order to obtain new and
additional light. It was moreover perceived that the Civil Code did
not contain many and important provisions of the Spanish laws in
force, nor any rules of judicial proceedings; that the statutes regulating these proceedings had proved insufficient; and that the Superior

2021-2022]

TUCKER LETTER

431

Court had in divers instances, and particularly in the case of Cottin
vs. Cottin, Martin’s Rep. vol. 5, p. 93, determined that the Spanish
laws ‘must be considered as untouched, whenever the alterations
and amendments introduced in the digest do not reach them; and that
such parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary to,
or incompatible with the provisions of the code.’ It thus appeared
that a much greater portion of the Spanish laws remained in force
than had been at first supposed. It was then doubtless the desire of
the legislature to spread generally the knowledge of such of these
laws, as are not to be found in the Civil Code, or in the digest of our
statutes, that induced them to make provisions for the printing of
this statute.” (The Laws of Las Siete Partidas, which are still in
Force in the State of Louisiana. Translated from the Spanish by L.
Moreau Lislet and Henry Carleton, Counsellors at Law. 1820 p.
xxii.)
The plan of the translation pursued was simple. “Each title of the
Partidas, is preceded by a list of the titles of the Roman and Spanish
laws, and of the Civil Code, relative to the subject it treats of, together with an index of the articles therein contained. (Translation
Las Siete Partidas, p. xxiii.)
This is somewhat similar to the situation in the Moreau notes of
1814 relating to the articles of the Civil Code of 1808 which point
to Spanish and Roman, or civil law, sources.
Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Martin O.S. 93, generally considered as having
caused the revival of Spanish law, was decided in July, 1817. Even
before that case, there was some premonitory hints to that effect in
a decision of the Supreme Court (Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Mart. O.S.
138,140; 1812). In Cottin v. Cottin, supra, Moreau was the successful advocate for the defendant; Livingston (with Mazureau), the unsuccessful counsel for the plaintiff; and Derbigny, the judge who
wrote the opinion. They were the commissioners who drafted the
Code of 1825.
It is not too much to assume that Moreau, in preparing the notes
of 1814, wanted to show that his Code of 1808 was in large measure,
a statement of the Civil Laws in force in the territory at the date of
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the adoption of the code; perhaps induced by his position in Cottin
v. Cottin.
In any event, the report of the Commissioners to draft the Code
of 1825, in their preliminary report to the Legislature, February 13,
1823, reprinted in Louisiana Legal Archives, Vol. 1, p. LXXXVII,
says that the Commissioners (Livingston, Moreau and Derbigny)
“consider the principal Object the Legislature had in view, was to
provide a remedy for the existing evil, of being obliged in many
Cases to seek for our Laws in an undigested mass of ancient edicts
and Statutes, decisions imperfectly recorded, and the contradictory
opinions of Jurists; the whole rendered more obscure, by the heavy
attempts of commentators to explain them; and evil magnified by
the circumstance, that many of these Laws must be studied in Languages not generally understood by the people, who are governed
by their provisions. The Legislative assembly of the Territory made
one step toward the removal of this Evil, by adopting the Digest of
the Civil Law, which is now in force: This was an extremely important measure; because it was an advance towards the establishment of system and order, in the several points of Jurisprudence,
which are contained in its provisions; because it took away on those
subjects, the necessity of a reference to the Spanish and Roman authorities, and because it demonstrated the practicability of a more
extensive reform. - - But it was necessarily imperfect; not purporting
to be a Legislation on the whole body of the Law; a reference to that
which existed before, became inevitable, in all those cases (and they
were many) which it did not embrace.”
This very important preparatory declaration preceding the Code
of 1825 is interesting and of considerable importance, as may be
judged from the above quotation, but to comment further about it is
quite beyond the purport of this letter.
Suffice it to say that the Civil Code of 1825 reproduces literally,
in most of its content, the text of the Code Napoleon, often amplified
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by the intercalation, as articles of the Code of 1825, of concise quotations from the French commentaries on particular articles of the
Code Napoleon.
The projet of the Code of 1825 (republished by the state as Louisiana Legal Archives, Vol. 1) has an abundance of references to
sources in Roman law and French commentaries, but references to
Spanish sources are rare.
All Spanish, French and Roman laws in force in Louisiana at the
time of the cession to the United States, and all anterior legislation
for which special provision had been made in the code, were repealed by Article 3521 of the code itself.
However, decisions of the Supreme Court cast serious doubt
upon the efficacy of this repeal in some particular cases. The legislature then passed Act 40 of 1828 repealing the Code of 1808, and
Act 83 of 1828 which abrogated the civil laws in effect before the
promulgation of the Code of 1825. But these laws still have some
vestigial vitality according to the Supreme Court. (Reynolds v.
Swain, 13 La. 193, 199 (1839); Hubgh v. New Orleans and Carrollton Ry., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851); and Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La.
169, 165 So. 447 (1923).
I have recounted these things not in disparagement of, but in great
admiration for Moreau Lislet. I think he meant exactly what he said
in the prefatory remarks he made to the volume of the Code of 1808
with his notes - - that he was citing civil laws, meaning Roman laws
and Spanish laws “with which the laws in the Louisiana Code had
some connection.” (Emphasis mine.)
I have read a great deal of what Moreau had to say about his own
works - - in the translation of the Partidas, in the February, 1823,
report of the Code Commissioners to the legislature, his Digest of
Statutes, 1828, and in the projet of the Code of 1825. I compiled a
list of the cases he had with Livingston as his opponent - - there were
approximately thirty - - Moreau lost only eight as I remember. You
can learn a whole lot about what Moreau thought from these cases.
Moreau was a Frenchman, and when he wrote the Codes of 1808
and 1825 he did so as a Frenchman.
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I therefore view the notes in this volume you have sent me as a
striking example of Moreau’s great scholarship, and certainly the
earliest, and probably the best ever, demonstration of comparative
law in action in the history of this state.
It would be well if someone would make a descriptive list of these
citations, although I expect some of the works cited will be very hard
to come by. If they were difficult to find in 1808 and 1825, what
would the situation be now?
I am profoundly grateful to you for sending me this volume reflecting the scholarly industry of one for whom I had a profound
admiration for all of my professional life.
Please accept my sentiments of respect and gratitude.
Faithfully,

JHTjr:al
P.S. I spoke to the Tulane Law Review dinner more than thirty
years ago on the subject of Moreau Lislet. In discussing it with my
good friend, Gaston Porterie, then attorney general, I said that he
had perished in the cholera epidemic of 1832 and that it was not
known where he was buried. Shortly afterwards, Gaston told me that
had been walking in St. Louis Cemetery No. 1, and found his grave.
I visited it myself and found it covered with a flat black stone marker
- - as I remember it, his son was included in the inscription on the
stone. I remarked to someone of the law faculty at Tulane that some
annual ceremony ought to be instituted in honor of the greatest law
writer we had ever had in Louisiana. Sad to relate, when I visited
the cemetery after World War II, I found that a tree or something
had fallen on the stone marker and broken it up pretty badly, although you still could make out the names. If you ever visit St. Louis
No. 1, immediately after entering, turn right on the first alley or path
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until you reach the last alley or path near the wall, turn left not very
far and you will see it on your right on the ground.

JHTjr

BOOK REVIEW
LAW, LANGUAGE AND CHANGE. A DIACHRONIC SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW, by Caroline I.B. Laske,
Brill, 2020, ISBN 978-90-04-42848-5, 242 pp., €116.00/$140.
The doctrine of consideration is one of the great survivors of the
common law. It first emerged in something like the modern form in
the mid-sixteenth century. Consideration has fended off challenges
to its continued existence on more than one occasion in the intervening centuries. Despite its longevity, many modern English lawyers
would endorse the sentiments of Lord Goff in White v Jones,1 who
said that “our law of contract is widely seen as deficient in the sense
that it is perceived to be hampered by an unnecessary doctrine of
consideration.” The requirement of consideration must appear even
more perplexing to those schooled in the civilian tradition. It was no
great surprise that consideration was excluded when it came to
drawing up model rules for European private law in the Draft Common Frame of Reference.2 This book nevertheless still has some important lessons for civilians. Causa and consideration whilst not
identical, share a similar function. Both doctrines are a condition for
the validity of informal contracts. At a time when causa seems under
some threat, for example in the 2016 reforms of the French Code
civil, an account of the history of consideration is particularly apposite. A good understanding of consideration is highly desirable for
those who want to engage in the debates about the value of causa.
The strongest reason for the continued requirement of consideration is a not unreasonable concern that some of the work done by
consideration will fall on other legal doctrines with uncertain results.3 There is a systemic explanation for its survival as well. For
the most part, the doctrine of consideration has caused few problems. English common law is not noted for making the sort of radical change required by removing the doctrine of consideration. Rather, change tends to take place incrementally. S.F.C. Milsom
1. [1995] 2 AC 207, 262-263.
2. CHRISTIAN VON BAR ET AL, PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE Ch 4, Section 1 (Book 2, Sellier 2009).
3. This was a point made by Phang J.A. in Singapore, Gay Choon Ing v.
Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter [2009] SGCA 3, [114]-[116].
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summed up the general rule: “Fundamental change happens slowly
and by stages so small that nobody at the time could see them as in
any way important.”4
Consideration has been examined by legal historians many times
before. There was a rash of scholarship on the origins of the doctrine
of consideration as recently as the 1970s.5 In one of those contributions, A.W.B. Simpson argued that, “Any study of the doctrine of
consideration must begin by fixing the ordinary meaning of the
word; a legal concept evolves through the progressive refinement of
a concept which is not in origin specifically legal.”6 Simpson was
involved in the Oxford Linguistic Philosophy movement in the
1950s, so it isn’t too hard to see his starting point. Laske would agree
with Simpson’s observation. Her aim, she explains, “was to trace the
advent and early use of the concept of consideration in English contract law, by studying the doctrinal development in parallel with the
corresponding terminological evolution.”7 However, her inspiration
is different from Simpson. She characterises it as “akin to Begriffsgeschichte work undertaken in German-speaking academia,”8
and contends that the same approach used in social and political
thought and economic structures can be applied to a legal doctrine.
Legal history is, by definition, interdisciplinary. Various sub-disciplines have grown up in recent times. To name just a few, these include intellectual history, economic, colonial, and feminist perspectives.9 A linguistic analysis is still much more unusual. Laske explains that “The present study has attempted to bring together the
two ‘sciences’ in an inter-disciplinary space that makes linguistics a
4. S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 75 (Columbia U. Press 2003).
5. John Barton, The Early History of Consideration, 85 LQR 372 (1969);
J.H. Baker, Origins of the Doctrine of Consideration, 1535-1585, in ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 336-58 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., U. North Carolina Press 1981). More recently, see David J. Ibbetson, Consideration and the
Theory of Contract in the Sixteenth Century, in TOWARDS A GENERAL LAW OF
CONTRACT 67-123 (John Barton ed., Duncker and Humblot 1990).
6. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 329 (Paperback ed., Clarendon Press 1986).
7. CAROLINE I.B. LASKE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND CHANGE. A DIACHRONIC
SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW 1 (Brill 2020).
8. LASKE, supra note 7, at 10.
9. For a flavour of the enormous variety, see MARKUS DUBBER & CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY (Oxford U. Press
2018).
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means for studying legal concepts.”10 She distinguishes between a
standard “full, general and statistical analysis of the language of law
reporting”11 and her approach here, which involves “the study of
how legal concepts materialise, evolve and are translated into the
letter of the law.”12
Chapter 3 contains quite a lot of necessary discussion of the
methodology of functional linguistics, which might be of greater interest to specialists. Indeed, it won’t be much of a surprise to legal
historians to learn that the meaning of words depends on cultural
context and situation. Chapter 4 takes us into the different types of
language used in a legal context: Latin, French, Law French, and
English. Laske provides a serviceable summary of the rise of the
English language in legal usage. On page fifty-nine, we get on to the
doctrine of consideration.
Chapter 5 is called “The Origins of the Concept of Consideration”, but Laske actually provides a brief history of the development
of the law of contract from the Anglo-Saxon’s times to the eighteenth century. There are some questionable points of detail and emphasis in this section. Laske observes that, “Between the 13th century and the reforms of the 19th century, procedural formalities
dominated common law thinking.”13 This observation is true up to
point if she is talking about the superior courts as opposed to more
local courts. But expressed in these terms, Laske underplays the ingenuity of the common lawyers. Her book provides two illustrations
of the point: the use of fiction in the development of the writ of trespass and the patently false allegation of vi et armis, and the use of
the indebitatus clause in assumpsit. In such a world, formality is
sometimes the handmaiden of legal development; it is not necessary
its jailor. Oddly, one procedural matter that is highly relevant to the
growth of assumpsit and the seminal litigation in Slade’s Case14—
the different modes of proof in debt and assumpsit (wager of law as
opposed to a jury trial)—isn’t mentioned at all. In fact, the jury is
central to the history of contract law following the rise of assumpsit.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

LASKE, supra note 7, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 62.
(1602) 4 Co Rep 91 (a).
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It would be surprising if the jury trial did not have an impact on the
application of the doctrine of consideration as with much else.
Laske’s characterisation of the law prior to the rise of assumpsit
is also open to challenge. The idea that English contract law before
1066 “was rather rudimentary”15 is a rather anachronistic way of
looking at things. In any event, there was a degree of continuity between pre- and post-Norman law, both in reference to transactions
by pledge and agreements more generally.16 It is difficult to know
what to make of the statement “It is only with the action of assumpsit
that the idea grew of informal agreements as actions in their own
right.”17 Whilst it is true that from the fourteenth century in the royal
courts, a deed was required in covenant,18 this hardly means that the
action played a “minor role in the history of contract”19 or that no
one thought that there could be informal contracts. The difficulty
was rather that with the imposition of a deed in covenant, gaps appeared in the mechanisms for enforcing informal contracts in the
royal courts. Some of these were significant. No general action on
an informal agreement was possible in the royal courts because trespass and trespass on the case were deemed not to be appropriate in
cases of non-feasance.20 It is quite another thing to assert that “The
action of debt was riddled with technicalities and procedural complexities that excluded many meritorious claims for enforcing informal agreements.”21 Debt, after all, remained a very popular action
into the nineteenth century. Some debt was formal and used a deed
(debt on a bond). Debt on a contract did not require a deed but relied
on the presence of quid pro quo. That being said, it could not be used
for some transactions. When land was conveyed and the buyer failed
to pay the price, debt could be used, but it could not be used in the
reverse situation where the price was paid but the land was not conveyed.22 Debt on a contract was also unavailable when someone had
15. LASKE, supra note 7, at 63.
16. JOHN HUDSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL
II 871-1216 691-708 (Oxford U. Press 2012).
17. LASKE, supra note 7, at 65.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 73-74.
21. Id. at 67.
22. Shipton v. Dogge (1442) YB Trin. 20 Hen VI fo. 34, pl. 4.
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failed to perform a service. However, in this situation, debt on a conditional bond was a very useful device, albeit that a deed was needed
because it could cover a range of contracts for service.23 The local
courts and the, rather significant, mercantile courts could also be
used. Instead of a single remedy, a patchwork of remedies and courts
provided a pretty good range of options. There is after all no reason
to think that as now, more than a tiny number of actions ever reached
the superior courts.
Laske contends that “the concept of consideration emanated from
a diversity of legal sources and this may in part be a reason why its
terminology settled only hesitantly,”24 and this is probably the only
conclusion that can be drawn. Laske then provides an overview of
some of the familiar elements of consideration including the rule
that consideration need only be sufficient, it need not be adequate,
the idea of benefit and detriment, and the cases on forbearance. She
makes the interesting point that in as much as natural love and affection was ever valid consideration, it was confined to the special
category of marriage cases—a fact that is supported by counting up
the references to marriage and consideration in the Year Books and
Law Reports.25 Having suggested that consideration “was not devised as part of an overall doctrine of contract law,”26 Laske concludes that rather “consideration was used to check the floodgates
from opening too wide and to limit assumpsit action (sic) to those
where the promise was supported by consideration.”27 She then suggests that a theory of contract law was only initiated in the eighteenth century by Blackstone and his contemporaries.28 It is, of
course, difficult to attribute motive in the way that consideration developed. It was undoubtedly some limit on the action of assumpsit.
Perhaps the more interesting question is how much of a restriction
consideration really was on the action in practice. It does not follow
at all that there were no substantive ideas underpinning assumpsit.

23. A.W.B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82
LQR 392 (1966).
24. LASKE, supra note 7, at 89.
25. Id. at 99.
26. Id. 104.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Whilst the thinking of lawyers was often implicit rather than explicit, Ibbetson has shown very convincingly that lawyers did think
of assumpsit as founded on a bilateral agreement rather than a promise.29 Eighteenth-century writers did begin to explore the rationale
of contract. The doctrine of consideration was a major obstacle to a
coherent approach. Even Henry Ballow writing in the 1730s, influenced by the Natural Law theorists, was unable to reconcile the basic
idea that contracts were formed by assent with the English requirement of consideration. These problems were magnified by the rise
of the will theory in the nineteenth century. Legal writers were not
alone in seeing difficulties with consideration. Judges felt the same.
Laske concludes the chapter with Lord Mansfield. Several aspects
of her entirely conventional account are open to challenge, including
the claim that Lord Mansfield was advocating a doctrine of unjust
enrichment in Moses v Macferlan30 or that he favoured a moral consideration doctrine. The rest of the book’s material is novel because
it involves an entirely linguistic analysis of the doctrine of consideration. Laske’s source materials are some printed yearbooks and
reports, along with some dictionaries, abridgments, and some more
general language texts. Naturally, this excludes manuscript reports.
Chapter 6 looks at the regularity and context of the words, “assumpsit”, “promise,” and “consideration” over time. Chapter 7 reviews the results of this statistical analysis. Most of the conclusions
are not very surprising. But they do confirm the existing impression
that the action of assumpsit did not immediately settle down into a
particular terminological form until the sixteenth century,31 that
promise as a term to describe contractual liability was rather marginal,32 and that consideration was in general use before lawyers
adopted it but became common in a legal sense from the sixteenth
century.33 Nor is it very surprising that by Lord Mansfield’s time,
consideration was becoming more technical and precise in its use.34
29. IBBETSON, supra note 5, at 102-105.
30. (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 1 Wm Bla 219. On this point, see Roxborough v
Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516.
31. LASKE, supra note 7, at 179. On this point, see J.H. BAKER, 6 OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1483-1588 839 (Oxford U. Press 2003).
32. LASKE, supra note 7, at 182.
33. Id. at 184
34. Id. at 190

2021-2022]

BOOK REVIEW

443

A little more unexpected is Laske’s claim that during the eighteenth century, the term “moral” was often a proximate term to “consideration.”35 This assertion was evidenced by looking at the prevalence of the words in a sample of cases which “specifically dealt
with the consideration as a concept of moral obligation”36 between
the 1760s and 1840s. In the same sample, she also searched for “obligation”, “duty” and “conscience.”37 But the fact that these patterns
show up in a group of specially chosen cases covering ninety years
does not convincingly demonstrate that Lord Mansfield was wedded
to the concept of moral consideration. In many of the leading cases,
Lord Mansfield did refer to “conscience”, but he made free use of
terms like “natural justice” and “equity” as well. This kind of language needs to be placed against more fluid notions of precedent. It
is going too far to say that he was advocating a legal concept of
consideration that included moral obligations in any broad sense.
The two leading authorities Atkins v Hill38 and Hawkes v Saunders39
were not decided on the basis that a moral obligation provided good
consideration.40 Lord Mansfield was at pains to stress that quite the
contrary, these were cases where there was more than a moral obligation or, as he put it, an obligation which “would otherwise only
bind a man’s conscience.”41 These were cases concerning the distribution of estates in which the plaintiff was trying to bring a claim
against the executor in their representative or personal capacity rather than pursuing a claim in Chancery. Lord Mansfield’s other examples of claims barred by infancy, limitations, or bankruptcy were
a very limited set of moral obligations. It is better to think of these
as examples of cases of legal obligation barred by a technicality.
Nevertheless, some early nineteenth-century judges did toy with a
broader idea of moral consideration. Bosanquet and Puller described

35. Id. at 186
36. Id. at 184.
37. Id. at 168.
38. (1775) 1 Cowp 284.
39. (1782) 1 Cowp 289.
40. W. Swain, The Changing Nature of the Doctrine of Consideration 17501850, 26 JLH 55, 62-65 (2005).
41. Atkins v Hill (1775) 1 Cowp 284, 288–289; Hawkes v Saunders (1782) 1
Cowp 289, 290.
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these events in their note to Wennall v Adney42 written in 1814, but
just as quickly, the idea seemed to fizzle out.
Laske concludes by claiming that “a linguistic and terminological
approach also contributes to a better comprehension of the concept
of evolution of the law and its socio-cultural content.”43 Her study
shows both the strength and limits of this approach. It is clearly useful to know that consideration was in wider non-legal use before
lawyers adopted it. A linguistic analysis reflects the rise of assumpsit and the way in which consideration became a prevalent technical
legal term in the eighteenth century. At the same time, a linguistic
analysis does not tell us very much about why either of these things
occurred. There are some limits to this approach, even on its own
terms. It is difficult to come to robust conclusions without regard to
the context. The law reports themselves changed very significantly
throughout the study. On a superficial level, the printed reports got
longer. Judgments were reported in more detail. There is no reason
to assume that the substance of consideration was constant either. In
the sixteenth century, consideration reflected the idea of a bargain
or exchange and in this respect was similar to the requirement of
quid pro quo in debt. There were always some cases which are quite
difficult to fit within that model. By the nineteenth century, consideration was closely bound together with the idea of serious intention
so that whilst the language of benefit and detriment continued to be
used for good historical reasons, the veneer of reciprocity was very
thin indeed. The results of the linguistic approach will certainly be
of interest. But to be truly interdisciplinary, a study like this needs
to be more fully immersed in the substantive legal doctrine than this
present one.
Warren Swain
Faculty of Law, University of Auckland

42.
43.

(1814) 3 B & P 249 (note).
LASKE, supra note 7, at 196.

THE LOST TRANSLATORS OF 1808 AND THE BIRTH OF CIVIL LAW IN
LOUISIANA, by Vernon Valentine Palmer (University of Georgia
Press 2021), ISBN 978-0820358338, 139 pp., $54.95.
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana’s unique legal system is based on translation. This
book by Vernon Palmer, a professor of law at Tulane University and
a world-renowned expert in mixed jurisdictions, sheds light on the
seminal work of the translators who were involved in the first major
translation effort in the state, translating the Louisiana’s first civil
code, the Digest of the Civil Laws Now in force in the Territory of
Orleans of 1808, from French into English. This instrument was key
to settle the dispute whether the Territory would remain a civil-law
or common-law jurisdiction after the purchase by the United States
in 1803. This civil code anchored the state in the civil-law tradition,
which was reinforced in the wholesale revisions of 1825 and 1870
and the piecemeal amendments in more recent years.
The identity and method of work of those translators had remained invisible1 so far. This book solves a “200-year-old mystery”2
by revealing the translator’s identities and biographies, putting them
in the spotlight, for good and for bad. After Palmer’s painstaking
research, their names can now be written in black and white: Henry
Paul Nugent and Auguste Davezac de Castera.
II. STRUCTURE AND STYLE OF THE BOOK
The book is divided into five chapters and one appendix. It starts
with a literary scene depicting a trial in which the soon-to-be-revealed translators were involved, one as a defendant and the other
as counsel. Chapter two details the method followed by the author
to discover the identities and biographies of the translators. Chapter

1. Invisibility in translation is a recurring topic in translation studies, and the
fundamental work in the area is LAWRENCE VENUTI, THE TRANSLATOR’S
INVISIBILITY: A HISTORY OF TRANSLATION (Routledge 2008).
2. See https://perma.cc/Y98H-XLJM.
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three and four tell the stories of the translators, a “mercurial man”3
and an “eloquent docteur.”4 Between chapter four and five there are
some portraits of relevant characters to this research, among which
we can see that of Davezac; alas, there is no portrait of Nugent. The
translation is put in context in chapter five, which engages in a critical analysis of the translation approach and strategy. As a corollary,
the appendix contains selected writings by the translators, who had
a somehow prominent public life.
A special comment is due regarding the general style in which
the book has been crafted—Professor Palmer writes with eloquence
and a literary flavor. The story of the translators starts with a scene
in medias res, a technical literary technique Palmer masters, and
continues with a very natural flow throughout the rest of the book.
The effort by the author to always choose the right word is easily
noticeable, and commendable.
II. TWO UNCONVENTIONAL TRANSLATORS
The names have been finally revealed: the Digest of 1808 was
translated by Henry Paul Nugent and Auguste Davezac de Castera.
Palmer’s initial scene depicts a libel trial followed against Nugent
for his writings against a judge. Nugent, in turn, was represented by
his co-translator Davezac. The trial was presided by another prominent legal translator: François-Xavier Martin. Palmer’s feeling is
that at that trial there was more at stake than mere libel allegations—
this trial was opposing competing French-into-English translators.5
The search for the identities of the lost translators took the author
to the Legislature’s acts authorizing payments to those involved in
the drafting and translation of the Digest. He discovered their

3. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE LOST TRANSLATORS OF 1808 AND THE
BIRTH OF CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA 12 (Univ. Georgia Press 2021).
4. Id. at 20.
5. The rivalry may date back to the times when Nugent fiercely criticized
Martin’s translation of Pothier. See PALMER, supra note 3, at 33 (referring to Martin’s “imbecility exhibited in his burlesque translation of Pothier”).
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identities through “deduction, extrinsic evidence, and a process of
elimination.”6
Henry Paul Nugent was a self-proclaimed polyglot born in Ireland who immigrated into the United States after receiving his education in France and England;7 he also presented himself as a dancer
and a dance teacher.8 Aguste Davezac de Castera was a Frenchman
born into a Saint-Domingue family; he immigrated to the United
States and trained and practiced as a doctor in North Carolina before
settling in New Orleans.9 By reading his writings, Palmer highlights
how persnickety Nugent was in the use of language, both French
and English;10 he was what today is termed a snoot.11 Davezac also
read law in Edward Livingston’s office,12 who was his brother-inlaw. The author also mentions Davezac’s profuse experience translating books from French into English.13 Both Nugent and Davezac
were registered with the Superior Court in New Orleans as sworn
translators and interpreters. At a time when there was no formal
training in translation or interpretation, being in that roster could be
considered tantamount to being professional. In addition to relying
on archives and statutes where their names appear, the author draws
the big picture of the connections among these two persons and the
legal élite of their times. Palmer has found family, professional, political, and business bonds that tie the two men to the translation, as
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 20.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 32 (where an extract is transcribed of a writing by Nugent chastising an actor for his poor pronunciation of English terms).
11. David Foster Wallace, Authority and American Usage, in CONSIDER THE
LOBSTER AND OTHER ESSAYS 69-70 (Little, Brown and Company 2005):
There are lots of epithets for people like this — Grammar Nazis, Usage
Nerds, Syntax Snobs, the Grammar Battalion, the Language Police. The
term I was raised with is SNOOT. . . . A SNOOT can be loosely defined
as somebody who knows what dysphemism means and doesn’t mind letting you know it.
I submit that we SNOOTs are just about the last remaining kind of truly
elitist nerd.
12. PALMER, supra note 3 at 15.
13. Id. at 16.
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their name is nowhere to be expressly found as translators of the
Digest.14
III. THE TRANSLATION UNDER SCRUTINY
While the greatest contribution of this book is the unveiling of
the identities of the translators of the Digest of 1808 through historical research using primary sources, chapter five on the quality of
the translation is equally important. In this part of the book, Palmer
engages in translation criticism.
As soon as the translation was out, it was criticized as “extremely incorrect” by Governor W. C. C. Clairborne.15 Officials
even thought of getting rid of the English version and keeping the
French only. However, no legislative action was taken. Then, the
issue became a contested matter in the courts. While judges were
reticent to giving prevalence to one version over the other, they
eventually established a sensible “French-preference rule.”16
The quality of the French-into-English translation of the Digest
and the subsequent codes has been a matter that garnished attention
from scholars.17 The most important contribution so far is perhaps
the analysis carried out by Professor Joseph Dainow in 1972.18
However, Palmer’s contribution in this respect goes beyond
14. While Palmer supposes that the names of the translators did not appear as
such because their product proved to be not as good as expected, another explanation could be that they were kept in the shadows because of a sustained and
widespread practice of invisibilizing translators and their work. Especially when
it comes to the translation of legislation, some people may fear that recognizing
the people who actually were involved in translating would affect the image of
the text as the solemn expression of the Legislature, particularly when the text is
supposed to be on an equal standing with the original. Hiding the translators’
names may have been a strategy to depersonalize the English text.
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 47.
17. See, e.g., E. B. Dubuisson, Errors of Translation in the Codes, 5 LOY.
L.J. 163 (1924); John M. Shuey, Civil Codes—Control of the French Text of the
Code of 1825, 3 LA. L. REV. 452 (1941).
18. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA (Joseph
Dainow ed., volumes 16-17 of West’s Louisiana Statutes Annotated, 1973)
(1940). For more information on the compiled edition, see Jaro Mayda, Book Review, 34 LA. L. REV. 152 (1973).

2021-2022]

BOOK REVIEW

449

criticizing errors. As a mixed-jurisdictions scholar, he succeeds in
taking a deeper look at the general approach and specific strategies
adopted by the chastised translators. He found a deliberate attempt
by the translators to introduce common-law equivalents. Aware of
their role in a developing jurisdiction with an influx of lawyers
trained in the common law only, the translators knew that they had
to do something else than merely translate to convey the message.
Also, the author’s analysis revealed a very questionable practice in
how these translators worked: they divided their work in parts and
each did his share, without consulting each other and comparing
their versions. Though undesirable in principle, time constraints
may require dividing large documents for translation among two or
more translators,19 especially in legal contexts.20 However, a basic
good practice to ensure the quality of the final product is that (a) the
translators involved work together and agree on translation solutions
and style, and/or (b) that a third-party reviser goes through the entire
document to polish any discrepancies and makes the text look as if
it had been written by a single person.21 Palmer’s analysis reveals
that none of these courses of action were followed. Evidence of the
translators’ method of work is the translation of the French term
fruits civils as civil profits in some sections, and as civil fruits in

19. This practice is referred to as “batch translation” in DANIEL GOUADEC,
TRANSLATION AS A PROFESSION 107 (John Benjamins Publ’g 2007).
20. See Fernando Prieto Ramos, Quality Assurance in Legal Translation:
Evaluating Process, Competence and Product in the Pursuit of Adequacy, 28 INT.
J. SEMIOT. L. 11-30 (2015).
21. See GOUADEC, supra note 19, at 107 (explaining that:
Parallel or simultaneous translation means the different translators translate their respective batches in the same time interval. The main problem
is terminological, phraseological and stylistic consistency between the
different batches. This can be achieved upstream by making sure the resources or raw materials (terminology, phraseology, models, and memories) are made available to all the translators and validated and harmonized before the translation starts. It can be achieved downstream by harmonizing the translations during the proof-reading process. It is essential
in any case that all the translators concerned be duly advised that other
translators are working on different batches of the same job. (emphasis
in the original)).
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others.22 The author attributes the inconsistency in the quality and
style of the translation to the lack of collaboration between the two
translators.23
Palmer goes over the famous Batiza-Pascal debate24 only to
highlight how little attention had been paid to the English translation
of the 1808 Digest. At this point, his research not only sheds light
on the identities of the translators, but also on the sources they used
to translate the civil law into English. Among these sources, two
merit an express mention: an old English translation of Domat’s Les
Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel and Blackstone’s Commentaries
on the Laws of England. Blackstone’s presence in the Digest revealed the efforts made by the translators to convey a new body of
law with language that was familiar to the common-law-trained professionals present in Louisiana at the turn of the 19th century. The
author makes clear that these decisions were most probably taken by
the translators themselves, without what is known in modern translation studies as a “translation brief,”25 i.e., instructions from the
commissioner of the translation job (in this case, most likely the
Legislature). Anyway, they took it upon themselves to “communicate in the language best understood by the anglophone bench and
bar.”26 Palmer gives the translators credit where credit is due: the
1808 translation is portrayed as an “uncatalogued creation,”27 which
served to “accommodate, reconcile, or bridge legal differences and
to overcome communication gaps between the traditions.”28 In
22. See PALMER, supra note 3, at 66.
23. See Wallace, supra note 11, at 69-70.
24. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971-1972); see also Robert Pascal,
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603
(1972). In short, Batiza advocated the theory that most of the sources of the Digest
were French in origin, while Pascal held that they were Spanish.
25. See generally Juliette Scott, Specifying Levels of (C)overtness in Legal
Translation Briefs, in LEGAL TRANSLATION. CURRENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
IN RESEARCH, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS (Ingrid Simonnæs & Marita Kristiansen eds., Frank & Timme 2019).
26. PALMER, supra note 3, at 52.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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translation-theory terms, Nugent and Davezac had in mind a purpose
or skopos29 that shaped the translation strategies for their work.
Palmer takes a compassionate approach on how the translators
used the common law to find “equivalents for the benefit of an anglophone legal audience.”30 A purist could say that this approach is
flawed because the language of the civil law should be conveyed in
civilian terms only.31 Also, some could even allege that by introducing common-law terms the translators lost the opportunity to lay
solid foundations for the language of the civil law in English. Let us
remember that the Digest of 1808 was the first modern, Europeanstyle civil code in English. A balanced approach requires accepting
that sometimes it is beneficial for the purpose of the translation to
use common-law terminology.32 Using the common law in those
cases takes the text (or author) closer to the reader, and not the other
way around.33
29. Hans J. Vermeer’s “skopos theory” explains the translating activity by
parting from the view that translation is a form of human interaction and, as such,
determined by its purpose or “skopos.” See Christiane Nord, A Functional Typology of Translations, in TEXT TYPOLOGY AND TRANSLATION (Anna Trosborg ed.,
John Benjamins Publ’g 1997) (“One of the main factors in the skopos of a communicative activity is the (intended) receiver or addressee with their specific communicative needs.”).
30. PALMER, supra note 3, at 53.
31. See, e.g., Alain Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language;
Comparativists Beware, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009) and John Randall Trahan, Levasseur, Legal Linguist, 76 LA. L. REV. 1025 (2016).
32. The author of this review believes that resorting to common-law language
to translate the civil law is appropriate mostly for informative purposes. For example, if a lawyer in New York needs a contract translated from Spanish into
English to understand whether a lease is part of a merger transaction he is working
on, it is likely that the lawyer will not understand if the translation uses civilian
English, unless the lawyer is specifically trained in or is generally aware of the
civil law. See, e.g., Ejan Mackaay, La traduction du nouveau code civil néerlandais en anglais et en français, in JURILINGUISTIQUE : ENTRE LANGUES ET
DROIT/JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE (Jean-Claude Gémar &
Nicholas Kasirer eds., Bruylant & Éditions Thémis 2005) [hereinafter
JURILINGUISTICS: LAW AND LANGUAGE] (explaining how a translation of the
Dutch Civil Code done using strictly civilian terminology had to be adapted with
common-law terms due to pressure from legal practitioners who complained
about the understandability of the original translation).
33. Schleiermacher is to be credited for differentiating between two methods:
the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader
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Palmer presents the dichotomy between translating using civilian language and common-law language as a clash between “literal
translation” and “legal transposition.” The common-law terminology referred to by Palmer includes attorney in fact, chattels, consideration, joint and several obligation, loan on bottomry, parol evidence, sales by cant, separation from bed and board, and landlord.34
What the author calls “transposition” is typically known as translating in one legal system by using “equivalents” from another system.
He shows that this translation practice was applied in Louisiana even
before the Digest of 1808.35
Scholars studying the legal system of Louisiana have pointed out
that there has been a pedagogic purpose in mind in the early codes,
especially in the 1825 code.36 This is in stark contrast with the Code
Napoléon, which made the case for concise and cut-to-the-chase legislation to be understood by all. Palmer argues that while the Digest
of 1808 was not intended to be such a pedagogical tool, the translation was. In translation-theory language, the skopos37 of the translation was to educate the rising legal community in Louisiana. Palmer
accurately exemplifies this approach by analyzing the translation
strategy used by Nugent and Davezac in translating headings. Because the translators were probably afraid that their audience would
not understand if they translated civilian language transparently,
they oftentimes resorted to the strategy of using doublets. This is
how “Des obligations solidaires” became “Of Obligations In Solido
or Jointly and Severally,”38 for example. At the time of the
toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the
author toward him. See VENUTI, supra note 1, at 20. See generally, FRIEDRICH
SCHLEIERMACHER, SOBRE LOS DIFERENTES MODOS DE TRADUCIR (Valentín García
Yebra trans., Gredos 2000).
34. PALMER, supra note 3, at 53-54.
35. Id. at 54 (explaining that the Legislature acts of 1804–1808 had already
adopted this approach).
36. Id. at 55.
37. See Batiza, supra note 29 and Pascal, supra note 29; see also PALMER,
supra note 3, at 55. Palmer calls this an “independent educational or pedagogic
purpose.”
38. PALMER, supra note 3, at 56.
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translation, when the language of the civil law was not widely disseminated in English, the translators probably believed that solidary
obligations would not do the trick, as the term would sound arcane
to Louisiana practitioners and judges. That might have been why
they resorted to a doublet, using a Latin term (in solido) and a common-law equivalent (joint and several), which more or less reflected
the same idea as the original.
While Nugent and Davezac clearly made an effort to reach the
Anglophone legal audience of the time, they also lost some opportunities to establish and consolidate the language of the civil law.
After all, their translation was not for informative purposes only, as
could be the case with the translation of a civil code for academic
purposes. Their translation was intended to be, and actually was, at
an equal footing with the original French text. In drafting an official
text, they were entitled to resort to the strategy of creating neologisms when neologisms were needed, as they were writing a text
that was not only supposed to convey what the law said, but to be
the law itself.
Nevertheless, the translation approach was not unsupported by
facts, as it is true that the emerging legal community of Louisiana in
general was mostly ignorant of the civil law and its codification in
the state. Right after the Louisiana Purchase, the influx of commonlaw lawyers from other parts of the United States grew dramatically,
to the point that in the 1803–1805 period 56% of lawyers were Anglophone Americans, and the Francophones only accounted for 37%
of the bar.39
Palmer’s general analysis of the translation is followed by an
analysis of specific choices by the translators. He recognizes their
great share of responsibility in shaping the language of the civil law
in English in Louisiana. They coined part of the language which
would be used for years to come. One of these examples, for which
the author praises the translators, is the use of the obligee-obligor
39. Id. at 58.
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pair. Palmer says that this terminology is a “notable invention.”40
This choice by the translators, however, can be criticized on many
counts.
The author concedes that the terms were “obscure and musty
English law terms that were rarely used even in common-law
books,”41 adding that the usage seemed to be confined to the law of
English bonds.42 The translators used obligee-obligor only in five
articles, and they used creditor-debtor in the rest. The author attributes this hesitance to the inexperienced translators, who were dealing with terminology they did not master, and posits that whenever
the translators used the new terminology “they applied it precisely
backward and mistakenly, thus producing legal nonsense.”43 Then
he offers six examples in which these terms or one of its derivations
(i.e., co-obligee) are used to convey a meaning opposite the meaning
now in use. For example, article 42 used obligee as a translation of
débiteur and article 44 used obligor as a translation for créancier.
These mistakes cannot be lightly attributed to the ignorance of
the translators. They might have been baffled by these arcane terms,
but also the legal community these days finds this terminology farfetched.44 The source of confusion may be that the ending -or in legal English usually designates the active party in a transaction, and
the ending -ee is used for the passive party: a lessor is the one who
gives a lease over a piece of property to another, called the lessee,
who takes the property and undertakes to pay the lease price; a
promisor is the one who makes a promise to another called
40. Id. at 61.
41. Id.
42. Cf. MARTIN HOGG, OBLIGATIONS. LAW AND LANGUAGE 56 (Cambridge
2017) (asserting that John Cowell, in his Institutes of the Lawes of England, written in 1651, already referred to the party burdened with the duty as the “debtor”
or “obligor.” Hogg makes it clear that Cowell was writing within a “consciously
civilian framework”).
43. Id. at 62.
44. Bryan Garner, a leading authority on legal English, believes that “the wisest policy is probably not to handle [these terms] at all.” Obligee; obligor, BRYAN
A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2001).
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promisee, who is entitled to enforce the promise against the first one;
the bailor is the one who gives personal property to another called
bailee, so that the bailee has the obligation to take care of the item
and return it upon bailor’s request. In the obligor-obligee pair, one
is tempted to say that the person who is obligated to the undertaking
is the obligee, because it sounds like the passive party in the transaction, just like the lessee receives the property and pays the lease
price or the bailee receives the item from the bailor. But in Louisiana
law—and in current legal parlance in general—the obligee is the
party to whom the performance is owed. The obligor, then, is the
party obligated to perform. What led the translators to use the terminology in the opposite direction as compared to how is used nowadays in Louisiana and some other jurisdictions, including commonlaw jurisdictions, could be the archaic use of that terminology.
Black’s Law Dictionary recognizes that an archaic use of obligee is
“someone who is obliged to do something.”45 The same dictionary,
in turn, defines obligor (with an “archaic” mark) as “someone who
obliges another to do something.”46
Palmer explains that the modern Louisianan sense of the terms
obligee-obligor consolidated after Louis Moreau-Lislet and Henry
Carleton used them in translating Las Siete Partidas and the translators of the 1825 Code extended the application of those terms to
twenty-three provisions. In both of these cases, obligee was used to
translate créancier and obligor to translate débiteur. While Palmer
holds that now the terminology is commonplace in civilian parlance,
it is hard to accept that it is one of the “civil law’s most useful
45. Obligee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The dictionary also
includes this explanatory warning:
Several dictionaries, such as The Random House College Dictionary
(rev. ed. 1995) and Webster’s New World Dictionary (4th ed. 2007), define obligee in its etymological sense [‘obliged’], as if it were synonymous with obligor. Random House, for example, defines obligee as ‘a
person who is obligated to another,’ but that meaning ought to be reserved for obligor. An obligee, in modern usage, is one to whom an obligation is owed. Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage
624 (3d ed. 2011).
46. Id.
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expressions,”47 as the terms still cause a lot of trouble nowadays.48
A different, clearer terminology would have been and is possible
and desirable. As a matter of fact, other civil codes in English use
the more transparent creditor-debtor pair.49 In addition to being
plain, this terminology has the added value of being in line with the
language of obligations in other tongues.50
Criticizing this translation, it needs to be said, is a risky endeavor, as the analysis must take into account usages that were valid
back in the early 1800s and that may no longer be valid these days.
In general, Palmer does an excellent job as a critic, but some of the
cases for which he whips the translators are at least debatable. One
of these slippery cases is the translation of animaux as cattle. Palmer
is categorical in his judgment of this translation:
Inexplicably, the simple word animaux (animals) proved to
be a bête noir. It was systematically translated as ‘cattle,’ a
mistake that automatically altered the intended scope of the
provision in question. . . . The substitution of the word ‘cattle’ for ‘animals,’ . . . reduced the entire animal kingdom to
a single bovine genus and thereby narrowed coverage obviously intended to be wider.51
While at first sight it may seem that Nugent and Davezac incurred the mistake of overtranslation by using a type of animal as
the hypernym, Palmer then concedes in a footnote52 that the translators may have used the word adopting “an obsolete meaning that
was once current centuries earlier.” The explanation of the term in
the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that, after an identification
with personal property during feudalism, the term was increasingly

47. PALMER, supra note 3, at 64.
48. See GARNER, supra note 44.
49. Such as the Civil Code of Quebec in English and the Civil Code of Goa,
India. The Civil Code of the Philippines uses both creditor-debtor and obligeeobligor.
50. In Spanish, acreedor-deudor; in Italian, creditore-debitore; in Portuguese
credor-devedor. And, of course, créancier-débiteur in French.
51. PALMER, supra note 3, at 70
52. Id. at 70 n. 83.
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used as “live stock” in English.53 The dictionary provides even more
support to the translators’ choice:
II. Live stock. . . . 4.a. A collective name for live animals
held as property, or reared to serve as food, or for the sake
of their milk, skin, wool, etc. The application of the term has
varied greatly, according to the circumstances of time and
place, and has included camels, horses, asses, mules, oxen,
cows, calves, sheep, lambs, goats swine, etc. The tendency
in recent times has been to restrict the term to the bovine
genus, but the wider meaning is still found locally, and in
many combinations.54
In light of this background, it is hard to believe that the translators made such a gross mistake. Writing in the early 1800s, the use
of cattle as live stock in general might have been familiar to the readers of that time.55
Another great contribution of this book is the unveiling of a
“third translator.” This is how Palmer refers to the translators resorting to William Strahan’s translation into English of Les Loix civiles
dans leur ordre naturel, originally written in French by Jean Domat.
Just as the codifiers borrowed from Domat to write the Digest,56
Palmer discovered that the translators took a “labor-saving
shortcut”57 as they copied verbatim from Strahan’s translation.
While Palmer suggests that the translators could have provided their
own version instead of just copycatting the English translator, it is a
standard practice in translation to stick to authoritative sources.
53. Cattle, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“Under the feudal
system the application was confined to movable property or wealth, as being the
only ‘personal’ property, and in English it was more and more identified with
‘beast held in possession, live stock’, which was almost the only use after 1500.”).
54. Id.
55. A good argument in favor of the view of this translation as a mistake
would be the finding of cases decided around that time in which the meaning of
the term was disputed. If that term was mistranslated, as Palmer suggests, there
must have been cases in which the dispute cropped up.
56. See, for the original study, Rodolfo Batiza, Louisiana Civil Code of 1808:
Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1972); to go deeper
into Batiza’s argument, see Seth S. Brostoff, The Encyclopedist Code: Ancien
Droit Legal Encyclopedias and Their Verbatim Influence on the Louisiana Digest
of 1808, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD. 33 (2020).
57. PALMER, supra note 3, at 70.
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Conversely, attention could be directed at praising the translators for
doing their research and resorting to a translation that was very well
accepted in the legal community. As a matter of fact, a translator is
supposed to concede to previous translations if the quality of the
translations is good and enjoys acceptance among the relevant community. However, Palmer hits the nail on the head when criticizing
the translators for being led to use strange collocations that are traceable to Strahan, such as knavish possessor for possesseur de mauvaise foi and honest and fair possessor for possesseur de bonne foi.
Possessor in bad faith and possessor in good faith would have certainly been better and plainer equivalents. Palmer is right in criticizing the “slavish reliance”58 on Strahan’s translation as for these
weird terms.
The use of Strahan’s translation by Nugent and Davezac leads
Palmer to speculate on how the translators interacted with the redactors of the Digest. The main redactor, Moreau-Lislet, was categorical in setting himself apart from the translation: “We have nothing
to do with the imperfections of the translation of the Code—the
French text, in which it is known that the work was drawn up, leaves
no doubt.”59 While that was the position pour la galerie, Palmer
suggests that the translators and redactors were in contact,60 because
otherwise the translators would not have known that extracts of the
Digest had been taken verbatim from Domat, which was translated
by Strahan. Another possibility could be that the translators discovered Strahan by their own means, but Palmer’s intuition seems to be
more accurate, in light of the translators’ lack of sound legal credentials.61 Discovering sources and contrasting originals with translations certainly requires legal and translation skills. Nowadays, it has
58. Id. at 71.
59. Id. at 75.
60. Id.
61. Looking at Moreau-Lislet’s library may be a good idea; see Agustín
Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s Library, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana, 76 LA. L.
REV. 1163 (2016).
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been understood that collaboration between authors and translators
is of the essence to attain optimal results. Especially in the area of
legislative translation with the purpose of creating translations
which actually are originals, the modern technique of co-drafting is
the way to go to guarantee the best product.62
IV. CONCLUSION
Palmer’s analysis has unearthed many interesting facts to understand how the law of Louisiana has been shaped since the drafting
and translation of a seminal piece of legislation which afterward, in
1870, became the monolingual English code. The translators were
responsible for many of the linguistic choices that shaped the civil
law in Louisiana for years to come. However, it is difficult to accept
that the civil law was born with this translation as the title of the
book suggests or that the civil law was “implanted”63 with this translation, as Louisiana was already “deeply rooted in the civil law tradition”64 before the enactment of the Digest in 1808. But Palmer is
right in pointing that this translation “represented a consequential
step in the birth of a distinct kind of civil law in Louisiana.”65 After
all, Nugent and Davezac might have been the first cooks behind
Louisiana’s “legal gumbo.”66
This book was very much needed to understand the origins of
codified civil law in the state of Louisiana. It is a great contribution
combining legal history, comparative law, and legal translation. The
view of an expert in mixed jurisdictions was key to put this translation in perspective as a “unique artifact of Louisiana’s mixed legal
62. See, e.g., Susan Šarčević, The Quest for Legislative Bilingualism and
Multilingualism: Co-Drafting in Canada and Switzerland, in JURILINGUISTICS:
LAW AND LANGUAGE, supra note 32, at 279-292.
63. PALMER, supra note 3, at 81.
64. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic
or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 4 (2002).
65. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
66. Olivier Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding
Contamination, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 519-520 (2011).
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system that mirrors the historical conditions of its day,”67 yet without avoiding pondering over the shortcomings of the translation. After going through the history of Nugent and Davezac and their translation, one is left with a desire for more. The legal community of
Louisiana would welcome a study like this one on the translators
and the story behind the translation of the Civil Code of 1825, which
was also drafted in French and translated into English. Professor
Palmer might want to enlighten us with a sequel, for the benefit of
all of us interested in this rich mixed jurisdiction.
Mariano Vitetta
Austral University School of Law

67. PALMER, supra note 3, at 3.

